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Aristotle on Sleep and **Dreams**

A Text and Translation

with Introduction, Notes and Glossary

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broadview press

1990

DE INSOMNIIS

ON DREAMS

CHAPTER ONE

20. 458a33-b3. *Introduction. Is dreaming the work of perception or of thought?*

458a33. Next we must inquire into the dream: first / with what part of the soul it is apparent, i.e. whether this affection is the work of the thinking or the perceptual part. For of the faculties within us, it is with these alone that we know anything.

21. 458b3-9. *It cannot be with perception that we are aware of dreams.*

458b3. Given, then, that the exercise of sight is seeing, and that of hearing is hearing, and in general that of perception is perceiving—and the senses have / common objects, e.g. shape, size, movement and the like, and again special ones, e.g. color, sound and taste—and given that everything with its eyes closed in sleep is unable to see, and likewise for the other senses as well, so that clearly we are not perceiving anything during periods of sleep; it follows that it is not with perception, anyway, that we perceive a dream.

22. 458b10-15. *Nor are we aware of dreams with judgment. For in sleep an approaching figure is said to be both a man and pale, a pronouncement which judgment without perception could not make.*

458b10. But neither is it with judgment that we do so. For we say not only that the thing approaching is a man or a horse, but also that it is pale or beautiful. None of those things could be said by judgment, either truly or falsely, without perception. Yet during periods of sleep the soul, in effect, does just that. For we judge that we see, equally, that the figure approaching is a man and that he is pale.

Insomni.

458a.33 Μετά δέ ταῦτα περὶ ἐνυπνίου ἐπιτηρητέου, καὶ πρῶτον
458b τίτι τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς φαίνεται, καὶ πότερον τοῦ νοητικοῦ τὸ
πάθος ἐστὶ τοῦτο ἢ τοῦ αισθητικοῦ. τοῦτοις γὰρ μόνοις τῶν ἐν
ἡμῖν γνωρίζομεν τι.

εἰ δ' ἡ χρῆσις ὄψεως ὄρασις, καὶ ἀκοῆς
τὸ ἀκούειν, καὶ ὄλως αισθήσεως τὸ αισθάνεσθαι, κοινὰ δ' ἐστὶ
5 τῶν αισθήσεων οἶον σχῆμα καὶ μέγεθος καὶ κίνησις καὶ
τὰλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἴδια δ' οἶον χρώμα φέρος χυμὸς,
ἀδυνατεῖ δὲ πάντα μύοντα καὶ καθέξοντα ὄραυν, ὁμοίως δὲ
καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν λοιπῶν, δῆλον ὅτι οὐκ αισθανόμεθα οὐδὲν ἐν τοῖς
ὑπνοῖς· οὐκ ἔρα γε τῆ αισθήσει τὸ ἐνύπνιον αισθανόμεθα.

10 ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ τῆ δόξῃ· οὐ γὰρ μόνον τὸ προσίον φαμεν
ἀνθρώπου ἢ ἵππου εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ λευκὸν ἢ καλόν· εἴη ἢ
δόξα εἴεν αισθήσεως οὐδὲν ἂν φήσεεν, οὔτ' ἀληθῆς οὔτε ψευ-
δοῦς· εἴη δὲ τοῖς ὑπνοῖς συμβαίνει τὴν ψυχὴν τοῦτο ποιεῖν·
ὁμοίως γὰρ ὅτι ἀνθρώπος καὶ ὅτι λευκὸς ὁ προσίον δοκοῦ-
μεν ὄραυν.

15 ἐτι παρὰ τὸ ἐνύπνιον ἐννοοῦμεν ἄλλο τι, καθάπερ
 μεθ', πολὺς καὶ διανοοῦμεθ' τι. οὕτω καὶ ἐν τοῖς ὑπνοῖς
 παρὰ τὰ φαντάσματα ἐνιοτε ἄλλα ἐννοοῦμεν. φανεῖν δ' ἐν
 τῷ τούτῳ, εἴ τις προσέχοι τὸν νοῦν καὶ κειρῆτο μνημονεύειν
 20 ἀναστὰς. ἥδη δέ τινας καὶ ἐπακασιν ἐνύπνια τοιαῦτα, οἷον
 οἱ δοκοῦντες κατὰ τὸ μνημονικὸν παρὰ γυγία τιθεσθαι τὰ
 προβλήματα συμβαίνει γὰρ αὐτοῖς πολὺς ἄλλο τι
 παρὰ τὸ ἐνύπνιον τιθεσθαι πρὸ ὁμμάτων εἰς τὸν τόπον φάν-
 25 τασμα. ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι οὐκ ἐνύπνιον πᾶν τὸ ἐν ὑπνῷ φάν-
 τασμα, καὶ ὅτι ὁ ἐννοοῦμεν τῆ δόξη δοξάζομεν.

δῆλον δέ
 περὶ τούτων ἀπάντων τὸ γε τοσοῦτον, ὅτι τὸ αὐτὸ ᾗ καὶ
 ἐγρηγορῆτες ἐν ταῖς νόσοις ἀπατάμεθα, τοῦτ' αὐτὸ καὶ
 ἐν τῷ ὑπνῷ ποιεῖ τὸ πάθος. καὶ ὑγιαίνουσι δέ καὶ εἰδῶσιν
 ὅμως ὁ ἥλιος ποδῶν εἶναι δοκεῖ.

ἄλλ' εἶτε δὴ ταῦτ' ἐτα'
 30 ἕτερον τὸ φανταστικὸν τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τὸ αἰσθητικόν, οὐδέν
 ἦττον οὐ γίγνεται ἀνευ τοῦ ὁπᾶν καὶ αἰσθάνεσθαι τι. τὸ γὰρ
 παροῦν καὶ παρὰ οὐκ ὁρᾶται. ἐν δέ τῷ ὑπνῷ ὑπέκειται μῆδὲν ὁπᾶν
 459a.1 μῆδ' ἀκούειν μῆδ' ὄλως αἰσθάνεσθαι.

16. The translation at 458b22-24 follows Barnes and Heit in taking ἄλλο τι with φάντασμα, despite their separation, as object of τιθεσθαι. Bearre (note ad loc.) evidently takes ἄλλο τι as subject of συμβαίνει, assumes a comma after ἐνύπνιον (b23), and understands τιθεσθαι... φάντασμα in apposition to ἄλλο τι. He translates: 'They frequently find themselves engaged in something else besides the dream, viz. in setting a phantasm which they envisage into its mnemonic position.'

23. 458b15-25. Moreover, a dream is to be distinguished from other thoughts in sleep. It is the latter that we cognize with judgment.

458b15. Again, over and above the dream we think something else, 15 just as we do when perceiving something during the waking state. For when we are perceiving something, we often also engage in some thought about it. So too during periods of sleep we sometimes think other things over and above the appearances (phantasmata). This would be apparent to anyone who should make a mental effort to remember / on arising. In fact, some people have actually experienced 20 such dreams, e.g. those who judge that they are arranging a given set of items according to the system for memorizing them. For they often find themselves putting into its place before their eyes some other appearance (phantasma) apart from the dream.¹⁶ Thus, it is clear that not every appearance (phantasma) during sleep is a dream, / and that it is what we are thinking that we cognize with judgment. 25

24. 458b25-29. If a dream is the work of neither perception nor judgment, what is it? This much is clear: a dream is due to the faculty by which we are perceptually deceived when awake but ill, or even when in good health.

458b25. On all these issues this much at least is clear: it is the very same faculty by which we are deceived during illnesses, even when awake, that also produces the affection during sleep. Why, even to those who are in good health and who know otherwise, the sun still seems to be only one foot across.

25. 458b29-459a1. Yet mis-seeing, mis-hearing etc. require that we perceive something; whereas in sleep, it is being assumed, we are not perceiving anything.

458b29. But whether in fact the imagining (phantastikon) part of the soul and the perceptual are the same / or different, still the affection 30 does not occur without our seeing or perceiving something. For someone who mis-sees or mis-hears must be seeing or hearing some real thing, albeit not the thing he supposes. But during sleep, it is being assumed, one is neither seeing / nor hearing, nor, in general, perceiving anything. 459a

26. 459a1-8. Possible solution: even though we are not perceiving anything, the senses may still be affected in some way. And judgment might

ἔρ' οὖν τὸ μὲν μὴ ὄρα
 μηδὲν ἀληθές, τὸ δὲ μηδὲν πάσχειν τὴν αἰσθησίν οὐκ ἀληθές,
 ἀλλ' ἐνδέχεται καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν πάσχειν τι καὶ τὰς ἀλλὰς
 αἰσθησεις, ἕκαστου δὲ τούτων ὡσπερ ἐρηγορότος προσ-
 βάλλει μὲν πρὸς τῆ αἰσθησίν, οὐχ οὕτως δὲ ὡσπερ ἐρηγορότος·
 5 καὶ ὅτε μὲν ἡ δόξα λέγει ὅτι ψεύδος, ὡσπερ
 ἐρηγορόσι, ὅτε δὲ κατέχεται καὶ ἀκολουθεῖ τῷ φαντά-
 σματι;

ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἔστι τοῦ δοξαζοντος οὐδέ τοῦ διανοουμένου
 τὸ πάθος τοῦτο ὁ καλοῦμεν ἐνυπνιάζειν, φανερόν, ἀλλ' οὐδέ τὰς
 10 αἰσθανομένων ἀλλῶς· ὁρᾶν γὰρ αὐτὴν καὶ ἀκοῦειν ἀλλῶς.
 ἀλλὰ πᾶς δὴ καὶ τινα τρόπον, ἐπισκεπτέον. ὑποκεῖσθαι μὲν
 οὖν, ὡσπερ ἔστι καὶ φανερόν, ὅτι τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ τὸ πάθος, εἴτε
 καὶ ὁ ὕπνος· οὐ γὰρ ἀλλῶ μὲν τιμὴ τῶν ζώων ὑπάσχει ὁ
 ὕπνος, ἀλλῶ δὲ τὸ ἐνυπνιάζειν, ἀλλὰ τῷ αὐτῷ.

ἔπει δέ·
 15 περὶ φαντασίας ἐν τοῖς περὶ ψυχῆς εἰρηται, καὶ ἔστι μὲν
 τὸ αὐτὸ τῷ αἰσθητικῷ τὸ φανταστικόν, τὸ δ' εἶναι φαντα-
 στικῷ καὶ αἰσθητικῷ ἔργον, ἔστι δὲ φαντασία ἡ ὑπὸ τῆς
 καρτ' ἐνέργειας αἰσθησεως γινομένη κίνησις, τὸ δ' ἐνυπνιον
 φαντασματ' τι φαίνεται εἶναι (τὸ γὰρ ἐν ὕπνῳ φαντασμα
 20 ἐνυπνιον λέγομεν, εἰθ' ἀλλῶς εἴτε τρόπον τιμὰ γινόμενον),
 φανερόν ὅτι τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ μὲν ἔστι τὸ ἐνυπνιάζειν, τοῦτου
 φανταστικόν.

17. 'Declare it an illusion' (459a6). This translates Ross's text, but leaves it unclear, as at 460b15, *what exactly is declared illusory*. There is ms support for reading τὸ ὁρῶμενον after ψεύδος. Thus, Heit: 'opinion states ... that what is seen is false'; Bearse: 'the object seen is an illusion'; τὸ ὁρῶμενον may be a gloss, but if so, it is probably a correct one.

18. Bearse gives (459a10): 'If it were the latter [viz. an affection of the faculty of perception in the simple sense] it would be possible [when asleep] to hear and see in the simple sense'. Heit: 'for in that case it would be possible in a dream to see and hear normally'. But by understanding τὸ πάθος τοῦτο ὁ καλοῦμεν ἐνυπνιάζειν (line 9) as subject of ψῖν, the need for further supplementation is avoided. The present version understands the text accordingly.

sometimes recognize this experience as deceptive, but at other times accept it.

459a1. Then could it be true that one is not seeing anything, yet not true that the sense is in no way affected? Is it possible, rather, that both sight and the other senses are affected somehow, and that each of these impinges / in some way upon perception, as with a waking person, though not in the same way as with a waking person? And might judgment sometimes declare it an illusion,¹⁷ as it does for waking people, but at other times be held in check and follow along with the appearance (*phantasma*)?

27. 459a8-14. *Dreaming, then, is not the work of judgment. But neither is it the work of straightforward perception. Then what kind of perceiving is it?*

459a8. It is plain, then, that this affection that we call dreaming is not the work of that which judges, nor of that which engages in thought. But nor is it, / in an unqualified way, the work of that which perceives. 10 For then it would be unqualified seeing and hearing.¹⁸ But just how and in what manner is what has to be examined. Let it be assumed, then, as is indeed plain, that the affection is the work of the perceptual part, granted that sleep is too. For sleeping does not belong to one part of the animal and dreaming to another. Rather, both belong to the same part.

28. 459a14-22. *Conclusion: dreaming is the work of perception, but belongs to that faculty in its imagining capacity.*

459a14. Now since / imagination (*phantasia*) has been discussed in 15 our work on the soul, and since the imagining part (*to phantastikon*) is the same as the perceptual, yet their being is different for the imagining (*phantastikon*) and the perceptual; and since imagination (*phantasia*) is the movement produced by a sense in the course of its active functioning, and the dream appears to be some sort of appearance (*phantasma*)—for an appearance (*phantasma*) in sleep / (whether it occurs simply or in some particular way) is what we call a dream—it is plain that dreaming is the work of the perceptual part, but belongs to this part in its imagining (*phantastikon*) capacity.

Τι δ' ἐστὶ τὸ ἐνύπνιον, καὶ πῶς γίνεται, ἐκ τῶν περὶ τὸν ὕπνου συμβαίνοντων μέλιστα· ἂν θεωρησάμεν, τὰ γὰρ αἰσθητὰ καθ' ἕκαστον αἰσθητήριον ἡμῶν ἐμποιοῦσιν αἰσθῆσιν, καὶ τὸ γινόμενον ὑπ' αὐτῶν πάθος οὐ μόνον ἐνυπάρχει ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητήριοις ἐνεργουσῶν τῶν αἰσθήσεων, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀνεύρουσῶν.

παρὰπλήσιον γὰρ τὸ πάθος ἐπὶ τε τούτων καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν φερομένων ἔοικεν εἶναι. καὶ γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν φερομένων τοῦ κινήσαντος οὐκέτι θιγγάνουτος κινεῖται· τὸ γὰρ κίνησαν ἐκινήσειν δέφα τινά, καὶ πάλιν οὔτος κινουόμενος ἕτερον καὶ τοῦτον δὴ τὸν τρόπον, ἕως ἂν στή, ποιεῖται τὴν κίνησιν καὶ ἐν 459b δέπει καὶ ἐν τοῖς ὕπνοις.

ὅμοιος δέ ὑπολαμβάνειν τούτο δεῖ καὶ ἐπὶ ἀλλοιώσεως· τὸ γὰρ θεωρεῖν ὑπὸ τοῦ θερμοῦ τὸ πᾶν σίου θερμαίνει, καὶ τούτο διαδίδωσιν ἕως τῆς ἀρχῆς. ὅσπερ καὶ ἐν τῷ αἰσθάνεσθαι, ἐπειδὴ ἐστὶν ἀλλοίωσις τις ἢ κατ' ἐνέργειαν αἰσθήσεως, ἀνάγκη τοῦτο συμβαίνειν. διὸ τὸ πάθος ἐστὶν οὐ μόνον ἐν αἰσθανομένοις τοῖς αἰσθητήριοις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν περαινμένοις, καὶ ἐν βάθει καὶ ἐπιποθῆς.

φανερον οε
ὅταν συνεχῶς αἰσθανόμεθα τι μεταφερόντων γὰρ τὴν αἰσθῆσιν ἀκοινοῦμεν τὸ πάθος, οἷον ἐκ τοῦ ἡλίου εἰς τὸ σκότος· 10 συμβαίνει γὰρ μηδὲν ὁρᾶν διὰ τὴν ἐπι ὑποῦσαν κίνησιν ἐν τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς ὑπὸ τοῦ φωτός. κἂν πρὸς ἐν χρῶμα τοιοῦτον χροῖον βλέπωμεν ἢ λευκὸν ἢ χλωρὸν, τοιοῦτον φαίνεται ἐπι ὅσπερ ἂν τὴν ὄψιν μεταβάλλωμεν, κἂν πρὸς τὸν ἡλίον

CHAPTER TWO

29. 459a23-28. *To understand the nature and explanation of dreams, one should study what happens in sleep. Sense-impressions leave remnants in the sense-organs, which continue to be experienced after the original perceptions have gone.*

459a23. What a dream is, and how it occurs, we may best study from the circumstances attending sleep. For sense-objects / corresponding to 25 each sense-organ provide us with perception. And the affection produced by them persists in the sense-organs, not only while the perceptions are being actualized, but also after they have gone.

30. 459a28-b7. *Just as objects can continue in motion, even when what started them is no longer in contact with them, so can qualitative change be transmitted. Thus, perceptual remnants can persist when the sense-organs are no longer active.*

459a28. For the affection in their case would seem akin to that of objects being carried. In their case too / there is motion, even when the moving 30 agent is no longer in contact with them. For the moving agent moves a certain portion of air, and that, on being moved, in turn moves another. And in that way motion continues to be produced, / in air and liquids 459b alike, until a standstill is reached.

459b1. This, one must assume, applies in the case of alteration likewise. For what has been heated by something hot heats its neighbour, and this passes it on successively, until the starting-point is reached. So this must happen in perceiving as well, seeing that / perception is a kind of alteration. Hence the affection persists in the sense-organs, both in depth and on the surface, not only while they are actually perceiving, but even after they have ceased to do so.

31. 459b7-23. *Examples of perceptual after-effects in optical and other phenomena.*

459b7. This is plain whenever we engage in perceiving something continuously. For when we shift our perception, e.g. from sunlight to darkness, our previous affection continues. / For the result is that we 10 see nothing, because of the movement that was due to the light and is still subsisting in our eyes. Again, if we look for a long time at a single color, be it white or green, then any object to which we may shift our

15 βλέψαντες ἢ ἄλλο τι λαμπρὸν μύσμεν, παρατηρήσει φαίνεται κατ' εὐθυρίαν, ἢ συμβαίνει τὴν οὖν ὄραν, πρῶτον μὲν τοιοῦτον τῆν χροῶν, εἶτα μεταβάλλει εἰς φουρικόου κῆμειτα πορφυροῦν, ἕως ἂν εἰς τὴν μέλαιναν ἔλθῃ χροῶν και ἀφανισθῇ. και ἀπὸ τῶν κινουμένων δὲ μεταβάλλουσιν, οἷον ἀπὸ τῶν ποταμῶν, μέλαιστα δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν τάχιστα 20 πέδωντων, φαίνεται [γάρ] τὰ ἠραιοῦντα κινούμενα.

γίνονται δὲ και ἀπὸ τῶν μεγάλων ψόφων δύσκαφοι και ἀπὸ τῶν λογυρῶν ὁσμῶν δύσομοι, και ἐπὶ τῶν ὁμοίων <ἁμοίως>. ταῦτά γε δὴ φανερώς συμβαίνει τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον.

ὅτι δὲ ταχὺ τὰ αἰσθητήρια και μικρὰς διαφοράς αἰσθάνεται, σημείον τὸ 25 ἐπὶ τῶν ἐνόπτων γινόμενον· περὶ οὗ και αὐτοῦ ἐπιστήσας σκέψαιτό τις ἂν και ἀπορήσειεν. ἅμα δ' ἐξ αὐτοῦ δῆλον ὅτι ὡσπερ και ἡ ὄψις πάσχει, οὕτω και ποιεῖ τι. ἐν γὰρ τοῖς ἐνόπτοις τοῖς σφόδρα καθαροῖς, ὅταν τῶν καταμητῶν τὰς γυναιξὶ γινόμενων ἐμβλέψουσιν εἰς τὸ κάτοπτρον, 30 γίνονται τὸ ἐπιρῶδες τοῦ ἐνόπτου οἷον νεφέλη αἰματώδης· αὕτην κηλίδα, ἐὰν δὲ παλαιὸν, πέον. αἰτίου δέ, ὡσπερ εἶπεν, ὅτι οὐ μόνον πάσχει ἡ ὄψις ὑπὸ τοῦ κέρος, ἀλλὰ ἡ ὄψις τῶν λαμπρῶν και ἐχούτων χροῶν. τὰ μὲν οὖν και ποιεῖ τι και κινεῖ, ὡσπερ και τὰ λαμπρὰ και γὰρ ἔτερον μέρος ὁτιοῦν· και γὰρ φύσει τυγχάνουσι φάσβδεις οὖτες. διὸ γινόμενων τῶν καταμητῶν διὰ παραχῆν και φλεγασίαν αἰματικὴν ἦλτι μὲν ἡ ἐν τοῖς ὄμμασι διαφορά δῆλως, ἐνδοσι δέ (ἡ γὰρ αὕτη φύσις σπέματος και καταμητῶν), ὁ δ' ἀπὸ κινεῖται ὑπ' αὐτῶν, και τῶν ἐπὶ τῶν οἷον αὐτὸς πάσχει· ὁ δὲ τοῦ κάτοπτρου τὴν ἐπιφάνειαν. ὡσπερ δὲ τῶν ἡμετῶν, τὰ μέλαιστα καθαρά τάχιστα κηλιδούται· τὸ γὰρ καθαρόν ἀκριβῶς δηλοῖ ὅ τι ἂν δέξῃται, και τὸ μέλαιστα τὰς ἐλαχίστας κινήσεις. ὁ δὲ χαλκὸς διὰ μὲν 15 τὸ λεῖος εἶναι ὁμοιωσῶν ἀφῆς αἰσθάνεται μέλαιστα (δεῖ δὲ

19. Alternatively, reading *καὶ (sc. αἰ κινήσεις)* at 459b18 and retaining *γάρ* in b20, with Beare, 'the visual stimulations still present themselves, for the things really at rest are then seen as moving'. But see Ross, 272.

20. Perhaps, reading *ἄλλων ὁμοίως* (Hayduck) at 459b22, 'and likewise for the other senses'.

21. Several mss omit *τὸ* at 460a14, giving the sense 'for anything clean shows up distinctly whatever it receives, and especially the smallest blemishes'. But there is no reason why the smallest blemishes should be especially visible, and *τὸ* μέλαιστα must correspond to *τὰ* μέλαιστα *καθαρὰ* in a12 above.

vision appears to be of the same color. And again, if we close our eyes after looking towards the sun or some other shining object, then if we watch carefully, / it appears directly in line with our original vision, 15 first in its own color; then it changes to crimson, next to purple, until finally it turns black and disappears. Also, when people turn away from moving objects, e.g. rivers, particularly very / fast-flowing ones, 20 things at rest appear to them to be moving.¹⁹

459b20. Then again, people are made hard of hearing by loud noises, and their sense of smell is impaired by strong smells, and likewise for similar cases.²⁰ Plainly, these effects are produced in the above manner.

32. 459b23-460a23. *The sense-organs are sensitive even to slight changes and are not only affected by their objects but react upon them. This is manifest from a phenomenon on the surface of mirrors.*

459b23. That the sense-organs are rapidly sensitive even to slight differences is shown by what / happens with mirrors. Indeed, anyone who 25 would give his attention to it might look into that subject too and explore the problem. At the same time, it is clear from this case that the organ of sight is not only affected by, but also acts upon, its object. For in extremely clean mirrors, when women look into them during their menstrual period, / the mirror surface takes on a sort of blood-red cloud. In fact, if the mirror is a new one, it is not easy to get the stain out, although it is easier with an old one. The reason is, as we have said, / that the organ of sight is not only affected by the air, but is 460a also active and imparts movement, just as shining objects do. In fact the organ of sight is just such an object and one that possesses color. One may reasonably suppose, then, that during menstrual periods the eyes are in the same state as / any other part of the body. Further- 5 more, they are full of blood-vessels by nature. Hence, when menstruation occurs, owing to disorder and turbulence of the blood, the difference in the eyes is invisible to us, and yet it is present (for the nature of semen and of the menses is the same). The air is moved by the eyes, and makes the / air extending over the 10 mirror's surface to be of a certain quality, i.e. that by which it is affected itself. And this air in turn affects the surface of the mirror. Now just as with clothes, the cleanest are the quickest stained; for anything clean shows up distinctly whatever it receives, the most clean showing the smallest blemishes.²¹ Likewise the bronze, owing to / its smoothness, is highly sensitive to any sort of 15

νοῆσαι οἷον τρίψιν οὖσαν τὴν τοῦ κέρος ἀφῆν και ἄσπερ ἐκ-
μαξίν και ἀνέπλυσιν), διὰ δὲ τὸ καθαρὸν ἐνδὴλος γίνε-
ται ὀνηλικτοῦν οὔσα. τοῦ δὲ μὴ ἐπιέναι ταχέως ἐκ τῶν και-
νῶν καρδτρων αἴττιον τὸ καθαρὸν εἶναι και λεῖον. δια-
20 δεύται γὰρ διὰ τῶν τοιοῦτων και εἰς βάθος και πάντη, διὰ
μὲν τὸ καθαρὸν εἰς βάθος, διὰ δὲ τὸ λεῖον πάντη. ἐν δὲ
τοῖς παλαιῖς οὐκ ἐμμένει, ὅτι οὐχ ὁμοίως εἰσδύεται ἢ κη-
λῖς ἀλλ' ἐπιπολαιότερον.

ὅτι μὲν οὖν και ὑπὸ τῶν μικρῶν
διαφορῶν γίνεταί κίνησις, και ὅτι ταχέα ἢ αἰσθησις,
25 και ὅτι οὐ μόνον πάσχει, ἀλλὰ και ἀντιπολεῖ τὸ τῶν χρο-
μάτων αἰσθητήριον, φανερὸν ἐκ τούτων. μαρτυρεῖ δὲ τοῖς εἰ-
ρηνηνοῖς και τὰ περὶ τοῖς οἶνους και τὴν μυρμηκίαν συμ-
βαίνοντα. τὸ τε γὰρ παρασκευασθὲν ἔλαιον ταχέως λαμβά-
νει τὰς τῶν πλῆστον ὀσμὰς, και οἱ οἶνοι τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο πά-
30 σχουσι. οὐ γὰρ μόνον τῶν ἐμβαλλομένων ἢ ὑποκρινωμένων
ἀλλὰ και τῶν πλῆστον τοῖς ἀγγείοις τιθημένων ἢ πεφυ-
κότων ἀνταλαμβάνουσι τὰς ὀσμὰς.

πρὸς δὲ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς
460b σκέψιν ὑποκείσθω ἐν μὲν, ὅσπερ ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων φανερὸν,
ὅτι και ἀμελῶδντος τοῦ θύραθεν αἰσθητοῦ ἐμμένει τὰ αἰσθη-
ματα αἰσθητὰ ἄντα.

πρὸς δὲ τοῦτοῖς ὅτι ἄξιως ἀπαρτά-
μεθα περὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἐν τοῖς πάσσειν ἄντες, ἀλλοὶ δὲ
5 ἐν ἀλλοῖς, οἷον ὁ δελιδος ἐν φῶβῳ, ὁ δ' ἐρωτικὸς ἐν ἐρωτῇ,
ὅσπερ δοκεῖν ἀπὸ μικρᾶς ὁμοιότητος τοῦ μὲν τῶν πολέμιους
ἀπᾶν, τὸν δὲ τῶν ἐφίλων. και ταῦτα ὅσα ἄν ἐμπροσθε-
10 ρος ἦ, τοσοῦτῶ ἀπ' ἐλᾶσενος ὁμοιότητος φαίνεταί. τὸν αἰ-
τῶν δὲ τρόπον και ἐν ἀργαῖς και ἐν πάσαις ἐπιθυμίαις ἐπι-
10 ἀπάτητοι γίνονται πάντες, και μάλλον ὅσα ἄν μάλλον ἐν

22. One ms (M), after 'the former judges that he sees his enemies' (460b7), adds 'e.g., if he sees these sticks standing nearby, he thinks he is seeing armed men'. This elaboration of Aristotle's example is probably a gloss. But it illustrates the phenomenon of 'seeing X as Y' in virtue of some slight resemblance between them.

impact (and one should recognize the impact of air as a form of friction, a wiping, as it were, or washing on). And because of its cleanliness, any impact whatever shows up on it. The reason why the stain will not readily come off new mirrors is that the surface is clean and smooth. For it / has permeated such mirrors in depth and all over—in depth because the surface is clean, and all over because it is smooth; whereas in old mirrors it does not persist, because the stain does not penetrate to the same extent, but is more superficial.

33. 460a23-32. *The same conclusions are evidenced by wines and ointments.*

460a23. From the above, then, it is plain that movement is generated even by slight differences; that perception is rapid; and / that the sense-organ that perceives colors is not only affected by them but also acts reciprocally. What has been said is further attested by what happens with wines and the preparation of ointments. For when oil has been prepared, it rapidly takes on the smells of things near it. Wines too are affected in the same way: / they pick up the smells not only of things thrown or mixed in with them, but also of things placed near their containers or growing nearby.

34. 460a32-b16. *Original inquiry resumed. Two assumptions: (1) Sense-impressions persist after external stimuli have ceased. (2) We are especially liable to perceptual error when emotionally excited. The degree of error varies according to our condition and may or may not be endorsed by judgment.*

460a32. Returning, then, to our original / inquiry, let one thing be assumed, that is plain from what has been said: our sense-impressions persist, remaining perceptible, even after the external sense-object has gone.

460b3. It may be added that we are easily deceived with respect to our perceptions while we are in emotional states. And different people / according to different states, e.g. the coward in a state of fright, the amorous man in one of amorous passion. Thus, from a slight resemblance the former judges that he sees his enemies,²² but the latter that he sees his loved one. The more emotional his state, the slighter the resemblance that can give rise to these appearances. In the same way, all men become prone to / deception while in states of anger as well as in every form of appetite, and the more so, the more

τοὺς πάθειεν ἄστυ. διὸ καὶ τοὺς πυρέττουσιν ἐνίοτε φαίνεται
 ζῶα ἐν τοῖς τοίχοις ἀπὸ μικρᾶς ὁμοιότητος τῶν γρομμῶν
 συντιθεμένων. καὶ ταῦτ' ἐνίοτε συνεπιτείνει τοῖς πάθειεν οὐ-
 τως, ὥστε, εἰ μὲν μὴ σφόδρα κάμωσι, μὴ λαθεῖναι ὅτι
 15 ψεύδος, εἰ δὲ μετρίον ἢ τὸ πάθος, καὶ κινεῖσθαι πρὸς
 αὐτὰ.

αἴτιον δὲ τοῦ συμβαίνειν ταῦτα τὸ μὴ κατὰ τὴν αὐ-
 τὴν δύναμιν κρῖναι τὸ τε κύριον καὶ ὃ τὰ φαινόμενα
 γίνεσθαι. τοῦτο δὲ σημεῖον ὅτι φαίνεται μὲν ὁ ἥλιος πο-
 διστος, ἀντιφθῆσθαι δὲ πολλᾶκις ἔτερον τι πρὸς τὴν φαντα-
 20 σίαν. καὶ τῆ ἐπαλάξσει τῶν δακτύλων τὸ ἐν δύο φαίνε-
 ται, ἀλλ' ὅμως οὐ φαίνεται δύο. κυριώτερα γὰρ τῆς ἀφῆς
 ἢ ὄψις. εἰ δ' ἦν ἡ ἀφῆ μόνη, εἰς ἐκρίνομεν τὸ ἐν δύο.

τοῦ
 δὲ διεψεῦσθαι αἴτιον ὅτι οὐ μόνον τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ κινουμένου
 φαίνεται ἀδήποτε, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς αἰσθήσεως κινουμένης αὐ-
 25 τῆς, εἰς ὥσπερ κινῆται ὥσπερ καὶ ὑμὸ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ.
 λέγω δ' ὅτι οἶον ἢ γῆ δοκεῖ τοῖς πλάουσι κινεῖσθαι κινουμένης
 τῆς ὄψεως ὑμ' ἀλλου.

'Εκ δὲ τούτων φανερὸν ὅτι οὐ μόνον ἐρηγορότων αἰ κί-
 νῆσεις αἰ ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσθημάτων γινόμεναι τῶν τε θύραθεν
 30 καὶ τῶν ἐκ τοῦ σώματος ἐνυπαρχουσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅταν γέ-
 νηται τὸ πάθος τοῦτο ὃ καλεῖται ὕπνος, καὶ μάλλον τότε
 φαίνονται. μεθ' ἡμέραν μὲν γὰρ ἐκκρούονται ἐνεργουῶν τῶν
 461a αἰσθήσεων καὶ τῆς διανοίας, καὶ ἀφανίζονται ὥσπερ παρὰ
 πᾶσι πῦρ ἐάσταν καὶ λῦται καὶ ἡδοναὶ μικραὶ παρὰ
 μεγάλας, παυσαμένων δὲ ἐπιπολάζει καὶ τὰ μικρὰ. ὡ-

23. Alternatively, reading κρῖναι τὸ κύριον καὶ τὰ φαινόμενα γί-
 νεσθαι (460b17-18), 'The reason why these things happen is that it is not on
 the basis of the same faculty that the ruling part judges and the appearances
 occur'. This avoids the implication of Ross's text that 'the part by which ap-
 pearances occur' makes a judgment.

24. The translation is based on Ross's text at 460b28-32, adopting Bywater's
 emendation ἐνυπαρχουσιν for the mss' ἐνυπαρχουσῶν or ὑπάρχουσιν.
 If ἐνυπαρχουσῶν is read, φαίνονται must be taken as main verb in the
 first half of the sentence (b28-30), αἰσθήσεων read instead of αἰσθημάτων
 in b29, and a comma placed after τότε in b31. The whole sentence will then
 mean: 'From this it is plain that the movements based upon perceptions,
 whether the latter are derived from external objects or from causes within the
 body, present themselves (φαίνονται) not only when persons are awake
 but also when this affection which is called sleep has come upon them, and
 more especially at that time'. However, for the reasons given by Ross (276-7)
 and Beare, ἐνυπαρχουσῶν should be rejected.

they are in those states. That is also why animals sometimes appear on
 the walls to people in a fever, from a slight resemblance in the com-
 bination of lines. Sometimes, also, those appearances correspond to
 their state in such a way that if they are not seriously ill, they are
 aware of the /illusion; whereas if their condition is more serious, they 15
 actually move themselves in accordance with the appearances.

35. 460b16-27. *Explanation of the conflict between appearance and
 judgment.*

460b16. The reason why these things happen is that the ruling part
 and that by which appearances (*phantasmata*) occur do not judge on
 the basis of the same faculty. 23 Proof of this is the fact that the sun
 appears only one foot across, and yet frequently something else con-
 tradicts the appearance (*phantasia*). / Again, by crossing of the 20
 fingers a single object appears as two, but even so we still deny that
 there are two things. For sight has more authority than touch. If touch
 stood alone, we should actually judge the single object to be two.

460b22. The reason for the illusion is that any kind of appearance may
 arise, not only when a sense-object is imparting the movement, but
 also when a sense is itself being moved, / provided it be moved just as 25
 it would be by the sense-object. I mean, for example, that to people
 sailing past, the land seems to be moving, when it is vision that is
 being moved by something else.

CHAPTER THREE

36. 460b28-461a8. *Perceptual movements, then, can affect not only
 waking people, but sleeping ones as well. Persisting movements are espe-
 cially manifest during sleep, because normal perception and thought are
 then suspended.*

460b28. From the above it is plain that the movements arising
 from sense-impressions, both those coming from outside / and 30
 those from within the body, are present not only when people
 are awake, but also whenever the affection called sleep comes
 upon them, and that they are especially apparent at that time. 24
 For in the day-time, while the / senses and the intellect are 461a

functioning, they are pushed aside or obscured, like a smaller
 fire next to a large one, or minor pains and pleasures next to big
 ones, though when the latter cease, even the minor ones come

κτωρ δὲ δι' ἀρχίαν τῶν κατὰ μέρος αἰσθήσεων καὶ ἀνο-
5 νουαίαι τοῦ ἐνεργεῖν, διὰ τὸ ἐκ τῶν ἔξω εἰς τὸ ἐντὸς γίνε-
σθαι τὴν τοῦ θερμοῦ παλίστροφον, ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς αἰσθή-
σεως καταφέρουται καὶ γίνονται φανεραὶ καθισταμένης τῆς
ταραχῆς.

δει δὲ ὑπολαβεῖν ὡσπερ τὰς μικρὰς δίνας τὰς
ἐν τοῖς ποταμοῖς γινόμενας, οὕτω τὴν κίνησιν ἐκαστην γίνε-
10 σθαι συνεχῶς, πολλὰκις μὲν ὁμοίως, πολλὰκις δὲ δια-
λυομένης εἰς ἄλλα σχήματα διὰ τὴν ἀντικρουσιν. διὸ καὶ
μετὰ τὴν τροφήν καὶ πάλιν νεοῖς οὔσιν, οἷον τοῖς παι-
δίοις, οὐ γίνονται ἐνύπνια· πολλὰ γὰρ ἡ κίνησις διὰ τὴν ἀπό-
15 τῆς τροφῆς θερμότητα. ὥστε καθάπερ ἐν ὑγρῷ, ἐὰν σφό-
δρα κινήσῃ, διεσπαιμένον δὲ πάλιν, ὥστε φαίνεσθαι ἀλλοίον
ἢ οὗ ἐστίν, ἠρημῆσαντος δὲ καθαρὰ καὶ φανερά, οὕτω καὶ
ἐν τῷ καθεύδειν τὰ φαντάσματα καὶ αἱ ὑπόλοιποι κινή-
σεις αἰ συμβαίνουσαι ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσθημάτων ὅτε μὲν ὑπὸ
20 μείζονος οὔσης τῆς εἰρημένης κινήσεως ἀφανίζονται πάλι-
παι, ὅτε δὲ τετραραγμέναι φαίνονται αἱ ὀψεις καὶ τερα-
τώδεις, καὶ οὐκ εἰρόμενα τὰ ἐνύπνια, οἷον τοῖς μελαγχολι-
κοῖς καὶ πυρέττοις καὶ οἰνωμένοις· πάντα γὰρ τὰ τοιαῦτα
τὰ πάθη πνευματώδη ὄντα πολλὰν ποιεῖ κίνησιν καὶ ταρα-
χὴν.

25 καθισταμένου δὲ καὶ διακρινομένου τοῦ αἵματος ἐν τοῖς
ἐναίμοις, σφλομένη τῶν αἰσθημάτων ἡ κίνησις ἀφ' ἐκαστου
τῶν αἰσθημάτων εἰρόμενά τε ποιεῖ τὰ ἐνύπνια, καὶ φαίνε-
σθαι τι καὶ δοκεῖν διὰ μὲν τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς ὀψεως καταφρό-
30 μίαια ὄσων, διὰ δὲ τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς ἀκοῆς ἀκούειν, ὁμοιοτρόπως·
δὲ καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθημάτων· τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἐκείθεν δο-
κῆσκυεσθαι τὴν κίνησιν πρὸς τὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ ἔγρηγορος δο-
461b κεί ὄσων καὶ ἀκούειν καὶ αἰσθῆσθαι, καὶ διὰ τὸ τὴν δψιν
ἐνιοτε κινεῖσθαι δοκεῖν, οὐ κινουμένην, ὄσων φανεύ, καὶ τῷ τὴν

25. 'So that the dreams are not coherent', 'Coherent' translates εἰρόμενα
(461a22), Drossart Lulofs' emendation (J20) *kai-kiv* for various ms readings
that do not give satisfactory sense here and in line 27 below. At *Rhet.* 1409a24-
34 Aristotle uses εἰρομένη λέξις for a 'continuous' form of discourse.
That kind of 'coherence' is somewhat remote from the sense required here,
but the notion of 'coherence' suits the context better than any alternative.
Keeping εἰρόμενα, the most plausible of the ms readings, we must translate
'the dreams are morbid' (Heit), 'the dreams are unhealthy' (Beare).

to the surface. By night, however, owing to the inactivity of the special
senses and their / inability to function, because of the reversed flow of
heat from the outer parts to the interior, they are carried inward to
the starting-point of perception, and become apparent as the distur-
bance subsides.

37. 461a8-25. *Remnants of perception may be obliterated or may appear during sleep in a distorted form.*

461a8. One must assume that like small eddies forming in rivers,
similarly each movement develops / continuously, often in a uniform
pattern, but often breaking up into different shapes because of
obstruction. That is why dreams do not occur after food or in the very
young, e.g. infants. For there is much movement because of the heat
generated from the food. Hence, just as in a liquid, if one / agitates it
violently, sometimes no image appears, whereas at other times one
does appear but so completely distorted as to appear different from
what it is like, and yet when the motion has ceased, the images are
clear and plain; so also during sleep, the appearances (*phantasmata*)
and residual movements deriving from sense-impressions are some-
times completely obscured by / the aforesaid movement, when it is too
great; but at other times the vision appears disturbed and grotesque,
so that the dreams are not coherent,²⁵ as with those who are
atrabilious, feverish, or intoxicated. For all such conditions, being
gaseous, produce much commotion and turbulence.

38. 461a25-b7. *Or sense-remnants may retain their original form, causing an appearance to occur, so that the sleeper thinks that he is perceiving something.*

461a25. When in sanguineous animals the blood has subsided and its
purer elements have separated off, the movement of sense-impres-
sions persisting from each of the sense-organs makes the dreams
coherent. Thus something is made to appear, and because of effects
carried inward from vision one judges that one is seeing, or because of
those from hearing, that one is hearing; and so on similarly / for those
from the other senses. For even when one is awake, it is because the
movement from those sources reaches the starting-point that one
judges / that one is seeing, hearing, or perceiving. And it is because
vision is sometimes judged to be moved, when it is not, that we say we
are seeing; and because touch reports two movements, that one object

ἀφὴν δύο κινήσεις εἰσαγγέλλειν τὸ ἐν δύο δοκεῖ. θάλας γὰρ τὸ ἀπ' ἐκείτης αἰσθήσεως φησὶν ἡ ἀρχὴ, ἐὰν μὴ ἔτερά κλυωτέρα ἀντιφῆ. φαίνεται μὲν οὖν πάντως, δοκεῖ δὲ οὐ πάντως τὸ φαίνεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἂν τὸ ἐπικρίνον κατέχηται ἢ μὴ κινῆται τὴν οἰκείαν κίνησιν.

ὅσοι δ' εἰρημεύου ὅτι ἀλλοιοῦται τὸ κινεῖσθαι τὰ αἰσθητήρια, οὕτως ὁ καθέσθαι διὰ τοῦ ὕπνου καὶ τὸ κινεῖσθαι, ὥστε τὸ μικρὸν ἔχον ὁμοιότητα φαίνεται ἐκείνο. ὅταν γὰρ καθέσθῃ, καρτίοντος τοῦ πλείοντος αἵματος ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν συγκαταρχοῦται αἰ ἐνοῦσαι κινήσεις, αἱ μὲν ὀνόματι αἱ δὲ ἐνεργεῖα. οὕτω δ' ἔχουσι ὥστε ἐν τῇ κινήσει τῆσι ἥδε ἐπιπολάσει ἐξ αὐτῶν ἡ κίνησις, ἂν δ' αὐτῇ θεωρῆθῃ, καὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλας δὴ ἔχουσι ὥστε οἱ μεταλαμπένοι βάρβαροι οἱ ἀνιόντες ἐν τῇ ὕδατι τηκομένου τοῦ ἀδύς-οὕτως εἴνεοι δυνάμει, ἀνεμύετον δὲ τοῦ καθύοντος ἐνεργούσιν, καὶ λυθόμενοι ἐν δαίλιῳ τῷ λαοτῷ αἵματι τῷ ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητήρισις κινουμένοι, ἔχουσαι ὁμοιότητα ὥστε τὰ ἐν τοῖς νέφθεσι, ἃ παραεικάζουσι ἀνθρώποις καὶ κενταύροις ταχέως μεταβάλλουσα. τούτων δὲ ἕκαστον ἔστιν, ὥστε εἰρηται, ὑπόλειμμα τοῦ ἐν τῇ ἐνεργεῖα αἰσθηματος· καὶ ἀπελθόντος τοῦ ἀληθοῦς ἐνεοῦ, καὶ ἀληθὲς εἰμῆν ὅτι τοιοῦτον οἶον Κοπίκος, ἀλλ' οὐ Κοπίκος. ὅτε δὲ ἦσθαι, οὐκ ἔλαβε Κοπίκος τὸ κύριον καὶ τὸ ἐπικρίνον, ἀλλὰ διὰ τοῦτο ἐκείνου Κοπίκου τὸν ἀληθινόν. ὃ δὴ καὶ αἰσθανόμενον λέγει τοῦτο, ἐὰν μὴ παντελῶς κατέχηται ὑπὸ τοῦ αἵματος, ὥστε αἰσθανόμενον τοῦτο κινεῖται ὑπὸ τῶν κινήσεων τῶν ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητήρισις, καὶ δοκεῖ τὸ ὅμοιον αὐτῷ εἶναι τὸ ἀληθές· καὶ τοῦ αὐτῆ τοῦ ὕπνου ἢ δυνάμεις ὥστε ποιεῖν τοῦτο λαμβάνειν.

26. There is much ms variation in 461b6-7. Ross's text and the present translation require *δοκεῖ* to be supplied again after *ἀλλ'*. Possibly in b6 we should omit πάντως (with¹) and ἀλλ' (with several mss), and then read *ἂν τὸ ἐπικρίνον μὴ κατέχηται καὶ κινῆται τὴν οἰκείαν κίνησιν*. This would give the overall sense: 'In every case, then, something appears, yet what appears is not judged real, if the judging part is not held in check and moves with its own proper movement'. With this reading, the proviso in the *ἂν* clause gives not the circumstances in which appearances are endorsed by judgment, but those in which they are contradicted. But with Ross's text the thought flows better from the previous sentence, where the proviso contained in the *ἂν* clause postulates *lack* of contradiction by a superior faculty.

27. Or, reading *ἐὰν τὶ κινήσῃ* at 461b13-14, 'They are so related that, if anything moves the blood, some one sensory movement will emerge from it' (Beare). This enables *ἐξ αὐτοῦ* to refer to the blood rather than to its movement or (Ross, 277) to the fact that it is traveling to the heart.

28. Helt gives (461b24): 'it is true to say that it is (for instance) like Coriscus'. But *οἶον* should be taken simply as correlative to *τοιοῦτον*, and not as meaning 'for instance'. Beare gives 'it is correct to say of it, that though not ac-

is judged to be two. For in general the starting-point affirms the report from each sense, provided that some other, / more authoritative one does not contradict it. In every case, then, something appears, yet what appears is not in every case judged to be real; it is, though, if the critical part is held in check or fails to move with its own proper movement.²⁶

39. 461b7-30. *During sleep judgment is disabled from exercising its function. Thus, a perceptual remnant bearing some resemblance to a sense-impression is mistaken for the real one.*

461b7. Now, just as we said that different people are prone to deception on account of different emotional states, so is the sleeping person on account of sleep, because his sense-organs are being moved and because of other circumstances / attending perception. Consequently, 10 what bears a slight resemblance to something appears to be that very thing. For whenever one is asleep, as most of the blood sinks down to the starting-point, the movements present within it—some potentially, but some actually—go down with it. They are so disposed that in any given movement of the blood, one movement will rise from it to the surface;²⁷ and if that one perishes, then / another will do so. In 15 fact, relative to one another, they are just like those artificial frogs that float upwards in water as the salt dissolves—just so, the movements are there potentially, but become activated as soon as what impedes them is removed. Upon being released, they move in the little blood remaining in the sense-organs, taking on a resemblance, as cloud-formations do, which / people liken now to men and now to centaurs as they change rapidly. Each of these, as has been said, is a remnant of the actual sense-impression, and is still present within, even when the real one has departed. Thus, it is true to say that it is like Coriscus, even though it is not Coriscus.²⁸ While one was perceiv- 25 ing, / one's ruling and judging part was saying not that the sense-impression is Coriscus, but because of that impression, that the actual person out there is Coriscus.²⁹ The part that says this while it is actually perceiving (unless it is completely held in check by the blood) is moved by the movements in the sense-organs, as if it were perceiv- 30 ing.³⁰ Consequently, what is like something is judged to be that very thing. And / the effect of sleep is sufficient to make this escape notice. 30

29, 30. See p. 98.

οὐν εἴ τινα λαθάνουσι ὑποβαλλόμενος ὁ δακτυλὸς τῷ ὀφθαλμῷ, οὐ μόνον φαίνεται ἀλλὰ καὶ δοῖται εἶναι δύο τὸ ἐν, ἐν δὲ μὴ λαθάνη, φαίνεται μὲν οὐ δοῖται δέ, οὗτω καὶ ἐν τοῖς ὕπνοις, ἐὰν μὲν αἰσθάνηται ὅτι καθεύδει, καὶ τοῦ πάθους ἐν τῇ αἰσθητικῇ τοῦ ὑπνωτικοῦ, φαίνεται μὲν, λέγει δέ τι ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ ὅτι φαίνεται μὲν Κορίσκος, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ ὁ Κορίσκος (πολλὰκις γὰρ καθεύδοντας λέγει τι ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ὅτι ἐνύπνιον τὸ φαίνόμενον). ἐὰν δὲ λαθάνη ὅτι καθεύδει, οὐδὲν ἀντιθῆσει τῇ φαντασίᾳ.

ὅτι δὲ ἀνηθῆ λέγομεν καὶ εἰσι κινήσεις φανταστικαὶ ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητικοῖς, δηλον, ἐὰν τις προσέχων περὶ αὐτῶν ἐπιθυμῶν καὶ πάσχων καταφερόμενός τε καὶ ἐπειρόμενος. εὐλιότε γὰρ τὰ φαίνόμενα εἰδῶτα καθεύδοντι φησάσει κινήσεις κινήσεις οὐσας ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητικοῖς, καὶ εὐλιότε τῶν νεωτέρων καὶ μέγαν διαβάλλουσιν, ἐὰν ἡ σφόδρος, φαίνεται εἰδῶτα πολλά κινούμενα, ὅτι ἐκκαλύπτεται πολλάκις φαντασίαι.

ἐκ δὲ τούτων ἀπάντων δεῖ συναλογισασθαι, ὅτι ἔστι τὸ ἐνύπνιον φαντασμα μὲν τι καὶ ἐν ὕπνῳ, τὰ γὰρ ἔστι λεχθέντα εἰδῶτα οὐκ ἔστιν ἐνύπνια, οὐδ' εἴ τι ἀλλο λεγόμενον τῶν αἰσθησέων φαίνεται. οὐδὲ τὸ ἐν ὕπνῳ φαντασμα πάν. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ εὐλιότε συμβαίνει καὶ αἰσθάνεσθαι πᾶσι καὶ ψόφῳ καὶ φῶτι καὶ χυμῷ καὶ ἀφῆσι, ἀσθενικῶς μάλιστα καὶ οἷον πόρρωθεν. ἦδη γὰρ ἐν τῇ καθ-

tually Koriskos, it is like Koriskos'. But it is not clear whether ἀλλ' οὐ Κορίσκος should be taken as part of the ὅτι clause, i.e. as part of what it is true to say, or as an independent main clause. Alternative translations would be: 'it is true to say that it is like Coriscus; nevertheless it is not Coriscus', or 'it is true to say that it is like Coriscus, but (it is) not (true to say) that it is Coriscus'.

29. At 461b25-26 'the actual person out there is Coriscus' requires taking ἐκεῖνον . . . τὸν ἀνηθύν together and Κορίσκου as complement. Similarly Beare: 'called the genuine person yonder Coriscus'. In the waking state it is the man himself, and not the mere sense-impression of him, that is identified as Coriscus. This is missed in Hett: 'the genuine Coriscus was that man yonder'.

30. It is unfortunate that the text of this crucial passage (461b26-29) is uncertain. Ross (278), whose text has been translated here, emends the relative pronoun in b26 to ἡ, and takes its antecedent as τοῦτο in b28, i.e. the faculty that makes the relevant perceptual judgments. Beare retains οὗ at b26, and takes it as object of αἰσθάνεμενον, referring back to τοῦτο in b25: 'this sensory impulse, which, when actually perceiving, it [the controlling faculty] so describes...'. Similarly Hett. The general sense required is well explained in Beare's notes ad loc., but it remains hard to understand how it is to be derived from the received text.

40. 461b30-462a8. Moreover, as with other illusions, the dream appearance is endorsed by judgment, unless the dreamer should be aware of being asleep.

461b30. Accordingly, just as for someone who was unaware of a finger being pressed beneath his eye, / a single object would not only appear two, but would actually be judged to be two, whereas for someone aware of it, it will appear but will not be judged to be two; so during periods of sleep: if someone perceives that he is asleep, i.e. that it is a sleeping state in which the perception is occurring, then there is an appearance, but something in him says / that it appears to be Coriscus, and yet Coriscus is not there. (For often something in the soul of a person asleep says that what is appearing is a dream). But if he is unaware that he is asleep, then nothing will contradict the appearance (phantasia).

41. 462a8-15. Experiences that some people have when falling asleep or waking up support the foregoing account.

462a8. That our account is true, and that there are apparitional movements (kinēseis phantastikāi) in the sense-organs, will be clear if one makes an effort / to remember how we are affected when dropping off to sleep or when waking up. For, when waking up, one will occasionally detect the images appearing while one was asleep as movements in the sense-organs. Indeed, to some youngsters, even when their eyes are wide open, if it is dark, moving images frequently appear, so that they often cover their heads / in fright.

42. 462a15-31. These, however, and other experiences during sleep, are not dreams proper. Conclusion: a dream, properly speaking, is an appearance resulting from perceptual remnants, that occurs during sleep and in virtue of being asleep.

462a15. From all of this one must conclude that a dream is a certain sort of appearance (phantasma), namely, one that occurs during sleep. For the images just mentioned are not dreams, nor is any other that may appear once the senses have been set free. Nor again is every appearance (phantasma) during sleep a dream. For, in the first place, some people have the experience of actually perceiving, / in a certain manner, sounds and light, flavor and touch, albeit faintly and as if from a distance. For it has been known for people with their eyes partly open during sleep to recognize, as soon as they wake up, that what

εὐδελν ὑποβλέποντες, ὁ ἥρεια ἔδρων φῶς τοῦ λύχνου καθ-
 εὐδοντες, ὡς ἄντο, ἐμεγέθυντες εὐδῶς ἐγνώρισαν τὸ τοῦ λύχνου
 ὄν, καὶ ἀκρυφῶν καὶ κυνῶ φωνῆν ἥρεια ἀκούοντες ἐγρε-
 25 θύντες σαφῶς ἐγνώρισαν. ἔνιοι δὲ καὶ ἀποκρίνονται ἐρωτῶ-
 μενοι· ἐνδέχεται γὰρ τοῦ ἐρηγορέναι καὶ καθεῦδεν ἀπαῶς
 θάτερον ὑπάρχοντος θάτερον πῆ ὑπάρχειν. ὅν οὐδὲν ἐνύπνιον
 φάρτον, οὐδ' ὅσαι δὴ ἐν τῷ ὑπνῷ γίνονται ἀληθεῖς ἐννοοιοι
 παρὰ τὰ φαντάσματα, ἀλλὰ τὸ φάντασμα τὸ ἀπὸ τῆς
 30 κινήσεως τῶν αἰσθημάτων, ὅταν ἐν τῷ καθεῦδεν ᾖ, ἢ καθ-
 εῦδεν, τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἐνύπνιον.

ἦδη δὲ τινα συμβέβηκεν μη-
 462b δὲν ἐνύπνιον ἐπακέναι κατὰ τὸν βίον, τοῖς δὲ πόρρω
 του προελθούσης τῆς ἡλικίας ἰδεῖν πρότερον μὴ ἐπαρ-
 κόσιν. τὸ δ' αἴτιον τοῦ μὴ γίνεσθαι παραπλήσιον φαί-
 5 νεται τῷ ἐπὶ τῶν παιδίων καὶ μετὰ τὴν τροφήν. ὅσοις
 γὰρ συνέστηκεν ἡ φύσις ὥστε πολλὰν ἀναθυμίασιν πρὸς
 τὸν ἀνατόμον ἀναδέρεσθαι, ἢ πάλιν καταφερομένη ποι-
 εῖ πλῆθος κινήσεως, εὐλόγως τοῦτοις οὐδὲν φαίνεται φάντασμα.
 προτούσης δὲ τῆς ἡλικίας οὐδὲν ἄστρον φανῆναι ἐνύπνιον.
 10 μετὰβολῆς γὰρ τίνος γενομένης ἢ καθ' ἡλικίαν ἢ κατὰ πάθος
 ἀναγκαῖον συμβῆναι τὴν ἐναυτίωσιν ταύτην.

31. A variant ms tradition at 462b1-7, followed by Heit, gives after 'who have not seen a single dream in the course of a life-time': 'such a condition is rare, but it occurs nonetheless. For some it persists throughout life, whereas for others dreams occur when they are far advanced in age and have never seen one before. One must suppose that the reason for the non-occurrence is somewhat akin to that which accounts for dreams not occurring to those who go to sleep after food, or to infants'. There are further minor variants from ὅσοις (line 5) onwards, but they do not affect the sense.

they saw dimly while asleep, as the light of a lamp (as they supposed) was indeed from the lamp. Or again, after faintly hearing the noise of cocks and dogs, / they recognized these clearly upon waking up. 25 Again, some people actually give answers when questioned. For in the case of waking and sleeping, when one of these states is present in the ordinary way, it is possible for the other to be present in a certain manner. None of those things should be called a dream. Nor should any true thoughts that may occur during sleep, over and above the appearances (*phantasmata*). Rather, it is an appearance (*phantasma*) that arises from the / movement of the sense-impressions, while one is in the sleeping state and in virtue of one's being asleep, that is the dream proper.

43. 462a31-b11. *Addendum regarding non-dreamers*

462a31. There have been cases of people who have not experienced / a single dream in the course of a life-time, or who have experienced / one when well advanced in years, without having done so before. 31 The reason for the non-occurrence appears / akin to that which operates in the case of infants and after food. Thus, it is intelligible that no appearance (*phantasma*) should appear to those so constituted by nature that much exhalation is carried up to the upper region, which produces an abundance of motion upon returning downward. As their age advances, however, it is not surprising that a dream should appear. / For when a certain change has developed, ac- 10 cording either to age or to condition, this reversal must necessarily take place.