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\title{Philosophy and Public Affairs, Paper \#8}
\author{Greg Hudson}
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Thesis: Thomson argues from the starting point that a fetus is a
person from the moment of conception not because she is conceding this
point but because she is arguing that the pro-choice position need not
rely on it.  Thus she uses what sounds like a concession to strengthen
the pro-choice position.
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In this essay, I will consider in what sense Thomson allows the
premise that the fetus is a person from the moment of conception, why
she does this, and why this strategy is interesting.

Thomson introduces her strategy by stating, ``It seems to me to be of
great interest to ask what happens if, for the sake of argument, we
allow the premise [that a fetus is a person from the moment of
conception].''\footnote{Judith Jarvis Thomson.  ``A Defense of
Abortion''.  {\em The Problem of Abortion}, 2nd. ed.  Ed. Joel
Feinberg.  Belmont: Wadsworth, 1984.  p. 174.} When Thomson uses the
phrase ``allow the premise,'' she does not mean that we actually agree
with the premise, but that we make the assumption for the moment and
see if this is enough to establish the pro-life case.  In fact,
Thomson herself disagrees with the premise: ``I think that the premise
is false, that the fetus is not a person from the moment of
conception.''\footnote{Thomson, pp. 173--174}

By allowing that a fetus is a person, and thus that it has a right not
to be unjustifiably killed, Thomson can probe the pro-life argument
for weaknesses beyond the issue of the status of the fetus, and
therefore defend abortion on different grounds than the status of the
fetus.  Allowing the premise is thus a philosophical strategy: Thomson
can argue that abortion is permissible regardless of the status of the
fetus, while at the same time not conceding anything about the status
of the fetus.

This strategy is very different from arguments over the status of the
fetus.  Traditionally, opponents of legal abortion have used the
argument that the fetus is a person, and thus has a right to life
which is violated by abortion, while supporters of legal abortion have
countered that the fetus is not a person and has no such right.
Thomson's argument does not rely on either conclusion.

Why does Thomson not stick with the debate over the status of the
fetus?  She clearly agrees with the pro-choice side of it, at least to
a point, and she raises a fairly serious objection against the
``slippery slope'' argument of abortion opponents: if a fetus must be
a person because a newborn infant is, then must not an acorn be an oak
tree by the same argument?\footnote{Thomson, p. 173}.  But while
rejecting the pro-life conclusion that a fetus is a person from the
moment of conception, she doesn't think that the status debate can be
a convincing defense of the permissibility of abortion: ``we shall
probably have to agree that the fetus has already become a human
person well before birth.''\footnote{Thomson, p. 173} By allowing that
the fetus may be be a person at the time of abortion, Thomson frees
her position from relying on what she sees as a shaky argument, while
at the same time not conceding that argument.

What Thomson really wants to contest is the step from ``a fetus is a
person'' to ``abortion is not permissible.''  She states that this
step ``is neither easy nor obvious,'' and that upon examination, ``we
shall feel inclined to reject it.''\footnote{Thomson, p. 174}.  She
thus prepares herself to argue that the status debate is not
conclusive for the pro-life side of the argument.

Thomson's position is interesting to all participants in the abortion
debate.  For opponents of legal abortion, the argument is a challenge;
for its supporters, the argument is an alternative defense of legal
abortion.  Finally, it gives a way for those who do believe that a
fetus is a person from the moment of conception to consistently
support legal abortion.

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