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\line{\hss Albert Dvornik}

\centerline{\lf Minds and Machines}
\centerline{\lf Problem Set 2}

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\problem 1
I do not find Turing Test to be a meaningful way of assessing whether
a machine can think.  Turing himself states that the purpose of the
test is to determine whether a machine {\it ``can be made to play
satisfactorily the part of A in the imitation game.''} Regardless of
whether the original question is (as Turing states) {\it ``too
meaningless to deserve discussion,''} I disagree with the claim that
the two are more or less interchangeable.

\problem 2
Turing would claim that the quirks in these machines weren't directly
relevant to the general question, ``Can machines think?''  The lack of
adequate performance from any particular machine does not eliminate
the possibility of thinking machines.  The question he asks is whether
{\it ``modifying this computer to have an \ul{adequate} storage,
suitably increasing its speed of action, and providing it with an
\ul{appropriate} programme''} [underlines are mine] would give
satisfactory performance.  If the programs had quirks, then they
aren't completely ``appropriate,'' but it's quite plausible that these
quirks could be fixed (which might or might not require some hardware
modifications).

\problem 3
The fundamental statement of the objection is that a thinking machine
wouldn't necessarily {\sl want} to pass the Turing Test.  This is
relevant to the `$\longrightarrow$' part of the claim.

The remark that a {\sl truly} intelligent machine wouldn't be
interested in taking the Turing Test in the first place is not
entirely a joke.  (For instance, as far as I know Turing himself never
took the Turing test; yet some of us believe he was intelligent.)  The
failure to fool a human being into believing that you are another
human being (when in fact you aren't) doesn't necessarily constitute a
lack of intelligence.  It only implies a lack of will or ability to
fool human beings.

\problem 4
Turing supports the behaviorist view that a machine is intelligent if
it acts intel\-li\-gently-- e.g. like a human.  For Turing, an {\it
``appropriately''} complex SUPERELIZA would be intelligent.
Therefore, for Turing this objection isn't an objection at all.  (I
believe that Turing's whole idea of what machine intelligence is is
just wrong.)

Another problem with Turing's Test emerges when we examine this
objection.  The results of the test clearly depend on the competence
and knowledge of the judge.  (This is also made clear in Shieber's
article on the actual administering of the Turing Test.)  Different
judges will judge the same pair of ``contestants'' differently.
Therefore, the Turing Test does end up being a statistical survey of
different judges after all.  (Turing says, {\it ``But this is
absurd.''})

Even worse, the judgement depends on the other ``contestant,'' too.
Suppose person A in the test is a sufficiently powerful computer
running the SUPERELIZA program (developed by the US Government).  Let
the person B be an Australian Aborigine with a bad knowledge of
English.  I'm sure that many Americans would choose person A, with
which they are more ``compatible'' (culturally), as the human.  {\it
(``He doesn't know what Coke is?  He speaks bad English?  He \ul{must}
be a machine...'')}

This objection is relevant to the `$\longleftarrow$' part of the
claim.

\problem 5
This is just a particular example of the problem related to question
4.  If the judge is not sufficiently competent to distinguish machines
from humans (for whatever reason), [s]he can be fooled.  That doesn't
say anything about the intelligence of the machine: it just means that
the cave society has a lower ``Turing Test intelligence threshold''
than, say, our society.

We could claim that the judge was ``unsuitable'' for the task.  In the
cave-society {\sl any} judge would be unsuitable for the task, at
least from the point of view of our society.  But then, it's
reasonable to expect that there is a level of sophistication of
machine contestants when our whole society becomes unsuitable for
judging.  It seems that, for each society, there would be a level of
sophistication (probably connected to a type of technology the members
society are unfamiliar with) at which a non-intelligent machine can
pass a Turing Test administered by anyone within the society. (They
might or might not be aware that the machine is not truly intelligent,
but it passes the Turing Test.)

This objection is relevant to the `$\longleftarrow$' part of the
claim.

\problem 6
Turing's Test is extremely vulnerable to both ``unwilling''
intelligent machines and cunning ``impostors.''  Therefore, the Turing
Test doesn't seem a very good method of determining whether a machine
is capable of thinking.

However, if I were to decide for myself whether I believe a given
machine is intelligent, the procedure I'd follow would be largely
based on deciding whether I found its behavior similar to that of
humans.  (It would be hard to use anything but observations of its
behavior in judging its thinking ability.)  Therefore, despite the
fact that I believe Turing Test is useless for determining whether a
machine is ``really'' intelligent, the procedure for determining my
{\sl perception} of something's intelligence is basically equivalent
to the Turing Test.

And despite everything, it is a nice thought experiment.  It made me
think about what I really consider ``thought'' and ``intelligence'' to
be.

 \end
