\magnification\magstep1
\baselineskip=1.5\baselineskip
\parskip=4pt plus 2pt minus 1pt

% \font\lf=pbkd at 20pt
\font\lf=cmr10 scaled\magstep4
\font\fnf=cmr7

\newbox\foobox

\def\problem#1{\vskip20pt\noindent\hbox to\parindent{\bf #1.\hss}}
\def\ul#1{\setbox\foobox=\hbox{#1}\lower.5pt\hbox to 0pt{\vrule height0pt
depth.6pt width\wd\foobox \hss}\copy\foobox}

\def\ititle#1{{\parindent=2\parindent\item{$\bullet$}\sl #1}
\par}

\def\fnote#1#2{{\baselineskip=8pt\footnote{$^{#1}$}{\fnf #2}}}

\line{\hss Albert Dvornik}

\centerline{\lf Minds and Machines}
\centerline{\lf Problem Set 9}

\vskip20pt

\problem 1
{\it Fodor.  Fodor's argument for language of thought.  Speeeeeeww.}

\problem 2 {\bf Discussion of Denett's arguments}

\ititle{the infinity problem}

Denett notes that the number of beliefs in the brain is {\it huge,\/} if it
has an upper bound at all; it certainly by far exceeds the brain storage
capacity.  That implies that there must be an internal ``librarian''
mechanism for generating the beliefs from a (relatively) small set of core
beliefs.  But if the core beliefs are expressed in a language form, then
(according to Denett) the ``librarian'' needs a memory storage to hold its
metalinguistic information and lookup tables in.

If that information is represented in a linguistic form by a library of
core data, Denett claims, then there has to be another librarian to deal
with expanding that core data, and so on {\it ad infinitum.\/} This is the
point where this scheme clearly breaks down.  Therefore, says Denett, there
has to be some level at which information is stored in a non-language form.

The most obvious attack at Denett's reasoning would be to notice that he
cleverly avoids\fnote{1} {Denett partially masks this and other holes by
excellent writing style.  I'm wondering what would have happened if he had
chosen writing as a profession...} explaining why a librarian's data needs
to be stored through another librarian, and not in a ``static'' belief
list.  But if that list contains information in a linguistic form, then
there is no reason particular reason not to merge this list with the
library of core beliefs.  (The fact that the two might have heterogenous
structures--- ie, a ``different language''--- does not present much of a
problem, since we can always insure the distinguishability of the two by
tagging types of data with different ``flags.'')

But a librarian cannont really operate on no internal metalinguistic and
lookup-table information.  It must inherently include some information in
its structure, if it is to perform such a job.  One can decide to {\it
ignore} that information--- after all, why wouldn't there be some deep-down
level of brain activity which we simply don't consider a part of the
thought process?--- but this is just overlooking the problem.  Therefore,
at {\it some} level, information is stored in a non-linguistic format.

This isn't really contradictory with the idea of language-like entities in
our heads, it just points out those entities cannot form the {\it sole}
basis for thought and belief processes; they still could be a combination
of linguistic and non-linguistic mechanisms.

\ititle{the ``brother in Cleveland'' problem}



\end
