Path: bloom-picayune.mit.edu!snorkelwacker.mit.edu!americast.com!americast.com!americast-post Newsgroups: americast.wpost From: americast-post@AmeriCast.Com Organization: American Cybercasting Approved: americast-post@AmeriCast.com Subject: Selling High Tech to Iran= Date: Wed, 11 Nov 92 04:42:03 EST Message-ID: <28.1992Nov11.044204@AmeriCast.com> Selling High Tech to Iran= IF IRAQ HAD not had the bad judgment to invade Kuwait, it might well possess at least a rudimentary nuclear weapon by this time. After the Iraqi defeat, the rest of the world learned to its great dismay that Iraqi weapons development had gone much farther than almost anyone had thought possible. Now Iraq's neighbor and enemy Iran is giving every evidence of similarly pursuing the most dangerous and indiscriminate of weapons, nuclear and biolog- ical, as well as the missiles to deliver them. That presents a sort of intelligence test to the governments of the industrial countries with high technology to sell. Have they learned any- thing from their experience with Iraq? Iran won't be able to buy anything in the category of advanced technology from the United States. A few days before it adjourned last month, Congress enacted a broad prohibition. But that kind of ban isn't effective unless all countries join in enforcing it. In the case of Iraq, the United States was never wholehearted in its enforcement of the rules. It was trying to support Iraq in its war with Iran and, when the war ended in 1988, to use various benefits to bribe the Iraqis into more civilized conduct. When European companies sold Iraq goods of obvious military signifi- cance, as they did, the United States wasn't in a good position to complain because it wasn't being rigorous itself. In approaching Iran, the United States now confronts a familiar dilemma. If it tries to embargo a long list of all possible ex- ports relevant to high technology, other countries won't cooperate. It's wiser to work with a short list of items that everyone agrees are dangerous. That kind of international export control system is realistic and enforceable. It is not necessary - nor is it possible - to try to prevent the Iranians from buying civilian jet aircraft and airport equipment, or modern telecom- munications. The greatest difficulties always arise over what's known as dual-use items - equipment that can serve military as well as civilian purposes. The Iraqis were very imaginative in describing benign uses for gear that, on arrival in Iraq, vanished immedi- ately into the arms plants. It would not be a bad idea to begin setting precedents for inspection of dual-use exports, to ensure that they actually go where the export licenses promised they would. The key is to get international cooperation. A limited export control system that works well in practice, with worldwide sup- port, is entirely preferable to a perfect system that exists only in American law. 02:21 11-11C9999----- Copyright 1992, The Washington Post. This story is from the Washington Post's Capitol Edition On-Line and is not to be ar- chived or redistributed. For more information, send-email to American Cybercasting Cor- poration (usa@AmeriCast.COM)