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\title{24.03 Paper on Rationalist Approaches}
\author{Matthew Gray}

\begin{document}
\maketitle

\section*{Introduction}

In both anthropology and philosophy is a meaningful question to ask
how one defines rationality, and given that, how one can identify
rational beliefs.  It seems clear that in some cases, individuals who
seem irrational at first will, upon closer examination, turn out to be
quite rational beings.  How is it that one can explain the initial
perception of irrationality however?  If apparent irrationality is
explainable such that it is in fact rational, does rationality
maintain any meaning?

\par

Dan Sperber discusses a number of explanations for what might be
percieved as irrational behavior.  Each of these will be described and
discussed and examined as to how they might be applied in
anthropological cases, such as the Azande beliefs about Witchcraft.
Alternative explanations and views of rationality will be discussed as
well.

\par

\section*{Rationalizing the Irrational}

Sperber discusses a number of approaches to rationalizing apparently
irrational beliefs.  First are the cases of Intellectualism and
Symbolism, which are relatively straightforward.  Sperber goes on to
propose a more complex Relativist approach.  Finally Sperber proposes
a Rationalist approach which is likely the most subtle and complex of
the explanations.

\subsection*{Intellectualism}

The Intellectualist approach is relatively straightforward.  Its
essential allegation is that an individual may have an erroenous, but
rational, belief.  To another individual who recognizes the belief as
erroneous, the belief in this obviously false belief (to them) seems
irrational.

\par

This explanation, though simple, is fairly potent at explaining away
large amounts of apparently irrational belief.  The typical example of
how this works is the case of the belief that the Earth is flat.
Certainly, with the limited amount of information that many people
throughout history have had, this is a reasonable, and wholly {\bf
rational} belief.  If these beings had all the information, they would
clearly see that the Earth was, in fact, round.

\par

Sperber discounts this approach as particularly useful by citing cases
where cultures would fabricate complex systems which he alleges only
complicate the nature of the world, and are therefore not
``rational'', at least as one can reasonably explain with the
Intellectualist approach.

\subsection*{Symbolism}

The Symbolist approach is also quite simple, but only seems to explain
a very particular type of percieved rationality.  Essentially the
symbolist view claims that apparently irrational behavior is
explainable as not in fact the literal, irrational belief that it
seems to be, but instead is a metaphorical belief that is not nearly
so irrational when properly interpreted.

\par

Sperber points out that this explanation is only usable in a very
limited number of sitations.  Attempts have been made to use this
explanation in a more general sense, but typically are not terribly
useful.

\subsection*{Relativism}

Sperber then arrives at a relativistic approach in which he claims
that ``fundamental concepts ... are culturally determined''.  As a
result of this it seems that much apparent irrationality is in fact a
catastrophic failure of translation.

\par

That is, when someone seems to be stating something irrational, they
are in fact stating something so radically different from what you
interpreted them to be saying, that it is not irrational.  This
approach, like many forms of extreme relativism, has the problem of
almost eliminating the possibility of something being identifiable as
irrational.  If there is a regular and expected catastrophic failure
of translation, it is very difficult to label any beliefs as
irrational with any degree of certainty.

\subsection*{Rationalism}

Sperber further proposes a view he calls Rationalism which relies on a
distinction between believing that a {\em statement} is true, and
believing that the semantic content of that statment is true.  Sperber
calls the former case ``representational beliefs'' and goes on to say
that a seemingly irrational being or culture could in fact be holding
wholly rational representational beliefs.

\par

This experiences some of the same problems as the Relativist view, in
that it obviate the need for a concept of rationality at all.  If a
set of beliefs that are irrational based on their semantic value but
can be considered rational if the beliefs are in fact only the
``representational'' beliefs in the statements themselves, then it
becomes difficult to identify anything as genuinely irrational.

\par

Sperber does however admit that there can be certain beliefs which are
not ``representational'' and are ``factual''.  The only distinction he
provides is that a ``factual belief'' is one where there is
``awareness of (what to the subject is) a fact''.  This seems to say
that if the subject believes that his beliefs are facts then they are
not representational.  This seems a weak distinction.

\par

Without a objective way of identifying a belief as either factual or
representational, the approach seems to fall apart.  Either some
representations are {\em a priori} propositional representations
representing factual beliefs, or it becomes necassary to ask what
somebody believes about their beliefs in order to determine whether
any given belief is factual or representational.  This circle repeats
and makes the entire line of reasoning implausible.


\par

On the other hand, it would seem to be consistent the deny the
existence of {\em any} factual beliefs (though Sperber would certainly
not do this), and claim that all beliefs are complex representational
beliefs.

\section*{An Anthropological Case: The Azande}

In looking at a case like the Azande belief in witchcraft, one needs
to identify the reasons why it seemed irrational in the first place.
With the Azande, they held beliefs that were counter to much of the
evidence they had, and it became necessary to make their beliefs more
complex in order for it to continue to be consistent.  An observer
might claim that the fact that the Azande persist in believing in
witchcraft, despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary, is
irrational.

\par

Of the approaches to explaining apparently irrational behavior
discussed above, the Intellectualist approach seems best suited for
the case of the Azande.  Their beliefs in the existence of witches do
seem quite rational, they simply happen to be in error.

\par

It seems clear that the Symbolist approach does not apply in this
case, and the Relativist approach seems wrong as well.  While it is
possible that there is extreme mistranslation of concepts going on in
communication with the Azande, it genuinely appears that fairly
coherent and accurate communication is going on.

\par

The Rationalist approach does not seem to work well in this case
either, as the Azande would certainly (to them) believe that their
beliefs about witches are factual, and not at all committed to any
particular representation.

\section*{Alternative Explanations and the Motiviation for Explanation}

Before trying to identify further explanations for explaining
apparently irrational behavior, it makes sense to determine the
motivation in doing so.  If the goal is to provide a sufficiently
holistic explanation such that ``irrationality'' is no longer a
meaningful concept, one might as well solve the problem at the
semantic level and explain away apparently irrational behavior by
defining irrationality as something which cannot be.  Therefore, if we
believe something is irrational, we are mistaken, and it is in fact
rational by some other explanation.  This previous argument is, of
course, an Intellectualist one.

\par

Perhaps the closest explanation to what people actually think, is to
take a modified version of the four approaches presented here.  In
addition to claiming that rationality requires consistency, it seems
that most poeple's definition of ``rationality'' also requires the
acceptance of certain {\em a priori} tenets.

\par

These basic, fundamental beliefs could be minimalistic (weak) or
extremely thorough (strong).  These {\em a priori} tenets could be
taken to be the ``factual beliefs'' described by Sperber.  Sperber,
however, does not want to admit any {\em a priori} truths by which to
judge rationality, so doing so would be a departure from Sperber's
Rationalism.

\par

Equally, the Relativist and Intellectualist approaches can be enhanced
by this added stipulation.  While a ``pure'' Intellectualist might
claim that someone could be rational (but mistaken) to deny their own
existence, for example.  Realistically though, this is likely an
indication of irrationality.  A Relativist gains in much the same way,
but must first admit that generally there is not total failure of
translation, but only partial failure.

\par

These ``weak'' and ``strong'' forms of rationality allow one to span
the entire spectrum of views on rationality.  ``Weak'' rationality in
its most extreme form, borders on defining away irrationality.
``Strong'' rationality, in its extreme form, nearly requires
rationality to be defined as ``those who think just like me''.
Clearly both of these extremes are poor, but most people would seem to
define it somewhere in between, providing a more useful meaning.

\section*{Conclusion}

Each of the proposed explanations for apparent irrationality runs into
some problems when taken to absurd cases.  Intellectualism seems the
most directly consistent, but Sperber is apparently dissatisfied with
it's ability to explain away certain cases of apparent irrationality.
Symbolism isn't terribly problematic, but isn't terribly applicable,
either.  Relativism is a case that works well, but in an extreme form,
denies the existance of irrationality.

\par

Sperber's Rationalism, particularly in combination with possibility of
requiring certain ``factual beliefs'', is powerful.  In Sperber's
formulation, however, the distinction between ``factual'' beliefs and
``representational'' beliefs is defined in terms of a groups beliefs
about their beliefs.  This yields problems for his argument.

\end{document}
