Return-Path: <zealots-admin@shmoo.com>
Received: from MIT.EDU by po12.mit.edu (8.9.2/4.7) id QAA11512; Tue, 30 Jan 2001 16:01:14 -0500 (EST)
From: <zealots-admin@shmoo.com>
Received: from archimedes.shmoo.com by MIT.EDU with SMTP id AA10567; Tue, 30 Jan 01 15:59:43 EST
Received: from archimedes.shmoo.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by archimedes.shmoo.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id MAA83671; Tue, 30 Jan 2001 12:00:04 -0900 (AKST) (envelope-from zealots-admin@shmoo.com)
Date: Tue, 30 Jan 2001 12:00:04 -0900 (AKST)
Message-Id: <200101302100.MAA83671@archimedes.shmoo.com>
Subject: Zealots digest, Vol 1 #1 - 1 msg
Reply-To: zealots@shmoo.com
X-Mailer: Mailman v1.1
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
To: zealots@shmoo.com
Sender: zealots-admin@shmoo.com
Errors-To: zealots-admin@shmoo.com
X-Mailman-Version: 1.1
Precedence: bulk
List-Id: To discuss GAWD and the wireless universe <zealots.shmoo.com>
X-Beenthere: zealots@shmoo.com
X-Evolution: 00000073-0000


Send Zealots mailing list submissions to
	zealots@shmoo.com

To subscribe or unsubscribe via the web, visit
	http://www.shmoo.com/mailman/listinfo/zealots
or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to
	zealots-request@shmoo.com
You can reach the person managing the list at
	zealots-admin@shmoo.com

When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific than
"Re: Contents of Zealots digest..."


Today's Topics:

  1. Securing Wireless Access (Bruce Potter)

--__--__--

Message: 1
From: "Bruce Potter" <gdead@shmoo.com>
To: <zealots@shmoo.com>
Date: Mon, 29 Jan 2001 21:55:36 -0500
charset="iso-8859-1"
Subject: [Zealots] Securing Wireless Access

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1

Howdy,
The development of GAWD aimed to accomplish 2 purposes.  The first
was the obvious one of unifying information about access points all
over the planet so folks could be connected whereever they were.  The
second, slightly more philosophical goal was to raise awareness of
wireless security.

By gathering all these AP's together, I think a lot of us have
thought "if I enter my AP into the DB, how can I protect myself from
malicious activity that's off my premise but still in range?"  The
term "drive-by spamming" has become en vogue in the last few weeks...
it is a real threat, esp as more wireless communities develop and
DB's like GAWD get populated.

WEP is currenlty the standard for encryption on the wire (in the
802.11 world that is).  However, it doesn't scale very well.  Keys
must be rotated by hand, and even worse some hardware companies make
drivers that only support 1 key, not the standard 4. Also WEP has
come under theoretical attack recently, and rumor has it it's going
to be blown apart soon. So what are options besides WEP?  There are
serveral ways to view the need for security on a wireless LAN. 

- - Authentication: Verifying the entities who are on the LAN.. the AP
itself and the client trying to connect both need to authenticate. 
WEP does this via a shared secret, but a certificate based system
would scale better.

- - Authorization: The AP (ie: the device that's the egress point of
the wireless LAN into the rest of the network) needs to determine
what activities a client is authorized to do...  most systems allow
you to just have carte blanche, but some folks funnel their AP's
through a policy server that controls access.  WEP doesn't provide
any authorization.... Kerberos is about the oldest (and some say the
best) authorization protocol around.. something like it (or RADIUS)
might be a great thing for the wireless community

- - Data integrity: If I'm sitting next to 15 other ppl accessing the
same AP and being radiated with the same radio waves that I'm
intending only for the AP, I need a way to provide link level
encryption even if I don't have transport layer encryption. Sniffing
data on a wire requires direct physical access... sniffing a wireless
segment may simply require proximity.  So for data that I may trust
the wired world to protect without encryption I may still want link
level encryption for the first jump to prevent other coffe shop
patrons from knowing what stocks I'm looking at.  WEP provides 40,
64, or 128 bit encryption, but again, this is suspect.  Should link
level encryption even be an option?  or should vendors just say
"encrypt end to end, or you're screwed" (I doubt that would ever
happen.. vendors always went to give their customers a false sense of
security... but it sure would be a kick in the butt for the
industry).

Anyhoo, What do you all think?  How do you secure your AP's?

later

bruce

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: PGPfreeware 6.5.3 for non-commercial use <http://www.pgp.com>

iQA/AwUBOnYtATqMpaE/ej/cEQKLEwCdGokSJKPV5ON/nPfBI5He7DetnmAAnRgP
tlvz97H2yOJWI6adBgW4wNtB
=X8NP
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




--__--__--

_______________________________________________
Zealots mailing list
Zealots@shmoo.com
http://www.shmoo.com/mailman/listinfo/zealots


End of Zealots Digest
