Network Working Group J. Klensin Internet-Draft February 11, 2016 Updates: 4071 (if approved) Intended status: Best Current Practice Expires: August 14, 2016 Revised IAOC Membership draft-klensin-iaoc-member-01.txt Abstract The original specification of the membership of the IAOC included the IETF and IAB Chairs as voting members. While probably desirable initially, this has turned out to have unfortunate side effects. This document discusses those side effects and replaces those specific individuals with liaisons from the IAB and IESG. Status of This Memo This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." This Internet-Draft will expire on August 14, 2016. Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of Klensin Expires August 14, 2016 [Page 1] Internet-Draft IAOC Membership February 2016 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License. Table of Contents 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 2. History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3. The IAB and IETF Chairs and the IAOC . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 4. Reasons for IAB and IETF Chair Membership in the IAOC and IETF Trust . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 5. BCP 101 Modifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 6. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Appendix A. Other Obvious Questions About Choices . . . . . . . 7 A.1. How About the ISOC President/CEO? . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 A.2. The Trust-IAOC Relationship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 A.3. Changing the appointment mechanism for IAOC members selected from the community by the IAB and IAOC . . . . . 8 Appendix B. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 B.1. History and Changes from version -00 to -01 . . . . . . . 8 Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 1. Introduction The original specification of the membership of the IAOC in BCP 101 [1] included the IETF and IAB Chairs as voting members. While probably desirable initially, this has turned out to have unfortunate side effects. This document discusses those side effects and replaces those specific individuals with liaisons from the IAB and IESG. Note in Draft: This working draft contains a considerable amount of explanatory material about the various choices, both to make the intent more clear and to facilitate community discussion of those and other options. If the draft is approved in principle, those materials should probably either be moved to appendices or deleted entirely. Also, in response to several comments made on the IETF list, it is worth noting that this document is about IASA and the IAOC (and, peripherally, the IETF Trust) and only incidentally about how the IAB and IESG organize themselves and determine their representation on other bodies. Klensin Expires August 14, 2016 [Page 2] Internet-Draft IAOC Membership February 2016 2. History [[CREF1: RFC Editor: please remove this section if the document reaches you. ]] The original version of this document was posted in July 2009 and got absolutely no traction, indeed one or two key members of the IESG made it clear informally that they had no interest in it and that there was no point even trying to discuss it. In February 2016, a draft [3] was posted by some IAB members that seems to have [re]started the discussion. After repeated requests that a draft be posted, this one has been updated to reflect changed context and list discussion. It is posted as a contribution to the discussion. The concept of "liaisons" is from the original version of this draft and is a third alternative to recent suggestions of "observers" or ex-officio IAB and IESG members who are not necessarily the chair. While the author prefers a liaison model for reasons discussed below, the distinction may be minor and there would be little objection to one or the other substitution if the community favored it. As noted above, the author has produced this draft in the hope that it will provide a useful starting point and alternative for the community. If it is useful enough in that role to justify revision, a co-author, or an effort to merge parts of it with the Hardie et al draft [3], would be welcomed. 3. The IAB and IETF Chairs and the IAOC While BCP 101 specified that the IAB and IETF Chairs should serve on the IAOC (and now as Trustees of the Internet Trust [2]), there does not appear to be a strong motivation for having those particular Chair roles expanded to include the considerable additional workload that comes with the IAOC and Trustee roles. There were some good reasons associated with transition at the time the IASA (and IAOC) were established, but the transition to the IASA (and Trust) arrangements are now in the distant past and at least the original set of reasons no longer apply. It is clearly important that the IAOC and Trustees have direct and ongoing input from the IAB and IESG, but that responsibility need not be performed by the two Chairs. There are disadvantages associated with having the Chairs in the Trustee and IAOC roles, which include: Workload and full-time positions To a considerable extent, each additional task we permanently assign to the IAB or IETF Chair positions narrows the number of people who will have the bandwidth and support needed to take on those roles. It also assumes a wider range of skills. Those Klensin Expires August 14, 2016 [Page 3] Internet-Draft IAOC Membership February 2016 requirements make the positions harder to fill, reduce the number of volunteers, and increase the risk that the IAB or Nomcom, respectively, will be placed into the position of selecting someone "least bad" among a small range of candidates. Absent really compelling arguments to the contrary (see Section 4), it also puts us in a position in which the two Chairs are personally essential rather than leaders who are responsible to consensus within their bodies and the community. As others have pointed out, that is inconsistent with our claimed "no kings" model. A different way to look at almost the same issue is that circumstances change. The IAB should be able to determine its priorities, and how the time of the Chair should be allocated, and to do so dynamically rather than assuming that the IAOC is always a high and inescapable priority. Skill set Section 4 of BCP 101 [1] provides guidance about the IAB and IESG (non-ex-officio) appointments to the IAOC and indicates "people with some knowledge of contracts and financial procedures, who are familiar with the administrative support needs of the IAB, the IESG, or the IETF standards process." The "Principles" described in Section 2.2 of RFC 4071 make it entirely clear that the IAOC (and the IASA structure in general) are intended to provide for and support the administrative needs of the IETF and related organizations (including the IAB and, now, the IETF Trust). At least according to that document and the other documents that make up BCP 101, the IAOC is not a policy body. The strongest arguments that have been advanced for requiring in-person participation by the IAB and IETF Chairs all appear to be related to IAOC policy-making of to the IETF Trust (see below and Appendix A.2. If the community does not intend such policy-making to occur in the IAOC, it may be better to have the IAOC membership selected for a higher degree of skill and interest in its actual role. Similar issues apply to the IETF Trust role (unless the IAOC and Trustee roles are ultimately separated): doing the job well requires an ability and willingness to understand the realities of Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) law and regulations and to work effectively with lawyers and other advisers who are IPR specialists. The appeals chain RFC 4071 also defines an appeals model for IAOC actions that takes appeals to the IAB. Specifically for that IAB role, it would Klensin Expires August 14, 2016 [Page 4] Internet-Draft IAOC Membership February 2016 probably be better to not require that the IAB Chair be personally involved in the IAOC as a voting member. In addition, it is useful to clarify the role of the IAB and IESG representatives by making them non-voting liaisons. This reduces the requirement that IAB and/or IESG members be selected for the specific types of expertise needed on the IAOC and Trustees. If they cannot explain IESG and IAB requirements and perspectives to the voting IAOC and Trustee members and persuade them as needed or cannot explain IAOC and Truetee matters to the IAB (or IESG) as needed, we have far more serious problems than whether or not those two people vote. It may be worth noting that reporting on and explaining portions between the two bodies is exactly consistent with our expectations for IAB/ IETF liaisons to completely external bodies. 4. Reasons for IAB and IETF Chair Membership in the IAOC and IETF Trust As discussed above, when the community approved BCP 101, it was approving a fundamentally administrative activity. That was motivated, at least in part, by a desire to replace earlier arrangements if which administrative activities for the IETF were run entirely by an external body. However, it was equally important to be sure that those detailed administrative functions did not fall on the IESG or IAB in order that those bodies could continue to do their primary jobs. At the beginning, there were strong arguments for including the IAB and IETF Chairs in the IAOC in order to facilitate the transition and because they had been, de facto, the primary liaisons and contact points for the earlier arrangements. RFC 4071 is now well into its tenth year, we have a stable environment that is working at least moderately well (modulo some issues about responsiveness to the community and conformance with the transparency requirements of the RFC with which the presence of the two Chairs as voting members does not appear to be helping), and those transitional requirements no longer apply. The issues with the IETF Trust [2] are a bit different. It is much more a policy body than the IAOC. The reasons for making the IAOC members the Trustees of the IETF Trust were, again, dictated by some transition concerns in which the appearance of the Chairs of the IAB and IETF being directly involved was important. But, again, the IETF Trust has entered its second decade, is stable, and appears to be working relatively well. If Trust considerations argue against making the changes outlined in this document, that may be a stronger reason for the community to review the composition of the Trustees than to preserve the status quo in the IAOC. (See further discussion on this topic in Appendix A.2. Klensin Expires August 14, 2016 [Page 5] Internet-Draft IAOC Membership February 2016 Nothing in this document should be construed as prohibiting either the IETF or IAB Chairs from serving in the liaison roles. The IAB Chair, who is chosen for that role by an IAB selected largely or entirely for skills not related to the IAOC or the IETF Trust (and who serves at the pleasure of that body), will often not be the optimal liaison. By contrast, the IETF Chair, who is selected by the Nomcom for skills that will often be more relevant, may more often be the best choice for liaison. However, it seems more reasonable to leave those decisions to the IAB and IESG and the individuals involved rather than building them rigidly into a BCP, if only to better allow for changing circumstances. 5. BCP 101 Modifications BCP 101 is hereby modified by changing "eight" to "six" in the first sentence of Section 4 of RFC 4071, deleting the bullet items from that section that read "The IETF Chair (ex officio);" and "The IAB Chair (ex officio);", and adding, after the bullet list, "The IAB and IESG shall appoint liaisons from their own membership to the IAOC. Those liaisons shall function as full members but without vote. 6. Acknowledgments The original (2009) version of this draft emerged from a number of community discussions and discussions about variations in the match between the skills and interests of various IAB and IETF Chairs over the years, noting that the skills and interest needed to effectively serve on the IAOC had rarely been identified as primary, or even high, on the list of IAB or Nomcom criteria for people selected to those leadership posts. The current, 2016, version was stimulated by a draft being circulated for IAB comment [3] and IETF list discussion of it. One of the authors of that draft challenged those in the community who had different views or proposals to produce a draft that specified a practical alternative. This draft is a response to that request; the author thanks the IAB member authors of the other draft and many contributors to the on-list conversation for the new ideas and rationale that appear here, while understanding that some of them may not agree with the way in which this draft utilizes their views and insights. Comments from Brian Carpenter, Dave Crocker, Ted Hardie, Mike St. Johns, and Andrew Sullivan were particularly helpful in that regard. Klensin Expires August 14, 2016 [Page 6] Internet-Draft IAOC Membership February 2016 7. IANA Considerations [[CREF2: RFC Editor: Please remove this section before publication.]] This memo includes no requests to or actions for IANA. 8. Security Considerations This document makes an adjustment to an IETF and IASA procedural document. It has no Internet security implications beyond those described in the relevant base documents. 9. References 9.1. Normative References [1] Austein, R., Ed. and B. Wijnen, Ed., "Structure of the IETF Administrative Support Activity (IASA)", BCP 101, RFC 4071, DOI 10.17487/RFC4071, April 2005, . [2] Carpenter, B., Ed. and L. Lynch, Ed., "BCP 101 Update for IPR Trust", BCP 101, RFC 4371, DOI 10.17487/RFC4371, January 2006, . 9.2. Informative References [3] Hardie, T., Sullivan, A., and R. Housley, "Updating the ex-officio member of the IAB in the IAOC", February 2016, . Appendix A. Other Obvious Questions About Choices A.1. How About the ISOC President/CEO? As specified in RFC 4071, there are three ex-officio voting positions on the IAOC. This document eliminates two of those positions, replacing them with non-voting liaisons appointed by the relevant body. The preference remains to have the IETF Chair actually serve on the IAOC unless there are reasons to not do so while the preference about the IAB Chair is much less strong (and the reasons less compelling). That leads to an obvious question as to why the requirement that the ISOC President and CEO serve directly, ex- officio, on the IAOC (and the IETF Trust, see below) should be retained. The reason is that RFC 4071 makes it quite clear that IASA is an ISOC function, carried out for the IETF community, that the IAD is an ISOC employee, that ISOC is expected to be the actual signatory to relevant contracts, and so on. That combination of factors gives Klensin Expires August 14, 2016 [Page 7] Internet-Draft IAOC Membership February 2016 ISOC line responsibility (as well as ultimate budgetary responsibility) and having the ISOC President and CEO serve directly on the IAOC is important to those relationships and accountability for them. A.2. The Trust-IAOC Relationship When the IETF Trust was established, it was critically important, as an initialization and transition matter, that the Trustees and the IAOC have the same membership. At this point, a decade on, the importance of having the IAOC serve the administrative oversight function (for which it was named) remains clear. The IETF Trust and its Trustees have, by contrast, assumed more of a policy function. At this point, the reasons for keeping the two memberships the same (including an early, now-expired, constraint about not being able to make changes without external approval) have largely disappeared. This document does not specify separating the two, but such an action would be compatible with it, noting that there is almost certainly a much stronger argument for keeping the IETF and IAB Chairs as Trustees than there is for keeping them as IAOC members. A.3. Changing the appointment mechanism for IAOC members selected from the community by the IAB and IAOC Several suggestions have been made lately for shifting the IAB and IESG appointment responsibilities for community members to serve as voting IAOC members to the Nomcom, allowing the Nomcom to appoint all such members other than the one appointed by ISOC. This document does not address that possibility, but it would be compatible with what is proposed here. As with the role of the IAB and IETF Chairs (see above), there is probably a stronger case to me made for the IAB and IESG appointing Trustees than for their appointing IAOC members. Appendix B. Change Log [[CREF3: RFC Editor: Please remove this section before publication.]] B.1. History and Changes from version -00 to -01 As discussed above, version -01 of this document is a 2016 rewrite of the 2009 version -00. There are few if any changes to the substantive proposal but a good deal of discussion has been added to reflect more recent considerations. Klensin Expires August 14, 2016 [Page 8] Internet-Draft IAOC Membership February 2016 Author's Address John C Klensin 1770 Massachusetts Ave, Ste 322 Cambridge, MA 02140 USA Phone: +1 617 245 1457 Email: john+ietf@jck.com Klensin Expires August 14, 2016 [Page 9]