.nr LL 6i
.nr PO 1i
.nr VS 24
.B 11.3)
.PP
The hypothesis would have to be specialized by adding the conjunct 
.B "(inst ?x3 square)".  
As it stands now
.B ?x3's
is not an instance of anything, therefor it can be anything, namely the
square inside the circle.  It does not matter that 
.B ?x2
is also the square inside the circle.  Making 
.B ?x3
an unique instance of a square guarantees that there are two distinct
squares.  (I am assuming that two instances of something can not be the exact
same thing, if they could be then an extra conjunct stating that 
.B ?x2
and
.B ?x3
are not equal would need to be added.)  This shows that the shapes and
uniqueness of the objects are important in the identified situation.
.sp 1
.B 11.4)
.PP
In order for this method to work there has to be a known correct solution.
The first problem is that with chess there are two people fighting for
different goals, unlike in Lex where the one goal is solving the problem.
Therefor the computer will not get to choose the \*Qoperators\*U (moves).
To solve this problem the computer could use some sort of MINMAX procedure.
But the main problem still exists, namely the search spaces generated is
simply to big to handle so a solution can never be found.  The method used
for Lex requires a solution.  Supposing we DO get a solution (perhaps
it is very close to the end of the game) we might find it difficult to
figure out what is important for generalizing and specializing, what is the
identified situation for chess?
.sp 1
.B 11.8)
.PP
Formalized concepts are almost always a list of conjuncts.  Therefor, the
negation of a concept will be a number of disjuncts of negated statements;
~(a ^ b ^ c ^ d) becomes (~a or ~b or ~c or ~d).  What is happening here is
that we end up describing a concept in terms of what it is not.  Since for a
given concept in a given world there are so many things in the world that are
not at all related to the concept, stating all the things in the world that
the concept is NOT is an ridiculous task.  This is what the book calls the
disjunctive-concept problem.  We can add disjunct after disjunct, and there
comes a point where there are just too many disjuncts, and they don't give
us any insight into the concept itself.