
THE ATHENIAN EMPIRE
THRACEWARD REGION(62)
HELLESPONT(45)
IONIA(35)
ISLANDS (29)
CARIA(81)
1 Hydissus
2 Termera
3 Halicarnassus
4 Ceramos
5 Cherronesus
6 (Pyrrha*)
7 GALEPSUS
8 (Eion*)
9 (Amphipolis*)
10 Thyssus
11 Cleonae
12 Singos
13 SERMYLIA
14 Mecyberna
15 Spartolus
16 Dicaeopolis
PHASELIS State with assessment of 5 tal. or more
Parium State with assessment of 1 tal. or more
State with assessment of under 1 tal.
State known to have revolted
Site of overseas settlement
( ) Non-tributary
0
100
km
C.J.Tuplin
STREPSA
Aerreia
Methone
ARGILUS
(Brea*)
Stolos
Stagirus
Acanthus
Olophyxus
Acrothooi
Sane
Dion
TORONE
SCIONE
MENDE
Aphytis
POTIDEA
Olynthus
ABDERA
THASOS
MARONEA
SAMOTHRACE
AENUS
Imbros
Hephaestia
Myrina
LEMNOS
Tenedos
(Scyros)
Peparethus
Hestiaea
Diacrioi
CHALCIS
ERETRIA
(Athens)
AEGINA
Styra
CARYSTUS
ANDROS
Coressus
Ceos
Cythnos
Seriphos
Siphnos
(Melos)
Tenos
Myconos
(Delos)
PAROS
NAXOS
Ios
Thera
Amorgos
Astypalaea
Neapolis
CHERRONESUS
LAMPSACUS
Parium
Arisbe
ABYDOS
Dardanus
Scepsis
Cebren
(Antandros)
Assos
(Methymna)
(Mytilene)
(Antissa)
(Eressus)
PERINTHUS
SELYMBRIA
BYZANTIUM
CHALCEDON
Astacus
Proconnesus
CYZICUS
Myrina
CYME
Phocaea
ERYTHRAE
Clazomenae
TEOS
Colophon
Lebedus
Haerae
(Chios)
EPHESUS
Pygela
(Samos)
Oine
Priene
Myus
Latmus
MILETUS
Pedasa
Mylasa
Cindye
Iasos
Madnases
Syangela
Idyma
Cyllandioi
COS
CNIDUS
Calydnioi
Nisyros
CAMEIRUS
IALYSUS
LINDUS
Bricindarioi
Diacrioi
Telandria
Caunus
Calynda
Telmessus
LYCIOI
PHASELIS

The Athenian Empire

In 478 certain east Aegean members of the Hellenic League invited Athens to assume effective leadership of military action against Persia. The result was the alliance system commonly known as the Delian League. The name is modern, derived from the location of the treasury and of consultative meetings on Delos; contemporary parlance spoke simply of 'the Athenians and their allies'. Membership involved support of the League's military enterprises by provision of ships, or of money (tribute), in quantities determined by the Athenians. After 454 there were regular reassessments of tribute, theoretically every fourth year, but occasionally out of sequence (443 instead of 442, 428 and 425 instead of 426). The original membership and relative frequency of one or other type of contribution are obscure (Thucydides' valuation of the 'first tribute' at 460 talents being of uncertain import). However it is certain that choice or compulsion gradually made tribute payment the norm, so that by 431 only Chios and the cities of Lesbos were still furnishing ships (although Samos, which lost its fleet in 440/39, was paying war indemnity rather than tribute). By this time, too, Athenian official parlance was referring to 'the cities over whom the Athenians rule', and it had long been appropriate to speak of an Athenian Empire. Tribute is thus a central characteristic of the empire until its replacement in 413–10 by a 5 per cent import/export levy in the empire's harbours.

In 454 the treasury was moved to Athens, and a $1^2/_3$ per cent quota taken from tribute receipts for dedication to Athena began to be recorded on stone. The remains of these annual 'tribute lists' and of assessment lists from 425, 422 and (?)410 are the fundamental source for knowledge of the extent of the empire. Some 278 places are recorded as paying tribute at one time or another after 454/3 (32 for the first time in 429 or later); and a further 69 places can be named which were first assessed in 425 or later, but are not *known* to have paid. (The total number of such new assessments was certainly much larger.) For the location of all tribute payers and new assessments of 425 see the maps in R. Meiggs, *The Athenian Empire*.

The present map confines itself to states whose actual payments show an assessment of 1 talent or more at some date in the period 454/3 to 429/8, i.e. before pressures of war caused assessments to rise to much higher levels. A few places with lower assessments are also included for other reasons. The five tribute areas in which quotas are arranged in 442/38 (after which I and IV were amalgamated), together with the total number of actual paying states in each area (in brackets), are also shown. The wartime assessments introduced two new areas, *Actaean Cities* (the region between I and II), and *Euxine* (cities in the Crimea and on the west and south coasts of the Black Sea).

Two other features of the empire are illustrated. (1) Overseas settlement: here we may distinguish Thurii (see p. 84) and Amphipolis, which were indisputably colonies with minority Athenian participation, from the rest, which present problems of categorisation as between 'colony' and 'cleruchy'. (2) Revolt: the map shows places where revolt on one or more occasions is attested in literary sources, or by a conjunction of documents relating to organisation after revolt with evidence of non-payment in the quota lists. However it excludes cases where the hypothesis of revolt depends solely on the quota lists, e.g. Miletus (447, 445–3); Aegina (447); Cos (446–3); various islands which never appear in 453–50; 21 apparently regular payers in I, II and III which are absent on various occasions in 442–1, 439, 434, 432; some 20 places in III whose absence in 431 and later may be connected with the revolts of Potidaea, Spartolus and Olynthus; and over 25 Carian places absent in 441–39 and not recorded as paying after 443 at the latest.


PELOPONNESIAN WAR, 431-404 B.C.
Epidamnus
LYNCESTIS
Atalante
CRESTONIA
R. Strymon
R. Axios
Myrcinus
Abdera
LOWER
MACEDONIA
MYGDONIA
Amphipolis
Argilus
Oesyme
Bormiscus
Eion
Galepsus
Thasos
Stagirus
CHALCIDICE
Methone
Acanthus
Mecyberna
Stolus
Sane
Spartolus
Olynthus
Dion
Thyssus
Potidea
Sermyle
Singos
Mende
Torone
Scione
Mt. Istone
EPIRUS
Corcyra
Gyrton
R. Peneios
Larissa
Leucimme
Sybota
Crannon
THESSALY
Pherae
Pharsalus
R. Acheloos
Ambracia
Idomene
Anactorium
Olpae
Argos
Sollium
ACARNANIA
Leucas
Medeon
Heraclea
Trachis
Alope
Stratos
Cytinium
Thronium
Atalante Is.
SCYROS
EUBOEA
Astacus
AETOLIA
Aegitium
Amphissa
Orchomenos
Chalcis
Pleuron
Eupalium
Delphi
Chaeronea
Eretria
Oeniadae
Calydon
Chalcis
Oeneon
Thespiae
Delium
CEPHALLENIA
Erineos
Siphae
Thebes
Oropus
Panormus
BOEOTIA
Tanagra
Patrae
Plataea
Decelea
ACHAEA
Pellene
Pegae
Acharnae
Cyllene
Sicyon
Megara
Elis
Corinth
Athens
Zacynthus
Pheia
Phlius
Solygeia
Salamis
Olympia
Cleonae
Thoricus
Andros
Orchomenus
Omeae
Nemea
Aegina
Mantinea
Methana
Methydrium
Argos
Epidaurus
Sunium
Lepreum
Tegea
Troezen
Thyrea
Hermione
Caryae
Halieis
MESSENIA
Sparta
Prasiae
LACONIA
Pylos
Methone
Asine
Helos
Gytheium
Las
Epidaurus Limera
Melos
Cythera
1 Naupactus
2 Crommyon
3 Mycalessus
Sparta and Spartan Allies in 431
Corcyra Athenian Allies outside the empire in 431
For Athenian Empire see p.44
0
100
km
A
B
C
D


E
F
G
H
1
2
3
4
5
R. Hebrus
Selymbria
Perinthus
Byzantium
Chrysopolis
Chalcedon
PROPONTIS
Proconnesos
Cardia
Priapos
Cyzicus
Aegospotami
Lampsacus
Harpagium
Madytus
Sestos
IMBROS
Abydos
Cynossema
Elaeus
Dardanus
Sigeum
Rhoetium
Ilium
Dascylium
LEMNOS
TENEDOS
Antandrus
Hamaxitus
Adramyttium
Methymna
Antissa
LESBOS
Pyrrha
Eresus
Mytilene
AEOLIS
ARGINUSAE IS.
Cyme
Mt. Mimas
Phocaea
R. Hermus
Sardis
Cardamyle
Boliscus
Delphinion
Chios
Erythrae
Clazomenae
IONIA
Leuconium
Aerae
Teos
Mt. Corycus
Colophon
Notium
Lebedus
Ephesus
R. Maeander
Pygela
Magnesia
Samos
Anaea
ICARIA
Myus
Miletos
Teichiussa
Iasos
PATMOS
DELOS
LEROS
Halicarnassus
LYCIA
Cos
Caunus
Triopium
Cnidus
Syme
Loryma
Ialysus
Rhodes
Camirus
TEUTLUSSA
CHALCE
Lindos
C.J. Tuplin

Peloponnesian War, 431–404 BC

The term Peloponnesian War (not actually used in surviving texts until the first century BC) designates the whole period from Sparta's declaration of war in 431—as supposed champion of the autonomy of the Greeks—until Athens' surrender and reduction to the status of a subject Spartan ally in 404. A single map can only 'illustrate' the fighting of this 27-year period by indicating the whereabouts of as many as possible of the places mentioned in the sources. Three phases can be discerned:

(1) 431–21, the 'Ten Years War' or 'Archidamian War' (an early, though inappropriate, term). During this period there was fighting in various theatres: Attica (regular Spartan invasions until 425); Peloponnese (Athenian maritime raids in 431, 430, 426; the introduction of garrisons in Pylos, Methone, Cythera in 425–4); central Greece (Spartan siege of Plataea, 429–7; Athenian attempts to capture Megara and various parts of Boeotia, 424); north west Greece (429–6) and Corcyra (427–5); 'Thraceward' region (431–29; 424–1); Lesbos (428–7); Sicily (427–4).

A major turning point was the Pylos campaign (425). After it, Sparta was not only under greater pressure at home; she had also to abandon invasions of Attica to protect the lives of 120 Spartiates taken prisoner. She was ready to negotiate a year's truce in 423–2, and a 50-years peace in 421, when Brasidas' successful encouragement of rebellion among Athens' Thraceward allies provided something of a position of strength from which to do so. The resultant 'Peace of Nicias', accompanied as it was by a defensive alliance, required each side to surrender certain territorial gains (chiefly in the Peloponnese and Thrace) and all prisoners taken. But the territorial requirements were never properly implemented, and the peace was a very tense one from the outset.

(2) 421–13, an interlude—lasting until Sparta's occupation of Decelea in northern Attica—which Thucydides insisted was mostly no better than a 'suspicious truce' and therefore really part of the war. There was sporadic fighting in Thrace. Active hostility between Athens and Sparta appears in two main areas: Sicily, where resistance to Athens' major onslaught against Syracuse came to be directed by the Spartan Gylippus (415–13); Peloponnese, where Athens' defensive alliance with three anti-Spartan states, Argos, Mantinea, and Elis (420), led to military operations, including some direct action against Sparta or her unequivocal allies—incursions from Pylos (419 onwards); capture of Orchomenus (418) and Orneae (416/15); siege of Epidaurus (418–17); battle of Mantinea (418); maritime attacks on eastern Laconia (414).

(3) 413–04, the 'Decelean War' (cf. above), or 'Ionian War', because it was mostly fought out along the coasts from Byzantium to Rhodes. Both names underline crucial differences from the first period, when Sparta had not attempted either to *occupy* Attica, or, normally, to encourage or exploit disorder in the eastern Aegean or Black Sea approaches. The latter development was now prompted by over-optimistic expectations after Athens' Sicilian disaster. Another vital new element is Persian co-operation with Sparta. For five years this did not prevent Athenian recovery—in 410–08 especially. Only after the arrival of the Great King's son, Cyrus, in 407 was Persian wealth used effectively, at least whenever Lysander was in office as navarch (407 and 405–4). The change is well illustrated by the contrast between Sparta's hesitant reaction to loss of a fleet at Cyzicus (410), and the immediate replacement of the losses at Arginusae (406) with the ships which destroyed Athenian naval power at Aegospotami (405).



Pylos/Sphacteria

Five stages can be discerned in the events of 425 described by Thucydides (4.2-6, 8-23, 26-41). (1) The fortification of Pylos (?two stone walls and a palisade), and its occupation by a small Athenian force. (2) The encampment of Spartan land and naval forces around R. Gialova, and the installation of 420 hoplites on Sphacteria. Allegedly the Spartans intended to block the harbour entrances, i.e. either A and B, or B and C. In context Thucydides' words must refer to A/B, but unless the text is emended the reported dimensions of the entrances will only fit B/C. The tactical value of the plan, which was not carried out, is in any case dubious. (3) Two days of unsuccessful seaborne attacks on Pylos [1]. (4) A Spartan naval defeat in the harbour [2]. (5) The Athenian landings on Sphacteria [3]: a first wave disposed of southern outposts [4]; a second forced the main body [5] to retreat to the fort on Mount Elias [6], where it surrendered after some Messenians scaled the western cliffs.

The Bosporan Realm and its Neighbours

By the fifth century Panticapaeum had emerged as the leading Greek settlement on the Cimmerian Bosporus. Power was seized here *c.* 480 by Archaeanax. His descendants (of whom nothing is known) were displaced *c.* 438 by Spartocus, whose family was to maintain its rule in Bosporus till the late second century. To the west the Spartocids eventually secured control of the major port of Theodosia, even though Heraclea Pontica came to the latter's defence. Eastwards they sought control first of the Taman peninsula, and then gradually of the Maeotian tribes up the eastern shore of the Sea of Azov—objectives brought to completion during the reign of Paerisades II (344–11), when the Bosporan realm reached its zenith.

Various circumstances enabled the Spartocids to maintain their rule for an exceptionally long span by Greek standards. Not only did the family continue to produce suitably strong, long-lived successors over generations. In addition, even though the state was run entirely at their personal whim, they exercised moderation, causing little friction at home, and abroad shunning any reckless expansion such as came to harm many Greek tyrannies. Above all, however, the state was unusually wealthy. Since both rulers and ruled benefited, the poverty and consequent tensions common elsewhere were absent, and there was unanimous recognition that continued prosperity rested upon the maintenance of peace and stability.

Bosporan wealth derived principally from fish (herring, sturgeon, tunny), vines, and above all, corn. The latter was both grown locally, and brought from the plains of south Russia for export all over the Greek world. Well into the third century at least, Bosporus was the largest single supplier of corn to mainland Greece, especially to Athens, whose merchants enjoyed preferential treatment during the late fifth and fourth centuries. Wine was also made, and fish salted, on a significant scale, as shown by excavation of wine-making establishments and pickling vats, notably at Tyritace and Myrmecium.


THE BOSPORAN REALM AND ITS NEIGHBOURS
R. Hypanis
OLBIA
Scythi
R. Tyras
Ordessus
R. Borysthenes
Berezan Is.
Tanais
R. Tanais
Thatei
Psessi
TYRAS
Niconium
Tamyrace
Carcine
SEA OF AZOV
(PALUS MAEOTIS)
Doschi
MAITAE (MAEOTIANS)
Kalos Limen
Leuce Is.
CRIMEA
Cercinitis
Tauri
Porthmium
Myrmecium
PANTICAPAEUM
Cimmerian Bosporus
Taman Peninsula
Patraea
Cepi
Dandarii
R. Kuban
Nymphaeum
Tyritace
Phanagoria
Cimmericum
Sindi
Theodosia
Hermonassa
Gorgippia
Ilyratum
Charax
CHERSONESUS
Toretae
Sarmatae
BLACK SEA (PONTUS EUXINUS)
SINOPE
HERACLEA PONTICA
Modern place names are underlined
0 100
km
Amisus
Cerasus
TRAPEZUS
R.J.A.Talbert
A
B
C
D
E
1
2
3
4

Trade in the Classical Greek World

The pattern of Greek trading in and around the Mediterranean was largely determined by the need to secure certain basic supplies—foodstuffs, timber, and metals above all. Some overseas settlements were primarily commercial in aim—Pithecussae and Sinope for iron, for example, Al Mina for north Syrian metal ores, Massilia at the end of an overland river-route for tin from the north. The Pontic settlements, major sources of fish and grain, are termed *emporia* by Herodotus. Settlements with a more generally commercial purpose were Gravisca in Etruria and Naucratis in the Nile Delta.

Except for certain basic metals, however, trade was a marginal activity for the Greek world. The climatic homogeneity of much of the Mediterranean meant that most agricultural products could be obtained locally everywhere. So only regional wines of high quality, for instance, were worth exporting. Those of Thasos, Chios, and Lesbos had the highest reputation; Massilia sold its local product to enthusiastic Gauls who did not cultivate the vine. Athens and Egypt, too, seem to have been major customers for fine wine. Specialities exported by them in return were olive oil and fine pottery from Athens, grain, linen and papyrus from Egypt.

Corn was the principal exception to local availability. Most mainland and Aegean states imported some grain. South Italy, Sicily and Egypt supplied the Peloponnese. By the mid-fifth century Athens was heavily dependent on imported corn, obtained mainly from Thrace and south Russia.

Manufacture was on a small scale, and also mainly for local consumption. Individual traders travelled from port to port, buying and selling piecemeal. Pottery provides most of the evidence. Graffiti on Athenian pottery give some indications of traders to the west placing 'bulk' orders, but with the exception of the workshop of Nikosthenes there is not yet evidence of work being produced to specification to meet the taste of a particular market. Current research indicates that in the late fifth and fourth centuries Attic black glaze pottery was carried by Phoenician traders to much of the south and east Mediterranean.

In general, long voyages across the open sea were avoided. Some towns, like the Adriatic settlements, therefore became important as stepping stones, others because they commanded straits like the Bosporus, or lay on an isthmus. Corinth is the prime example of the latter type, though Athens also brought in goods by way of Euboea as well as Piraeus. Towns at or near river mouths—Massilia, Spina, Istrus, Olbia—traded up the rivers with their hinterland.

So far as any one Greek city was concerned, much of its trade might be in the hands of non-citizens, either resident (metics), or in passage. Instances of state intervention to control production or trade are few, and confined to staple products. The Attic silver mines were state owned, but leased to private concessionaires. In the early fourth century the towns of Ceos legislated to confine the export of *miltos* (red ochre) to vessels designated by Athens. The Thasians regulated the wholesale purchase and retail sale of their wines, but were evidently able to ban only Thasian vessels from importing foreign wines to the neighbouring mainland. In the fifth century Athens was sufficiently powerful to compel corn ships from the Black Sea to unload at Piraeus, and to limit the quantity re-exported; other states could import corn from Byzantium only on licence from Athens. In the fourth century by contrast, while restrictions were imposed on corn dealing in Attica, imports could only be encouraged indirectly, either by regulations on loans for mercantile ventures, or by offering incentives both to shippers and to foreign rulers able to control exports from their own territories.

Apart from the Greeks, Phoenicians were the main traders, covering the southern Mediterranean especially. From early in the fifth century the Phoenician settlement at Carthage virtually monopolised trade with Sardinia, western Sicily, southern Spain, and much of north Africa; it also controlled the Atlantic tin route.


TRADE IN THE CLASSICAL GREEK WORLD
C
D
1
2
4
5
6
A
B
C
D
Vix
Massilia
Spina
Emporiae
(Ampurias)
Elba
Gravisca
Ebusus
(Ibiza)
Mago
Cumae
Metapontum
Pithecussae
Poseidonia
Caralis
Gades
Malaca
Sybaris/Thurii
Lixus
Panormus
Motya
Zancle
Himera
Utica
Carthage
Gela
Rhegium
Syracuse
Hadrumetum
Malta
Lepcis Magna
Iron
Copper
Gold
Silver
Tin
Grain
Timber
Greek sea route
Phoenician sea route
0
500
km


E
F
G
H
1
2
3
4
5
Olbia
Panticapaeum
Istrus
Odessus
Phasis
Apollonia Pontica
Sinope
Trapezus
Amisus
Epidamnus
Amphipolis
Byzantium
Heraclea Pontica
Tarentum
Apollonia
Thasus
Sestus
Abydus
Mytilene
Croton
Corcyra
Phocaea
Chalcis
Chios
Athens
Corinth
Miletus
Al Mina
Cnidus
Coso
Rhodes
Cythera
Citium
Sidon
Tyre
Cyrene
Naucratis
Memphis
Ezion-Geber
E
F
H
J.F.Gardner


THE ANABASIS (Spring 401 to winter 400/399)
Salmydessos
Selymbria
Perinthos
Byzantion
Chrysopolis
Kalpes Limen
Bithynia
Herakleia
P
Paphlagonia
Sinope
Halys
Iris
Kotyora
Thermodon
Tibareni
Mossynoeci
Kerasous
Trapezous
Makrones
Gymnias
Harpasos
Chalybes
Taochi
(Erzerum)
ARMENIA
(Mus)
(Malazgirt)
(Kaghyzman)
'Phasis' (Araks)
L. Van
L. Urmia
Kentrites
Kardouchoi
Mespila
Larissa
Greater Zab (Zapatas)
Lesser Zab
Kainai
Tigris
Opis
Sittake
Cunaxa
Babylon
Pylai
Euphrates
Korsote
Araxes
Thapsakos
Chalos
Myriandros
Pyramos
Psaros
Tarsos
Tyana
Ikonion
Tyriaion
Thymbrion
Kaystroupedion
Keramon Agora
Peltai
Kelainai
Kolossai
Maiandros
Sardis
Hermos
Pergamum
Adramyttion
Antandros
Lampsacus
Land over 2,000m
P R. Parthenios
0 200 km
C.J.Tuplin
A B C D E
1 3
Physkos
Tigris (mod)
Adhem
P?
S?
O?
Sippar
M
M?
C?
Pallakotas Canal
0 30 km
A
3 4

The Anabasis

The map shows the routes taken by Cyrus' rebel army from Sardis to Cunaxa, where it was defeated by Artaxerxes; by the Greek and non-Greek remnants, marching separately, from Cunaxa to the R. Zab, where the Greek generals were treacherously murdered by Tissaphernes; and by the Greeks from the R. Zab to Byzantium, eastern Thrace and Aeolis. There are two problematic sections.

(1) *Cunaxa to Opis.* The Greeks marched north/north east for three days, stopped for over three weeks negotiating with the Persians and vainly waiting for Tissaphernes to escort them back to the Aegean, then marched to the Median Wall in three days, to the R. Tigris at Sittake in another two days, and up its east bank to the R. Physkos and Opis in a further four days. The location of all the named points is controversial: some have even suggested that Xenophon carelessly interchanged Opis and Sittake! The inset illustrates Barnett's solution: Cunaxa = Nuseffiat, Median Wall = Nebuchadnezzar's Opis-Sippar fortifications (partly preserved between Sippar and Nuseffiat), Sittake = Humaniye (near Azizye), R. Physkos and Opis = R. Diyala and a site at its junction with the Tigris. Other suggestions are shown for comparison as C?, M?, S?, P?, O?. A represents 'Artaxerxes' Ditch', part of a northern fortification line between the rivers, crossed two days before the battle.

(2) *Mespila (Nineveh)-Trapezus*, a march of three-and-a-half months, the course of which depends on deciding where the Greeks crossed or marched along the rivers Kentrites, Teleboas, Euphrates, 'Phasis' (i.e. Araks) and Harpasos. There is nothing in the sources to help except the record of distances (in days and *parasangs*, rather inexact measurements), general descriptions of terrain, and a scatter of tribal names, valueless in themselves. The solution shown is that of Lehmann-Haupt. Most others are generally similar: they tend to reduce or eliminate the detour to Malazgirt and Kaghyzman, but the final section from the upper Harpasos is common to all. The only radical alternative would be a route following a wide westerly arc from Muş to Gymnias.



Leuctra, 371 BC

The approximate location is established by the Theban battle monument. Combination of the individually incomplete ancient accounts of the battle reveals three key points:

(a) The Spartan cavalry [3] was placed opposite the enemy's initial position and therefore (contrary to normal practice) in front of the infantry, part of which it fouled and put out of action when easily defeated by the Boeotian cavalry [4] (Phase I).

(b) The Spartan King Cleombrotus attempted to counter a diagonal Boeotian advance by swinging his right wing forward, but could not complete the move before the arrival of the Thebans, spearheaded by the Sacred Band (front left).

(c) The 50-deep Theban hoplite contingent [5] crushed the isolated Lacedaemonians [1] (especially the Spartiate entourage of Cleombrotus), while the other Boeotians [6] and the Peloponnesians [2] remained unengaged (Phase II, actually almost simultaneous with Phase I).


THE SECOND ATHENIAN LEAGUE
C
D
NEAPOLIS
ABDERA
DICAEA
Amphipolis
MARONEA
THASOS
AENUS
PERINTHUS
SELYMBRIA
BYZANTIUM
Proconnesus
Methone
OLYNTHUS ('CHALCIDIANS')
DIUM (THRACE)
SAMOTHRACE
Cardia
Crithote
Chersonese
Sestos
Potidaea
Torone
Imbros
ELAEUS
Lemnos
TENEDOS
Corcyra
MOLOSSIS
Pherae
ANTISSA
METHYMNA
SCIATHUS
ICUS
Pyrrha
ERESUS
MYTILENE
PEPARETHUS
DIUM (EUBOEA)
HESTIAEA
Scyros
LESBOS
Leucas
ATHENAE DIADES
ACARNANIA
EUBOEA
CHALCIS
ARETHUSA
ERETRIA
CHIOS
Pale
Same
Cranae
PRONNI
THEBES
Oropus
CEPHALLENIA
CARYSTUS
Salamis
ATHENS
ZACYNTHUS
ANDROS
Samos
CORESIA
CEOS
IULIS
Oene
Thermae
POEESSA
CARTHAEA
TENOS
MYCONUS
ICARIA
Cythnos
Syros
Delos
Patmos
Seriphus
Leros
PAROS
Naxos
SIPHNOS
Cos
AMORGUS
SICINUS
Ios
Nisyrus
Astypalaea
Telos
RHODES
Anaphe
THERA
ATHENS Founder members
ABDERA Other members whose names survive in list accompanying prospectus
Anaphe Other possible or certain members of the league
CEOS Large islands whose cities joined the league individually
Chersonese In Athenian possession during part or all of the league's existence
Amphipolis Coveted but not acquired by Athens during league's existence
(Astraeus) Included in list accompanying prospectus but not located
0
100
km
B
D
E
P.J.Rhodes
1
2
3
4

The Second Athenian League

In 378/7, exactly 100 years after the founding of the Delian League, the Second Athenian League was founded. We possess its prospectus, a decree of the Athenian assembly which states defence of the freedom of Greek and barbarian states against Spartan imperialism as the League's purpose; all states outside Persia's domains are invited to join on stated terms, designed to protect members against the encroachments on their freedom which Athens had practised in the Delian League. Appended to the decree is a list of members, to which additions were made on various occasions between 377 and *c.* 375, but not thereafter.

The League was never as large or as prosperous as the Delian League, but fear of Sparta, and Athens' promises of good behaviour, won it widespread support in the 370s, mostly among former members of the Delian League. However, at the battle of Leuctra in 371 Sparta was decisively beaten by Thebes, and the threat of Spartan imperialism was destroyed. In the 360s Athens turned to supporting Sparta against Thebes; the cities of Euboea left the League with Thebes. In the Aegean Athens began making conquests and planting settlements, and broke some of the promises made at the League's foundation. Some members, especially in the south east Aegean, left the League as a result of the Social War of 356–5, but certain former members rejoined when they felt threatened by the growing power of Philip of Macedon. After his victory over Athens and Thebes at Chaeronea in 338, Philip organised the mainland Greeks in the League of Corinth, and the Second Athenian League ceased to exist.



Chaeronea, 338 BC

The relative positions of Athenian and Boeotian hoplites, Philip and Alexander are clear, and an eastern limit for the battlefield is provided by the Macedonian *polyandrion* and the Greeks' withdrawal to Lebadeia. The identity of the 254 skeletons under the Lion monument is too uncertain for them to help topographically; but the R. Haimon, near which some of the Greeks camped, must be west of Hill 177, which favours location of the Greek left near that hill rather than at the end of the Lebadeia road. Both Macedonian wings routed the enemy, with Alexander achieving the first breakthrough. However a more precise picture depends on whether he was leading the Companion Cavalry, and whether Polyaenus is reliable in his report of a deliberate retreat by the Macedonian right, which tempted the Athenians into disastrous pursuit. These problems are linked, for if Alexander led a cavalry charge (the normal view), Polyaenus must be used to explain why there was a gap in the Greek line for him to attack.


GROWTH OF MACEDONIAN POWER, 359-336 B.C.
Ardiaei
Autariatae
Agrianians
Maedi
Balkan Mountains (Haemus)
Beroe
Cabyle
Getae
Apollonia
Grabaei
Dardani
Paeonians
R. Strymon
Philippopolis
R. Hebrus
R. Nestos
Thrace
R. Drilon
Taulantii
Epidamnus
Pel.
R. Axios
Selymbria
Byzantium
Heraion Teichos
Perinthus
Atintanes
L. Ochrid (Lychnitis)
Heraclea
L.
?Philippoupolis
Philippi
Neapolis
Abdera
Maronea
Doriscus
Hieron Oros
Ganos
Aenus
Amphipolis
Pella
Anthemus
Cardia
Stagirus
Acanthus
Aegae
L. Methone
E.
Or.
Olynthus
Apollonia
Sestos
Chersonese
Imbros
R. Aous
Chaonians
Par.
El.
Pydna
Potidaea
Chalcidice
R. Haliacmon
Dium
Tym.
Perrh.
Lemnos
Molossian Kingdom (after 343/2)
R. Peneios
Mag.
Larissa
Halonnesos
CORCYRA
Thesprotians
Athamania
Thessaly
Pherae
Pagasae
Atarneus
Pandosia
Batiae
Buchetium
Crocus Field
Eresus
Elatria
Ambracia
Dol.
Pharsalus
Ach.
Halus
Cassope
Aen.
Oreus
Scyros
EUBOEA
LEUCAS
ACARNANIA
R. Achelous
Mal.
Nicaea
Doris
E. Locris
Chalcis
Aetolia
Elateia
Amphissa
Phocis
Chaeronea
Eretria
Naupactus
W. Locris
Delphi
Lebadeia
BOEOTIA
Thebes
Cephallenia
ACHAEA
Sicyon
MEGARA
ATHENS
CORINTH
Elis
Arcadia
Argos
EPIDAURUS
Mantinea
TROEZEN
Megalopolis
HERMIONE
Messene
Sparta
Delos
Melos
Cimolos
Upper Macedonian Cantons
L. Lyncestis
Pel. Pelagonia
El. Elimiotis
Or. Orestis
E. Eordaea
Tym. Tymphaea
Par. Parauaea
Thessalian Penoecis
Perrh. Perrhaebia
Aen. Aenis
Mag. Magnesia
Mal. Malis
Dol. Dolopia
Ach. Achaea Phthiotis
ATHENS States represented in the anti-Macedonian army at Chaeronea
Cardia States allied with Philip at some date(s) before 338
Macedonian Kingdom in 359
Outer boundary of Upper Macedonia
Boundary of annexations
Other boundaries
0 50
km
C.J.Tuplin

The Growth of Macedonian Power, 359–336 BC

The growth of Macedonian power involves two distinct phenomena.

(1) *The extension of the Macedonian Kingdom proper.* This was achieved partly by the imposition of unprecedentedly firm control on the Upper Macedonian cantons, and partly by actual annexation of adjacent non-Macedonian territory. The scale of such annexations is debatable. The map registers the acquisition of the region up to Lake Ochrid (358), Pydna (357), the Strymon-Nestos area (356), Methone (354), Perrhaebia (352), and Parauaea (?351). Some would add Paeonia (356), and all of Chalcidice (348). The alternative view is that Paeonia simply became a vassal principality and that, although the land of Potidaea and Olynthus (cities destroyed in 356 and 348) was occupied by Macedonians, the surviving cities of Chalcidice became Philip's allies. At least one Macedonian cavalry squadron was named after a Chalcidian town—Apollonia.

(2) *The acquisition of effective control in areas outside the Kingdom.* Here three phenomena may be distinguished.

(i) The imposition of vassal status on tribal areas: Paeonians (356: see above); Dardanians (345); Odrysian Thracians under Cetriporis (towards R. Nestos: 356), Amadocus (between R. Nestos and R. Hebros: 352), and Cersobleptes (beyond R. Hebros: 352); the Molossian kingdom (*c.* 351–43/2: it is not clear what implications Molossian vassaldom had for the kingdom's allies among the Chaonians and Thesprotians); (?)Getae under Cothelas (*c.* 341); Scythians under Atheas (340). It is unlikely that the Agrianes were vassals, and the evidence that some or all of the Grabaei, Autariatae and Ardiaei were in that category is weaker than sometimes suggested. The Talauntii certainly were not vassals. The situation in Thrace after 342/1 is uncertain: some believe that a tribute-paying province stretching north to the Balkan Mountains (Haemus) was established under a Macedonian *strategos* (an office first attested under Alexander).

(ii) Thessaly: Philip's suppression of Pherae in 352 was followed by his acclamation as *archon* of the Thessalian League, an extraordinary position for a Macedonian king, in virtue of which he could receive taxes, command military support, and generally control the cities as he saw fit; after 344 the ancient office of tetrarch was revived to assist the process. The status of the *perioecis* (areas theoretically dependent on individual cities) is debatable: Perrhaebia and Magnesia were annexed in 352, but it is not clear whether the non-annexed areas (including Magnesia after 346) were subject to Philip as *archon* directly, or via the cities.

(iii) Other Greek states: Philip's alliances with several states between 359 and 338 may in varying degrees be construed as expressions of his growing power, and the same goes for his more or less open interferences in the politics of Euboea, Megara and the Peloponnese after 346, and his addition of certain small Greek towns to the Molossian kingdom in 343/2. But the chief expression and instrument of hegemony is the Corinthian League of 338, an organisation which involved assertions of Greek autonomy (but also the outlawing of socio-economic revolution); freedom from tribute and garrisons (except in Ambracia, Corinth and Thebes); the right of deliberation in League synods (albeit occasional and carefully orchestrated); and the obligation to provide military support for the projected Persian expedition. In default of appreciable precise evidence, the League must be presumed to have included all mainland and Aegean Greek states which were neither part of Macedonia nor in Persian hands; the only known exception is Sparta.

It should be stressed that, notwithstanding the erection of a farflung Macedonian *Reich*, the fundamental fact of Macedonian power remained the military potential of Macedonia itself, and the chief development here was the creation of a well-disciplined infantry force. In this context the use of population transfers to alter settlement patterns and create the appropriate human raw material was vital, but the general references in the sources do not permit any precise description of the process.


ALEXANDER'S CAMPAIGNS, 334-323 B.C.
CASPIAN SEA
Pella
Alexandria Troas
Troy
R. Granicus
HELLESPONTINE PHRYGIA
Gordium
Ancyra
Sardis
LYDIA
GREAT PHRYGIA
CAPPADOCIA
R. Halys
ARMENIA
Ephesus
Alexandria ad Latmum
Miletus
Halicarnassus
CARIA
333
PAMPHILIA
Side
LYCIA
Xanthus
Phaselis
Tarsus
Soli
Issus
Alexandria ad Issum
SYRIA
331
Thapsacus
R. Tigris
Gaugamela
Arbela
MESOPOTAMIA
R. Euphrates
MEDIA
CYPRUS
332
Ecbatana
324
Cossaei
Opis
Tyre
PALESTINE
Alexandria
Gaza
Babylon
Susa
BABYLONIA
SUSIANE
Uxii
Siwah (Ammonium)
Memphis
EGYPT
329
Alexander's route (with date)
Land over 2,000m
0
500
km


F
G
H
R. Jaxartes
R. Oxus
Alexandria Eschate
329
Marcanda
SOGDIANA
?328
Nautaca
Rock of Chorienes
Sogdian Rock
BACTRIA
329
?328
Alexandria ad Oxum
Alexandria (Margiane)
Alexandria (Bactra Zariaspa)
329
MARGIANE
PARAPAMISOS
Alexandria (Paropamisadae)
327
Aornus
Peucelaotis
Taxila
Alexandria (Bucephala)
326
Alexandria (Nicaea)
326
Alexandria (Iomoussa)
R. Cophen
R. Hydaspes
R. Acesines
R. Hydraotes
R. Hyphasis
HYRCANIA
Zadracarta
330
MARDOI
PARTHIA
Susia
Hecatompylus
Rhagae
Caspian Gates
AREIA
Alexandria (Areia)
ARACHOSIA
Alexandria (Arachosia)
Alexandria (Prophthasia)
DRANGIANE
330
ARIASPAI
PARAETACENE
330
PERSIS
Pasargadae
324
Persian Gates
Persepolis
CARMANIA
Alexandria (Carmania)
GEDROSIA
325
Alexandria (Oreitae)
Sindimana
Pattala
I N D I A
MALLOI
Alexandria
R. Indus
4
E
F
G
H
C.J.Tuplin

Alexander's Campaigns, 334–23 BC

The map illustrates Alexander's movements between the departure from Pella in 334 and his death at Babylon in 323. The general picture of his progress is not in doubt—334–1: Asia Minor, Levant; 331–30: Mesopotamia, Iran, Afghanistan; 329–7: Afghanistan, Soviet Central Asia; 327–5: Pakistan, India; 325–3: Iran, Mesopotamia. However lack of precise ancient evidence, conflict between different sources, and differences of opinion about logistical probabilities can render exact identification of the routes followed controversial. Sections where even a small scale map must reflect a disputed interpretation include Ancyra–Tarsus; Tyre–Thapsacus (the site of the latter is a notorious crux); Ecbatana–Rhagae; Zadracarta–Alexandria in Areia (= Herat); Herat–Alexandria in Arachosia (= Kandahar); movements either side of the R. Oxus in 328 (in particular, did Alexander actually visit Alexandria in Margiane (= Merv)?; Pattala–Alexandria in Carmania.

The campaigns fall into four periods.

(1) The war against Darius, ending in 330 with the latter's murder as he fled east from Rhagae. Though Alexander had claimed the Persian throne in 332, and had been hailed as 'King of Asia' by his army after Gaugamela, with Darius' opportune death such claims became a reality; further fighting would be against usurpers—like Darius' killer Bessus, who adopted the upright tiara of an Achaemenid king—and against recalcitrant 'subjects'. The reduction of Darius to the level of an expendable fugitive was principally achieved by three set-piece battles: at the R. Granicus (334: the attempt by Asia Minor forces to contain the invader); Issus (333: Darius' first personal appearance, and a defeat even though he first outmanoeuvred Alexander strategically); and Gaugamela (331: the defeat which exposed the empire's Mesopotamian and Iranian heartland). The delay between Issus and Gaugamela, which gave Darius another chance, was due to the time expended on the sieges of Tyre (p. 68) and Gaza, and the occupation of Egypt—diversions necessitated by Alexander's strategy of neutralising the Persian navy by control of its bases.

(2) In 330–27 Alexander slowly asserted control in the eastern satrapies against resistance from Satibarzanes, his own appointee as satrap of Areia; Bessus, satrap of Bactria and would-be Great King; and Spitamenes, leader of a rebellion in initially submissive Sogdiana. This occupied Alexander's attention for 18 months of hard and ill-documented campaigning in alternately mountainous and desert terrain. His successes in this period disposed of all concerted Iranian nationalist opposition to the foreign King of Kings. The next time there was trouble in Bactria, in 325, it came from discontented Greek mercenaries who disliked being settled in such an un-Greek environment.

(3) In 327 Alexander crossed into India (mostly staying within Pakistan in modern terms), capturing the apparently impregnable Aornus rock (Pir-Sar) early on, and then eliminating the resistance of King Poros at the R. Hydaspes (p. 69). Further advance eastwards stopped at the R. Hyphasis, when the army refused to endorse a decision to make for the R. Ganges. Instead Alexander set off down the R. Indus to subdue the tribes of its middle and lower reaches, which he did with considerable bloodletting. Return to the empire's centre along the coasts of Baluchistan and Iran became impossible when monsoons delayed the fleet, so Alexander had to cross the Gedrosian desert, losing up to three-quarters of his army to hunger and thirst in the process.

(4) 324–3 saw him back in Babylonia, and largely inactive militarily, except for a winter campaign against the Cossaei, and the preparations for an expedition to Arabia which his death forestalled.

RIVER GRANICUS, 334 B.C.



	Macedonians		Persians
1	Archers	A	Memnon
2	Agrianes	B	Arsames
3	Companions	C	Arsites (Paphlagonians)
4	Socrates' squadron	D	Spithridates (Hyrcanians)
5	Prodromoi	E	Unnamed national contingents
6	Paeonians	F	Bactrians
7	Hypaspists & Phalanx brigades	G	Rhoemithres
8	Greek allies & Thracians	H	Medians
9	Thessalians	I	Mercenaries

C.J.Tuplin

ISSUS, 333 B.C.



C.J.Tuplin

River Granicus, 334 BC

There is fundamental conflict between the main accounts. In Arrian Alexander fights his way across the river against Persian cavalry ranged on the east bank, while in Diodorus he makes an unopposed dawn crossing and fights a 'normal' engagement in the plain east of the river. Arrian's somewhat more circumstantial account is perhaps the lesser of two evils, though Diodorus supplies the Persian dispositions. There are two phases: first, the crossing, with two cavalry attacks on the Macedonian right, the second co-ordinated with infantry advance; second, the annihilation of the Persians' Greek mercenaries in the plain (not shown). The limited extent of the areas where crossing was unimpeded by either high banks or trees, or both, may explain Alexander's 'oblique' line of attack and his ultimate success (the very localised fighting neutralising Persian numerical advantage). But the process can only be represented schematically, since precise topographical information is lacking; possibly it is no longer even obtainable, as the river may have shifted course.

Issus, 333 BC

(a) represents schematically one interpretation of the final pre-battle dispositions recorded in Arrian. [1: Thracian javelineers, Cretan archers; 2: archers; 3: *prodromoi*, Paeonians; 4: archers, Agrianians; 5: Greek mercenaries; 6: small cavalry unit.] The Macedonian centre/right routed the enemy—the first breakthrough being led by Alexander against the Cardaces—while the left checked the Persian cavalry. Detailed reconstruction is difficult, not least as regards the initial Macedonian attack. A crucial problem here is the identification of the R. Pinarus. It seems most likely to have been either the Deli Cay (30 km north of Iskenderun), or the Payas (20 km north), where coastline and riverbed may have changed: see broken lines in (c). The Payas fits various reported distances less badly, but steep banks above A preclude the initial Macedonian cavalry charge implied by the sources—and indeed *any* orderly cavalry advance. So either the battle occurred on the Deli (between B and the sea), or infantry brigades opened the attack.



Tyre, 332 BC

The sources are only in broad agreement, and none provides enough incident for a siege of seven months. Initial Macedonian attempts to provide a platform for siege engines by constructing a mole encountered the insuperable difficulty of protecting the workmen against Tyrian attacks from the walls and from ships. Alexander's acquisition of 224 ships from Cyprus, Phoenicia, Rhodes, Cilicia and Lycia was crucial. The Tyrian fleet was then confined to harbour; a small sortie from the north, Sidonian, harbour failed. The mole was completed—though in the event its role was largely diversionary—and a successful assault was mounted. Two ship-borne engines inflicted sufficient damage for an assault party under Alexander to seize a stretch of wall (?adjacent to the south harbour), while the fleet broke into the harbours. However the puzzle of why this attack succeeded when others had failed is never properly solved by any source.

Gaugamela, 331 BC

To quote Brunt, 'The diversity of modern accounts . . . shows that agreement . . . has not been attained and suggests that it is unattainable'. This entirely schematic plan shows the position just before first contact. The dispositions are from Arrian. The oblique Macedonian line, position of the wings, and extent of the Persian overlap, are arguable. Thereafter three stages may be identified:



Macedonians
1 Mercenary cavalry
2 Prodromoi
3 Paeonians
4 Agrianians
5 Archers
6 Mercenary infantry
7 Alexander with Companion cavalry
8 Thracian javelineers
9 Cretan archers
10 Agrianians
11 Hypaspists & Phalanx bridges
12 Thessalian cavalry
13 Mercenary cavalry
14 Greek cavalry
15 Odrysian cavalry
16 Thracian javelineers
17 Cretan archers
18 Mercenaries
19 Second line infantry

Persians
A Bactrian cavalry
B Scythian, Massagetic cavalry
C Chariots
D Bactrians, Dahae, Arachosians, Susians, Persians, Cadusians (mostly cavalry)
E Darius with Persian 'Kinsmen' & melophoroi, Indians, 'transplanted Carians', Mardian archers, Greek mercenaries
F Reserve infantry (Uxians, Babylonians, Sitacenians, Red Sea men, Syrians, Mesopotamians, Medes
G Parthians, Sacae, Tapurians, Hyrcanians, Albanians, Sacesinians (all cavalry)
H Armenian cavalry
I Cappadocian cavalry
J Chariots
K Chariots & elephants

C.J.Tuplin

(1) The Macedonian right [1–6] stalls attack by Darius' left wing [A, B, parts of D], while light-armed troops [8–10] neutralise a chariot attack [C].

(2) The Companions and infantry phalanx [7, 11] rout the now exposed Persian left/centre [rest of D, E]; Darius flees; the extreme left panics.

(3) The Macedonian left and left-centre phalanx comes under severe pressure: some Persian cavalry may have got through it, or around it, to the baggage camp. But apparently the phalanx holds its own unaided, since the Companions and other cavalry [7, 1] moving behind the lines encounter retreating Parthian cavalry. Controversy attaches particularly to this entire last stage of the battle.





River Hydaspes, 326 BC

The map illustrates (a) Alexander's surprise river crossing, for which Stein's location is generally preferred; and (b) the subsequent decisive battle. Poros' dispositions derive from Arrian; Alexander's are nowhere properly described. The extent of Indian overlap is debatable.

Alexander's initial cavalry victory drove the Indian horse onto the infantry line, and caused the elephants/infantry to attempt a leftward countermovement. The Indian left's co-ordination was thus broken, and it was exposed to the Macedonian infantry, which pelted the elephants with missiles and then mounted a crushing mass charge. The chief problem is unit 3, which made for the Indian right but still participated in the cavalry battle. Probably it doubled back as shown, but some believe that Poros transferred his right-wing cavalry to the left—as is likely in any case—and that unit 3 followed them behind the Indian lines and attacked as they reached their goal.

Ai Khanum

The site of Ai Khanum ('Lady moon') takes its name from the nearby village in a remote frontier region where Afghanistan borders the USSR. Discovered by accident, it has been excavated by a French archaeological mission since 1965 to uncover the first evidence (beyond coins) of Greco-Bactrian civilisation. The city was most probably founded either by Alexander or Seleucus, and flourished for nearly 200 years until its violent destruction at the hands of nomadic invaders in the late first century BC. Its situation at the confluence of the Oxus and Kokcha was well chosen, with an acropolis rising to 60 metres reinforced by ramparts, especially to the exposed north east. The best residential area (to the south west) and the city's extensive public buildings were concentrated in the flat area between the left bank of the R. Oxus and a straight main street running below the acropolis. Throughout there appears a revealing blend of Oriental influence and traditional Greek elements.