.nr LL 6i .nr PO 1i .nr VS 24 .PP Although Churchland's phantasies about discovering the possibility for a significantly more complicated verbal language that is highly efficient at reflecting internal cognitive structures is interesting, I have a few problems with it. I see no reason to believe that such a degree of increase of sophistication over verbal communication is possible. Thus I see no reason to believe that FP will be replaced by such a system. I have two arguments against the possibility of a so drastically different kind of verbal communications system. .PP First of all, I have problems with the possibility Churchland posses of neural structures with operations and \*Qcomplexity far in excess of that shown by natural language\*U (p. 86) that can be used in verbal communication. It is not that I doubt the existence of exceedingly complicated neural structures. What I doubt is their ability to be exploited by a verbal communication system. Psycholinguistic research has found many limits and restrictions on natural languages. To me this suggests that natural languages are in the domain of the most complicated verbal communication systems; you might be able to invent a more complicated natural language, but you can't invent a more complicated kind (a higher dimension) of reliable verbal communication system. .PP My second argument has to do with the connection between language and conscious thought. They seem to operate to the same degree of complexity. Although there are not direct mappings from thoughts to sentences, for example, it none the less seems clear that thoughts and language are linking in a necessary way; they are both dependent on the same sort of cognitive processes. It also seems that the sophistication of a language cannot be more than the sophistication of the thoughts that it is representing. So, then, if we are to acquire a new kind of verbal communication system that is significantly more complicated, and not remotely similar to natural language, we then must acquire a kind of thought process that is just as alien to our current kind; our experience of consciousness would be totally different, which just doesn't seem too likely, if even possible. How would this acquisition take place? Presumably neuroscience discovers these sophisticated neurostructures and we create a system by which we can express this sophistication verbally; but how would we learn it? how would we acquire this new consciousness? It seems like the same sort of problem that a 2-dimensional creature has in understanding 3-D space: it simply can't be done. It can hypothesize about it, can find properties it has, be abstract about it, etc., but all in terms of 2-D concepts; it can't learn itself into 3 dimensions, which seems to be what Churchland is asking us to do with this new verbal communication system. .PP Surprisingly, what seems to be more likely than the new communications proposal is Churchland's third proposal (p. 87) whereby we communicate through neural transducers. This kind of low-level communication does not require a new consciousness (although it probably would take a little getting used to, and I'd be afraid that I couldn't stop `listening' to people, etc.). .PP I think major neuroscientific discoveries will have a great effect on the way people (especially psychologists) think about themselves, but I don't think neuroscience will replace Folk Psychology. The most change would probably occur in the field of psychotherapy and mental illness treatment. Mental disorders might all be treated chemically, etc. But day to day conversation will still be based on a FP. Programmers don't talk about their programs as lots of 0's and 1's. That is not to say I believe that FP is directly reducible to yet to be discovered neural structures. But perhaps discoveries in neuroscience will modify FP into a form that is closer to being reducible, yet still be on the level of current FP.