Path: bloom-picayune.mit.edu!snorkelwacker.mit.edu!americast.com!americast.com!americast-post Newsgroups: americast.twt.news From: americast-post@AmeriCast.Com Organization: American Cybercasting Approved: americast-post@AmeriCast.com Subject: China covets neighbors' land Date: Mon, 9 Nov 92 14:59:57 EST Message-ID: \SE A;WORLD \SS (WS) \HD China covets neighbors' land \SH Expansionism inspires fear \BY Graham Hutchings \CR LONDON DAILY TELEGRAPH \DT BEIJING BEIJING - Once it was the Russian bear that stalked the East. Not anymore. While the bear can barely manage a whimper, the Chinese dragon is shaping up to roar. Evidence of China's expansionist ambitions comes with every map of the country published in the People's Republic. Not content with one of the world's longest land frontiers, China's cartographers provide a large boxed item in the corner of each map. It is an enormous dogleg described by an international maritime frontier, which seems to roll up on the shores of Vietnam, Borneo and the Philippines. Inside are scores of islets. Some of these tiny specks - the Paracels and the Spratlys (or the Xisha and Nansha islands, as they are known in Chinese) - are occupied by token military forces. Others are little more than barren coral reefs, and still others are regularly submerged by high tides. Most are believed to be rich in natural resources, however, and so China, Taiwan, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam are fighting over their jurisdiction, development and sovereignty. Until recently this did not matter. The need to counter the Soviet presence eroded ideological hostility between China and its neighbors. The ambitious claims of Beijing's cartographers could be dismissed as a conceit until 1974, when Chinese troops expelled a Vietnamese garrison from one of the islands. They did the same thing again six years ago, and the drive south has proceeded apace this year. A law on the sea, passed in February, specifically included the contested islands within China's territory. China signed a contract in May to allow an American oil firm to prospect in the area. China's own vessels, meanwhile, have been looking for oil in the Gulf of Tonkin, infringing on the narrow coastal waters of Vietnam, according to Hanoi. Diplomatic sweet talk from Beijing, plus calls for "joint cooperation" in the islands, have failed to calm fears in Southeast Asian capitals. By the end of the century, Chinese ambitions in the South China Sea are likely to be backed up by a blue-water navy. "China should not attempt to revive the Middle Kingdom mentality and expect tribute from Southeast Asia," B.A. Hamzah, an analyst at Malaysia's Institute of Strategic and International Studies, said recently. A quest for power has motivated Chinese statesmen since the early 19th century, when warships of the industrialized West arrived. Until 15 years ago the cause was frustrated by wars, revolutions and Mao Tse-tung's murderous pursuit of ideological purity. Today the obstacles to China's renaissance are disappearing fast. China's door has been open to the outside world for 14 years and, thanks to the recent 14th Party Congress, will be opened still wider. Beijing wants advanced technology and financial and managerial expertise, but not the West's cultural values. It wants the dollars, but not the democracy; the profits, but not the political pluralism. The Worker's Daily put it this way: "In order to win superiority over capitalism, socialism must boldly assimilate and adopt all the fruits of civilization created by human society." Shanghai's Liberation Daily went further: "Wage labor and exploitation exists in foreign firms, but such enterprises have to be managed by us. . . . We can learn management from them and gain profits from taxes. Meanwhile, power will remain in our hands." What is troubling about China's resurgence is not the method it is using to make itself strong, but the fact that the "core values" of Chinese civilization are being strengthened in the process. The idea that wealth and power should be tempered by tolerance and intellectual magnanimity toward those with different views appears novel in the Chinese mental universe. When such values are the servants of a powerful state, there is the danger that the Chinese reach may embrace much more than a score of remote islands in the South China Sea. This article is copyright 1992 The Washington Times. Redistribution to other sites is not permitted except by arrangement with American Cybercasting Corporation. For more information, send-email to usa@AmeriCast.COM