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24.231  Ethics

Fall 2014

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Instructor: Kieran Setiya

Lecture:  MW11-12.30  (56-180)        

Information: 

Kieran Setiya office hour, 32-d916: R 11-12 or by appt.

Nilanjan Das office hours, 32-d927: T F 11-12.

Announcements

More Philosophy!

Course offerings for next term, if you are interested:

http://web.mit.edu/philosophy/undergraduate.html

Announced on 23 December 2014  10:04  a.m. by Kieran Setiya

Final Meeting

The plan for tomorrow is to have a slightly shorter session (I know you have finals and projects and a million other things), maybe an hour long. I'd like to get your thoughts on the place of philosophy at MIT, what topics you would like to see covered, what you hope to get out of your classes, and how they should be taught. Start thinking about this now and we'll see where the conversation goes.

Announced on 09 December 2014  4:10  p.m. by Kieran Setiya

Second Writing Workshop

If you didn't present your paper topic last Wednesday, you should be ready to do it tomorrow, for ~3 minutes, with 5-10 minutes for discussion.

Announced on 07 December 2014  7:37  p.m. by Kieran Setiya

First Writing Workshop

The plan for Wednesday is to talk about the final paper. If your name is on the list below, you should be ready to present a very brief outline of your topic and thesis, ~3 minutes total, after which we will have 5-10 minutes for brainstorming and discussion. Everyone else is scheduled for Monday, December 8.

Presenting on Wednesday: Doda, Maria, Virapat, Cory, Ka Yu, Jennifer.

Announced on 01 December 2014  2:08  p.m. by Kieran Setiya

Questions about Street

Street argues that, for normative realists, the accuracy of our normative beliefs would be an inexplicable coincidence; and that it is unreasonable to believe in such a coincidence unless one has reasons for belief that do not trivially beg the question, which the realist is said to lack.

Some topics to think about for tomorrow:

(1) Is there any way for normative realists to explain the accuracy of our beliefs without appeal to "morons"?

(2) When is it rational to believe that a brute coincidence has occurred? What sort of reasons do we need?

(3) What is the problem of self-refutation that worries Street in section 12, and is she able to avoid it?

Announced on 30 November 2014  11:49  a.m. by Kieran Setiya

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