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*Peacekeeping Options: Considerations for U.S. Policymakers
and the Congress*

Marjorie Ann Browne and Nina M. Serafino, Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division

April 10, 1997

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
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CRS Report for Congress

Peacekeeping Options: Considerations for U.S. Policymakers and the Congress

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April 10, 1997



PEACEKEEPING OPTIONS: CONSIDERATIONS FOR U.S. POLICYMAKERS AND THE CONGRESS

SUMMARY

As recent international efforts to quell instability in many troubled nations have reached mixed or ambiguous outcomes, many Members of Congress wish to reexamine the tools available to the United States to address the problem. Since its founding in 1945, the United Nations has been the world's primary instrument for international response to instability and for international efforts to achieve peace. But the 1990s expansion of U.N. peacekeeping activities, both in number and in scope, resulted in some operations which were perceived as mismanaged, ineffective, and costly. Concerned about the U.N.'s ability to carry out such operations effectively, many policymakers have begun to explore the possibilities of strengthening the United Nations or employing other organizations to help achieve peace.

In recent years, the United Nations, non-governmental and humanitarian organizations (NGOs), and regional organizations have increasingly supplemented each other's peace and security activities. The United States, and other nations, have organized "ad hoc" multilateral groups or coalitions (organized under the U.N. or regional aegis) when greater flexibility or speed of action was desired. Within the last few years, commercial firms contracted by the United States have also been brought into peace operations.

While these public, private, and "ad hoc" organizations all play a role in peace operations, the United Nations is uniquely active along the entire "conflict" continuum, from situations of potential hostilities to post-conflict situations. Except for a few in Europe, regional organizations are largely unequipped, structurally and financially, to effectively perform a wide variety of peace operations. (Regional organizations in Europe currently play a larger part in conflictive and other problem situations than regional organizations elsewhere.) NGOs have tended to concentrate on prevention activities, refugee resettlement, and post-conflict development. Private firms have been used to supplement U.S. and U.N. personnel in a few recent operations.

Most analysts would conclude that containing conflict at the lowest possible level is most cost-effective, but the **relative** costs and effectiveness of using these different organizations appear still unclear. A wide variety of circumstances can influence whether an organization is appropriate to use and able to prevent, contain or settle a conflict. No one organization or type of organization is seen as capable of providing, by itself, the necessary coverage in all situations. There are implications for U.S. interests, for the budget, for U.S. diplomacy, and for the U.S. military in the use and mix of each of these types of organization.

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**PEACEKEEPING OPTIONS:
CONSIDERATIONS FOR U.S. POLICYMAKERS
AND THE CONGRESS**

INTRODUCTION

As recent international efforts to quell instability in many troubled nations have entailed significant costs and reached ambiguous outcomes, many Members of Congress wish to reexamine the tools available to the United States to promote peace and security. For some, the issue is made more urgent by questions about the United Nations' post-Cold War expansion of peace and security missions -- in both number and scope -- and the utility of these missions in preventing, stabilizing, and resolving conflicts around the world. The cost effectiveness of these operations has been questioned by policymakers and leaders of several governments. Some U.S. policymakers question whether the U.N.'s peacekeeping activities serve the interests of the United States.

Consequently, U.S. policymakers have begun to explore the possibility of strengthening the United Nations or other organizations to carry out peace and security operations. These other organizations all have been and currently are used, usually in conjunction or cooperation with the United Nations. These are regional organizations, multilateral coalitions, non-governmental organizations, and commercial firms. In some situations, U.S. policymakers may prefer to act and to use U.S. forces unilaterally. Unilateral action is more likely to be preferred where U.S. interests are vital, where timing and, perhaps, a level of secrecy are essential, and where support from allies is less than certain. Public, private, and "ad hoc" organizations can offer U.S. policymakers additional options when they prefer that others share the financial or political cost of and responsibility for an operation.

This report provides a frame of reference for considering the relative merits of using these organizations in peace and security operations. It first reviews the types of actions and activities available to deal with situations ranging from low-level tension to open conflict to post-conflict transitions. It then examines, for each of the organizations, the major considerations, i.e., effectiveness, advantages and disadvantages, and other important issues for U.S. policymakers in their use. It concludes with a discussion of the relative costs and risks of using these options, the powers of Congress, and related implications for Members of Congress and other U.S. policymakers.

"**Peacekeeping**" is a generic and often imprecise term that has long been used to describe the many activities that the United Nations and other international organizations undertake to promote, maintain, impose or enforce peace. It is used in that broad sense in the title and in general references in this report. However, when appropriate, this report also uses more precise terms that have been developed to categorize different types of activities that the U.N. and other organizations undertake to manage conflict and promote peace. Appendix A lists and defines these terms. This section discusses the activities.

OVERVIEW OF PEACE AND SECURITY ACTIVITIES

International attempts to deal with conflicts and ameliorate their effects through multilateral action and a variety of organizations are not new. Non-governmental, humanitarian organizations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) have played an active role in conflicts since the last century. In this century, precedents for U.N. peacekeeping were laid down through the collective security activities of the League of Nations and multilateral coalitions during the period between World War I and World War II. While the United Nations has been the principal actor in international peacekeeping efforts since the end of World War II, regional organizations, various multilateral groupings and coalitions, non-governmental organizations, and even most recently private firms have all played a part.

These organizations undertake their activities under a broad range of circumstances which can be viewed as a "conflict continuum." These circumstances present varying challenges, costs, and degrees of risk to the organizations and personnel seeking to establish or sustain peace. Because of this, different organizations have concentrated their efforts at different points of the conflict continuum: preventive activities in areas of low tension and potential hostilities, conflict management and resolution activities in situations of open conflict, and in post-conflict transitions. The activities in each of these areas of the continuum and the involvement of each of the organizations are summarized below.

Preventive Activities in Pre-Conflict Situations

At the low end of the conflict continuum are situations of low-level tensions and potentially unstable, hostile situations. In these circumstances, organizations may undertake a variety of "preventive activities." These include: **targeted humanitarian aid** intended to relieve conditions of misery and prevent the growth of tensions; **confidence-building regimes** by means of which states wishing to avoid war regularly inform each other in advance of actions that could be viewed as threatening; **consultation systems or the use of good office or mediation efforts** intended to forestall conflict (i.e.,

preventive diplomacy¹); "**early warning**" systems that will detect problems in time for international organizations and other parties to intervene diplomatically before conflict breaks out; and **electoral observer missions** to monitor elections.

Activities in Conflict Situations

Conflict situations can range from low-level situations of intermittent hostilities to open and lasting warfare. **Humanitarian operations** can be undertaken at all levels of conflict, and a wide variety of other activities may be carried out in hopes of stabilizing the situation and promoting peace. Among the activities most often undertaken in conflict situations are those that are now encompassed under the terms "peace making" and "conflict resolution." These include **investigatory and fact-finding missions, diplomatic efforts** such as the offer of good offices, mediation and negotiation assistance, and the **deployment of military personnel for observation, deterrence and conflict containment**. In situations of open conflict, nations may also decide to undertake "peace enforcement" actions, where forces are sent to **compel compliance with cease-fire agreements or resolutions**, or to **restore order** after a peace agreement has been broken. Forces sent on peace enforcement missions may forcibly separate belligerents; they also may protect civilians and humanitarian workers. (Peace enforcement sometimes engages forces in actions that many military analysts view as more typical of warfighting than peacekeeping.)

Activities in Post-Conflict, Transition Situations

Traditionally, most efforts and activities of the international community have occurred at the post-conflict stage of the continuum, that is, in transitional periods following stable peace accords where the parties are dismantling war-time structures and military forces and attempting to replace them with stable peace-time and civilian institutions. **Humanitarian assistance** tends to be a predominant feature of these efforts. Peace making efforts continue in an attempt to secure smooth and lasting transitions. "Traditional" peacekeeping activities occur after a cease-fire accord, when forces -- i.e., military observers and sometimes infantry troops -- are placed between previously warring factions as an "interpositional" force to **monitor and verify compliance** with the accords. International or other foreign forces may also be placed along borders to **deter the infiltration of arms or supporting forces**. After more stable peace agreements are reached, post-conflict activities also encompass "**peace building**" steps. These include disarming, demobilizing, repatriating and

¹ The term "preventive diplomacy" is used for actions taken in three separate contexts: to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent disputes from escalating into conflicts, and to limit conflicts after they have occurred. Thus, "preventive diplomacy" can be used at different points of the conflict continuum. For more on this concept, see: Mark M. Lowenthal. *Preventive Diplomacy: Prospects and Issues*. CRS Report 93-349 S. March 25, 1993.

resettling armed forces, resettling refugees, and monitoring elections. They also include activities known as "**nation-building**," among them creating, reforming, or strengthening institutions.

DETERMINING THE UTILITY OF AVAILABLE OPTIONS

Determining the utility of options available to carry out peace and security operations implies an assessment of the relative advantages and disadvantages of the organizations available to deal with a problem, and their comparative effectiveness. One problem in accurately assessing whether the United Nations or other available organizations are more effective in these operations is the lack of agreement on what constitutes success. Another is a lack of consistent comparative studies on the performance of two or more organizations involved in peace operations. This section examines concepts of the appropriate criteria for success. The following sections look at the major issues involved in using these options, including judgments on their overall effectiveness. In examining and assessing options, this report has used information from several existing evaluations of effectiveness; it has not attempted independent study or evaluation of operations.

Definitions of Success

For some, an operation has only been successful if it leads to a **permanent end to tensions and hostilities**, based on a resolution or removal of the underlying causes of the dispute. This judgment may represent different perspectives. For some the financial costs of undertaking a peace operation may only be justified if it permanently ends a conflict, which can imply that operations should only be undertaken where there are clear prospects of success. For others, the human and social costs of abandoning an operation requires that every effort be made to settle not only conflicts, but the underlying tensions that produce them.

Some studies have used graduated, more relative criteria of success, e.g., whether lives have been saved and whether the costs of instability have been minimized or avoided. By these criteria, operations can be considered successful even if they fall short of permanently resolving a conflict. Where hostilities have yet to break out, an operation may be considered successful if it has **prevented or deterred conflict**. In cases where conflict has broken out, an operation might be successful if it **contained conflict** within the borders of the initial parties to the dispute or **averted escalation** within a country, or if the operation **led to the abatement of conflict** for a substantial period of time. Another criteria of success would be whether operations substantially alleviated human misery associated with conflict and prevented deaths from famine or exposure. Analysts looking at individual cases will often develop their own mission-specific criteria.

Additional criteria are sometimes used to judge success. In the case of the United Nations, where the Security Council establishes a concrete mandate for every operation and whose goal may be short of permanent settlement, many analysts judge an operation successful or relatively successful if the Security Council **mandate has been met**. For the operations of regional organizations, some analysts have cited as one criteria of success an effort's ability to "**isolate**" **a conflict**, i.e., contain a conflict to the local or regional level and prevent it from becoming a global issue.²

It is usually difficult to prove that most activities of the United Nations and other international organizations have met the first criteria of success -- that of a permanent resolution. Under the more relative criteria, particularly those of averting or abating conflict -- many more could be considered successful. The premise of crediting an operation with success even in the absence of a permanent settlement is that preventing, deterring, containing, limiting, or abating conflict for a substantial period of time all save lives and economically benefit the countries involved as well as the international community. They have been spared the economic, human, and social costs of hostilities and conflict, and have bought time for attempts to work out a permanent settlement. On the other hand, some analysts point out that delaying, abating, or limiting conflicts in certain cases may only lead to greater conflict in the future.

The Costs of Inaction

Judgments that operations can be considered successful even if they do not result in a permanent settlement often rest on the assessment that the costs of inaction would be too high. Although the economic, human and social costs of inaction, i.e., the costs of continued instability, are largely unmeasurable, they are often considerable.

The economic costs of "instability" -- tensions, sporadic hostilities, and continuing conflict -- involve new or continuing defense expenditures for the countries involved and perhaps for neighboring countries who wish to protect their borders. To finance increased defense expenditures, countries may often cut expenditures in other areas or raise taxes. These actions can depress the economies of the countries involved, reduce levels of government and non-government imports of goods and services, and discourage domestic investment. Continuing states of tension and hostilities can also involve lost opportunities in trade, contracts, and foreign investment.

Instability usually entails the loss of human life and significant other social costs, and may well involve substantial international humanitarian expenditures and defense expenditures. Situations of hostilities and conflict can induce thousands, or even tens of thousands, of persons to flee their homes and

² Of course, governments or other interested parties, in order to justify their costs, may also cite operations as a success on the basis of relative criteria in a less critical fashion than the analysts cited in this report.

livelihoods to seek refuge elsewhere in their country or abroad. Refugee flows can create humanitarian crises that often are addressed through internationally-funded efforts to feed, shelter, provide medical care, and relocate these populations.

On the other hand, inaction may save the resources that a premature or fruitless intervention would entail. (See the discussion on the factors contributing to peace settlements in the section on Comparative Effectiveness, below.)

The following sections of the report on the United Nations, regional organizations, multilateral forces, and on the major, practical options for "privatizing" peacekeeping, (i.e., the use of commercial contractors and non-governmental organizations), offer general guidance on their relative effectiveness and utility in addressing instability. In analyzing the utility of these options, policymakers also need to include judgments on the costs and benefits of inaction when considering whether to initiate an operation or to continue an ongoing one.

MAJOR FINDINGS

COMPARISON OF ACTIVITIES

The United Nations, non-governmental and humanitarian organizations, and regional organizations have traditionally supplemented each others' efforts in peace and security activities. Within the last few years, commercial firms contracted by the United States have also been brought into peace operations. While the activities of these tools for peace and security overlap in some areas, none but the United Nations has carried out the full range of activities throughout the conflict continuum. The efforts of the others tend to be focused on one or two major areas, where they overlap with efforts of the United Nations.

The most active of these organizations in the preventive activity arena have been the United Nations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Specialized U.N. agencies and non-governmental organizations have been involved in humanitarian work. The U.N. Secretary-General (and Security Council) has traditionally been involved in pre-conflict diplomatic efforts. Recently, NGOs have played an increasing role in attempting to settle unstable situations through mediation efforts. Some regional organizations are assuming an active role in this area.

In conflict situations, the United Nations often has been involved in areas where only partial or temporary peace arrangements could be achieved -- such as Cyprus and Southern Lebanon. For most of their histories, the regional organizations have largely avoided deploying troops in any capacity into conflictive situations. The Organization of African Unity (OAU) appears to have been the most active in conflict situations, but primarily in peacemaking efforts. Recently, there have been exceptions. These include the maritime and air interdiction of NATO and the Western European Union (WEU) in the former Yugoslavia, where an *ad hoc* multilateral coalition also arranged for humanitarian assistance, the recent Liberia operation of the Economic Organization of West African States (ECOWAS), and the operation of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in Georgia. NGOs also carry out their efforts in conflict situations: providing humanitarian relief and development assistance; monitoring and publicizing human rights violations; and encouraging conflict resolution.

Under its Charter, the United Nations was designed in large part to undertake action which is now referred to as "peace enforcement." However, U.N. members never implemented the institutional arrangements set forth and appear unlikely to do so in the future. There is widespread opinion that the U.N. is not suited to undertake peace enforcement operations. Except for NATO, regional organizations currently do not have the institutional infrastructure to undertake peace enforcement operations. U.S.-led *ad hoc* multilateral coalitions have undertaken recent peace enforcement missions

under a U.N. mandate. NGOs have played a large role in providing humanitarian assistance in conflict situations, with security sometimes provided by armed forces.

In the post-conflict functions, the U.N.'s activities, for many years, were primarily the placement of interpositional forces in "traditional" peacekeeping activities, where it was the primary actor. Increasingly, however, it has become involved in a series of nation-building activities which are intended to promote the conditions needed to prevent a reoccurrence of anarchy or civil strife, and to achieve a permanent peace. NGOs have recently undertaken an active role in nation-building activities, often in conjunction with the United Nations. Regional organizations are also involved, particularly in election monitoring, and some are contemplating increased peace-building roles. Support for peacekeeping forces in post-conflict situations is sometimes contracted out to private firms.

COMPARATIVE EFFECTIVENESS

None of these options appears clearly more effective than any other. Results are often mixed, and success is often measured against the relative criteria mentioned earlier. Although the small number of comparative studies makes any conclusions on effectiveness tentative, available evidence suggests that the effectiveness of a peace operation often depends as much on the factors at play in a situation as on the form of organization which carries it out.

Six factors are often cited.³ Three concern the conflict itself: first, the nature of the conflict, i.e., whether it is interstate or internal; second, the relative balance of power among those involved; and third, the interests of third party states. A fourth factor, the desire of the parties involved to reach a settlement, may change over time because of changes in the second and third factors. (This accounts for some analysts' beliefs that peace negotiations will not succeed until a situation is "ripe" for settlement, and that some conflicts can only be settled by a military victory.)⁴ The fifth and sixth factors relate to the character and competence of the aspiring peacekeepers and peacemakers, particularly perceptions of their impartiality and neutrality, and the match of a peacekeeping operation's resources to its mandate.

³ See, for example, Joseph S. Nye, Jr. *Peace in Parts: Integration and Conflict in Regional Organization*. Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America, Inc., 1987 (reprint of a 1971 publication); Paul F. Diehl. *International Peacekeeping*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993; Fen Osler Hampson. *Nurturing Peace: Why Peace Settlements Succeed or Fail*. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996; and, Robert F. Randle. *The Origins of Peace: A Study of Peacemaking and the Structure of Peace Settlements*. New York: The Free Press, 1973.

⁴ The concept of "ripeness" and its limitation as an explanatory factor of peace settlements is explored by Hampson, *ibid.* See, especially, pp. 20-24.

IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY

For many analysts and policymakers, the high costs of instability and war, as detailed in the section on costs, argue for strengthening the international system to deal with crises. Those concerned with strengthening this system tend to divide into two schools of thought. One would continue current efforts to strengthen the United Nations first, and other mechanisms as needed. The other would de-emphasize the United Nations, and strengthen the others to take over some or many of its current functions. The findings of this report raise implications for U.S. policy in both approaches.

Proponents of the first approach argue that to gain maximum effectiveness from the current international peace system, all existing groups, particularly the United Nations and regional organizations, must continue to be reformed and built up in a complementary way. Strengthening the United Nations is important because it often can bring the most influence and resources to bear in a situation. Nevertheless, many considerations -- a desire to avoid internationalizing a local or regional problem, strong conflicting interests among U.N. member states or disputants', and member states sensitivities about sovereignty in certain situations -- may sometimes make the use of a regional or even non-governmental organization preferable. And, because each organization's potential for success will vary according to specific circumstance, the overall rate of success in peace operations would be greater if the international system had a variety of improved tools to choose from.⁵

⁵ One analyst, who examined efforts at preventive diplomacy, including the role of the U.N., regional organizations, NGOs, and individual states, came to this conclusion regarding preventive activities in particular. Michael S. Lund writes that "each of the principal players--the United States, regional organizations, the United States and other major powers, and NGOs--has its weaknesses as well as its strengths. None can perform all the tasks of preventive diplomacy adequately by itself or some tasks necessarily as well as some other players. In short, an adequate, cost-effective, and politically feasible global system of prevention cannot look primarily to one type of actor." See: *Preventing Violent Conflicts: A Strategy for Preventive Diplomacy*. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace. 1996. pp. 180-181.

After studying five recent peace operations, Fen Osler Hampson also concludes that a mix of organizations is desirable in pursuing peace. He writes: "third parties need other third parties if they are to work efficiently and effectively in nurturing the conditions for peace. No single third party alone had the resources or leverage to make the peace process work. In those settlements that did succeed, many different laborers tilled the soil so that the peace process could bear fruit. The United Nations required the backing of great powers. Great powers needed the local support of a country's neighbors. Regional actors and groups needed the assistance of subregional groups. Governments and international organizations also required the active assistance and involvement of nongovernmental organizations and agencies, particularly during the implementation of the agreement." Hampson, *ibid.*, p. 233.

Creating an overlap in the system would probably have cost implications, however. It could be more expensive than the current system, if it were to require creating duplicate structures within the U.N. and regional organizations, and sustaining a variety of non-governmental organizations with government funds. Or, given current donor fatigue, it may mean that less resources would be available to all organizations in the international system and each would suffer proportionately. Some analysts argue, however, that greater involvement of many organizations at many levels would introduce elements of both cooperation and competitiveness into future efforts. This could lead to greater efficiency, even if overall international funding is scarce, as the United Nations, regional organizations, and agencies involved would be encouraged to better plan and coordinate their activities.

On the other hand, those who have found little reason to trust the United Nations would strengthen regional organizations to take a lead role in peace activities and use NGOs, and perhaps private contractors, more extensively. Some proponents of this position are concerned by the possible infringement of the U.N. on U.S. sovereignty. The central argument, however, is that the U.N. does not adequately represent U.S. interests, and that the U.N. is so burdened by bureaucratic and political inefficiencies that it can never be sufficiently reformed to play an effective peace and security role.

Although many analysts argue that regional organizations could be reformed and strengthened to play a larger role in a greater variety of peace operations, many also do not regard them as a substitute in all cases for the United Nations. Regional organizations' limited utility in certain situations, and their desire not to act in others, argues for the existence of some overarching international organization. Some argue that if the U.N. peace and security role was eliminated, world leaders would have to create some form of overarching international grouping (an association of "likeminded states" as some analysts refer to it) that could supplement the regional organizations when they were not able or did not wish to play a role.

De-emphasizing or reducing the U.N. role could mean that the United States would become more active on a unilateral or an *ad hoc* multilateral basis than it has been in the past, with uncertain cost implications. Because there are no regional organizations willing at this time to take on a full peace and security role in Asia, and because there is no Middle East-wide regional organization capable of taking responsibility for the conflicts between Arab states and Israel, the United States could find itself committing more of its military might and resources to these areas, where it has important and vital interests.⁶

⁶ For a review of considerations regarding the concept of a comprehensive regional organization in the Persian Gulf, or perhaps the entire Middle East, see: Alfred B. Prados. *Persian Gulf Region: U.S. Post-War Security Interests*. CRS Report 93-568 F. June 11, 1993.

Both approaches would entail a proliferation of groups involved in peace organizations. This could present challenges to U.S. diplomats, other officials, and policymakers.

Despite the potential advantages of strengthening more organizations in international peace and security efforts, such increased involvement could raise problems for U.S. diplomacy and for the efficient management of operations. As discussed in the regional issues section, the United States might find itself faced with complications to bilateral and regional relations if it chose to promote a greater role for regional organizations in international peace and security activities. The greater the number of organizations and groups involved in peace operations, the more interests will be at play.

Regarding the management of individual operations, the more organizations that are involved in a peace operation, the more critical the coordination and control problem. This can be particularly burdensome when the U.S. military is responsible for the security of individuals in organizations over which it exercises little authority.

Policymakers may well encounter new problems in apportioning funding for such programs, particularly in choosing which organizations will be involved. As a result of several recent operations, some analysts wonder whether the U.S. practice of funding international and local NGOs has created networks favored on political grounds rather than on relative effectiveness. Others fear that U.S. funding for NGOs could create vested interests which will lobby effectively for unnecessary projects or unnecessarily prolong useful projects.

Much of the impetus behind U.S. funding for NGOs to participate in various peace and security activities is based on the belief that they "privatize" such assistance, and private organizations are able to handle such assistance more efficiently than international intergovernmental organizations. Some analysts have worried, however, that internationally-funded NGOs are usurping functions more properly performed by the national government of a country, or by local citizen's groups, and are creating a dependency on international funding and institutions. For instance, some argue that state governments and local groups should be trained and equipped as quickly as possible to do their own election monitoring, rather than funding NGOs, or for that matter, offices in regional organizations which might perpetuate their own role in such activities.

The potential increased costs to the United States involved in both approaches could argue for an increased emphasis on preventive measures. Increasing the number and efficiency of preventive mechanisms, i.e., those to detect and avert incipient crises, is argued to be cost-effective, in the long run, for the entire international system (although many analysts note a shortage of research that would provide guidance on the relative advantages and

appropriate use of preventive activities).⁷ Potential cost benefits are likely to be even greater for the United States because the United Nations is, at least for the moment, widely regarded as an inappropriate mechanism for peace enforcement activities, and the United States is likely to play a major role and bear a major cost in the organization of multilateral operations to handle conflicts.

An emphasis on preventive activities may not be without problems, however. The concept that preventive activities should be undertaken regularly is relatively new, and there is little knowledge about the types of activities that would be most effective and the conditions under which they would be successful. And, they may have unintended consequences. (Like other types of peacekeeping actions, preventive measures may be used by interested parties to gain advantages.) Further, the results of preventive activities can not be measured. Lives lost can be counted, lives saved cannot. Thus, in the current U.S. budget climate, U.S. policymakers may find it difficult to argue and sustain funding for preventive activities.

⁷ Writing on the need to reshape the international security system and offering proposals to reform the U.N., former Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans urges that priority be given to dispute resolution and conflict prevention. He details a suggestion for enhancing the U.N. preventive apparatus, arguing that "the cost of a modest investment now in strengthening and widening preventive diplomacy efforts should yield a considerable benefit. The establishment of adequately equipped preventive diplomacy units in six regional centres, with a total staff of 100 and funds for necessary travel, would require in the order of \$21 million per annum; compare this with the expected U.N. peacekeeping budget for 1993 of \$3.7 billion, or the estimated cost of well over \$70 billion for the Gulf War coalition, a single enforcement operation." *Cooperating for Peace: The Global Agenda for the 1990s and Beyond*. St. Leonards, Australia: Allen & Unwin, 1993, p. 177.

THE UNITED NATIONS IN PEACE AND SECURITY ACTIVITIES

SCOPE OF ACTIVITIES

Over its history, the United Nations has been most active in preventive activities and efforts at the post conflict or transitional stage in maintaining or restoring peace and security and promoting the settlement of disputes. The legal, political, and historical basis of the United Nations in this area is grounded in Article 1 of the U.N. Charter:

The Purposes of the United Nations are:

1. To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace;⁸

U.N. preventive measures have often been taken by the U.N. Secretary-General. If a potential crisis or dispute arises, the Secretary-General, using quiet diplomacy and diplomatic channels, might offer his "good offices" to help the disputants achieve a settlement. As two analysts observe, "Although this activity is rarely visible to the public, it constitutes one of the most important functions of the UN."⁹

Sanctions and the Use of Force

The Charter drafters sought to correct the perceived weaknesses of the League of Nations Covenant by authorizing the U.N. organization, through its Security Council, to impose sanctions and to use force, if necessary, to maintain

⁸ The activities discussed in this section provide an indicative, not a comprehensive, look at the U.N. role. For example, as suggested in Article 1 (1) of the Charter, the tools available include the International Court of Justice, an important organ not discussed here. For further information on the role of the World Court, see Rosalyn Higgins. *Problems and Process; International Law and How We Use It*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1994. Chapter 11. *Dispute Settlement and the International Court of Justice*, pp. 186-204; Oscar Schachter and Christopher C. Joyner, eds. *United Nations Legal Order*. v. 1. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995. pp. 174-203.

⁹ Thomas M. Franck and Georg Nolte. *The Good Offices Function of the UN Secretary-General*. In: *United Nations, Divided World: The UN's Roles in International Relations*, 2nd edition. Edited by Adam Roberts and Benedict Kingsbury. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993. p. 144.

or restore international peace and security.¹⁰ The organization was conceived, primarily, as a force for peace, not an instrument for war. The main provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter aimed at providing the Council with the advice, materiel, and personnel for using force have never been fully implemented.¹¹

Sanctions, whether economic or diplomatic, may be preventive in intent but are coercive in impact.¹² They are imposed to achieve a desired response from the target government or group. While most of the 11 sanctions situations occurred in a pre-conflict or preventive context, at least four were imposed or existed under conflictive circumstances.¹³ Council authorizations of the use of force or implied force, for the most part, were made under conflictive conditions. Only in the example of southern Rhodesia, when force was authorized to implement sanctions, might the authorization be interpreted as preventive and in a pre-conflict situation. In addition, the authorization of force in Haiti might be interpreted in either category, as preventive or conflictive.

For most of the Cold War, the U.N. Security Council was limited by Great Power constraints in using Chapter VII tools to respond to peace and security situations. Thus, the authority in Article 41 to impose sanctions was employed in only two cases, both in southern Africa: southern Rhodesia and South Africa. During the Cold War era, the Council authorized the use of force in three instances -- in 1950, at the start of the Korean War; in 1961, for the U.N. peacekeeping operation in the Congo (ONUC); and in 1966, in connection with enforcement of sanctions against southern Rhodesia.¹⁴

¹⁰ The League Covenant did not provide for binding decisions to be taken by League organs; a member state had to go to war before sanctions could be used against it; and the League system was "decentralized" in the peace and security area. See Simma, Bruno, ed. *The Charter of the United Nations, a Commentary*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1994. pp. 606-607. The U.N. Charter focused peace and security actions in the Security Council which could take binding decisions relative to sanctions and could itself determine that a threat to or breach of the peace existed.

¹¹ These include Article 43 (agreements to provide forces, assistance, and facilities) and Articles 44-47 (Military Staff Committee).

¹² For a summary of the 11 cases, see *Use of Sanctions Under Chapter VII of the UN Charter* on the Internet, United Nations web cite at the following address, "<http://www.un.org/News/ocssg/sanction.htm>".

¹³ Former Yugoslavia, Liberia, Angola, and Rwanda.

¹⁴ The United Kingdom sought and gained authority to use its military to intercept, stop, board, and redirect oil tankers bound for southern Rhodesia, in violation of trade sanctions. For information about these cases, see *Iraq-Kuwait: the United Nations Response Before the War*. CRS Issue Brief 90147. Updated May 10, 1991 (Archived). See pages 6-7 for brief details. Additional information may be found on Korea, in Rosalyn Higgins. *United Nations Peacekeeping 1946-1967; Documents and Commentary*.

(continued...)

Freed of the limits imposed by the Cold War environment, between August 1990 and December 1996, the Council has imposed Article 41 sanctions in nine cases.¹⁵ Committees of the entire 15-member Council have monitored and fulfilled the tasks of each case of sanctions as stipulated in its resolutions. In addition, the Council has called on member governments to monitor sanctions implementation at borders and ports. Examples include the actions by the U.S. Navy to monitor U.N. sanctions against Haiti before Aristide was returned to Haiti and steps taken by the U.S. and other entities to monitor aspects of the sanctions against the former Yugoslavia. During the same period, the Council authorized the use of force or its equivalent in five cases -- Iraq-Kuwait, Somalia, Bosnia and Hercegovina, Rwanda, and Haiti.¹⁶

Peacekeeping Operations

The concept of the peacekeeping operation was initiated by the United Nations during the Cold War, with the first U.N. peacekeeping operations set up before the term was used and its concepts formulated. Peacekeeping operations, either as observer missions, which are unarmed, or "force-level" operations, which involve larger numbers of lightly armed personnel at higher costs and with heavier equipment, have usually been created after a cease-fire has been achieved, as a post-conflict tool to promote work toward lasting settlement.¹⁷

Between 1948 and early 1988, the Council established 13 peacekeeping operations, five of which dealt with aspects of the Arab-Israeli disputes while

¹⁴(...continued)

v. 2-Asia. London: Oxford University Press, 1970. pp. 172-178; on the Congo, in Rosalyn Higgins. *United Nations Peacekeeping 1946-1967; Documents and Commentary.* *v. 3-Africa.* London: Oxford University Press, 1980. pp. 56-60; and on southern Rhodesia, in Simma, pp. 624-625.

¹⁵ The nine cases involve Iraq, former Yugoslavia, Libya, Somalia, Liberia, Haiti, Angola (UNITA), Rwanda, and Sudan.

¹⁶ In the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Council authorized UNPROFOR "to take the necessary measures, including the use of force" and authorized others (interpreted to mean NATO) to take "all necessary measures, through the use of air power". [S/RES/836 (1993), June 4, 1993; paragraphs 9 and 10. UNPROFOR was the U.N. Protection Force in the former Yugoslavia.] In the other four cases, involving Iraq-Kuwait, Somalia, Rwanda, and Haiti, the Council did not use the term "force" but authorized the use of "all necessary means" or "all necessary measures", with the understanding that force was included among the necessary means available.

¹⁷ For background, see: Marjorie Ann Browne. *United Nations Peacekeeping: Historical Overview and Current Issues.* CRS Report 90-96F. January 31, 1990. The distinctions between observer missions and "force-level" operations are used in International Peace Academy. *Peacekeeper's Handbook.* New York: Pergamon Press, 1984. Chapter III, see esp. Annexes A and B, p. 41-42.

three were located in the Middle East region but unrelated to the Arab-Israeli clashes. The peacekeeping operational concepts of consent, impartiality, and non-use of force, were formulated in 1956, with the establishment of UNEF I in the wake of the Anglo-French takeover of the Suez Canal and the Arab-Israeli war. The term peacekeeping operation was introduced into the U.N. lexicon at that time. These concepts were modified for the U.N. Operation in the Congo (ONUC), when the Security Council, in 1961, authorized ONUC to use force to prevent civil war and to apprehend military and paramilitary forces in the Congo (now Zaire).

As with preventive measures, the nature and character of the traditional U.N. peacekeeping operation also began to change near the end of the Cold War when the Council, in 1988, activated the plan for Namibia (U.N. Transition Assistance Group, UNTAG), originally devised and approved in 1978. This pacific settlement arrangement labeled the entire operation -- both military and civilian components -- as peacekeeping. This precedent was expanded in 1991-1992 with the U.N. Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), that encompassed seven operational components, although only two, military and civil police, were peacekeeping tasks. These two operations, in Namibia and Cambodia, established to implement comprehensive pacific settlement arrangements, might be characterized as fully post-conflict in character. Other U.N. operations, for example, in El Salvador, Mozambique, and Haiti, had a post-conflict role but first had to move the situation from a conflict stage. In still other, ongoing situations, such as in Western Sahara and Angola, that post-conflict stage envisioned in the peace settlement has been impossible or very slow to achieve.

As the Cold War came to a close, the United Nations became the tool that U.N. members turned to first when a peace and security situation arose, a so-called forum of first choice. The Security Council was characterized as acting as the drafters of the U.N. Charter envisioned, with the Permanent members of the Council working together in a proactive way to devise a response that would be adopted unanimously by the Council. Since 1988, up through May 1994, the Council created 20 "peacekeeping operations", involving conflicts throughout the world.

Another change in the post-Cold War era is that many peace and security situations are now internal or involve intrastate disputants rather than interstate, or between states. During this 1988-1994 period, the Council placed U.N. operations into areas where the civil war or ethnic struggle aspect of the conflict made universal adherence to a cease-fire difficult to maintain. The absence of governmental authority in some cases and a breakdown in law and order often present in internal situations removed one of the three basic tenets of traditional U.N. peacekeeping -- consent. This absence of consent, in turn, limited the ability of a traditional peacekeeping operation to be an effective tool for the maintenance of international peace and security.

May 1994 marked a change in policy for the United States and U.N. Security Council, with both becoming more constrained in their responses to peace and security situations. Each issued a statement setting forth factors and criteria to be considered in establishing a U.N. peacekeeping operation or other U.N. mission.¹⁸ The impact of this policy has been greater caution and a reduction in the number of peacekeeping operations established. Between May 1994 and January 1997, the Council has set up nine peacekeeping operations, five of which were replacement operations for those in the former Yugoslavia, including three to implement the Dayton Agreement.¹⁹

U.S. POLICY

Since May 1994, U.S. policy has been to continue to emphasize the United Nations as the "primary international body with the authority to conduct peacekeeping operations" (PDD-25) but to limit how "ambitious" new peacekeeping mandates should be. Rigorous Security Council guidelines were instituted, at U.S. urging, so that the Council would determine when to begin or renew a peacekeeping operation based on its consideration of the cost, size, risk, mandate, and exit strategy. The United States continued to work to strengthen the U.N.'s capacity to respond to peace and security situations.

ISSUES IN THE USE OF THE UNITED NATIONS

Two overriding issues dominate the potential for effectiveness of any United Nations/U.N. system activity in response to a peace and security situation. First, action by the United Nations is whatever the members of the organization, or the 15 members of the U.N. Security Council decide should be done. The Secretary-General, as the chief administrative officer, may bring issues to the attention of the U.N. membership and report, as requested, on the options available and on the U.N. capacity to act. He is, however, subject to the authority imposed by member state decisions. Secondly, United Nations efforts

¹⁸ See *White House Summary of Presidential Decision Directive 25, signed May 3, 1994*, in Mark M. Lowenthal. *Peacekeeping in Future U.S. Foreign Policy*. CRS Report 94-260 S. Updated May 10, 1994. pp. 26-43. See also, *Statement by the President of the Security Council, made May 3, 1994, on behalf of the U.N. Security Council*. U.N. Document S/PRST/1994/22. New York: United Nations, 1994.

¹⁹ In March 1995, the Security Council split the U.N. Protection Force in the former Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR) into three separate and distinct operations: UNPROFOR (for Bosnia and Herzegovina), the U.N. Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia (UNCRO), and the U.N. Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) in "Macedonia". After the Dayton Agreement, UNPROFOR and UNCRO ended and the U.N. Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH) which includes the International Police Task Force (IPTF), the U.N. Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (UNTAES) in Croatia, and the U.N. Mission of Observers in the Prevlaka (UNMOP) in Croatia were established.

will be successful largely to the extent that the parties to the dispute or conflict find it in their interests to work with the organization to stop the conflict or resolve the dispute.

Has the United Nations been effective in promoting international peace and security?

The effectiveness of the United Nations in promoting international peace and security has been mixed. Effectiveness might be assessed according to the following categories:

- Successful - resulting in a lasting settlement.
- Relative Success - interpreted as conflict has abated or ended; or the mandate has been fulfilled but lasting resolution is absent or unclear.²⁰
- Mixed Results - parts of the mandate were fulfilled; there were also failures but the entire operation did not fail.
- Failure/Lack of Success - the mandate was not fulfilled; the operation failed; conflict or unrest resumed.
- Inconclusive/Still Going On/Too Soon To Know - evaluation is premature because either the operation is recently operational and it is too soon to judge the outcome, conflict still persists in area, or acceptance by the parties is slipping.

Secretary-General "good offices". Information about the effectiveness of the Secretary-General in preventing the outbreak of conflict through his "good offices" is influenced by the nature of this practice. As Franck and Nolte have observed, "The secrecy of the process ensures that the effectiveness of each good offices mission is hard to assess."²¹ The exploratory, informal, and frequent nature of these efforts should be noted. Among the publicly known successes of U.N. Secretaries-General was the 1970 agreement under which Bahrain, about to be given independence from Britain but claimed by Iran, became an independent nation, endorsed by both nations and the Security Council. A second success was the 1988 resolution of the Iran-Iraq war.²²

²⁰ The U.N. Security Council often draws up a mandate that is limited in scope and stated in concrete terms, rather than in general or imprecise terms. The goal of the mandate may not be to negotiate a final settlement but to create the conditions that might facilitate negotiation of a lasting settlement. Thus, the mandate of the operation might be viewed as being met, with the conflict halted or abated, but the underlying dispute might continue unresolved.

²¹ Franck and Nolte, *op. cit.*, p. 178.

²² This success is in the context of mutual military exhaustion and increased cooperation among the Permanent Five members of the U.N. Security Council. Other examples include the Christmas 1977 release of eight French hostages held by the Polisario (Kurt Waldheim); April 1988 Geneva accords providing for Soviet troop
(continued...)

Failures include an inability to free the hostages from the 1979 takeover of the U.S. embassy in Teheran and the collapse of efforts in 1964-1965 to get a negotiated settlement on Vietnam.²³

Sanctions. The effectiveness of Chapter VII tools -- sanctions and use of force -- by which the U.N. Security Council might respond to peace and security situations has been mixed. Article 41 sanctions can be most effective when imposed at the international level by the United Nations rather than imposed unilaterally by one country or several countries acting individually or even through a regional organization.²⁴ The obligation to abide by Council-imposed sanctions is universal whereas the unilateral sanction rests on the action of one country. The target country of sanctions imposed by a regional group usually seeks to circumvent the sanctions by turning to other sources of trade or contacts beyond the sanctioning framework.

One can argue that over the very long term, imposition of sanctions in the two cases during the Cold War, southern Rhodesia and South Africa, was successful, but at a high cost to society and the economy of both the target country and its former trading partners.²⁵ During the post-Cold War period, seven of the nine cases remain active, as of January 1997, and thus might be viewed as being inconclusive in effectiveness, with the situation still unresolved. Diplomacy and the impact of sanctions, including threat and use of force, in the case of Haiti seem to have achieved the desired result.

Use of Force. Council authorization of the use of force had mixed results. Of the three Cold War era authorizations, use of force in Korea resulted in a return to its status before war started, while the U.N. Congo operation was successful in protecting the territorial integrity of the Congo. Of the five cases initiated from 1990 on, four involved authorization of non-U.N. commanded

²²(...continued)

withdrawal from Afghanistan (Perez de Cuellar and a series of negotiators); 1990 El Salvador accords (Perez de Cuellar and Alvaro de Soto); 1991 release of British and American hostages from Lebanon (Perez de Cuellar and Giandomenico Picco). See Franck and Nolte, *op. cit.*, for a fuller discussion, pp. 144-172.

²³ See Franck and Nolte, *op. cit.*, pp. 144-172, for further discussion.

²⁴ See CRS reports, for example, Erin Day. *Economic Sanctions Imposed by the United States Against Specific Countries: 1979 through 1992*. CRS Report 92-631 F. Revised August 10, 1992. (Available on Optical Disk); Dianne E. Rennack. *China: U.S. Economic Sanctions*. CRS Report 96-272F. Revised April 11, 1996. 42 p.; and Dianne E. Rennack and Mark P. Sullivan. *Cuba: U.S. Economic Sanctions*. CRS Report 95-248F. February 2, 1995.

²⁵ The desired result ultimately was achieved. Implementation, however, was not universal, with leaks of continued trade, especially with southern Rhodesia. The arms embargo with South Africa inspired that country to manufacture its own weapons. See Simma, *op. cit.*, pp. 624-625.

forces to use such measures as necessary. The use or threat of the use of force in two of the cases (Haiti and Bosnia and Hercegovina) was effective in producing a settlement. Terms of the settlement have been working in Haiti, but the presence of a U.N. Support Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) and the continuation of sporadic violence reveal its fragility. In Bosnia and Hercegovina, implementation of the Dayton Agreement arrangements is still in process. In the remaining cases, use of force produced mixed results.²⁶

Appendix B (U.N. Peacekeeping Operations: Effectiveness Evaluations) provides the views of various analysts on the success or failure of many of the 43 U.N. peacekeeping operations established since 1948.²⁷ These analysts agreed in their evaluations in about three of every four operations. About half (18 of 39) of the operations were rated as mixed; that is, the operations had some measure of success but also experienced some failure or deficiency. Nineteen operations were rated either fully successful (6) or relatively successful (14), with one operation, UNEF II, included in both categories. Some positive elements were found in 33 of 39 operations, being listed under fully successful, relatively successful, or mixed results.²⁸ Five operations were viewed as total failures.²⁹ Nine were cited as inconclusive in their likely outcomes and still going on.

²⁶ The coalition forces successfully removed Iraq from Kuwait but Iraq's continued behavior in violation of parts of S/RES/687 (1990) and S/RES/688 (1990) keeps open the possibility that force might still be necessary. See Kenneth Katzman. *Iraqi Compliance with Cease-Fire Agreements*. CRS Issue Brief 92117. Updated regularly. The Unified Task Force authorized for Somalia successfully provided a secure environment for humanitarian services while it was there, but the failure of UNOSOM II to, among other things, facilitate national reconciliation led to its withdrawal and conditions in the country deteriorated. See Alfred B. Prados. *Somalia: Current Developments, Drawdowns, and Implications*. CRS Report 94-817F. October 2, 1994. Operation Turquoise in Rwanda helped lower the level of violence, but the sources for conflict continued to exist. See Theodoros Dagne. *Rwanda Crisis: a Chronology, August 1994-June 1995*. CRS Report 95-773F. July 5, 1995.

²⁷ Appendix B is based on discussions of the mandates and evaluations of operations by several analysts: William J. Durch, ed. *The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping; Case Studies and Comparative Analysis*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993; Joshua Sinai. Project Manager. *United Nations Peace Operations; Case Studies*. Washington, D.C.: Federal Research Division (FRD), Library of Congress, 1995. [A study Prepared by FRD under an Interagency Agreement with the Joint Staff, J-8, Studies, Analysis, and Gaming Division, The Pentagon, September 30, 1995]; Nigel D. White. *Keeping the Peace; The United Nations and the Maintenance of International Peace and Security*. New York: Manchester University Press, 1993. See Chapter 9. A Review of Peacekeeping; Ramesh Thakur and Carlyle A. Thayer, eds. *A Crisis of Expectations: UN Peacekeeping in the 1990s*. Boulder: Westview Press, 1995.

²⁸ Five operations were each listed twice over the three categories.

²⁹ Four of the five were also included in the mixed results category.

Should the United Nations be the option of first choice?

There are several advantages to using the United Nations as the option of first choice in dispute settlement. Early on, before the start of conflict and even before the parties to the dispute are locked in or polarized, a variety of mechanisms might be available through the United Nations to provide "third party" factfinding and mediation to resolve some of the underlying disagreements, removing or redirecting antagonisms. For many, but not all, nations, the U.N. retains an aura of impartiality. If a legal question is involved, a government might take various aspects of the dispute to the International Court of Justice. If human rights issues are involved, an increasing number of mechanisms may be engaged to find remedies in those situations.³⁰ If humanitarian or development assistance is needed, the U.N. system of agencies and programs might be called on to help. Preventing conflict, if the parties are convinced that the dispute will be resolved with a reasonable balance of interests, in the final analysis, is cheaper and more cost effective, in both human and financial terms, than trying to rebuild a society, an economy, and a country or region after conflict.

Disadvantages, however, of using the U.N. in the first instance abound. Bringing a situation to the United Nations, even through quiet diplomacy, internationalizes the issues. Most disputes in the post-Cold War era involve situations within states or may be limited to a region. Most governments, even those not directly involved in an internal dispute, may be reluctant to take such a dispute to the U.N., seeking instead to preserve for its own future use, the protections against U.N. intervention granted to all sovereign member states under Article 2, paragraph 7 of the U.N. Charter.³¹ Even in the area of human rights, where the record for U.N. interventions has increased measurably, factfinding or other U.N. missions can be interpreted as prohibited interference, as they expose to the international community dubious human rights conditions that the government may consider necessary for its survival. In this and other instances, the offending governmental authority would consider such U.N. efforts as threatening to its own survival and too costly to allow.

³⁰ Virgil Wiebe. *The Prevention of Civil War Through the Use of the Human Rights System*. New York University Journal of International Law and Politics. Winter 1995. pp. 409-468.

³¹ Article 2, para. 7, reads: "Nothing in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII."

Does participation in United Nations activities and programs accept infringement on the national sovereignty of its member states?

This question is the foundation of the attitudes and actions of many, if not all, U.N. member states and their interest in protecting their national sovereignty. The extent to which they allow infringements on their sovereignty is dependent on what they perceive to be in their national interest. Attitudes on the role of the United Nations in the maintenance of international peace and security may determine the extent to which a nation, 1) will take a situation or crisis to the United Nations for resolution; and 2) will participate in a U.N. decision or activity to respond to or resolve a peace and security situation. In the United States, as well as in other democratic states, public perceptions of the United Nations and its activities would influence the government as it decided whether to use the U.N. option, including whether to place its troops under U.N. control.

Some analysts conclude that Articles 2 (4) and 2 (7) of the U.N. Charter protect the territorial integrity and political independence of any U.N. member state from intervention by either other states or the United Nations, except as a consequence of a Chapter VII enforcement action by the Security Council.³² Others, however, argue that the "absolute" character of the Article 2 (7) prohibition on the United Nations has been tempered by time and precedent. For example, U.N. practice has made protection of the human rights of individual citizens around the world a matter of international concern and an item of some consequence on the agendas of the U.N. General Assembly, the U.N. Commission on Human Rights, and other bodies.³³

The other area where changing circumstances has introduced the perception of infringement on the sovereignty of states is humanitarian intervention. According to one author, "traditional readings of the U.N. Charter, international law, and state practice argue against any broad right of humanitarian intervention -- either by the United Nations or by any individual nation or

³² Article 2 (4) states, in part, "All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state...." See text of Article 2 (7), in footnote 31. See also Article 2 (1) under which the "sovereign equality of all its Members" is recognized.

³³ Formerly, human rights of individual citizens were viewed as a matter wholly under the authority and control of the nation in which the person was a citizen. See Wiebe, cited in footnote 30. Since 1945, a system of U.N. treaties and of special rapporteurs, experts, and working groups, now joined by a U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, investigate and report on violations of human rights around the world, often visiting the alleged violating countries. According to one source, discussion of and resolutions on human rights violations in specific countries do not violate Article 2 (7), but visits to those countries, without host government consent, by human rights investigators, would be. See Simma, *op. cit.*, p. 150, para. 30.

group of nations."³⁴ However, the end of the Cold War, a change in the character of peace and security situations from interstate to intrastate, and U.N. Security Council resolutions 687 (1991) and 688 (1991) on Iraq, altered U.N. practice in this area.³⁵ Former U.N. Under-Secretary-General Sir Brian Urquhart observed:

The new interventionism is based on the perception that sovereignty does not reside in the state so much as with its people, whose rights must be observed and protected by all governments. It follows that when a humanitarian tragedy is out of the control of the state authorities, the world community should intervene. *** ...the motivation for intervention has shifted from *international* peace and security to *human* security,....³⁶

These humanitarian interventions, especially under U.N. auspices, introduce questions about the, 1) credibility of the U.N., especially if these efforts are perceived as costly and unsuccessful; 2) criteria used to determine when such an approach might be usefully employed; 3) willingness of U.N. member states to participate fully in such efforts, especially if hostilities still exist among the local populations; and 4) the legal basis for such action if taken without the consent of the host government and the concomitant concern over the impact of this precedent on the legality of future interventions. Some have argued that these Security Council actions to protect *human security* in areas

³⁴ David J. Scheffer. *Toward a Modern Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention*. University of Toledo Law Review. Winter 1992. p. 266.

³⁵ In response to S/RES/687 (1991), the cease-fire resolution, the U.N. Special Commission (UNSCOM) proceeded to eliminate Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and to monitor Iraq's current and future compliance with Section C of the resolution. This required unlimited and unrestricted access by both U.N. and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) officials and staff to Iraq's territory and facilities. Under Council RES/688 (1991), U.N. member states, including U.N. Security Guards, have provided protection and humanitarian assistance for Kurds in northern Iraq since the end of the war. Somalia was the first situation where the international community sent in a U.N. peacekeeping operation whose initial function was humanitarian and thereafter, authorized a multinational effort to provide food and other relief to the starving populations, in the absence of a government.

³⁶ Brian Urquhart. *Current and Future Arrangements for Intervention*. In, *Managing Conflict in the Post-Cold War World: the Role of Intervention*. Report of the Aspen Institute Conference, August 2-6, 1995. Washington, D.C.: The Aspen Institute, 1996. p. 97.

where consent of the host authority may not be conclusive might be an infringement of sovereignty rights.³⁷

A number of sovereignty-related concerns have been raised in the United States as domestic political considerations. They influence the willingness of the U.S. population to continue to support U.N. peace and security activities. These concerns include, 1) the relationship of U.S. military units participating in U.N.-controlled peacekeeping operations to the U.N. force commander and 2) the relationship of the U.N. Secretary-General as the head of the organization to the U.N. Security Council and to the U.S. government and its foreign policy direction. Underlying both questions is the extent to which some U.S. citizens fear that the United Nations is already, or will shortly become, or have the attributes of, a world government, authorized and capable of imposing its will on the U.S. government and its population.³⁸

The case of Michael G. New has become a touchstone for some views in the United States concerning the issue of U.S. forces operating under U.N. commander.³⁹ U.S. Army Specialist New, part of an unit assigned to serve in the U.N. Preventive Deployment Force in Macedonia, refused to obey an order to wear the designated U.N. patch and head gear, arguing that his allegiance was to the United States, not to the United Nations. He was court-martialed on January 24, 1996, and given a bad-conduct discharge. On June 14, 1996, his

³⁷ On the other hand, others might argue that human security, protection of sovereignty as it resides in the individual, rather than as it resides in governments, is a fundamental right, protected under the Charter.

³⁸ An April 1996 public opinion poll conducted by the Wirthlin Group for the United Nations Association of the United States (UNA-USA) found that Americans did not want to make a standing commitment of military units to the United Nations for use as a U.N. force (22% support, down from 42% in 1992) but would support provision of troops on a case-by-case basis (72% support, up from 45% in 1992). If U.S. military units were provided, they believed (63% in support to 31%) that they should be "under the control only" of the U.S. President, not "under the control of an overall U.N. command." Lastly, opinion was equally divided (45% to 45%) on whether "U.N. peacekeeping makes a valuable contribution to preserving peace at an affordable price" or "U.N. peacekeeping imposes unnecessary financial and military burdens on Americans while contributing little to our security."

³⁹ While the practice of U.S. military participation in U.N. peacekeeping operations goes back to 1948, this concern was not an issue to Americans until 1991. At that time, the United States started providing U.S. military personnel in larger numbers to serve in U.N. peacekeeping operations. The first entire U.S. unit to participate in such operations was a MASH unit in Croatia in November 1992. The major problem is having U.S. armed forces under U.N. "command". See discussion in report of the House Committee on National Security on the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996. House Report 104-131, pp. 259-260. U.S. forces have served, however, under NATO command. (See Lowenthal, op. cit., pp. 37-39, and Edward F. Bruner. *U.S. Forces and Multinational Commands: PDD-25 and Precedents*. CRS Report 94-887F. Updated August 29, 1996.)

commanding general, after reviewing the case, upheld the court-martial.⁴⁰ In Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 25, "the President retains and will never relinquish command authority over U.S. forces. On a case-by-case basis, the President will consider placing appropriate U.S. forces under the operational control of a competent U.N. commander." Congress continues to consider legislation on both the command issue and the specifics of the New case.

The second concern -- the question of the relationship of the United Nations and its Secretary-General to U.S. policy positions and actions -- targeted U.N. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali as being in charge of U.S. foreign policy. This was asserted usually in opposition to some of the foreign policy positions taken by President Clinton.⁴¹ In the middle of these accusations was a Secretary-General who may possibly have been the strongest activist since Dag Hammarskjold who held the post between 1953 and 1961.⁴² During the Cold War, most Secretaries-General were elected on the premise that they would not be too active. Boutros-Ghali vigorously promoted his vision of the United Nations and in so doing, provoked critics both in the United States and in other countries. Boutros-Ghali failed in his bid for a second term, and on January 1, 1997, he was succeeded as U.N. Secretary-General by Kofi Annan.⁴³

Does the United States pay too large a portion of the U.N. costs for peace and security?

Choice of the U.N. option, especially U.N. peacekeeping operations, is influenced by its cost, relative to both other U.N. tools and to various non-U.N. options, including the unilateral and "do nothing" options.⁴⁴ The cost of U.N. peacekeeping operations to the United Nations rose from \$253.8 million in calendar year 1988 to \$1.7 billion in calendar year 1992, and peaked at \$3.3 billion in calendar year 1993. Calendar year 1996 U.N. estimates place the cost

⁴⁰ Patrick Pexton. *New gets Bad Conduct Discharge*. Army Times. February 5, 1996. p. 8; and Jane McHugh, *Wearing of U.N. Blue Walks Fine Line of Army Regulation*. Army Times. February 26, 1996. p. 4. New filed a civil suit of Habeas Corpus challenging the findings and sentence in U.S. District Court, District of Columbia, which was rejected on March 29, 1996.

⁴¹ Senator Jesse Helms. *Boutros Boutros-Ghali Dreams of U.N. Sovereignty*. Human Events. March 15, 1996. p. 14; Barbara Crossette. *U.N. Election Fever--Ready, Set, Don't Run!* New York Times. February 11, 1996. Section 4. p. 3; and, John M. Goshko. *Boutros-Ghali Believed Near Bid for 2nd Term in U.N. Post*. Washington Post. February 18, 1996. p. A36.

⁴² See Stanley Meisler. *Dateline U.N.: A New Hammarskjold?* Foreign Policy. Spring 1995. pp. 180-197.

⁴³ For further background, see Marjorie Ann Browne. *United Nations Secretary-General: The Appointment Process*. CRS Report 96-675F. August 6, 1996.

⁴⁴ See also Chapter on Cost, *infra*.

at \$1.4 billion. U.S. contributions for U.N. peacekeeping costs increased as well, rising from \$36.7 million in 1988, to \$726.7 million to \$991.4 million in 1994. Among the concerns relating to cost are questions on the size of both U.N. peacekeeping budgets and of the U.S. peacekeeping assessment and how the United States can influence these determinations. Another concern is the extent to which those countries involved in the peace and security dispute or that benefit directly from the stability brought about by the presence of a U.N. operation bear, on a voluntary basis, some of the cost of the U.N. operation.⁴⁵

Fundamental decisions on the cost or budget for peace and security take place in the Security Council (if the Council is to authorize the activity), the U.N. Secretariat, and the General Assembly. The Council primarily determines how the authorized operation or activity will be financed -- either at no cost to the United Nations, by voluntary contributions, or by assessed contributions to a separate account. That decision is subject to a veto by the United States or any of the other four permanent members of the Council.⁴⁶ The Council receives a rough estimate of the cost from the Secretary-General and may refuse to authorize the activity until the estimated cost is within the limits it desires.⁴⁷

Under Article 17 of the U.N. Charter, the U.N. General Assembly approves the budgets of the organization and provides for apportioning of the expenses among the membership.⁴⁸ Under procedures put into place by the Assembly

⁴⁵ For example, Kuwait pays two-thirds of the costs to the U.N. of the U.N. Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission, thereby reducing the amount to be paid by assessments on the U.N. membership. Greece and Cyprus also make voluntary contributions, \$6.5 million and one-third of the total, respectively, to the U.N. Force in Cyprus, reducing the amount levied on U.N. member states.

⁴⁶ The five Permanent members of the Council are China, France, Russia (the USSR), the United Kingdom, and the United States.

⁴⁷ Final Security Council authorization of the operation in Namibia, UNTAG, was delayed in early 1989, while the Secretary-General devised a plan that would reduce the estimated cost from \$700 million to \$416 million. See United Nations. *The Blue Helmets*. New York: United Nations, 1990. pp. 350-352. Delays in Council action on the 1992-1993 operation in Cambodia because of concerns over cost led the Council to set up a small advance mission to start the extensive preparations, including clearing of mines.

⁴⁸ A 1961 International Court of Justice opinion on Expenses of the Organization determined that peacekeeping assessments are expenses of the Organization, under Article 17. United Nations. International Court of Justice. *Reports of Judgments, Advisory Opinions and Orders. Certain Expenses of the United Nations* (Article 17, Paragraph 2 of the Charter). Advisory Opinion of 20 July 1962. I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 151. The Hague, International Court of Justice, 1962. See excerpts, discussion, and bibliography in Louis B. Sohn. *Cases on United Nations Law*, 2nd edition (revised).

(continued...)

in 1986, Assembly decisions on budgets are taken by consensus, a process designed to give the United States and other large contributors an implied veto. If a country objects to an element of the budget, no consensus is reached. Thus, the Assembly resolutions appropriating funds for each peacekeeping operation have all been agreed to by the United States or altered in such a way that the United States could join the consensus in passing the resolution.⁴⁹

Many believe that the United Nations, and more particularly, its peacekeeping operations, should not be dependent on any one member nation for nearly one-third of its funding. They recall that the 1973 General Assembly resolution setting up the peacekeeping assessment framework was passed as an *ad hoc* arrangement.⁵⁰ As early as 1992, U.S. policy was to seek a reduction in the U.S. peacekeeping assessment to 25%. At that time, the U.S. assessment was 30.387% or rounded off, 30.4%. Negotiations with other governments toward this target were unsuccessful and the U.S. assessment increased to 31.7% for 1993.⁵¹ In 1993, the Administration stated that it would not recognize the

⁴⁸(...continued)

Brooklyn: The Foundation Press, Inc., 1967. See Chapter VI, Maintenance of international peace and security, pp. 763-818, on Financing Peace-keeping.

⁴⁹ There is no single peacekeeping budget. Each peacekeeping operation, except for two funded from the U.N. regular budget, has its own approved budget and is funded through a separate assessed account.

⁵⁰ U.N. General Assembly resolution 3101 (XXVIII), December 11, 1973. Operative paragraph 2. See also, U.N. General Assembly resolution 1874 (S-IV), June 27, 1963. *General principles to serve as guidelines for the sharing of the costs of future peacekeeping operations involving heavy expenditures.* Under this framework, the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council are viewed as having a special responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security and, thus, a special responsibility to pay more than the regular budget assessment level. Under the peacekeeping assessment scheme, the U.N. membership is divided into four groups of nations according to their economic status, except for the permanent five, which are called Group A countries. Group B consists of "Economically Developed countries" and they pay at the same rate as their regular budget assessment. Group C are termed "Economically less developed states" who pay at 20% of the regular budget assessment. Group D are termed "Economically least developed states" who pay at 10% of the regular budget assessment. Group A countries pick up the difference in the amount not assessed Groups C and D.

⁵¹ After the breakup of the Soviet Union, its replacement on the Security Council and in the United Nations by the Russian Federation government, and the admission of the various former Soviet constituent republics as separate U.N. members, discussions were held to determine the allocation of the Soviet regular budget assessment. As a result, the regular budget assessment for the Russian Federation went down. This meant that Russia's peacekeeping assessment rate also went down and the assessment for the remaining four Group A countries increased. For the United States, with the largest regular budget assessment, the rate of increase was larger than for China, France, and the United Kingdom.

increased rate of 31.7% but would pay its peacekeeping dues only up to 30.4%. In 1994, Congress enacted and the President signed into law a requirement that effective October 1, 1995, U.S. peacekeeping payments would not exceed 25%.⁵² Meanwhile, the U.N. has been lowering slightly the U.S. peacekeeping assessment rate, an action related to changes in the regular budget assessments and moves by some U.N. members from Group C (Economically less developed states) to Group B (Economically Developed countries)(see footnote 49, for background discussion).⁵³ The more fundamental change sought by the United States, however, has not been adopted by the U.N.⁵⁴

Within this context and noting the other peace and security tasks that the United States finances without reimbursement from the United Nations, one might conclude that the United States is paying too large a share of the assessed peacekeeping burden. Moreover, some argue the world organization should not be dependent on one country for as much as 31% of its income.⁵⁵

Can the United Nations increase its effectiveness as a tool for promoting international peace and security?

A critical factor in considering the United Nations as a response option to peace and security situations is the capacity of the organization to carry out such a role. The increase in the use of U.N. tools, as discussed above under Scope and Effectiveness, revealed weaknesses in many areas, primarily because the organization had not previously been called upon to perform such functions, either in the numbers or types of operations. The U.N. Secretariat lacked the structure, number of staff, and expertise required for effectively planning, putting into the field, and managing so many complex operations. Notably, the Security Council sometimes adopted mandates that could not be implemented successfully by the size and type of operations created.

Several reforms have been implemented or initiated. They include the following:

⁵² Section 404 (b)(2), Public Law 103-236, April 30, 1994.

⁵³ The U.S. peacekeeping assessment rate for **1994**: 31.735%; **1995**: 31.151%; and **1996**: 30.9652%.

⁵⁴ The 6 percent gap between the U.N. assessment level and the U.S. contribution level will cause U.S. arrears to mount, creating possible problems for U.S. influence in U.N. policy and reform initiatives. It may also pose financial problems for the organization and for U.N. troop-contributing countries that are not being reimbursed for providing forces to U.N. peacekeeping operations.

⁵⁵ In March 1996 the Administration announced it would work to lower its regular budget assessment level to 20%, down from 25%. This, it was argued, would have the effect of lowering the peacekeeping assessment level to 25%.

- To ensure institutional focus on peacekeeping, a Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) was established in 1992. In 1995, DPKO was reorganized into three main offices: Office of the Under-Secretary-General (USG); Office of Planning and Support; and Office of Operations. A 24-hour Situation Center and the Military Adviser's Office are both in the Office of the USG. A Training Unit and Lessons Learned Unit are under the Office of Planning and Support.
- To correct a glaring deficiency in planning capacity, the DPKO Office of Planning and Support added a Mission Planning Service (MPS) that provides for comprehensive planning, encompassing contingency planning, large-scale logistics planning, and pre-deployment planning, as well as operational planning.
- To provide for badly needed coordination among the major Secretariat departments with responsibilities in the broad peacekeeping arena, a "Framework for Cooperation" is being instituted among the DPKO, the Department of Political Affairs (DPA), and the Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA). The purpose of this framework is to develop among the staff of the three departments a culture of "coordination, cooperation and information-sharing" in all aspects of their work.⁵⁶
- To meet the need for rapid deployment and reinforcement of peacekeeping operations, a Standby Arrangements system was initiated in early 1993. Through this process, the Secretary-General has access from a database to the numbers of military and other personnel, equipment, and services each country might make available for peacekeeping purposes. This system and its information is under constant review and revision.⁵⁷
- To enhance the U.N.'s capacity to prevent the eruption of conflict, the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) has been given responsibility for preventive action and reorganized to "strengthen its capacity in the

⁵⁶ United Nations. Joint Inspection Unit. *Military Component of United Nations Peace-keeping Operations*. JIU/REP/95/11, United Nations Document A/50/576. Geneva, 1995. pp. 19-20, para. 77.

⁵⁷ Some experts consider Standby Arrangements an unsatisfactory alternative to rapid deployment force capabilities that would be on call for emergency use. A government's identification of resources does not include the automatic obligation or commitment to provide such personnel, equipment, or other services. Provision of these resources is dependent on the individual situation. As of November 30, 1996, 62 U.N. members had confirmed their willingness to provide standby resources, including 80,000 personnel. Five of these countries had formalized their standby arrangements through a memorandum of understanding. See United Nations. *Progress Report of the Secretary-General on Standby Arrangements for Peace-keeping*. United Nations Document S/1996/1067. New York: 1996.; also JIU report, op. cit., A/50/576, pp. 9, 28-31.

fields of preventive diplomacy and peacemaking." It is mandated to monitor, analyze, and assess political developments worldwide and to identify potential or actual conflict.⁵⁸ Since its reorganization in March 1994, DPA has been "actively involved in preventive diplomacy or peacemaking in about 30 disputes or conflicts and participated in approximately 45 exploratory, fact-finding and good offices missions."⁵⁹

- To ensure that circumstances were right for the introduction of a peacekeeping operation into a situation and that the tasks and mandates fit the type of operation to be inserted, the Security Council, in May 1994, stipulated that "the political goals, mandate, costs, and where possible, the estimated time-frame of...operations...be clear and precise." It also approved a list of six factors, bearing on the viability and likely success of a proposed operation, to be taken into account when new operations are under consideration.⁶⁰

Other reform efforts supported by the United States and currently underway include:

- Establishment and budgeting for a Forward Logistics Base in Brindisi, Italy;
- Extension of the audit, evaluation, monitoring, inspection, and investigation functions of the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) to peacekeeping;
- Reform of procedures for determining reimbursement to member states for Contingent-owned equipment;
- Recent progress on U.N. procurement reform, of which peacekeeping procurement is a large component;
- Creation of rapidly deployable headquarters elements that can be sent into the field as soon as a peacekeeping operation is set up;⁶¹

⁵⁸ United Nations. Joint Inspection Unit. *Strengthening of the United Nations System Capacity for Conflict Prevention*. JIU/REP/95/13, United Nations Document A/50/853. Geneva: 1995. pp. 18-19.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 21, para. 91.

⁶⁰ These factors may be summarized as follows: existence of a threat to international peace and security; capacity and willingness of regional arrangements to assist; existence of a cease-fire and commitment of parties to peace process; existence of a clear political goal; formulation of a precise mandate; and guarantee of safety and security of U.N. personnel. Statement by the President of the Security Council, made May 3, 1994, on behalf of the U.N. Security Council. U.N. Document S/PRST/1994/22. New York: 1994.

⁶¹ Implementation has started with a small team assembled in summer 1996 as "the first building block" of a headquarters component to be further developed during 1996. (continued...)

- Institution and adoption of peacekeeping operations budgets on an annual or semi-annual basis, starting with July 1, 1996.⁶²

A number of proposals for reform remain for consideration and possible adoption. These include development of a secure and stable basis for financing U.N. peace and security responses by applying the assessment scale for U.N. membership contributions to peacekeeping accounts. The United States has proposed that the largest contributor, the United States, pay only 20% of the U.N. regular budget. According to then U.S. Permanent Representative Madeleine Albright, in a speech in North Carolina on March 4, 1996, this would have the effect of reducing the U.S. peacekeeping assessment level to 25%.⁶³

The U.S. Administration has opposed several other proposed options on the grounds that they present unrealistic tasks or approaches for the United Nations. They include:

- Establishment of a rapid reaction or rapid deployment force. Various models have been proposed for ensuring that the United Nations can quickly respond to an emergency before it is too late.⁶⁴ The U.S. prefers the Standby Arrangements system (discussed above), already in operation.

⁶¹(...continued)

Statement by Cameron Hume, U.S. Political Counselor, in Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, April 3, 1996. U.S. Mission to the United Nations, Press Release, USUN-43(96). According to the President's 1996 Annual Report to Congress on Peacekeeping, the Rapid Deployable Mission Headquarters (RDMHQ) is expected to be ready for deployment in July 1997.

⁶² On June 7, 1996, the U.N. General Assembly adopted resolutions providing \$1.44 billion for the annual appropriations (July 1, 1996-June 30, 1997) for at least 11 peacekeeping operations. This step implemented a decision taken by the Assembly on December 23, 1995, changing the budget cycle of peacekeeping operations financed by special accounts.

⁶³ A High-level Open-ended Working Group on the Financial Situation of the United Nations, under the chair of the U.N. General Assembly President, has been reviewing a number of financing issues, including the regular budget scale of assessments.

⁶⁴ See, Nina M. Serafino. *A U.N. Rapid Reaction Force? Considerations for U.S. Policymakers*. CRS Report 95-787 F. June 29, 1995; William H. Lewis. *Peace Operations: Is a Standing Force Needed?* Strategic Forum. April 1995; *Towards a Rapid Reaction Capability for the United Nations*, Report of the Government of Canada. 1995; and, Carl Kaysen and George Rathjens, *Peace Operations by the United Nations: the Case for a Volunteer U.N. Military Force*. Cambridge, Mass.: Committee on International Security Studies, American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1996. On December 15, 1996, Austria, Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, and Sweden signed an agreement to set up a Multinational U.N. Standby Forces High Readiness Brigade.

- Formal use of the U.N. Military Staff Committee as the source of military advice for the U.N. Security Council, as envisioned in Article 47 of the U.N. Charter. It is argued that such advice would help the U.N. Security Council approve mandates for U.N. operations that are better matched to a credible force. The U.S. maintains that this is a duplication of expertise already available and being improved within the Secretariat.

Among the other proposals are some that, because they involve difficult policy and political issues, such as nonintervention in the internal affairs of member states, or may require a comprehensive restructuring of U.N. system programs, require more extensive discussion, debate, and examination. They include:

- Devising an early warning capacity of the United Nations for peace and security and humanitarian situations that could form the basis for preventive initiatives. Current capacities form the basis for response once the situation has reached serious dimensions. Taking steps to prevent or halt deterioration would place the United Nations in the position of intervening in the internal affairs of member states.
- Improving the capacity of the U.N. system to provide economic development assistance at both the preventive and post-conflict stages.⁶⁵

Progress had been made in improving the capacity of the United Nations, through its Secretariat staffing, structures, and procedures, to respond to peace and security situations. Fundamental difficulties cited by those seeking maximum utility of U.N. tools include:

- U.N. Security Council member states must make a political decision to authorize a U.N. response.

The Council, as of January 1997, has continued what some might call a minimalist approach in its response to potential and actual peace and security situations. It is unclear whether or when it will return to a more activist mode.

- U.N. member states, in the General Assembly and individually, make the financial and other resource commitments to support a U.N. response.

⁶⁵ The sources of proposals for reform in the peace and security area are several and varied. They include reports of the U.N. Joint Inspection Unit, two of which have already been cited. A third deals with the U.N. humanitarian role: United Nations. Joint Inspection Unit, *The Involvement of the United Nations System in Providing and Coordinating Humanitarian Assistance*. JIU/REP/95/9, United Nations Document A/50/687. Geneva: 1995.

The current financial condition of the organization, both with its regular budget and peacekeeping accounts, also makes unlikely agreement to set up a large peacekeeping undertaking. Assessed payments to both sets of accounts are slow, with outstanding contributions to the U.N. currently totalling between \$1 and \$2 billion. The U.N. periodically faces cash-flow problems, especially in the last quarter of the calendar year. Troop contributing countries are not being reimbursed promptly, thus affecting the ability and/or willingness of some countries to continue to provide forces. Efforts to staff and equip peacekeeping operations continue to be somewhat problematic.

- To enable U.N. action, parties directly involved in a peace and security dispute must determine it is in their interest to support a peaceful solution.

In the post-Cold War era, disputes that impact international peace and security have occurred more often from internal situations, such as ethnic differences, than between states. Intrastate disputes are often quite intractable because of the intensity of animosities that can exist between groups of people. Once these animosities are released and atrocities are committed, achieving an enduring settlement is difficult. Another condition that has required U.N. attention is that of the failed state and the lawlessness and humanitarian suffering that might accompany such a condition. Thus, the challenges to an effective United Nations in peace and security situations have increased significantly in the 1990s and can be expected to continue.

Some of these difficulties are limitations inherent in the Charter and at present, it does not appear that they can be resolved in a determinative fashion so as to make more likely an effective U.N. role in responding to peace and security situations. Substantial empowerment of the United Nations implies a reconsideration by nations of the nature of the organization.

REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS⁶⁶

Regional organizations were founded in the expectation that they would promote cooperation and unity among member states, and help defuse conflicts. They have not played a leading role, however, in peace and security activities worldwide. Instead, their activities have often preceded, followed, or been carried out in conjunction with U.N. operations, especially in recent years.

Regional organizations that were created with, or subsequently acquired, a "peace-brokering" mandate (i.e., to prevent conflict and to restore and maintain peace) operate in most, but not all, geographic areas of the world. Three Third World organizations have been active the longest. The 22-member **Arab League**, founded in 1945, has been the least active. The 35-member **Organization of American States (OAS)**, founded in 1948, and the 52-member **Organization of African Unity (OAU)**, founded in 1963, have been more engaged in such activities, especially during the 1950s and 1960s.

In Europe, several organizations established after World War II now play a peace-brokering role. The primary military organization is the 16-member **NATO**, formed in 1949, followed by the ten member **Western European Union (WEU)**, formed in 1954. Both were created as defensive, security alliances, and have only taken on a peace-brokering role beginning with the 1990 breakdown of Yugoslavia. The **Conference of Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)** was founded in 1975 to ease tensions

⁶⁶ Sources for this section include: Joseph S. Nye, Jr. op. cit.; Paul F. Diehl. op. cit.; Robert F. Randle. op. cit.; Erkki Kourula. *Peacekeeping and Regional Arrangements*, in A. Cassese, ed., *United Nations Peacekeeping*. The Netherlands: Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 1978; Henry Wiseman, ed. *Peacekeeping: Appraisals and Proposals*. New York: Pergamon Press, 1983; Virginia Page Fortna. *Regional Organizations and Peacekeeping: Experiences in Latin America and Africa*. The Henry L. Stimson Center, Occasional Paper No. 11, June 1993; David R. Smock and Chester A. Crocker, eds. *African Conflict Resolution: The U.S. Role in Peacemaking*. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1995; Berhanykun Andemicael. *Peaceful Settlement Among African States: Roles of the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity*. New York: United Nations Institute for Training and Research, 1972; Carl Kaysen, Robert A. Pastor, and Laura W. Reed, eds. *Collective Responses to Regional Problems: The Case of Latin America and the Caribbean*. Cambridge, Mass.: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1994; Kevin O'Prey. *Keeping the Peace in the Borderlands of Russia*. The Henry L. Stimson Center, Occasional Paper 23, July 1995; Hans van Mierlo. *The WEU and NATO: Prospects for a More Balanced Relationship*. NATO Review. March 1995; Klaus Kinkel. *The new NATO: Steps towards reform*, NATO Review, May 1996; Sir John Goulden. *The WEU's Role in the New Strategic Environment*, NATO Review. May 1996; and, United Nations. Joint Inspection Unit. *Report on Sharing Responsibilities in Peacekeeping: The United Nations and Regional Organizations*. JIU/REP/95/4. Prepared by Fatih K. Bouayad-Agha and Boris P. Krasulin. Geneva: 1995. For brief histories and discussion of regional organizations, see, Stanley R. Sloan. *Global Burdensharing in the Post-Cold War World*. CRS Report 93-892 S. October 8, 1993.

between eastern and western European states; its successor, 52-member **Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)**, was founded in 1994. It is comprised of NATO, non-NATO, and former Warsaw pact countries, and has undertaken a variety of tasks to promote peace. The economic and political **European Community (EC)** began to take a peace role in the ex-Yugoslavia crisis, which has continued and expanded under the 1993 successor 12-member **European Union**. The 12-member **Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)**, established in 1991 and comprised of former Soviet bloc countries, carries out peace activities in areas which Russia considers within its historical sphere of influence.⁶⁷

SCOPE OF ACTIVITIES⁶⁸

As noted above in the discussion of United Nations, preventive activities often go unreported, but most organizations have carried out many reported preventive activities. Pre-conflict "preventive" activities have long been carried out in Europe. The **CSCE** played a role in confidence-building among the Eastern and Western European states; its successor **OSCE** decided to emphasize conflict prevention, although it also currently carries out many peace-building tasks. The **OAU**, the **OAS**, and the **Arab League**, have generally not carried out preventive diplomacy intended to lessen the possibilities of a first-time conflict, but they have been involved in diplomacy to prevent reoccurrences of conflict where tensions fester (see below).

Because the **OAS**, the **OAU**, and the **Arab League** generally have not addressed regional problems until the member states brought problems to them, their involvement usually began after the outbreak of conflict. Most **OAS** activities during the late 1940s through the mid-1960s took place in the context of low-level conflicts involving the smaller states of Central America. The **OAS** investigated and mediated several interstate conflicts, stemming from border disputes or the activities of exile rebels crossing borders. After a situation stabilized, the **OAS** sent military observers to dispel future conflict. In the late 1970s, the **OAS** attempted to mediate conflict in Nicaragua. In the late 1980s, it participated in the last stages of Nicaraguan peace negotiations initiated by an ad hoc group of Western Hemisphere leaders.

During the 1960s and 1970s, the **OAU** sponsored several investigating teams and mediating groups in attempts to reconcile parties engaged in open conflict. Only twice were troops sent to areas of conflict in what became failed attempts at peacekeeping missions. During the 1990s, the **OAU** has taken part in peacemaking efforts in internal conflicts, among them the conflicts South

⁶⁷ The United States belongs to the OAS, NATO, and the OSCE.

⁶⁸ This list is intended to be illustrative, not comprehensive. Regional and subregional organizations have carried out missions that are not mentioned here.

Africa, Liberia, Mozambique and Angola. Since 1993, the OAU has undertaken preventive diplomacy missions, for example, to Burundi.

The **Arab League** has not played a significant visible role in conflict situations. The only notable exceptions were the deployment of a peacekeeping force in the Kuwait-Iraq confrontation of 1961-63, and the placement of an Arab Deterrent Force in Lebanon in 1976.

Among the regional organizations active in Europe, all have attempted to play a role, albeit in some cases a limited one, in resolving the conflicts in ex-Yugoslavia after it broke out in 1991. To supplement the U.N. ground operation in ex-Yugoslavia, UNPROFOR, NATO undertook its first operational roles ever in a conflict situation: it cooperated with the WEU in a blockade in the Adriatic Sea, and monitored and enforced the Deny-Flight zone over Bosnia. The **European Community (EC)/European Union (EU)** undertook, along with the United States, a humanitarian mission to air drop food and supplies to the Bosnians and others in ex-Yugoslavia. **CSCE/OSCE** attempted an early role in crisis management in Yugoslavia, although a minor effort compared to those undertaken, first, by the **EC** and, later, by the United Nations.

Of the **CIS** operations, the largest has been its involvement in the former Soviet republic of Tajikistan, where civil war broke out when the republic became independent in September 1991. A small-scale **CIS** military operation was organized in December 1992 to disarm "illegal" groups, i.e., the loose coalition of nationalist, Islamic, and democratic opponents of the communist government, aided by Afghanistan. When that **CIS operation** encountered difficulties, a sizable five-country (largely Russian) force was created in August 1993 to stabilize the situation, aid negotiations, and protect humanitarian aid deliveries. By 1994, however, the **CIS** main function shrank to protecting the Tajik-Afghan border from insurgent incursions. After a September 1994 truce agreed to at a U.N.-sponsored meeting, the United Nations established the U.N. Mission of Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT), sending military observers to supervise the truce (which has subsequently both broken down and been renewed several times) and patrol the borders. (The **OSCE** had also set up a small office.)⁶⁹

Within the last few years, some regional organizations have begun to undertake various activities in post-conflict situations, many in cooperation with the United Nations. These range from "traditional" peacekeeping functions of providing military observers and interpositional forces, to various nation building activities. Among the recent activities in this area:

⁶⁹ For current information on the situation in Tajikistan, see two CRS products by Jim Nichol: *Tajik Civil War: Recent Developments and U.S. Policy Concerns*, CRS Report 97-82 F. Jan. 8, 1997; and *Central Asia's New States: Political Developments and Implications for U.S. Interests*. CRS Issue Brief 93108. Updated regularly.

- The **OSCE** has assumed a large transitional and post-conflict role in several countries. Its most prominent role, currently, is to help implement the Dayton Peace Agreement in Bosnia-Herzegovina, by supervising elections, overseeing negotiations on confidence-building measures, and assisting in arms control negotiations, implementation and verification. It also has undertaken a preventive role in the South Ossetia, Georgia, conflict and in Nagorno Karabakh.⁷⁰
- **NATO** became decisively involved in ground operations in Bosnia in the wake of the Dayton Peace Accords, and has taken on a traditional peacekeeping role in the highly volatile post-conflict setting.
- Since undertaking activities in Nicaragua in 1989, the **OAS** has carried out a continuing program of peace-building activities intended to contribute to lasting peace in Suriname, Nicaragua, and Haiti -- in the last two cases in conjunction with U.N. missions. In the wake of the December 1996 peace accord in Guatemala, the OAS has taken on a similar role there.
- **CIS** has taken on a peacekeeping role with a predominantly Russian force of a few thousand troops in Abkhazia, Georgia. The peacekeepers monitor the compliance of the parties involved with the May 1994 cease-fire and separation of forces agreement. The United Nations, which had sponsored the cease-fire talks, refused initially to send peacekeepers, but later sent some under the U.N. Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) to supplement CIS efforts in monitoring the separation of forces agreement. (U.N. peacekeepers also monitor the activities of the CIS force.) A joint peacekeeping and law enforcement force of Russian, Georgian, and Ossetian members currently operates under CIS authority in South Ossetia.

U.S. POLICY

The Clinton Administration, in the publicly available summary of Presidential Decision Directive 25 on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations (PDD-25), has stated that it would strengthen regional organizations' ability to undertake peacekeeping capabilities.⁷¹ This parallels statements by then U.N.

⁷⁰ For more on OSCE activities in Nagorno Karabakh, see Carol Migdalovitz. *Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict*. CRS Issue Brief 92109. Updated regularly. More on the OSCE and NATO activities in Bosnia is included in Steven J. Woehrel and Julie Kim. *Bosnia-Former Yugoslavia and U.S. Policy*. CRS Issue Brief 91089. Updated regularly.

⁷¹ Reproduced as an appendix to CRS Report 94-260 S, *Peacekeeping in Future U.S. Foreign Policy*, by Mark M. Lowenthal, updated May 10, 1994. The Administration statement notes, however, that the United States "will continue to emphasize the U.N.

(continued...)

Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali. Because Africa is viewed as the area of great need, the Clinton Administration has focused considerable attention on and provided funds to the OAU and the 16-member subregional Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). It has also examined the possibilities of using subregional organizations for preventive activities in Africa. In Europe, the Clinton Administration has encouraged the OSCE, and provided it with funds, to expand its peace and security role. It has supported the use of NATO for peacekeeping efforts in ex-Yugoslavia and has provided funding to prepare some Partnership for Peace (PFP) countries for participation in future NATO peacekeeping efforts.

ISSUES IN THE USE OF REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

How successful have regional organizations been in peace and security operations?

Because *pre-conflict* preventive activities are relatively new to regional organizations, there is little or no track record from which to generalize about their success. The OAS and OAU mediating efforts of the 1950s and 1960 to prevent the reoccurrence of hostilities, or to limit their escalation when they occurred, have been generally considered successful.⁷²

The success of other efforts to curb conflict has been mixed. The OAS's diplomatic and limited peacekeeping role in the 1940s - 1960s (its most active period) have been viewed as positive and effective. In a few cases, its efforts even helped lead to permanent settlements of a conflict. The OAU, in its peacemaking activities involving interstate conflict, has been viewed as playing a positive role in lowering tensions and contributing to temporary cessations of hostilities. In other instances, it contributed to a permanent settlement. In other instances of internal conflicts, the OAU has been seen as ineffective in reducing conflict or ending hostilities. Two OAU attempts at peacekeeping in Chad failed. (The first short-lived attempt took place after civil strife had abated 1979, although no settlement had been reached; the second took place while the situation was still unstable a year after the December 1980 Libyan invasion.⁷³) More recently, some point to the OAU diplomatic role and sanctions as facilitating a peaceful transition to black majority rule in South Africa. In the early 1990s, a four-part observer mission with representatives

⁷¹(...continued)
as the primary international body with the authority to conduct peacekeeping operations."

⁷² See, especially, Nye, *op. cit.* regarding information in this paragraph and the next. Appendix C to this report summarizes in chart form Nye's evaluation of the effectiveness of regional organizations' selected activities and operations from 1948-1969.

⁷³ See Nye, *op. cit.*, pp 154-161; Andemicael, *op. cit.*, pp 45-100; and Fortna, *op. cit.*, pp 22-28.

from the OAU, EC, the U.N. and the British Commonwealth helped monitor South Africa's implementation of the 1992-1993 transitions accords concluding with the 1994 elections.

European organizations and the OAS are playing an expanded role in transitional and post-conflict peace operations, as mentioned above. On an anecdotal level, their involvement generally has been considered positive, with many situations moving haltingly towards greater stability. Policymakers and analysts may also, however, fault specific aspects of individual operations.

Few sub-regional organizations have had a role in peace and security activities, and when they have played such a role, it was usually marginal. For instance, the small **Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS)** played a role in the U.S. invasion of Grenada in 1983, issuing a request for U.S. assistance and sending 300 troops to perform policing functions. The six-state **Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)** called upon its Western Allies for help when it failed to deter and repulse Iraq's 1990 invasion of Kuwait. (Analysts have pointed to its "incapacity, as well as its unwillingness, to field a credible deterrent force.")⁷⁴

In one notable exception, the sub-regional **ECOWAS** has played a prominent peacemaking and non-traditional peacekeeping role in Liberia since 1990, through the creation of the ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), with the encouragement of the United States. It became involved in Liberia's civil conflict when no action was taken by either the UN or the OAU. The U.N. assumed a role in 1993, when the Cotonou Accord called for the U.N. and ECOMOG to cooperate in continued peace efforts.⁷⁵ As of March 1997, the Clinton Administration was cautiously optimistic that ECOMOG had helped stabilize conditions in Liberia sufficiently to permit relatively peaceful elections to be held. Nevertheless, although ECOMOG has made progress in disarming irregular forces (over 20,000 of an estimated 33,000 thus far), not all of their command structures have been disbanded and weapons caches have been discovered.

⁷⁴ Joseph A. Kechichian. *Security Efforts in the Arab World: A Brief Examination of Four Regional Organizations*. A RAND Note, N-3570-USDP, Prepared for the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, 1992, p.14.

⁷⁵ One article on U.N.-ECOMOG cooperation in Liberia describes their working relationship as poor. See: 'Funmi Olonisakin. *UN Co-operation with Regional Organizations in Peacekeeping: The Experience of ECOMOG and UNOMIL in Liberia*. International Peacekeeping. Autumn 1996. pp.33-51.

Do they have an inherent advantage over the United Nations?⁷⁶

Some policymakers and analysts argue for greater use of regional organizations, claiming that they have an inherent advantage over the United Nations in conflictive situations because they are more homogenous. They assert that the member states of regional organization are more likely to have similar historical, ethnic and tribal roots, levels of development, political attitudes, and a common interest in maintaining regional stability. Some analysts believe that this relative uniformity increases the likelihood of consensus and cooperation in conceiving and implementing a peace operation. Some analysts also point to another advantage -- a greater familiarity with the issues at stake and the personalities involved. These factors, they argue, are likely to result in more timely action, at less cost, with less loss of life, and greater possibilities of success.

Other analysts argue that a presumed homogeneity and common understanding are overstated as predictors of regional organizations' capability to prevent and resolve specific conflicts. For one, they point out some regional organizations are more homogenous than others. Further, some argue that differences among member states may be more important than their similarities and undermine consensus. Indeed, differences of interests -- particularly of a regional power, an important sub-regional group of countries, or neighbors of a country or countries in conflict -- may be fueling the conflict in the first place.

The influence of regional powers can be critical in attempts to resolve conflict at a regional level. They can facilitate a solution, or they can complicate or impede action. In greater Europe, Russia has proved to be a significant force in the activities of the CIS and the OSCE, and a complicating factor in OSCE involvement in efforts to achieve a permanent cease-fire in Nagorno-Karabakh. (Nagorno-Karabakh is a region of Azerbaijan which enjoyed a certain autonomy when Azerbaijan was under Soviet rule, whose Armenian residents now seek independence.) The OSCE dealt with a Russian attempt to manage the negotiations independently of the OSCE by giving Russia the co-chairmanship of the OSCE negotiating team.⁷⁷ In the Western Hemisphere, the OAS has been reluctant since the 1960s to take a role in active conflict situations. Many analysts attribute this reluctance to the sense of some OAS member states that the OAS can be too easily manipulated by the United States.⁷⁸

⁷⁶ Information and ideas for this section are drawn primarily from Diehl, *op. cit.*, Nye, *op. cit.*, and Randle, *op.cit.*

⁷⁷ See Migdalovitz, *op. cit.*

⁷⁸ This perception dates back, at least, to 1965, when the OAS deployed a follow-up peacekeeping force after the U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic. This action bestowed legitimacy on the U.S. action that many Latin Americans viewed as an unwarranted intrusion in the Dominican Republic's internal affairs.

A regional organization's ability to act may, like that of the United Nations, be susceptible to the influences of third parties with an interest at stake in a conflictive situation. In 1961, when, as mentioned earlier, U.N. action would have been blocked by a USSR veto, the Arab League sent a force to Kuwait to deter a possible Iraqi attack motivated by Iraq's objection to the establishment of Kuwait as a separate state upon its independence from Great Britain. Similarly, third parties can constrain the use and potential use of regional organizations. In the Middle East, for example, one analyst cites the interests of many influential power centers "Teheran, London, Washington, Ankara, Islamabad, and Moscow, among others...[as] often incompatible" with the interests of the Arab League in the area.⁷⁹

Two comparative studies have found that regional organizations do not necessarily have an advantage over the United Nations. In one recent study, Paul F. Diehl judged that the United Nations would have the comparative advantage in most situations, most importantly because its ability to draw on troops from countries with no close ties to the disputants would confer at least the perception of greater neutrality. In another study, published in the 1970s, Joseph S. Nye, Jr. concluded -- after examining 19 cases of conflicts in Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East handled by the OAU, OAS, or the Arab League -- that the regional organizations compared favorably to the United Nations in their ability to settle or ameliorate conflicts, but noted that the United Nations handled the hardest cases.⁸⁰

⁷⁹ Kechichian, *op.cit.*, p. 8.

⁸⁰ The former study, done by Diehl (*op. cit.*), is a largely qualitative, theoretical analysis. Diehl suggests that regional peacekeeping efforts "may be desirable when carried out jointly with the United Nations or when confined to conflicts involving small states in the region" (p. 142). Nye (*op.cit.*), who actually examined case studies, concluded that macro-regional political organizations helped isolate conflicts among their members in 74 per cent of the relevant cases, helped contribute to the abatement of conflict in 58 per cent of the cases, helped end fighting in 44 per cent of the relevant cases, and helped provide a lasting settlement in 32 percent of the cases. "When we weighted the cases by the intensity of hostilities and seriousness of the probable alternatives, however, we found that the successes were restricted primarily to cases of low intensity and that there were important differences between the poor performance of the Arab League and the more successful records of the OAS and OAU. Even with the latter organizations, we noted that success had been limited to interstate conflicts and in the case of the OAS to the area proximate to the United States." (p. 175) In comparing the results of regional organizations to that of U.N. cases, Nye weighted cases according to difficulty, and found that although unweighted scores compared favorably with the United Nations "of roughly one success in three," the intensity of conflict was much lower in the median regional case than the median U.N. cases. (p. 170) He also found that "contrary to the regionalist hypothesis, regional organizations were not successful in the cases of primarily internal conflict with which they tried to deal." (p. 172)

Some analysts have suggested, however, that regional organizations, because of their shared interest in regional stability, may be better suited than the United Nations for undertaking preventive efforts and continued peace making in transition/post-conflict situations. A recent U.N. document cites "early warning and preventive diplomacy [as] an area of priority for many regional organizations," and judges that "the need to strengthen their capacity may be less acute [than for peacekeeping activities]. In fact, some regional organizations seem to have more advanced mechanisms in this respect than the United Nations."⁸¹

The Diehl and Nye studies, and other work on peace settlements, also suggest that the possibilities of success are determined by many factors other than the choice of organization to lead peace efforts. Most important among these factors are the nature of the conflict and the relative balance of power among the parties. As mentioned earlier in the section on the United Nations, analysts have found that internal conflicts are usually more intractable than interstate conflicts.⁸² (There are, of course, prominent exceptions, notably the history of Arab-Israeli conflicts.) The possibilities of a workable settlement are greatest where power is relatively equal among the parties to the conflict -- which can result in long stalemates and the prospect of mutual exhaustion -- and when there is little or no outside involvement. As indicated by previous discussion in this section, the chances of success improve when the states or the organization playing a peace-broker role have compatible interests that can facilitate a consensus on action, and when they are perceived as impartial. The likelihood of success is also greater where peace missions are well thought-out, with achievable goals.

Are regional organizations receptive to the idea of a more vigorous role?

Among regional organizations, there are many questions as to how broad and active a role they should play in conflict prevention and resolution. Organizations have responded differently to recent calls, including that of the

⁸¹ United Nations. *Report on Sharing Responsibilities in Peace-keeping: The United Nations and Regional Organizations*. op. cit. p. 20. JIU/REP/95/4. Prepared by Bouayad-Agha, Fatih K. and Boris P. Krasulin, Joint Inspection Unit. Geneva: 1995.

⁸² I. William Zartman writes: "Internal conflicts--civil wars--are the most difficult of conflicts to negotiate. Only a quarter to a third of modern civil wars (including anticolonial wars) have found their way to negotiation, whereas more than half of modern interstate wars have done so. About two-thirds of the internal conflicts have ended in the surrender or elimination of one of the parties involved; fewer than a quarter of the international conflicts have so ended. Yet in internal conflicts more than in interstate wars, defeat of the rebellion often merely drives the cause underground, to emerge at a later time." *Dynamics and Constraints in Negotiations in Internal Conflicts*, in I. William Zartman, ed. *Elusive Peace: Negotiating an End to Civil Wars*. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1995. p. 1.

U.N. Secretary General in his 1992 Agenda for Peace for greater regional action.⁸³

Some of these organizations are strongly interested in preventive and diplomatic roles, particularly the OAU and the OSCE. In 1993, the OAU established a formal Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution, to anticipate and prevent conflicts before they reach the state where assistance from the United Nations would generally be sought. It is currently seeking access to U.N. information that would help develop an early warning system. The OSCE decided to develop early warning systems, undertake confidence and security building measures, and promote arms control. In 1994, OSCE members agreed to an expanded role in election monitoring in non-conflictive situations. The OAS is still seeking to define whether it should have such a role, with some member states leery of the "intervention" that such a role may entail. Some analysts note, however, that regional organizations with a strong "anti-intervention" ethos, especially the OAS, may be reluctant to expand preventive roles, because the collection of information necessary for early warning systems can be viewed as a form of intervention. This sentiment may impede the actual development and operation of preventive mechanisms in other organizations.

European nations have taken on greater responsibility for peacekeeping and peace enforcement efforts in their own region, but the appropriate relationship between NATO and the WEU in such efforts is under negotiation. At a June 1996 NATO meeting in Berlin, 15 European foreign ministers and the U.S. Secretary of State adopted a compromise agreement on the command, conduct and use of NATO resources for search and rescue, crisis management, humanitarian, and peacekeeping/peace enforcement missions, as well as the appropriate coordinate role for the WEU.⁸⁴ Several issues remain to be resolved regarding NATO/WEU cooperation.

Third World regional organizations, in general, have shown less interest in assuming responsibility for full-scale peacekeeping activities. The OAU, after early failures in peacekeeping, has avoided the commitment of forces to a peacekeeping operation. Nevertheless, some Africans wish to enhance the OAU's ability to deal with crisis situations, and the U.S. is supporting the development of an OAU conflict management center. As discussed in the previous question, the OAS is likely to continue to resist assuming roles involving a military component.

⁸³ Boutros Boutros-Ghali. *An Agenda for Peace*. New York: United Nations, 1992.

⁸⁴ OSCE. *Lisbon Document 1996*. Doc.S/1/96. December 3, 1996. <http://www.osceprag.cz.news/ls96ew08.htm>.

Would they be able to handle a greater workload and bear the costs attributable to a larger role?

Many analysts in the past and present note practical constraints on the use of regional organizations, except those in Europe. Organizations with Western European member States are probably capable of carrying out whatever missions their members muster the political will to undertake, and they probably could count on member governments to provide the necessary funding and troop contributions. (The United States, however, might be expected to contribute heavily.) In the Third World, analysts have pointed to a lack of appropriate organization, structures, and resources to carry out a wide range of peace and security operations, and even a lack of appropriate structures for the activities they currently do carry out. Even if Third World regional organizations were to adjust their charters to provide appropriate organizations and structures for peacekeeping, the lack of resources would be a continuing limitation.

All analysts note a severe shortage of funds in most organizations to carry out a range of activities. Although the availability of financial resources would obviously vary according to region, most analysts predict that the U.N.'s difficulties in raising funds for peacekeeping forces and sustaining them would only be magnified for regional organizations. For the OAU, this could be particularly troublesome; one of the reasons for its two failed peacekeeping operations was lack of adequate funding. The United States might find itself bearing much of the cost of increased OAS activities, even if the OAS were willing to take on peacekeeping and peace enforcement. (The CIS, although founded with a peace role, might well suffer comparably severe shortages of funds.)

Many analysts also doubt that Third World regional organizations would be able to raise and support the number of troops necessary for prolonged operations in conflictive situations.⁸⁵ When regional organizations send forces, they are, like U.N. forces, comprised of troops volunteered by the member states. In the past, regional organizations have rarely inserted military personnel into situations of open conflict. Unless regional organizations could recruit

⁸⁵ RAND analysts have pointed out that some 30 to 35 countries have provided the greatest number of troops to international peacekeeping. Most of these are developed European countries; only a "handful" are from Asia and Africa. See Thomas S. Szayna, Preston Niblack and William O'Malley. *Assessing Armed Forces' Deficiencies for Peace Operations: A Methodology*. International Peacekeeping. Autumn 1996. p. 77. Discussing proposals for an all-African peacekeeping force, a publication of the National Defense University's Institute for National Strategic Studies states that only eight militaries of Sub-Saharan Africa are equipped and trained to participate, and two of those should not at this time. The number of troops that the remaining six could field is limited. "The African states lack the military capabilities to handle any but the most benign contingencies," write William D. Bajusz and Kevin P. O'Prey, in *An All-African Peace Force: An Immediate Option or Long-Term Goal for the Region*. Strategic Forum, No. 86, October 1996. p. 2.

volunteer troop contributions from countries outside the region, they may not be able to afford deploying forces of the size necessary to control a situation.

The social and economic policies of member states of Third World regional organizations may also be affected, particularly by the expansion of peacekeeping and peace enforcement roles. For instance, governments seeking to downsize their militaries and reduce military expenditures may find that task complicated if their military establishments are to take on expanded peacekeeping and peace enforcement roles through regional organizations.

Do they offer worldwide coverage?

Currently, there are important gaps, worldwide, in the coverage of regional organizations.

- In the Middle East, there is no regional organization that can deal with the region's major conflicts -- those between Israel and its Arab neighbors. The key regional organization there, the Arab League, is comprised only of Arab states.
- In Asia, regional organizations are just beginning to play a peace and security role. ASEAN has considered expanding into peace and security activities, but thus far it has done so in only a limited way. Events in Cambodia drew ASEAN into a diplomatic role to end the 1978 Vietnamese occupation and to promote subsequent negotiations, and ASEAN formulated a common position regarding the Cambodian conflict. (ASEAN countries participated separately, however, in the negotiations leading to the 1991 Paris Peace Accords.) The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), an organization founded in 1993 which includes Japan, China and the United States, is intended to play a preventive, peacemaking role.⁸⁶ Some ASEAN countries are also interested in establishing mechanisms for undertaking multilateral peace operations, including a regional peacekeeping center.
- In Africa, the OAU prefers to leave responsibility for peacekeeping operations involving the commitment of troops to the U.N. The reluctance of Western nations to lead an intervention under U.N. aegis in recent African crises prompted the United States to propose, in October 1996, that African nations with more developed militaries

⁸⁶ For a discussion of the ARF, see: Larry Nicksch. *Regional Security Consultative Organizations in East Asia and Their Implications for the United States*. CRS Report 94-79 F. January 14, 1994; and, Raymond J. Ahearn. *ASEAN: Background, U.S. Interests and Policy Challenges*. CRS Report 97-187 F. January 31, 1997. For a discussion of the attempts of ASEAN nations to deal with the conflicting claims of several Asian nations to islands in the South China Sea, and ARF's role, see: U.S. Institute of Peace. *The South China Sea Dispute: Prospects for Preventive Diplomacy*. August 1996.

form an Africa Crisis Response Force. Under this proposal, the United States and other developed nations would help supply and train African troops to take part in traditional peacekeeping operations under the United Nations. (Although the proposal created friction with some African states, others have responded favorably.) These troops could also be used by the OAU if it chose to undertake peacekeeping activities in the future. There is little prospect for a regional capability to undertake peace enforcement operations, however. (See footnote 85)

- European organizations have the human and material ability to cover a full range of peacekeeping operations in greater Europe. Nevertheless, the Russian-dominated CIS is the only regional organization that has authorized military forces in the area of the former Soviet Union. Even though NATO currently conducts "out-of-area" operations (beyond the borders of current NATO members in the states of the former Yugoslavia), there is no consensus among NATO members on how far to extend NATO's area of operations. In some circumstances this might, from a U.S. perspective, create a gap in reliable regional coverage within areas that Russia considers within its historical sphere of influence. Whether this gap persists will depend on the evolution of NATO and other European organizations.

What effect would strengthening regional organizations have on U.S. policy towards sensitive regions and regional powers?

Strengthening regional institutions to deal with peace and security situations could have several effects on regional politics and on U.S. relations towards regions. Most importantly, strengthening regional organizations could enhance the political or military position of a regional power in ways that may or may not be in the United States' interest. This could be an important consideration as the United States will probably have much less influence over the operations of certain regional organizations than it has over the United Nations.

This could be particularly important in dealing with regional organizations in Europe. There are a number of European regional organizations that could be used in peace operations, and their future role is under discussion. In some, the United States has more influence than others. How these arrangements work out will have implications for the future U.S. role in Europe, its future relations with its allies, and Russia's position among the states of the former Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact, and in Europe.

Some analysts also feel that intensifying use of regional organizations in peacekeeping or peace enforcement roles could have negative implications for arms control efforts. Some fear equipping and training regional organizations for peacekeeping could contribute to regional arms races and, possibly, have a destabilizing effect on regional military balances.

MULTILATERAL COALITIONS

SCOPE OF ACTIVITIES

Nations have created multilateral coalitions of varying sizes for a variety of war, peace, and security functions. These *ad hoc* coalitions have ranged from small groups of leaders, representing two or more nations to mediate disputes, to multilateral forces intended to perform a wide range of peacekeeping and associated tasks, to alliances to fight wars. Sometimes these groups have acted under the auspices of the United Nations or of a regional organization, and their activities are considered operations of those organizations. Sometimes they have operated with the authority of a U.N. resolution or that of a regional organization, without being considered a U.N. or regional operation. These groups have most often carried out peacemaking activities. In the post-World War II period, multilateral forces have undertaken activities in only a handful of cases involving significant low-level or post-conflict situations.

The most likely future use of multilateral coalition forces is in peace operations in areas of conflict, i.e., activities commonly referred to as peace enforcement. In the 1995 supplement to his 1992 Agenda for Peace, U.N. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali acknowledged that the United Nations was unable to perform such operations,⁸⁷ a position supported by U.N. Security Council members.

U.S. POLICY

The United States has long participated in military coalitions of various sizes. In a number of recent peace enforcement operations or similar operations, the United States has preferred the use of U.S.-led multilateral forces over U.N. forces, because it could exercise effective leadership. U.S. policymakers have also tended to regard *ad hoc* multilateral operations as preferable to unilateral ones in many circumstances, because they bestow greater legitimacy on U.S. actions, and help spread the costs and operational burdens.⁸⁸ The Clinton

⁸⁷ United Nations. *Supplement to An Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary-General on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations*. U.N. Document A/50/60 -- S/1995/1. New York: 1995. p. 18. See also, U.S. General Accounting Office. *United Nations: Limitations in Leading Missions Requiring Force to Restore Peace*. GAO/NSIAD-97-34. March 1997.

⁸⁸ The U.S.-led multilateral force that drove Iraq from Kuwait in the 1991 Desert Storm operation is one example of a successful operation conducted by a multilateral coalition under a U.N. mandate, with costs shared among several nations. Analysts have disagreed, however, on whether that operation was peace enforcement or straightforward war.

Administration's PDD-25 does not specifically address U.S. participation in *ad hoc* coalitions. Nevertheless, the Clinton Administration continued the practice of participating in such coalitions. With France and Britain, the United States has enforced a no-fly zone over southern Iraq since August 1992. Some 80 U.S. troops were sent to participate in a four-nation multilateral military observer mission stationed on the Peru-Ecuador border after hostilities erupted in January 1995, as efforts to negotiate an end to a long-standing border dispute were carried out.

ISSUES IN THE USE OF MULTILATERAL FORCES

The issues concerning *ad hoc* cooperation among countries for peace and security activities center on the use of larger multilateral forces. Few question the use of prominent individuals or small numbers of troops for peacemaking activities. Even the dispatch of U.S. military observers to the conflict areas at the Peru-Ecuador border created no controversy.

How successful have multilateral forces been?

A notable success in a post-conflict transition situation was the 1979-1980 British-led multilateral peacekeeping force in Rhodesia that led to a peaceful transition to an independent Zimbabwe, with black majority rule, in April 1980. The United Kingdom first intervened in the 1970s to promote negotiations to end Rhodesia's civil war. Subsequently, it led a force from five countries of the British Commonwealth to monitor the Rhodesian cease-fire agreements, and an electoral observation team provided by the Commonwealth, the OAU, the U.N., and the European Community to oversee elections. This success in a complicated internal conflict, exacerbated by foreign interests, is attributed to the British government's mustering of countervailing international power, adroit diplomacy, and appropriate follow-up.⁸⁹

The most long-running and prominent peacekeeping multilateral force has been the Multilateral Force and Observers (MFO) in the Sinai, established in April 1982. Created as an *ad hoc* multilateral operation due to an expected Soviet veto of any proposed U.N. force to monitor the 1979 Egypt-Israel peace treaty, the MFO's 11-nation, almost 2,000 strong military force observes the border between the two countries, and patrols security zones as well as the Strait of Tiran.⁹⁰ Civilian observers -- 15 Americans -- periodically verify Israeli and Egyptian compliance with the 1979 treaty's security arrangement.

⁸⁹ See Fortna, *op.cit.* p. 17-21.

⁹⁰ This includes one battalion from the United States, plus troops from Australia, Canada, Colombia, Fiji, France, Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, and Uruguay.

The MFO is widely seen as a success in preventing renewed conflict by creating a climate of confidence between Egypt and Israel.⁹¹

Two consecutive multilateral forces intended to promote stability in the Middle East are viewed in retrospect as failures, even though the first was considered a success when its mission ended in 1982. The first Multinational Force (MNF) deployed troops from the United States, France, and Italy in August 1982 to supervise an agreement for the withdrawal of Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) fighters from Lebanon. It withdrew the next month, hailed as successful in accomplishing that mission. Troops from the same countries, and later from Great Britain, were redeployed to Lebanon in September 1982 to provide a peacekeeping "interpositional" force and to help the Lebanese government establish order. This second MNF withdrew hastily and ceased operations in March 1984, as it could not contain conflict in Lebanon.

Comparing the second MNF to U.N. operations in the Middle East, analysts note that it had the advantage of being able to deploy swiftly, but suffered from an inadequate mandate, difference of opinion among the troop contributing countries, and the lack of necessary support. In addition, the unusual complexity of the Lebanese situation -- where the central government had little control -- and numerous nations had an interest in who would eventually control the country, made any attempts at conflict resolution difficult.⁹²

Other recent multilateral forces have been the U.S.-led UNITAF force in Somalia from December 1992 through early May 1993, which followed and preceded separate U.N. missions, and the U.S.-led Restore Democracy force in Haiti launched in September 1994 and turned over the mission to the United Nations in March 1995. Despite widespread perceptions that all three Somalia operations failed because the mission mandates were grossly unrealistic, some argue that the U.S.-led UNITAF coalition successfully carried out its primary mission -- that of relieving suffering through the delivery of humanitarian assistance -- and failed only when it overreached its mandate and resources.⁹³ The U.S.-led multilateral force in Haiti was successful in stabilizing the situation in Haiti to the point that the U.N. could assume control. The final outcome of the U.S. and U.N. operations, however, is still in doubt.

⁹¹ See, in particular: Chapter Six, The Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai (MFO), in John Mackinlay. *The Peacekeepers: An assessment of peacekeeping operations at the Arab-Israel interface*. London: Unwin Hyman, 1989. pp. 160-198.

⁹² See: Anthony McDermott and Kjell Skjelsbaek, eds. *The Multinational Force in Beirut, 1982-1984*. Miami: Florida International University Press, 1991. pp. x-xi, 251-253, and, especially, Chapter Two, What Went Wrong? by Nathan A. Pelcovits; and Mackinley, op. cit., Chapter Four, The Second Multinational Force in Beirut (MNF 2), September 1982 to March 1984.

⁹³ Kenneth Allard. *Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned*. Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1995. p. xviii.

Could they be expected to operate more efficiently than U.N. forces?

Many analysts assert that situation-tailored *ad hoc* multinational coalitions can often act more expeditiously than the United Nations or, for that matter, a regional organization, primarily because of their greater flexibility.

- *Ad hoc* multilateral actions are easier to authorize because there are far fewer parties to deal with than in multilateral organization. Coalitions need only to get approval from the disputing parties to take action. Third parties cannot place limitations on, or block, a deployment approved by disputing parties, as they might through the U.N. or regional organization. The U.N. must seek approval from at least nine of the 15 members of the Security Council, with any of the five permanent members able to exercise a veto. This can often mean that the United Nations must condition mandates and action on many members' interest. Similarly, regional organizations most often seek consensus for any action before proceeding.
- In the past at least, multilateral forces have been freer to act with an open-ended mandate, rather than with deadlines or with limitations placed by non-troop contributing nations. Analysts have argued that open-ended mandates are an advantage because they may facilitate long-range planning and allow greater flexibility. Opinion shifts on the desirability of such mandates, however. Now analysts often stress a disadvantage. Because disputing parties know that peacekeeping forces probably will provide a buffer against inadvertent outbreaks of violence, open-ended mandates may remove an incentive for them to make the politically difficult decisions necessary to permanently resolve a conflict. Consequently, peacekeeping missions with open-ended mandates may extend indefinitely. With PDD-25, the Clinton Administration expressed a reluctance to go into any operation with an open-ended mandate. Many members of Congress also object to endorsing peace operations without a firm sense of what is to be accomplished for completion and a date by which all forces will be removed.
- Multilateral forces can enjoy relative ease in organizing. Because they can rely on existing military systems, they can have more efficient logistics and supply systems than the United Nations and regional organizations, unless these institutions' capabilities were enhanced. This latter could facilitate more timely responses. Multilateral groups may be at a disadvantage in constructing a force, however, as they often do not have the experience of the U.N.

There is some dispute over the relative efficiencies of military command and control systems. Some analysts argue that command and control systems are more uniform in *ad hoc* multilateral forces, and thus their coordination of peace operations is more efficient. Others believe that the coordination difficulties

among different national units are the same in the U.N. as in other multilateral operations, except where the nations involved regularly train together, as do NATO nations. As increased stress is placed on international peacekeeping training, the advantages may vary from place to place.

Because of the advantages of flexibility, many see *ad hoc* multilateral forces under a U.N. mandate as a preferred vehicle for U.S. action in peace enforcement activities. On the other hand, many argue that U.N. operations offer greater assurance that the mission and mandate will represent the viewpoints of third party states and subnational actors whose approval or acquiescence is helpful, or perhaps essential, to the success of peacekeeping. This may make a U.N. operation more successful in some situations.

One disadvantage of multilateral forces, raised by some analysts, is that they are more likely to be biased -- or perceived as biased -- in their actions than U.N. forces. This is because they are more likely to be formed of states that have a direct stake or interest in a conflict. Moreover, in a coalition where there is one major contributing state, the operation may be identified with that state. On the other hand, though desirable, neutrality may not be necessary in all cases. For instance, in the Middle East, the United States has taken a leading role in peace efforts, even though Arab countries perceive it as partial to Israel. Israel, on the other hand, has come to view the United Nations, especially the U.N. General Assembly, as partial to Arab causes.

Would multilateral operations be more or less costly to the United States than financing U.N. operations?

The costs to the United States of *ad hoc* multilateral operations might be higher or lower than those of U.N. operations, depending on the amount which the U.S. would be expected to contribute to the operation. (The United States currently contributes 25 per cent of the costs of U.N. peacekeeping operations.)⁹⁴ In the case of the *ad hoc* Multilateral Force and Observers (MFO) in the Sinai, the United States contributed 31 percent of the costs in FY1995. (See the section on Costs, below.) In the case of Desert Shield/Desert Storm in 1991, the United States paid about 7.7 percent of the costs. (See Appendix F)

⁹⁴ See discussion on the amount of U.S. contributions, p. 26, above.

NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

This section examines the use of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), meaning private, voluntary, non-profit organizations. The term covers thousands of groups, which vary tremendously in size, purpose, and types of activities, both in the United States and in other nations. Many non-governmental organizations are international in the sense of having members in more than one country, whereas others are national in the sense that they have members only in one country, although they may conduct operations in other countries.

SCOPE OF ACTIVITIES

Non-governmental organizations have been playing an active role in peace operations at least since 1864 when the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) was founded. The primary traditional function of NGOs has continued to be to provide humanitarian assistance; that is, assistance to the victims of natural or man-made disasters such as war, usually without regard to nationality. Hundreds of NGOs have moved to the preventive field and supplement relief activities with assistance for economic, social, and political development. Some have concluded that to permanently improve conditions they must get at the root causes of conflict, both economic and political. These may have supplemented food relief with seeds and agricultural training, emergency surgery with the training of local medical staff, and emergency response with efforts to resolve disputes.

While non-governmental organizations have become active in the whole range of peace operations, they have been perceived as most effective in five areas:

- **humanitarian and development assistance:** the perception is that, in emergencies, non-governmental organizations can respond quickly and directly with dedicated workers, less fettered by bureaucracy and sensitivity to international and domestic political concerns. They are considered to have relatively low overhead and to be generally effective in carrying out community-based development projects, although they do not have the power or experience of U.S. government agencies in working with foreign governments on policy reforms necessary to create an environment favorable to development.⁹⁵

⁹⁵ U.S. General Accounting Office. *Foreign Assistance; Private Voluntary Organizations' Contributions and Limitations*. GAO/NSIAD-96-34. December 1995. p. 3.

- **development of humanitarian law:** the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has sponsored several treaties seeking to extend the rule of law further into armed conflict, including the current development of a convention banning or reducing the use of land mines. The ICRC also has a unique role under the Geneva Conventions in serving as a neutral intermediary in a conflict.
- **conflict resolution:** non-governmental organizations are often found by disputants to be more appropriate for mediation than government officials because they are considered impartial and neutral. The Carter Center, for example, has a Conflict Resolution Program and International Negotiation Network which monitors and helps mediate armed conflicts worldwide. It has been involved in dispute resolution in Sudan, North Korea, Bosnia, the Baltics, and Rwanda and Burundi.
- **refugee resettlement and post-conflict development:** as part of their humanitarian activities, non-governmental organizations, often under contract with the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, help displaced people survive and reestablish themselves. To illustrate, the International Rescue Committee conducts emergency operations in countries where refugees are emerging, such as Bosnia and Somalia, and also operates agricultural self-help projects as a basis for long-term refugee integration, and provides resettlement and processing assistance.
- **electoral assistance:** non-governmental organizations prepare for and monitor elections which may be central to the resolution (or prevention) of violent conflict. For example, the Council of Freely Elected Heads of Government, a group of 25 current and former leaders from the Western Hemisphere linked with the Carter Center, has monitored critical elections in Panama, Nicaragua, Mexico, Haiti, and Guyana.

Non-governmental organizations are increasingly becoming a force to reckon with in almost every area. World conferences on the environment at Rio de Janeiro in 1992, and on women at Beijing in 1995, illustrated the growing influence of non-governmental organizations, as a whole, in bringing issues to world attention, stimulating debate on policy objectives and budget allocations, and shaping opinion. Not counting domestic organizations, there are more than 15,000 international non-governmental organizations, those that operate in three or more countries and draw their finances from sources in more than one country.⁹⁶ Organizations working in functions related to peacekeeping are only a small portion of the total number of national and international non-governmental organizations. Nevertheless, hundreds of such organizations exist, with vastly different objectives, capabilities, and effectiveness.

⁹⁶ Thomas G. Weiss and Leon Gordenker. *NGOs, the UN, & Global Governance*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996. p. 44.

U.S. POLICY

At the present time, U.S. policy generally facilitates humanitarian and other activities of non-governmental organizations related to peacekeeping. Frequently U.S. agencies contract with private organizations for distributing assistance or monitoring elections. As of October 1, 1995, 435 private voluntary organizations were registered with the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), a requirement by law to receive federal funds to carry out overseas aid projects. During 1994, registered groups received more than \$4.89 billion in private contributions, 67 percent of their total resources, and USAID provided them an additional \$1.4 billion in grants and contracts (20 percent). Other U.S. agencies and international organizations provided almost another billion (\$988 million) (13 percent). The registered NGOs spent some \$4.3 billion in overseas program expenses.⁹⁷

ISSUES IN THE USE OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

Should the U.S. government entrust foreign policy activities to private organizations?

A major argument against increasing reliance on non-governmental organizations, whether U.S., international, or indigenous organizations, is that they are independent organizations, not subject to governmental control in the way that U.S. agencies and employees are. This independence is their main advantage, however, for non-governmental organizations can often be more effective than governments in providing humanitarian assistance, mediating conflicts, and monitoring elections, largely because local groups consider them fair, impartial, and neutral in the dispute or conflict. They are sometimes more efficient because they are less subject to government regulations than government agencies. For organizations which carry out humanitarian assistance at the direction and with the funding of the U.S. government, the issue is whether they can retain the advantages of being private and independent, and whether they will compromise their neutrality, or their image of neutrality, by becoming an instrument of U.S. policy. Other observers question whether private organizations should be involved at all in carrying out foreign policy.

Non-governmental organizations which act entirely with private funding raise the issue of whether their activities abroad may, inadvertently or deliberately, work against U.S. foreign policy. While such organizations must obey U.S. laws and regulations, they are otherwise subject to little government control. Some organizations are neither neutral nor non-political, and advocate

⁹⁷ USAID Voluntary Foreign Aid Programs, 1996. *Report of Voluntary Agencies Engaged in Overseas Relief and Development Registered with the U.S. Agency for International Development*, April 1996. pp. 78-79.

courses of action not acceptable to everyone. Even humanitarian activities can have political and foreign policy repercussions.

How much should the United States fund NGOs, and which ones?

A major advantage of using non-governmental organizations is that they mobilize efforts and funds of private citizens for international humanitarian activities. Private citizens may decide to contribute to whichever of the many humanitarian crises throughout the world they wish, although some observers fear that private interests and the media may have too much influence in determining what, and how, crises are brought to the attention of the public.

But often the funds NGOs use are primarily from the U.S. government, not private citizens. Both the United Nations and the United States have increasingly been choosing non-governmental organizations as contractors to provide humanitarian assistance or undertake activities promoting democracy, such as election monitoring. Issues include how much the U.S. government can fund a non-governmental organization before it loses its private status, whether the funds are adequately audited and accounted for, and whether the private organizations can use the funds more effectively than government agencies.

Congress has encouraged U.S. grants to non-governmental organizations. In 1995, when foreign aid and peacekeeping was being reduced, the Foreign Operations Appropriation Act for FY1996 directed the President to seek to ensure that the percentage of funds for the activities of private and voluntary organizations and cooperatives was at least equal to the percentage in FY1995. At the same time, Congress has also required that, to obtain grants, private organizations should raise a significant amount of their funds from private resources. It legislated a "privateness requirement" that U.S. private voluntary organizations must receive at least 20 percent of their financial support for overseas activities from non-U.S. government sources. USAID believes that requiring a substantial portion of private funds helps ensure the commitment of the organization as well as its continued participation after USAID support ends.

After deciding to provide aid through non-governmental organizations, the next issue focuses on the choice of organization. The U.S. government provides some type of support to more than 275 of the groups registered with USAID, including numerous humanitarian organizations. But the bulk of government relief money goes to just a dozen or so of the largest NGOs, such as CARE, the American Red Cross, Save the Children, Catholic Relief Services, and World Vision. Some observers question whether a concentration of funds in a few organizations is the most effective use, and whether it is fair since the contracts expand greatly the capabilities of the recipient organizations to win future contracts. Others believe that only a few of the NGOs have the qualifications and capacity to administer large amounts of assistance. USAID policy is to apply rules relating to procurement integrity and conflict of interest to assure that no

organization has an unfair competitive advantage and that NGOs are objective and provide impartial advice.

Should the United States protect NGO workers?

One critical limit on expanding the use of private groups in peace operations is that they are not equipped to protect themselves. Non-governmental organizations ordinarily depend upon the host government for access and security, so security becomes a problem when the host government breaks down or civil conflict occurs. If the United States wants to rely on private groups to supply humanitarian assistance, it risks getting involved militarily to protect them as it did in Somalia in 1992, when fighting and lawlessness prevented relief organizations from delivering sufficient food to prevent famine. If the U.S. military is called upon to protect NGO workers, a host of issues are raised, including their perceived neutrality and non-governmental nature. Most of the private groups have primarily local staff and only a few U.S. personnel. The United States may be obliged to protect U.S. citizens if it has supplied assistance to them, but what about local employees the NGOs hire? What if NGO staff ignore the travelers' advisories of the State Department or take unauthorized actions, and their workers are attacked or taken hostage?

Security risks for humanitarian workers have grown in recent years. In Somalia in 1995, several aid workers were held hostage for more than two weeks and, in January 1996, Save the Children decided to leave Somalia because of operational and security problems. In a survey conducted in December 1995 by the American Council for Voluntary International Action, 15 aid groups reported that a total of 115 of their aid workers had been killed since 1993; another 1995 survey of 28 relief groups showed 60 percent believed their work had become more dangerous.⁹⁸

Is Coordination Adequate?

Some practitioners and analysts contend that one of the greatest needs is increased coordination to improve the capacity and effectiveness of NGO activity. During Operation Restore Hope, military officials found coordination to be a growing problem, as the number of international NGOs in Somalia doubled from 25 (December 1991) to 54 (March 1993).⁹⁹ To others, the strength of non-governmental organizations is in their independence and diversity of approaches. They view NGO competition among themselves as well as with other international and governmental bodies as a positive factor, which

⁹⁸ Stephen Buckley. *Aid Groups Snared in African Violence*. Washington Post. January 23, 1996. p. A9.

⁹⁹ Jonathan Dworken. *Military Relations with Humanitarian Relief Organizations; Observations from Restore Hope*. Center for Naval Analyses, CRM 93-140. October 1993.

could be lost if centralization and coordination are increased. Moreover, "everyone favors coordination, but no one wishes to be coordinated."¹⁰⁰

Currently, coordination is primarily at three levels: international, national, and organizational. At the international level, organizations may apply to the U.N. Economic and Social Council for consultative status in a system administered by a U.N. committee on non-governmental organizations. Benefits of having consultative status include access to U.N. documents, security passes giving access to all buildings, and a status of legitimacy.¹⁰¹ The United Nations coordinates efforts in specific humanitarian emergencies in a variety of ways. Sometimes a lead agency is designated, like the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees in the former Yugoslavia. UNICEF, the World Food Program, and the U.N. Development Program have also served as lead agencies on other occasions. Sometimes a special coordination group is established, as in Afghanistan. The case of Sierra Leone was taken up by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), composed of the executive heads of the United Nations humanitarian organizations as well as ICRC, the International Federation of the Red Cross, and the Red Crescent Societies, the International Organization for Migration, and the non-governmental consortia, International Council of Voluntary Agencies, Interaction, and the Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response.

For the U.S. government, the President has designated the Administrator of USAID as his Special Coordinator for Disaster Assistance. USAID has launched an effort to foster a partnership with private voluntary organizations (PVOs) and cooperative development organizations (CDOs), and strengthen their capability. One goal is for countries receiving humanitarian assistance to achieve development and thereby avoid long-term dependence on humanitarian assistance. In March 1995, USAID established eight principles which are relevant to strengthening the effectiveness of PVOs in humanitarian assistance.¹⁰² These include increasing consultation with the groups, participation by host country organizations and supporting relationships between U.S. private groups and host country organizations, and working with PVOs as both intermediaries and independent entities.

In addition, the U.S. military has begun to establish a group to serve as liaison with NGOs, such as a Civil-Military Operation Cell (CMOC) in Somalia and Haiti. Most analysts agree the relationship between U.S. government and

¹⁰⁰ Thomas G. Weiss and Leon Gordenker. *NGOs, The UN, & Global Governance*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996. p. 219.

¹⁰¹ Peter Willetts. *The Conscience of the World; the Influence of Non-Governmental Organizations in the U.N. System*. London: Hurst, 1996. p.43.

¹⁰² U.S. Agency for International Development. *Policy Guidance*. USAID-U.S. PVO Partnership. April 12, 1995. See Appendix E for summary.

non-governmental organizations has improved since the action in Somalia, with workshops involving military and civilian personnel, and exercises to build understanding and cooperation.

Non-governmental organizations have sought to coordinate their own activities in order to achieve greater effectiveness, particularly in the field of humanitarian assistance. The organization InterAction is a coalition of 160 U.S.-based private and voluntary organizations. It sets standards designed to ensure professional competence, quality of service, and accountability to donors. Its latest directory, *Interaction Member Profiles, 1995-1996*, lists more than 60 organizations in the program index under Strengthening of Civil Society, more than 40 under Democratic Development, and approximately 70 under Disaster and Emergency Relief. It also publishes a guide to relief and reconstruction activities in specific areas such as Bosnia or Rwanda. The groups discuss methods, including political action, of improving their effectiveness in peacekeeping. A recent proposal is to develop an early warning system to detect and frame preventive responses to prevent conflicts and resolve them.¹⁰³

¹⁰³ Bernard Kouchner. *Human Rights and Humanitarian Interference*. Paper submitted to the Association pour l'Action Humanitaire, October 21, 1993.

COMMERCIAL CONTRACTORS

Both the U.S. Department of Defense and the United Nations have purchased goods and services for peacekeeping operations from various private sector sources. As the U.S. military's role in international peacekeeping has grown during the 1990s, some defense and military analysts have urged greater use of commercial contractors in peacekeeping and other contingency operations. Others have reservations about their use. This section primarily addresses the issues involved in DOD contracting for peacekeeping, but some of the concerns about the use of private contractors could also apply to the United Nations, which contracts for services not volunteered or provided on a reimbursable basis by member states.

This section deals with the issues raised by the use of large commercial contractors to perform logistics support functions for the U.S. military in peace and security operations, because their use has implications for national security and defense. Other smaller commercial contractors have been contracted by agencies such as the Agency for International Development (AID) to take on tasks, such as assisting in elections. Because the issues involved in their use are similar to those involved in the use of non-governmental organizations, they are not dealt with here.

SCOPE OF ACTIVITIES AND U.S. POLICY

For most of its history, the U.S. military has purchased assistance for non-military tasks in peace and wartime situations. It has traditionally secured private sector assistance on a piece-meal basis, for instance, purchasing food, transport, or services in the field, or through limited, project specific contracts. It has continued to do so in recent contingency operations. In 1992, the U.S. Army contracted a commercial firm to perform, for the first time, a wide range of logistics support functions in peace operations. Brown and Root, Inc., of Houston, Texas, was given a comprehensive, single-source contract, to supply services ranging from base camp construction and maintenance to linguistic support in Somalia. Subsequently, the Army hired Brown and Root, again under Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) comprehensive contracts, to provide operational assistance in Rwanda, Haiti, and Bosnia.¹⁰⁴

¹⁰⁴ The costs to the United States of previous Brown and Root, Inc., efforts in support of peacekeeping, according to U.S. Army figures, are as follows: (1) **Somalia** -- \$106.1 million for base camp construction/maintenance; support including power, water, and fuel supply, laundry, hygiene, and waste facilities, food services, and linguistic support to U.S. and U.N. forces over 16 months from December 1992 to March 1994; (2) **Rwanda** -- \$6.5 million for water supply and storage, over four months, from July through September 1994; (3) **Haiti** -- \$148.6 million for base camp construction and maintenance; support including laundry, food service, provision of fuel, maintenance, and
(continued...)

Brown and Root did not win the LOGCAP contract when it was put up for bid in 1996. In October 1996, the U.S. Army awarded a new LOGCAP contract for support to forces deployed in contingency operations to DynCorp Aerospace Technology of Fort Worth, Texas. (It is effective January 30, 1997, for one-year with four annual renewal options.) The U.S. Navy also has two comprehensive contracts -- one to cover the Atlantic region and one to cover the Pacific region -- with private companies to provide construction, engineering, and related services for contingency operations.

The U.N. procures goods and services from various private sector sources to supplement member states' contributions to peacekeeping operations.¹⁰⁵ The U.N. field operations have traditionally purchased some goods and services from local providers at the site of the operation. U.N. headquarters procurement has most often been through contracts for individual services ("single-service" contracts). Recently, the U.N. has worked through comprehensive single-source contracts in a few countries,¹⁰⁶ contracting companies to provide the wide range of services provided to DOD under its comprehensive contracts. This was because member states could not always offer to provide sufficient resources to carry out the expanding number of missions

¹⁰⁴(...continued)

transportation over 18 months from September 1994 to February 1996. For support in **Bosnia**, FY1996 LOGCAP costs totaled \$436.5 million. Of this, \$430.2 million was for base camp construction/maintenance and other support to the Army, including power, water and fuel supply, laundry, hygiene and waste facilities, and food services. Another \$ 6.3 million was for the construction in late 1995 of a 1,000 person base camp to support Air Force operations over Bosnia. LOGCAP costs for support in **Bosnia** during the first two months of FY1997 (Oct. 1 - Nov. 27, 1997) were \$36.8 million. Projected costs there through May 27, 1997, when the LOGCAP contract with Brown and Root ends, are \$84.5 million. The LOGCAP operation in Bosnia has been controversial because actual costs exceeded early estimates. For information on this controversy, see the General Accounting Office's report, *Contingency Operations: Opportunities to Improve the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program*. GAO/NSIAD-97-63. February 1997.

¹⁰⁵ The United States has traditionally volunteered or provided through reimbursable "Letters of Assist" a substantial proportion of the airlift or sealift to support UN operations. In 1994, the United States provided some \$141.3 million in "Letter of Assist" support services, some 38.5 per cent of such services provided to the U.N. by member states that year, according to an October 6, 1995, State Department certification to Congress.

¹⁰⁶ In its first comprehensive contract, U.N. Headquarters took over the existing DOD LOGCAP contract with Brown and Root in Somalia, then issued its own contract to the firm, for a combined cost of some \$30 million, according to a U.N. estimate. The U.N. briefly secured Brown and Root LOGCAP services in Haiti through a Letter of Assist with the United States, then itself contracted the same range of services, after competitive bidding in a split contract, from Brown and Root and Serv-Air, a subsidiary of Raytheon Corp, for a cost of some \$5 million. It has also signed a comprehensive contract with Brown and Root for the operation in Rwanda (about \$8 million), and with a partnership of Raytheon and a Brazilian firm for Angola (about \$17 million).

authorized by the Security Council in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and because in the most impoverished countries there was no local market for field procurement. In Bosnia, the U.N. has reimbursed the United States for a small part of services provided through the LOGCAP contract.

ISSUES FOR THE UNITED STATES IN THE USE OF COMMERCIAL CONTRACTORS

Does the use of commercial contractors significantly relieve the burden on U.S. military forces?

U.S. military and defense leaders have embraced the use of commercial contractors in non-military operations as a "force multiplier" which eases strains on downsizing military as it carries out extensive contingency operations. Contractors can significantly stretch the military's capacity to perform peace operations, supplementing active duty forces, whose capability to perform support services has recently been overtaxed by such operations. For example, a March 1995 report of the General Accounting Office found that nearly all Army support units, which provide necessities such as food, water, toilet and showers, and military police, were being used for peace operations at that time.¹⁰⁷

On the other hand, some analysts argue that the use of contractors could prove detrimental to military capabilities in some circumstances. Two analysts for the recent Commission on Roles and Missions (CORM) state that reliance on contractors could degrade capability in three ways. It could, they claim: (1) keep the United States "from building and maintaining capacity needed for strategic or other important missions;" (2) limit training opportunities in some military specialties, and (3), result in the lack of, or inadequate procurement of, appropriate equipment to perform certain tasks.¹⁰⁸

Analysts also point out that the use of commercial contractors enables the President to avoid or minimize the call-up of reserve units to provide support services necessary to perform a mission. Some state this can be advantageous as it reduces the political complications and costs of reserve call-ups. Some also believe that using commercial contractors can be more efficient than using reserves, as commercial contractors can often respond more quickly and provide more timely support to a call to action than activated reserves. However, those who wish to maintain reserve capabilities may fear that the use of commercial

¹⁰⁷ U.S. General Accounting Office. *Peace Operations: Heavy Use of Key Capabilities May Affect Response to Regional Conflicts*. GAO/NSIAD-95-51. March 1995.

¹⁰⁸ Christine Cervenak and George T. Raach. *Contracting and Privatization in Peace Operations*, in *Peace Operations: Developing An American Strategy*, edited by Antonia Handler Chayes and George T. Raach. Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1995. pp. 137-151.

contractors, who can substitute for reservists, might provide a rationale for downsizing reserve forces.

Are they less costly than using U.S. or other military forces?

Most analysts agree that the costs of using a private contractor and the costs of using a military force may vary widely, depending on the operation and on the type of personnel used. Thus, the relative cost of using these options may also vary.

A recent cost comparison prepared for DOD showed that the cost of using a commercial contractor under the LOGCAP contract for support functions in the Bosnia Joint Endeavor operation was considerably cheaper -- some \$176 million -- than the cost would have been if U.S. military forces had been used.¹⁰⁹ Logistics Management Institute (LMI) calculated the cost of the use of a hypothetical "equivalent" military force to perform the same tasks and provide the same living standard as the commercial contractor. In constructing the equivalent force, LMI assumed that it would be composed predominately of reservists¹¹⁰ and that supplies, equipment, and troops would be transported from the United States. LMI found, however, that comparative costs might change significantly if the assumptions used to construct the equivalent military force were changed or if the level of support were reduced. But "in nearly all variations, the LOGCAP costs compare favorably," according to the LMI report.

The greatest saving in using LOGCAP was its lower labor costs. LOGCAP's extensive use of lower-cost local nationals (80 per cent of LOGCAP'S total 6,766 personnel during peak months, not including subcontractors) resulted in much lower costs than those of the assumed equivalent force. LOGCAP's use of local hires also resulted in a significant savings in transport costs. While no transport was required for LOGCAP 5,478 local hires, all 8,918 U.S. military troops (active duty, reserves and guard) comprising the equivalent force were assumed to be deployed from the United States by sea. The costs of equipment and supplies would be cheaper if U.S. forces were used, however, provided the costs of refurbishment were not added.

¹⁰⁹ The study, entitled "LOGCAP Support in Operation Joint Endeavor: A Review and Analysis" (# LG612LN1, June 1996), was prepared by David Gallay and Charles Horne of the Logistics Management Institute (LMI) for the Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Logistics. See: Study: Logcap in Bosnia Less Costly than Equivalent Force Structure. Inside the Army, Oct. 14, 1996, pp. 1, 8-10. "Joint Endeavor" is the U.S. military's name for its effort, beginning in December 1995, to support NATO operation in Bosnia following the Dayton Peace Accord. The LMI study covers the period from November 1995 through April 1996.

¹¹⁰ Because the U.S. army relies heavily on the reserves to provide most of its support capability, the U.S. military's standard practice in recent peacekeeping operations has been to draw most of the support personnel from Reserve units.

According to the report's authors, the costs of using U.S. troops could be reduced significantly by a different mix of forces and use of resources, or by providing a lower living standard. Labor costs could be cut using more active duty soldiers rather than reservists. Because the costs of the use of the military are calculated on an "incremental" basis, that is, the additional cost of the soldier over normal peacetime status, it is much more costly to activate and deploy a reservist, who in peacetime normally receives only a small retainer, than to deploy an active duty soldier who already receives a full-time salary. The LMI analysts also point out that transport costs could be cut by extending the length of deployments beyond six months and by transporting available resources from Europe rather than from the United States. However, the extent to which more active duty troops could be used is currently limited by the relatively small number of active duty units that support functions. Extending deployments for reservists would require politically-sensitive change in current practices, and the use of resources in Europe might strain the military's ability to respond to crises, many analysts argue. (See question above.)

Another way to lower costs would be to reduce the standard of living of troops in the field. The LOGCAP contract for Joint Endeavor provides for a higher standard of living than the conditions under which troops serve in combat missions. If the standard were lowered significantly, the cost of using U.S. troops to provide support services would be less than using a private contractor, according to the LMI analysts. It might be politically difficult to subject troops serving in peacekeeping missions to harsh combat conditions, however.

Defense budget analysts point out that the results of any comparison of the costs of using a private contractor instead of the U.S. military to support peace operations depends on the assumptions made. These assumptions include the numbers, skills, and locations of those deployed or contracted, and the number of local hires vs. American citizens used by the private contractor or the military. Analysts point out that the relative costs between military and non-military performance might well vary considerably based on the type of support provided and the nature of the operation.

In addition, some analysts argue that comparing the use of private contractors and the U.S. military must take into account the cost to the military of protecting the contractors. Soldiers performing support functions can provide their own protection, analysts point out. When contractors are hired to perform support tasks, soldiers often must be tasked to protect them.

The United Nations has not undertaken a rigorous, comprehensive cost analysis comparing the use of commercial contractors and the use of member state forces in U.N. operations, but U.N. staff found from an informal survey of ongoing operations in late 1996 that private contractors are, in general, less expensive. The staff also found, however, that commanders in U.N. operations

have greater flexibility in responding to changing situations when military forces are used.

Are there limits to their use?

Thus far, commercial contractors have been used principally in "rear areas," in situations that were anticipated to be largely non-conflictive, and for logistics functions. Although some might argue that more use could be made of commercial contractors in a wider range of situations and functions, others argue against it. Analysts point to at least three areas in which the use of commercial contractors may be limited or not permitted altogether: in risky and unpredictable circumstances, in politically sensitive situations, and for inappropriate functions, i.e., those which should be carried out by U.S. government personnel.

Risky and unpredictable circumstances. Some argue that there would be little advantage in using commercial contractors in any but low risk situations. Because commercial contractors do not provide their own security, U.S. (or other) troops are required to protect them. In risky environments, this requirement would place an added burden on U.S. (or other) military forces, diminishing the "force multiplier" advantage that the contractors could bring to operations. In addition, some analysts argue that the savings from using commercial contractors could be diminished in conflict environments because some commercial contractors might expect to receive greater compensation for assuming greater risks.

Some analysts also argue that commercial contracts can be a liability in situations where unexpected changes may occur.¹¹¹ Contracts often do not take into account all possible circumstances in an operation, and altering contracts can be time-consuming and costly. In unilateral and multilateral operations, contractors may be less flexible than military forces, and less able to respond as rapidly as needed to changes on the ground. In multinational operations, however, commercial contracts may, in some instances, provide greater flexibility to meet changing circumstances than trying to renegotiate the terms of troop and other contributions from member states.

Politically-sensitive situations. U.S.-contracted commercial firms also may be inappropriate for situations where their shortcomings or failings could create political and legal difficulties, or undermine the achievement of U.S. policy goals. The two CORM analysts (referred to above) point out "the perception/reality that the contractor is a U.S. agent and therefore the United States assumes symbolic, political, and legal liability" for the contractor's

¹¹¹ See Cervenak and Raach, op. cit., p. 143.

actions.¹¹² They note these problems, particularly in connection with operations where contractors take on police or security functions "with the potential for the use of deadly or injurious force," and note they can apply in other politically-sensitive circumstances where the means by which a task is carried out can be important to an operation's success or failure. They also point out that in certain circumstances it may detract from the achievement of U.S. policy goals if the United States appears unwilling or unable to carry out an operation itself.¹¹³

On the other hand, the LMI report points out that the use of private contractors can be beneficial in some sensitive situations. Where the presence of a large number of U.S. troops may not be desirable due to, for instance, anti-Americanism, the use of a private contractor can reduce the number of soldiers needed.

Inappropriate functions. Analysts argue that some functions in peace and security operations should only be performed by U.S. government personnel. Cervenak and Raach state that activities "such as combat or the direct support of forces engaged in combat" are inappropriate for the private sector.¹¹⁴ Some DOD analysts argue that executive branch restrictions on the use of non-governmental personnel for strictly government functions (as contained in an Office of Management and Budget Circular A-76) would limit the use of commercial contractors in contingency operations to support functions and would prohibit their use to replace troops involved in certain peace operations tasks, such as patrolling, border and force observation, and evaluating intelligence. Further, many argue that U.S. government policy is best carried out by personnel whose function is, specifically and solely, to fulfill the mandates of that policy, not "mercenaries" whose interests may differ from those guiding that policy.

¹¹² Cervenak and Raach, op. cit., p. 145. These analysts refer specifically to liability for a contractor's use of force, but liability could also be incurred as a result of other actions.

¹¹³ Cervenak and Raach, op. cit., pp. 145-147.

¹¹⁴ Cervenak and Raach, op. cit., p. 42.

COSTS

Costs of peacekeeping have become an important factor as the United Nations and its member states have encountered increasing budgetary problems at the same time that peacekeeping missions have become more frequent.

Costs vary greatly in peace operations because of the vastly different kinds and scope of operations, and the uncertainty of world events. They can be estimated, however, by calculating the costs of the components required. Major variables that affect the cost of an operation include:¹¹⁵

- Number of personnel (including reserve mobilization)
- Length of the mission
- Deployment/redeployment costs (which vary depending on timing, distance, nature, and amount of equipment)
- Sustainment costs
 - Infrastructure needs
 - Logistics operations and supplies
 - Supporting air and naval operations
 - Operational tempo
 - Medical costs

The United Nations has developed a standard costs manual for peacekeeping operations to provide a uniform basis for budgeting and financial management. This manual includes standardized costs and specifications for all manner of equipment and supplies procured for peacekeeping organizations. Rates of reimbursement to governments of troop-contributing states are also based on standard rates established by General Assembly Resolution.¹¹⁶ They begin with \$988 per person per month basic pay at all ranks, plus \$291 for a limited number of specialists, \$65 for personal clothing and gear, \$5 for personal weaponry and ammunition, plus \$1.28 per man per day for daily subsistence. Additional amounts are set for recreational leave, death and disability, and a detailed schedule of reimbursement for contingent-owned equipment (such as vehicles, aircraft, communications equipment, and other) used in the missions.

Attempts to devise a formula to provide, in advance, reasonable estimates of the variable costs of planned operations have not produced a reliable model. In 1993, a U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff U.N. Logistics Working Group surveyed U.N. peacekeeping operations to develop a model intended to assist the U.N. Field Administration and Logistics Division in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations in planning future operations. By using this model (a "budget

¹¹⁵ Stephen Daggett. *Bosnia Peacekeeping: An Assessment of Administration Cost Estimates*. CRS Report 95-1165 F. December 4, 1995.

¹¹⁶ United Nations. Field Operations Division, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, draft, Feb. 2, 1994. General Assembly Resolution A/45/258 of May 3, 1991.

template"), the costs of varying-sized operations for six months were estimated at: \$16 million for a small operation with 500 personnel, \$85 million for a medium operation with 5,000 personnel, and \$404.5 million for a large operation of 20,000 personnel.¹¹⁷ The U.N. office has not found these indicators to be useful for planning purposes. In addition to the many variations in mandates which affect the configuration of a mission and the types of programs to be implemented, conditions such as climate, country size, and the state of the local infrastructure and labor force vary greatly among the peacekeeping operations. These factors can have a bigger impact on costs than differences in the size of the operation. Nevertheless, the template figures provide a general idea of possible differences in magnitude of costs among operations.

Statistics on past military operations bear out the obvious, however, that the larger and longer the conflict, the greater is the cost to the United States in both money and American lives; the more costs are shared, the smaller is the cost to the United States. Appendix F lists the costs of major U.S. wars in this century (World Wars I and II, Korea, Vietnam, and the Persian Gulf War). Costs range from \$72 billion in constant FY1998 dollars for the Persian Gulf War, of which most was offset by allied contributions, to \$4.2 trillion in constant FY1998 dollars for World War II. In six recent military operations listed (Grenada, Lebanon, the Persian Gulf Tanker Escort of 1987-88, Panama, Somalia, and Rwanda), the incremental costs were in the millions, not billions, of dollars except in the cases of Somalia and Haiti, which cost \$1.7 billion and \$852 million in constant FY1998 dollars, respectively. Except for Somalia and Haiti, these operations each cost the United States less than \$215 million in constant FY1998 dollars.¹¹⁸

In U.N. peacekeeping operations, many are fairly small, and the United States pays only a portion of the costs in both money and lives.¹¹⁹ Several operations involved costs (calculated in unadjusted, current-year dollars) to the United Nations of less than \$5 million: UNOGIL (Lebanon in 1958), UNYOM

¹¹⁷ From: Joint Staff United Nations Logistics Working Group. *Recommendations and Products*. Prepared October 4, 1993 through December 5, 1993. Lt. Col. Gordon T. Kennedy, Team Chief. The formula, based on seven previous peacekeeping missions, was intended to provide a means to rapidly estimate the cost of an operation, within plus or minus 25 percent of actual cost. Similarly, the Department of Defense is still working to develop a model which will reliably estimate the costs of planned contingency operations to be undertaken by the U.S. military -- of which peacekeeping operations are one type.

¹¹⁸ Updated figures based on CRS Report 94-995 F, by Stephen Daggett. *Costs of Major U.S. Wars and Recent U.S. Military Operations*. December 13, 1994. See Appendix F.

¹¹⁹ See Table 1 in Marjorie Ann Browne. *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, 1988-1993: Background Information*. CRS Report 94-193 F. Updated Feb. 28, 1994.

(Yemen in 1963-64), and UNIPOM (India and Pakistan, 1965-66).¹²⁰ Only two long-standing operations, UNFICYP (Cyprus since 1964) at \$1.76 billion, UNIFIL (Southern Lebanon since 1978) at \$2.1 billion, and one more recent operation, UNTAC (Cambodia) at \$1.5 billion, cost in the billions.

Multilateral coalitions share the costs as well as the military contributions. In the case of the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO), for FY1995, Japan, Germany, and Switzerland contributed a small part of the funds for the \$51 million budget, and Israel, Egypt, and the United States each provided \$16 million.¹²¹

The military operation is only a part of the cost of modern complex peacekeeping operations. The total cost for the United States includes more than the incremental costs to the Defense Department because of U.N. peacekeeping assessments and other assistance provided by U.S. government appropriations to the Department of State, and has mushroomed since the end of the Cold War. The General Accounting Office estimates that, from 1992 through 1995, for a broad range of peacekeeping and related operations in Haiti, former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Somalia, the United States spent nearly \$6.6 billion divided as follows:¹²²

Haiti:	\$1,616,000,000
Former Yugoslavia	2,186,900,000
Rwanda	573,700,000
Somalia	2,223,100,000
TOTAL	\$ 6,600,400,000

These totals include DOD incremental expenses and all expenses incurred by the Departments of State, Justice, Commerce, Transportation, Health and Human Services, and the Treasury, including food and humanitarian assistance and other aid. Sometimes, as in the case of UNTAC, the U.N. mission to Cambodia, costs for all aspects of multifunctional operations have been shared through assessments. Other times, as in El Salvador and Mozambique, the costs of the U.N. operation have been shared through assessment, and the United States has unilaterally provided additional economic assistance.

¹²⁰ Even if adjusted for inflation, these expenditures would be less than \$50 million.

¹²¹ *Annual Report Pursuant to Section 6 of P.L. 97-132 for Period Ending January 15, 1996.* p. 7. Germany, Japan, and Sweden contributed a total of \$1.65 million. About \$2.7 million of the budget was covered by unexpended FY1994 funds.

¹²² U.S. General Accounting Office. *Peace Operations: U.S. Costs in Support of Haiti, Former Yugoslavia, Somalia, and Rwanda.* Letter Report GAO/NSIAD-96-38, March 6, 1996.

Beyond the financial costs are lives lost and casualties. The number of U.S. lives lost in the five major wars of this century range from 147 in the Persian Gulf War to upwards from 291,000 in World War II.¹²³ In the six smaller military operations discussed above -- Grenada, Lebanon, the Persian Gulf Tanker Escort, Panama, Somalia, and Rwanda -- except for Lebanon, where 260 U.S. military lost their lives, the number of lives lost in each of these operations was fewer than 30. Fatalities suffered in U.N. peacekeeping operations range from six, including three Americans, in UNMOGIP (Kashmir in 1948), to 28, including seven Americans, in UNTSO (Middle East since 1948), to 136 in UNOSOM II (Somalia in 1993-1994), of whom 26 were U.S. personnel.¹²⁴

¹²³ Robert L. Goldich and John C. Schaefer. *U.S. Military Operations, 1965-1994 (Not Including Vietnam): Data on Casualties, Decorations, and Personnel Involved*. CRS Report 94-529 F. June 27, 1994; and Department of Defense, *Principal Wars in which the United States Participated; U.S. Military Personnel Serving and Casualties*.

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*

ROLE OF CONGRESS

For Congress, an important consideration is the degree of control or influence it can have on any particular form of peace operation. Congressional support is also an important factor in the success of peacekeeping operations. The Clinton Administration's Presidential Decision Directive on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations (PDD-25) recognizes the necessity for Congress and the American people to be participants in the processes of U.S. decision-making on peacekeeping operations.

Legally, Congress has a strong position. Under the Constitution, Congress has the power to declare war and make rules of the land and naval forces. Following ratification of the United Nations Charter, the United Nations Participation Act established the framework for U.S. participation in the organization; it limits the number of personnel the President may commit to U.N. peacekeeping operations to 1,000, and then only to serve as observers, guards, or in any noncombatant capacity. Congress annually authorizes and appropriates funds for contributions to the United Nations, U.N. peacekeeping, regional organizations, and the funds that are contributed to non-governmental organizations.¹²⁵ In addition to establishing funding levels, the legislation authorizing and appropriating the funds has established numerous guidelines and restraints concerning peacekeeping in general, and for particular peacekeeping operations. (See Appendix D, Legislative Framework for Peacekeeping.)

In practice, however, despite the congressional powers and constraints in law, Presidents have asserted the position that the Commander-in-Chief role gives the President the power to deploy forces, whether or not as a part of U.N. or NATO operations. Congress has found it usually has little effective control over the military actions of the President when entering an operation. Often, this is because Members disagree on the appropriate policy toward the situation involving the operation. Members also disagree on the extent to which Congress should limit the President's flexibility, especially regarding commander-in-chief powers.

In recent years, Congress has sought to exert greater influence over executive actions through reporting and consultation requirements on U.N.

¹²⁵ The Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY1997, in sections on the State Department, appropriated \$352.4 million, with conditions, to cover U.S. assessed U.N. peacekeeping contributions. Under foreign operations additional appropriations, the Act earmarked \$65 million for U.S. voluntary contributions to U.N. or other peacekeeping operations. Funds in other accounts are also used to assist foreign militaries and regional organizations increase their peacekeeping capabilities, as discussed above under Regional Organizations. See Appendix D for further information about these and other related provisions of the Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY1997, H.R. 3610, P.L. 104-208.

peacekeeping, sources of funding for U.N. and other peacekeeping, and the deployment of U.S. troops for peacekeeping purposes. The Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FY1994 and FY1995 required the President to consult monthly with Congress on the status of U.N. peacekeeping operations, including anticipated operations. The Defense Appropriations Act for FY 1996 stated the non-binding sense that in the event of a deployment in peace operations, the President must engage in consultations with the bipartisan leadership of Congress, except for an international humanitarian assistance operation carried out in response to a disaster or costing less than \$50 million. It continued an FY1994 and FY1995 prohibition on the use of Defense Department funds to make a financial contribution to the United Nations for the costs of a U.N. peacekeeping activity.¹²⁶ In the State Department sections of the Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY1997 (P.L. 104-208), Congress prohibited the President from committing funds to pay U.S.-owed assessments for U.N. peacekeeping operations to missions where U.S. troops will be placed under the command or operational control of a foreign national, unless the President submits to Congress a recommendation from his military advisers that such placement serves U.S. interests.

Members of the 105th Congress may consider playing a further role in shaping the use of funds and troops for peacekeeping. Congress may wish to adopt or modify the approach of the 104th Congress, which in the conference report to the FY1997 omnibus appropriations earmarked \$20 million in U.N. peacekeeping funds for African crises,¹²⁷ and consider dedicating funds for the activities of certain organizations or for certain types of peacekeeping activities, such as preventive action.

¹²⁶ P.L. 104-61 became law without the President's signature on December 1, 1995.

¹²⁷ Making Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1997, Conference Report 104-863 to Accompany H.R. 3610, September 26, 1996, p. 836.

APPENDIX A.

DEFINITIONS OF PEACEKEEPING ACTIVITIES

The generic term -- peacekeeping -- encompasses many types of activities undertaken to promote and secure peace. The following table summarizes the terminology that is generally used to group these different activities.

Situation	Types of Activities
Pre-Conflict	<p>Targeted Humanitarian Aid -- Humanitarian relief needed to relieve conditions of misery and prevent the growth of tensions.</p> <p>Confidence-building regimes -- Mechanisms by which states inform each other in advance of potentially threatening actions.</p> <p>Preventive Diplomacy -- Consultation systems or the use of good office or mediation efforts intended to forestall conflict.</p> <p>Early-warning Systems -- Mechanisms to alert international organizations to potential instability to allow them to intervene diplomatically before conflict breaks out.</p> <p>Electoral Observer Missions -- International observers to monitor the conduct of elections.</p>
Conflict	<p>Humanitarian Relief -- Provision of food, clothing, shelter and other necessities to refugees and other populations affected by conflict.</p> <p>Peace Making -- Also known as "conflict resolution." Action to bring hostile parties to agreement through such peaceful means as through negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, and judicial settlement. Can include the dispatch of military and other personnel for observation and deterrence.</p> <p>Peace Enforcement -- Actions taken when traditional peacekeeping is not sufficient to keep the peace or when the safety of peacekeeping forces is threatened by actions of one or more parties to the conflict. Differs from peacekeeping in that it allows forces to use measured but sufficient force to restore peaceful conditions after peace has been broken or peacekeeping forces threatened. It usually is taken without the full consent of one or more parties to the conflict.</p>
Post-Conflict	<p>"Traditional" Peacekeeping -- The deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, with the consent of all parties concerned, to allow contending forces that wish to stop fighting to separate with some confidence that they will not be attacked in order to create conditions conducive to a political settlement. Normally involves United Nations military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as well.</p> <p>Peace Building -- Actions taken to forestall future eruptions between the parties to the conflict. Includes disarming warring parties, controlling and destroying weapons, repatriating refugees, training and supporting security personnel, monitoring elections, promoting human rights practices, and activities known as "nation-building" such as reforming or strengthening governmental institutions, and promoting political participation.</p>

Source: Adapted from *Peacekeeping and Conflict Management Activities: A Discussion of Terminology*, by Stanley R. Sloan. CRS Report 93-1017 S. November 26, 1993.

APPENDIX B.

U.N. PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS: EFFECTIVENESS EVALUATIONS*

Name of Operation (Location)	Acronym and Dates	Successful/ Lasting Settlement	Relative Success**	Mixed Results	Failure/Lack of Success	Inconclusive/ Still Going On
+ U.N. Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine (Middle East)	UNTSO 1948 -		Observing & reporting- success (White) Deterrent (Thakur)	Original mandate not met (Durch); Success as mediator, not as buffer (Sinai)		
+ U.N. Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (Kashmir)	UNMOGIP 1948 -		Mandate met (White)	Original task done, but not since 1972 (Durch)(Sinai)		
U.N. Emergency Force I (Gaza; Egyptian side in Sinai)	UNEF I 1956-1967		Mandate met (Durch)(Sinai) (White)			

* Appendix B is based on discussions of the mandates and evaluations of operations by several analysts in the following sources:

William J. Durch, ed. *The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping; Case Studies and Comparative Analysis*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993 (Durch case studies coverage: 1947 - 1991);
 Durch-1996. William J. Durch, ed. *UN Peacekeeping, American Politics, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996;
 Joshua Sinai. Project Manager. *United Nations Peace Operations; Case Studies*. Washington, D.C.: Federal Research Division (FRD), Library of Congress, 1995. [A Study Prepared by FRD under an Interagency Agreement with the Joint Staff, J-8, Studies, Analysis, and Gaming Division, The Pentagon, September 30, 1995] (Sinai case studies coverage: 1947-mid-1995).
 Nigel D. White. *Keeping the Peace; The United Nations and the Maintenance of International Peace and Security*. New York: Manchester University Press, 1993. See Chapter 9. A Review of Peacekeeping. (White case studies coverage: through September 1992).
 Ramesh Thakur and Carlyle A. Thayer, ed. *A Crisis of Expectations: UN Peacekeeping in the 1990s*. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1995. (Thakur case studies coverage: through mid-1995).

** Relative Success includes abatement of conflict, isolation of the conflict, mandate fulfilled.

+ Ongoing Operation

Name of Operation (Location)	Acronym and Dates	Successful/ Lasting Settlement	Relative Success**	Mixed Results	Failure/Lack of Success	Inconclusive/ Still Going On
U.N. Observer Group in Lebanon	UNOGIL June-Dec. 1958			Limited to observing & reporting (White)	Mandate not met (Durch)	
U.N. Operation in the Congo	ONUC 1960-1964		Secession ended (Durch) (Sinai) (White)			
U.N. Security Force in West New Guinea (West Irian)	UNSF Oct. 1962- Apr. 1963	Did its job (Durch); Mandate met (Sinai) (White)				
U.N. Yemen Observer Mission	UNYOM July 1963- Sept. 1964			Some success (Sinai)	Task impossible (Durch); Failed (White)	
+U.N. Force in Cyprus	UNFICYP 1964 -		Mandate met (Durch)	Mixed (Sinai) (White)		
Mission of Representative of the Secretary-General in the Dominican Republic	DOMREP May 1965- Oct. 1966					Not evaluated by analysts
U.N. India/Pakistan Observer Mission	UNIPOM Sept. 1965- Mar. 1966		Mandate met (White)			
U.N. Emergency Force II (Suez Canal sector; Sinai)	UNEF II 1973-1979	Peace Treaty (Sinai) (White)	Fighting stopped (Durch)			
+U.N. Disengagement Observer Force (Israel-Syria; Golan Heights)	UNDOF 1974 -		Mandate met (Durch) (Sinai)(White) Border quiet (Thakur)			

** Relative Success includes abatement of conflict, isolation of the conflict, mandate fulfilled.

+ Ongoing Operation

Name of Operation (Location)	Acronym and Dates	Successful/ Lasting Settlement	Relative Success**	Mixed Results	Failure/Lack of Success	Inconclusive/ Still Going On
+U.N. Interim Force in Lebanon	UNIFIL 1978 -		Buffer, deterrent, infrastructure (Thakur)	Mandate partly met & humanitarian support (Durch) (Sinai) (White)		
U.N. Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan	UNGOMAP Apr. 1988- Mar. 1990			Soviets out but violations not examined (Durch) (White)		
U.N. Iran-Iraq Military Observer Mission	UNIIMOG Aug. 1988- Feb. 1991		Conflict ended (Durch) (Sinai)(White) (Thakur)			
U.N. Angola Verification Mission I	UNAVEM I Jan. 1989- May 1991		Met mandate (Durch) (Sinai)(White)			
U.N. Transition Assistance Group (Namibia)	UNTAG Apr. 1989- Mar. 1990	Settled (Durch) (Sinai)(White) (Thakur)				
U.N. Observer Group in Central America (Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua)	ONUCA Nov. 1989- Jan. 1992		Qualified success (Sinai) Mandate met (White)			
+U.N. Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission	UNIKOM Apr. 1991 -		Mandate met (Durch) (Sinai)			
U.N. Observer Mission in El Salvador	ONUSAL May 20, 1991-Apr. 30, 1995	Success (Sinai)				
U.N. Angola Verification Mission II	UNAVEM II May 31, 1991-Feb. 8, 1995			Electoral success (Sinai) (White) (Thakur)		

** Relative Success includes abatement of conflict, isolation of the conflict, mandate fulfilled.
+ Ongoing Operation

Name of Operation (Location)	Acronym and Dates	Successful/ Lasting Settlement	Relative Success**	Mixed Results	Failure/Lack of Success	Inconclusive/ Still Going On
+U.N. Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara	MINURSO Apr. 29, 1991 -			Some success (Sinai)		Failing (Durch)
U.N. Advance Mission in Cambodia [usually included in UNTAC evaluations]	UNAMIC Oct. 16, 1991-Mar. 15, 1992					
U.N. Protection Force (Former Yugoslavia: Croatia, Bosnia & Hercegovina (B&H), "Macedonia"); only Bosnia & Hercegovina	UNPROFOR Feb. 21, 1992; March 31, 1995-Jan. 31, 1996			Some success (Sinai)		
U.N. Transitional Authority in Cambodia	UNTAC Feb. 28, 1992-Oct. 1994			Some success but military failures (Sinai) (Thakur)		
U.N. Operation in Somalia I	UNOSOM I Apr. 1992-Apr. 1993				Mandate not met (Sinai) (Thakur)	
U.N. Operation in Mozambique	ONUMOZ Dec. 16, 1992-Jan. 31, 1995	Successful (Sinai)				
U.N. Operation in Somalia II	UNOSOM II May 1, 1993-March 31, 1995			Some success (Sinai)	Failed (Thakur)	
U.N. Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (Uganda)	UNOMUR June 22, 1993-Sept. 21, 1994			Mandate met in part (Sinai)		

** Relative Success includes abatement of conflict, isolation of the conflict, mandate fulfilled.
+ Ongoing Operation

Name of Operation (Location)	Acronym and Dates	Successful/ Lasting Settlement	Relative Success**	Mixed Results	Failure/Lack of Success	Inconclusive/ Still Going On
+U.N. Observer Mission in Georgia	UNOMIG Aug. 24, 1993 -			Success in meeting political & military tasks (Sinai)		
+U.N. Observer Mission in Liberia	UNOMIL Sept. 22, 1993 -					Inconclusive (Sinai)
U.N. Mission in Haiti	UNMIH Sept. 23, 1993-June 30, 1996			(Donald E. Schulz, <i>Whither Haiti?</i> Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: U.S. Army War College, 1996)		Mid-1995 (Sinai)
U.N. Assistance Mission for Rwanda	UNAMIR Oct. 5, 1993- March 8, 1996			Mandate met in part (Sinai); Success but incomplete (Debate, U.N. Security Council, March 8, 1996, S/PV.3640; U.N. Press Rel. SC/6192.) (Sec.-Gen.'s report-S/1996/149).	No success (Thakur)	
U.N. Aouzou Strip Observer Group (Chad and Libya)	UNASOG May 4-June 13, 1994	Resolved (Libya Withdraws From Aouzou. UN Chronicle v. 31, Sept. 1994: 37.)				

** Relative Success includes abatement of conflict, isolation of the conflict, mandate fulfilled.

+ Ongoing Operation

Name of Operation (Location)	Acronym and Dates	Successful/ Lasting Settlement	Relative Success**	Mixed Results	Failure/Lack of Success	Inconclusive/ Still Going On
+U.N. Mission of Observers in Tajikistan	UNMOT Dec. 16, 1994 -					Still going on
+U.N. Angola Verification Mission III	UNAVEM III Feb. 8, 1995 -			Mixed Results (Debate, U.N. Security Council, May 8, 1996, S/PV.3662; UN Press Rel. SC/6218. Sec.-Gen.'s report-S/1996/328).		
U.N. Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia	UNCRO March 31, 1995-Jan. 15, 1996			Mixed (Durch-1996)		
+U.N. Preventive Deployment Force ("Macedonia")	UNPREDEP March 31, 1995 -		Mandate being implemented (Debate, U.N. Security Council, May 30, 1996, S/PV.3670; UN Press Rel. SC/6228. Sec.-Gen.'s report-S/1996/373).			
+U.N. Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (includes International Police Task Force)	UNMIBH Dec. 21, 1995 -					Still going on
+U.N. Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja & Western Sirmium (Croatia)	UNTAES Jan. 15, 1996 -					Still going on

** Relative Success includes abatement of conflict, isolation of the conflict, mandate fulfilled.

+ Ongoing Operation

Name of Operation (Location)	Acronym and Dates	Successful/ Lasting Settlement	Relative Success**	Mixed Results	Failure/Lack of Success	Inconclusive/ Still Going On
+U.N. Mission of Observers in the Prevlaka (Croatia)	UNMOP Jan. 15, 1996 -					Still going on
+U.N. Support Mission in Haiti	UNSMIH June 28, 1996 -					Still going on
+U.N. Mission in Guatemala	MINUGUA Jan. 20, 1997 -					Still going on

** Relative Success includes abatement of conflict, isolation of the conflict, mandate fulfilled.

+ Ongoing Operation

APPENDIX C.

REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: EFFECTIVENESS EVALUATION, 1948-1969¹²⁸

Organization/Conflict/ Mission or Activity	Year(s)	Successful/ Lasting Settlement	Relative Success, i.e., Helped End Fighting, Abate Conflict for at Least Three Years, and/or Isolate Conflict Locally or Regionally	Lack of Success/Failure/ or Regional Organization Irrelevant to Settlement
OAU/Algeria-Morocco Border dispute/Mediation	1963		Helped end fighting, abate and isolate conflict	
OAU/Ethiopia-Somalia-Kenya cross- border guerrilla actions/ Suasion-"quiet diplomacy"	1964- 1967		Helped isolate conflict	
OAU/Congo--internal rebellion with high external involvement/Conciliation	1964- 1965			Rebellion settled by military defeat of rebels
OAU/Rwandan exile cross-border hostilities from Burundi/Conciliation	1967		Helped abate and isolate conflict	
OAU/Nigerian civil war/Diplomacy	1967- 1970			Biafran secessionist movement militarily defeated
Arab League/Lebanon-United Arab Republic, involvement in civil strife/ Diplomacy	1958	OAU contributed in small part to subsequent negotiations among an Arab caucusing group that resolved conflict		

¹²⁸ Adapted from: Nye, J.S. *Peace in Parts: Integration and Conflict in Regional Organizations*. Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1971, pp. 129-172.

Organization/Conflict/ Mission or Activity	Year(s)	Successful/ Lasting Settlement	Relative Success, i.e., Helped End Fighting, Abate Conflict for at Least Three Years, and/or Isolate Conflict Locally or Regionally	Lack of Success/Failure/ or Regional Organization Irrelevant to Settlement
Arab League/Iraq refused to accept Kuwaiti independence, claimed it as a "lost province"/Diplomacy/Troop deployment	1961	Arab League reaffirmation of Kuwaiti independence and dispatch of Arab troops (to replace departing British troops) to defend/secure it/Also helped isolate conflict		
Arab League/Yemen civil war/Mediation	1962-1967			Fighting diminished greatly by withdrawal of outside forces and support
OAS/Nicaragua supported Costa Rican exile invasion/Investigation, suasion, observation by military committee	1948		Helped end fighting, abate conflict	
OAS/Exile invasion of Guatemala from Honduras/U.S. blocked OAS action, looked to OAS to legitimize U.S.-supported invasion	1954		Helped isolate conflict	Conflict ended in military defeat of elected government by invading forces
OAS/Nicaragua supported Costa Rican exile invasion/Suasion, mediation, investigation, border observation	1955		Helped end fighting, abate and isolate conflict	
OAS/Honduras-Nicaragua border dispute/Publicity, suasion, investigation, observation, mediation, assistance in transfer of territory	1957	Lasting settlement achieved through the International Court of Justice, OAS action made it possible	Helped end fighting, abate and isolate conflict	
OAS/Panamanian exile invasion from Cuba/Publicity, investigation, nominal OAS naval surveillance (U.S.-provided)	1959		Helped end fighting, abate and isolate conflict	
OAS/Nicaraguan exile invasion from Costa Rica/Investigation	1959			Problem solved by Nicaragua internally

Organization/Conflict/ Mission or Activity	Year(s)	Successful/ Lasting Settlement	Relative Success, i.e., Helped End Fighting, Abate Conflict for at Least Three Years, and/or Isolate Conflict Locally or Regionally	Lack of Success/Failure/ or Regional Organization Irrelevant to Settlement
OAS/Dominican-sponsored assassination attempt against Venezuelan president/ Investigation, sanctions, delegitimization of Dominican government	1960	Effective use of OAS sanctions and unilateral U.S. show of naval force led to removal of offending Dominican regime		
OAS/Dominican Republic charged hostile acts by Haiti/Publicity, suasion, investigation	1963		Helped abate and isolate conflict	
OAS/Panamanian riots against U.S. presence in Canal zone/Forum for public discussion, investigation for conciliation and face-saving purposes	1964		Helped abate and isolate conflict (The two countries later resumed diplomatic relations and negotiations on new Canal treaty.)	
OAS/Dominican Republic coup d'état/ Diplomacy, troop deployment, post hoc legitimization of U.S. invasion	1965	Helped end fighting, abate and isolate conflict, and contributed to conflict settlement through 1966 elections		
OAS/Honduras-El Salvador border dispute/Diplomacy, investigation, conciliation, military and civilian observers, and assistance	1969		Helped end fighting, abate and isolate conflict	

APPENDIX D.

LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK FOR PEACEKEEPING

CONSTITUTION Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution gives Congress powers including:

- to declare war
- to raise and support Armies
- to provide and maintain a Navy
- to make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces
- pay the Debts and provide for the common Defense and general Welfare of the United States
- to make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof

Article II, Section 2, makes the President Commander-in-Chief.

TREATIES In treaties, the United States undertakes various collective security and pacific settlement obligations. These include:

- United Nations Charter
- Charter of the Organization of American States
- Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance
- North Atlantic Treaty
- Mutual Defense Treaty with the Philippines
- Security Treaty with Australia and New Zealand
- Mutual Defense Treaty with Republic of Korea
- Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty
- Treaty Concerning the Permanent Neutrality and Operation of the Panama Canal

UNITED NATIONS PARTICIPATION ACT (P.L. 79-264, signed December 20, 1945, as amended)

- Section 6 authorizes the President to negotiate special agreements under Article 43 of the U.N. Charter, subject to the approval of Congress, providing for the numbers and types of armed forces and facilities to be made available to the Security Council. Once an agreement is concluded, further congressional authorization is not necessary before the troops are committed to U.N. operations, but the legislation stated this did not authorize the President to make additional forces available beyond those provided for in the agreement. No special military agreements under Article 43 have been concluded.

- Section 7 authorizes the detail of up to 1,000 personnel to serve as observers, guards, or in any noncombatant capacity "in support of such activities of the United Nations as are specifically directed to the peaceful settlement of disputes and not involving the employment of armed forces contemplated by chapter VII of the United Nations Charter...."
- Section 4 requires the Secretary of State to promptly transmit Security Council resolutions and reports on any proposed U.N. peacekeeping operation to appropriate committees of Congress, and requires the President at the time of his budget presentation to submit a report on costs and personnel participating in multinational forces.

FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1961 (P.L. 87-195, signed September 4, 1961, as amended)

- Section 551 authorizes the President to furnish assistance to friendly countries and international organizations for peacekeeping operations and other programs carried out in the furtherance of the national security interests of the United States. The assistance may include reimbursement to the Department of Defense for expenses pursuant to section 7 of the U.N. Participation Act, not to exceed \$5 million unless a greater amount is authorized.
- Section 628 authorizes the President or head of any agency to assign to any international organization any officer or employee or to render any technical, scientific, or professional advice or service to the organization.

WAR POWERS RESOLUTION (P.L. 93-148, enacted November 7, 1973)

- Section 3 requires the President to consult with Congress in every possible instance before introducing U.S. Armed Forces into hostilities or situations of imminent hostilities
- Section 4 (a) requires the President to report the introduction of U.S. Armed Forces into (1) hostilities or imminent hostilities, or (2) into the territory or waters of a foreign nation, or (3) in numbers which substantially enlarge U.S. Armed Forces already located in a foreign nations
- Section 5 states that whenever a report is filed pursuant to section 4(a)(1) -- hostilities or imminent hostilities -- the President is to terminate the use of U.S. Armed Forces unless Congress declares war or authorizes them to remain.

FOREIGN RELATIONS AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FY 1994 AND 1995 (P.L. 103-236, signed April 30, 1994)

- Section 407 requires the President to consult monthly with Congress on the status of U.N. peacekeeping operations, including anticipated operations

OMNIBUS CONSOLIDATED APPROPRIATIONS ACT FOR FY1997 (P.L. 104-208, signed September 30, 1996)

- **Title I, Section 101 (a), Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciaries, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1997:**
 - **Title IV, Department of State and Related Agencies**, provides \$352.4 million to pay assessed and other expenses of international peacekeeping activities directed to the maintenance or restoration of international peace and security. Of this, \$50 million is to pay arrearages accumulated in 1995 upon the certification of the Secretary of State that the United Nations has achieved certain savings and made specified personnel cuts.
 - Title IV requires the President to inform Congress about proposed new or expanded U.N. missions at least 15 days before (or as far in advance as possible in emergency cases) a U.N. Security Council vote on the mission, indicating the estimated cost and length of the mission, the vital national interest to be served, the planned exit strategy, and the sources of funding to pay the U.S. share.
 - Title IV requires the Secretary of State to certify to Congress that American manufacturers and suppliers are being given opportunities to provide equipment, services, and material for United Nations peacekeeping activities equal to those given foreign manufacturers and suppliers.
 - **Title VI, General Provisions**, Section 610, provides that no funds provided by this act may be committed to a U.N. peacekeeping mission where U.S. troops will be placed under the command or operational control of a foreign national unless the President has submitted to Congress a recommendation from his military advisers that such involvement serves U.S. interests.
- **Title I, Section 101(b), Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1997:**
 - **Title VIII, General Provisions**, Section 8091 requires the Secretary of Defense to submit a quarterly report to Congress on Department of Defense costs for implementing or supporting U.N. Security Council resolutions and on efforts to secure reimbursement.
 - Section 8092 requires a 15-day advance notification to Congress for transferring any defense articles to another national or international organization for peacekeeping operations.
 - Section 8094 prohibits the use of Department of Defense funds to make a financial contribution to the United Nations for the cost of a peacekeeping activity or arrearage.

- **Title V, Additional Appropriations:**
 - **Chapter 7, International Security Assistance**, provides \$65 million for voluntary peacekeeping contributions under section 551 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (P.L. 87-195, as amended), see above.

OTHER

In addition, Congress regularly establishes funding levels, and frequently includes guidelines or restraints, for particular peacekeeping operations through annual authorization and appropriation legislation for the State Department, the Defense Department, and the foreign aid program.

APPENDIX E.**USAID PRINCIPLES ON STRENGTHENING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF PRIVATE VOLUNTARY ORGANIZATIONS¹²⁹**

A. **CONSULTATION** USAID seeks to establish continuing consultation processes with a broad cross-section of PVO and indigenous NGOs. Operational guidance asserts the importance of applying rules relating to procurement integrity and organizational conflict of interest to assure that no organization has an unfair competitive advantage and that they are objective and provide the government impartial advice.

B. **PARTICIPATION** USAID policy calls for building opportunities for participation by host country organizations and peoples into the development processes, and to support their activities and initiatives when they relate to USAID objectives.

C. **PROGRAM INTEGRATION AND MANAGING FOR RESULTS** USAID policy is to define the objectives, performance targets and indicators for its development and emergency relief priorities, and take into account areas of mutual interest between USAID, host countries, and PVOs in setting priorities and allocating resources.

D. **INDEPENDENCE** USAID policy is to work with PVOs as both intermediaries for USAID programs and independent entities. A PVO's relationship with USAID "must not result in a loss of the PVO's private and independent character" because this would reduce their advantage. USAID applies the legislated "privateness requirement" that U.S. PVOs must receive at least 20 percent of their financial support for overseas activities from non-U.S. government sources.

E. **SUPPORT FOR RELATIONSHIPS OF U.S. PVOs AND INDIGENOUS NGOs.** USAID believes indigenous NGOs can act as intermediaries between governments and people and be more effective than state agencies in the provision of services. USAID encourages partnership relations between U.S. PVOs and indigenous NGOs to train, support, and facilitate indigenous NGO-implemented activities.

F. **CAPACITY BUILDING** USAID facilitates the provision of direct assistance to indigenous NGOs to strengthen their capacity and support their development activities, and plans to invest in strengthening the institutional capacity of U.S. PVOs when this will help them to be more effective in working in priority areas and forming collaborative relations with indigenous NGOs.

G. **USAID-PVO COST-SHARING** USAID policy has cost sharing as a principle, but applied on a flexible and case-specific basis. It seeks an appropriate level of financial participation from recipients in grants and cooperative agreements to help ensure PVO commitment and that private involvement will continue after USAID support ends, mobilize financial resources and increase USAID's effectiveness, and limit USAID

¹²⁹ Summarized from U.S. Agency for International Development. *Policy Guidance*. USAID-U.S. PVO Partnership. April 12, 1995.

finances to amounts the PVO cannot obtain on its own. Generally in development projects the point of reference is 25 percent of costs to be borne by the PVO and 75 percent by USAID, but since 1994 the 25 percent requirement has been flexible.

H. SIMPLIFICATION USAID policy calls for simplifying administrative and grant-making requirements to achieve a result-oriented partnership and speed action, consistent with appropriate standards of accountability.

APPENDIX F.

COSTS OF MAJOR U.S. WARS AND RECENT U.S. MILITARY OPERATIONS*

Costs of U.S. military operations, ranging from small humanitarian assistance exercises to global conflicts, are measured by determining the "incremental" costs of the actions, i.e., operations expenses over and above the ongoing costs of normal military operational tempo, training, pay, etc. **Table 1** below provides estimated incremental costs of major U.S. conflicts in the 20th century. **Table 2** on the reverse shows costs of recent smaller operations. These figures do not include veterans benefits and other indirect costs.

TABLE 1. Costs of Major U.S. Wars

World War I	
Current Year \$	\$33 billion
Constant FY98\$	\$523 billion
World War II	
Current Year \$	\$360 billion
Constant FY98\$	\$4,263 billion
Korea	
Current Year \$	\$50 billion
Constant FY98\$	\$362 billion
Vietnam	
Current Year \$	\$111 billion
Constant FY98\$	\$517 billion
Persian Gulf War*	
Current Year \$	\$61 billion
Constant FY98\$	\$72 billion

Sources: World War I, World War II, and Korea current year costs from Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1994; deflators and all other data from Department of Defense Comptroller.

***Note:** Most Persian Gulf War costs were offset by allied contributions or were absorbed by DOD. Net costs to U.S. taxpayers total \$4.7 billion in current year dollars. Source: Department of Defense Annual Report to Congress, January 1993.

* Prepared by Stephen Daggett, Specialist in National Defense, Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division.

**TABLE 2. Incremental Costs of Recent
U.S. Military Operations**

Grenada (FY1983)	
Current Year \$	\$76 million
Constant FY98\$	\$118 million
Lebanon (FY1983)	
Current Year \$	\$63 million
Constant FY98\$	\$97 million
Persian Gulf Tanker Escort (FY1987/88)	
Current Year \$	\$152 million
Constant FY98\$	\$213 million
Panama (FY1990)	
Current Year \$	\$163 million
Constant FY98\$	\$201 million
Somalia (FY1993/95)	
Current Year \$	\$1,520 million
Constant FY98\$	\$1,691 million
Rwanda (FY1994/95)	
Current Year \$	\$145 million
Constant FY98\$	\$158 million
Haiti Democracy Restoration (FY94/96)	
Current Year \$	\$790 million
Constant FY98\$	\$ 852 million

Source: All data from Department of Defense Comptroller.

Since final data are not available, **Table 2** does not include estimates of costs of ongoing operations, including operations in and around the former Yugoslavia and Kuwait. For information on costs of current operations, see *Peacekeeping: Issues of U.S. Military Involvement*, CRS Issue Brief 94040, by Nina M. Serafino, updated regularly.