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    fanl

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From: aldini@zeus.csr.unibo.it (Alessandro Aldini mat.1193)
Subject: Help about Kerberos (TGT request)
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 I read from "Firewalls and Internet Security" about the Kerberos 
 Authentication System :
 Kerberos principals may obtain tickets for services from a special server
 known as the Ticket Granting Server (TGS). 
 The client "speaks" to TGS with a private key and he obtains this key at
 session-start time from KDC (key distribution centre). The client 
 makes a request to the KDC to obtain this key (and other information for
 the TGS) and the KDC reply with an encrypted messagge; the key used for this
 messagge is 
 the client private key, so the KDC must know the private key of every user.
 The client key is derived from a noninvertible transform of the user's

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