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\title{24.03 Paper on Moral Relativism}
\author{Matthew Gray}

\begin{document}
\maketitle

\section*{Introduction}

This paper will discuss various ways of analyzing, evaluating and defending that evaluation of the {\em moral} statement:
\par
\begin{newmargins}{.5in}{.5in}
\begin{singlespace}
{\C}:  Extraterrestrials (who are without the slightest concern for human
life and happiness) ought to avoid injuring humans.
\end{singlespace}
\end{newmargins}
\par

This will be discussed briefly in the non-relativistic frameworks of
nihilism and absolutism and the addressed from the perspective of
various cognitivist and non-cognitivist versions of relativism.
Specifically, the views of Stevenson (emotivism) and Harman will be
discussed.  Validity of their arguments and plausibility of their
premises for evaluation will be covered.  Additionally potential
objections and discussion of the appropriateness of relativistic
treatment of {\C} will be included.

\section*{Trivial Cases of Absolutism and Nihilism}

In order to best discuss how a relativist might analyze statement {\C}
it is useful to consider how the two other broad categories of
morality, absolutism and nihilism would consider it.  Both views
provide questions that must be considered when considering the
relativist view.

\par

An absolutist evaluation of {\C} would certainly claim that it has a
truth value, and in fact that truth value is completely independent of
the moral frameworks of the ET's, the person stating {\C} and any other
parties that one might invoke.  The statement is undeniably either
true or false to an absolutist.  As will be shown later, the various
relativists will take exception to various portions of this
evaluation.

\par

A nihilist evaluating the same statement would not only fail to
endorse its truth, but would explicitly also deny that it's opposite
is true.  In fact, the nihilist would claim that both statement {\C} and
any ``opposite'' moral judgment would both be false.  This claim would
also, incidentally, be independent of the moral frameworks of any of
the participants.  This view will most notably contrast with the next
view to be addressed, emotivism, which also essentially denies any moral
statement the ability to be true, but in a sharply different way.

\section*{Non-Cognitivist (Emotivist) Relativism}

In determining how a non-cognitivist relativist might interpret {\C}, it
is difficult to directly compare the non-cognitivist argument with any
of the varieties of cognitivist relativism, absolutism or nihilism.
This is because the non-cognitivists, in contrast to the other
approaches to moral evaluation, do not allow moral statements to have
truth values at all.  That is, a no-cognitivist would say that a moral
statement such as {\C} is no more true (or false) than the statement
``Climb the tree''.

\par

Considering this, it is possible to attempt to evaluate the meaning of
statement {\C} from a non-cognitivist standpoint, specifically the
emotivist, and even more specifically, from the standpoint of the
emotivist Stevenson.  Other varieties of non-cognitivism won't be
addressed, but most of the comments that apply to emotivism will apply
in some senses to other types of non-cognitivism, such as
prescriptivism.

\par

The basic interpretation emotivists have for moral statements is that a
statement such as ``{\X} is wrong'' should really be taken to mean
``Boo! to {\X}''.  Clearly, this translation has no truth value.
Using this rule, an emotivist might claim {\C} is best interpreted as
``Boo! to ETs injuring humans'', which seems a perfectly sensical, but
non-truth-valued sentence.

\par

Stevenson offers a slightly different angle on emotivism, generically
translating ``{\X} is good'' to ``{\X} is {\em considered} good''.
By this system, {\C} would become something like ``ETs injuring humans is
considered bad''.  By using this alternative emotivist interpretation,
Stevenson intends to apply any and all of the cognitivist relativist
arguments to non-cognitivism.  That is if all instances in cognitivist
relativism that refer to something as ``good'' are changed to
``considered good'', it yields Stevenson's emotivism.  Some potential
problems with this are discussed later.

\section*{Appraiser and Agent Relativism}

On the cognitivist side, there are two immediately and obviously
contrasting approaches.  These are appraiser and agent relativism.
Each essentially defines in which moral framework a moral statement
should be evaluated to determine its truth.

\subsection*{Pure Agent Relativism}

The agent relativist alleges that if {\A} states ``{\B} ought to do {\Y}'',
then {\A} speaks truly if and only if {\B} should do {\Y} in the context of
{\B}'s moral framework.  In this case, {\C} would be a false statement
because in the moral framework of the extraterrestrials, harming
humans is irrelevant.

\subsection*{Pure Appraiser Relativism}

Appraiser relativism switches the relevant moral framework to that of
the person making the statement.  That is, if once again {\A} states ``{\B}
ought to do {\Y}'', then {\A} speaks truly if and only if {\B} ought to do {\Y}
in the context of {\A}'s moral framework.  In this case, statement {\C}
would be true, assuming the author of the statement (the appraiser)
believes {\C}.

\subsection*{Hybrid View: Harman}

Harman sees an inconsistency in either of these pure approaches.
Harman claims that a person {\A} stating that ``{\B} ought to do {\Y}'' is not
completely sensical even if {\A}  believes {\B} should do {\Y}, if {\A}
knows that {\B} has {\em no} reason to do {\Y}.  Equally, he claims that it is
odd for {\A} to make the same statement if {\A} does not believe that {\B}
ought to do {\Y}, even if {\A} knows that {\B} {\em does} have moral reason
to do {\Y}.  This seems to be reason for throwing out both appraiser and
agent relativism, but Harman holds onto them both and finds a hybrid.

\par

Harman merges these by asserting that when {\A} says ``{\B} ought to do
{\Y}'' then {\A} speaks truly if and only if the agent {\B} has reasons
to do {\Y} {\em and} that the appraiser, {\A} in some senses endorses
those reasons, and that even the person to whom the statement is being
made endorses those reasons as well.\footnote{Harman does make it clear
that this sort of rewriting only applies to what he calls ``Inner
Judgments'', and not to all moral statements.  This class of moral
statement does, however, include statements of the type used
throughout this paper}  Essentially Harman seems to claim that a
moral statement is true if and only if it is true under both an
appraiser relativist view {\em and} an agent relativist view, as well
as being shared due to endorsement of the reasons behind the action.

\par

Harman would say that statement {\C} is odd, if not outright
nonsensical.  His reasons for this are that the individual making the
statement (presumably a human who doesn't want to be injured by an
ET), and the agent of the statement (the ET) do not share a common
moral framework surrounding the issue of whether one ought or ought
not to injure humans.

\section*{Validity of Arguments}

Now that we have established how the various relativists would analyze
such a statement, it becomes reasonable to ask whether their analysis
is plausible.  From there it becomes possible to consider amending
these treatments of moral statements to remedy the problems that are
found.

\subsection*{Stevenson}

In considering the non-cognitivist point of view, specifically
Stevenson's emotivism, it initially seems reasonable to claim that
when a person utters statement {\C} they are not in fact making a
relativist moral statement, but in fact stating the ET's injuring
humans is not {\em approved of} by them.  This interpretation, however
becomes a bit peculiar when one admits that there might be someone who
disagrees with {\C}.  That is, it is unlikely that the objector
actually disagrees whether they approve or {\em consider good} of the
ET's actions, but yet they disagree.  This would seem to make normal
arguments over moral issues such as {\C} non-sensical at a minimum.
While it may be possible to redefine the exact nature of arguments and
the like to yield a self-consistent philosophy, it seems unnatural.

\subsection*{Harman}

Harman's interpretation seems to hold more true to the form of
interpretation that a rational and consistent relativist might have.
Certainly, there is still the issue of disagreements simply being due
to the differing moral frameworks of the individuals making the moral
statement.  This might reduce simply to appraiser relativism, but
Harman at least partially saves himself by adding that the appraiser
must only endorse the reasons for which the agent is performing the
action.  This, then, reduces to agent relativism for cases where the
appraiser endorses the agents reasons.  So, in fact disagreements over
moral statements are in fact disagreements over endorsement of the
reasons for doing an action.  This seems consistent with arguing
behaviors.

\par

Lyons levels an objection against Harman that perhaps Harman's
allegation that statement \C is peculiar is not due the the reasons
Harman attributes it to.  Lyons argues that perhaps the peculiarity
perceived in statement \C is not due to a failure of the appraiser and
the ET to share common reasons for not injuring humans, but for
convictions about the futility of trying to alter the opinion of
someone who is likely uninfluencable, or some other equally plausible
source.  While it is possible in some cases that this is the case, it
seems essentially equally reasonable to allow Harman's point and have
Lyons' objections be meta-issues.  That is, if a person, in fact,
considers {\C} peculiar because they do not believe there is a point
in trying to convince the ETs otherwise, perhaps the real issue is
whether one should try to convince the ETs otherwise, in which case
the argument is now about a separate moral issue ``One ought not try
to convince someone of something under futile conditions''.  This
judgment can then be analyzed in Harman's manner without loss of
consistency.  This semantic acrobatics could be taken to be a
flaw in the structure of Harman's thesis, or it could merely be
necessary due to its subtlety.

\par

Harman's argument has another possible weakness however.  Consider a modified version of {\C}:

\begin{newmargins}{.5in}{.5in}
\begin{singlespace}
${\C}_2$: Extraterrestrials (who are without the slightest concern for
human life and happiness, but who will experience great pain should
they injure a human) ought to avoid injuring humans.
\end{singlespace}
\end{newmargins}

Given ${\C}_2$, Harman's argument would seem to say that this is odd
as well.  This is because if it is stated by a human (who believes
human life is precious and we should therefore avoid injuring humans)
{\A}, then the ETs in fact have reason to avoid injuring humans, but
their {\em reasons} for doing so are by {\em no} means endorsed by the
human {\A}, despite their {\em actions} being endorsed.  The claim
that ${\C}_2$ seems odd, seems odd.  Given ETs who have reasons not to
injure humans (save their own pain), and a human ({\A}) who doesn't
want humans to suffer (because life is precious), it seems perfectly
natural for {\A} to claim that the ETs ought to avoid injuring humans,
despite their differing {\em reasons}.  By Harman's thesis, this is
equally odd as the original version of {\C}.  It seems Harman's merger
of appraiser and agent relativism needs to be done more carefully.
Certainly in both cases is seems natural to consider the moral
framework of the utterer of {\C} or ${\C}_2$, and certainly in both
cases the moral framework of the ETs comes into play.  It would also
seem odd, though, to only require that their moral frameworks dictate
an identical course of action, as that seems to divorce the issue from
the moral and make it a wholly practical discussion.

\section*{Conclusion}

The non-cognitivist view apparently has some fundamental flaws, which
may be fixable, but in any case seem to go against the normal sense of
how a moral relativist might evaluate moral judgments.

\par

Harman's approach gains much consistency, but it is unclear whether it
correctly attributes the cause of the apparent peculiarity of a
statement like {\C}.  It does seem reasonable though to carefully mend
his argument to solve this issue.  Further, there may be some
conditions where the endorsement of the agent's reasons by the
appraiser is not necessary, but this opens up another entire set of
discussions.

\par

Overall, Harman's approach seems to be fairly complete and practical,
though may have some subtle holes and some oversimplification.  The
non-cognitivist approach, however, is much more fundamentally flawed.


\end{document}

