1.208 Resilient Infrastructure Networks
Fall 2017
Instructor: Saurabh Amin
Lecture:
MW1-2.30 P.M.
(5-233)
Office hours: F3:30-4:30 P.M. [or by appointment]
(1-241)
Summary:
Game-theoretic models and network optimization methods for improving resilience of large-scale infrastructure networks against security and reliability failures. Network security games, interdiction models, strategic resource allocation and network design. Network equilibrium models, routing games, congestion pricing, and demand response. Cyber-physical security of control systems, fault and attack diagnostic tools, and resilient control. Design of operations management strategies for different reliability and security scenarios. Applications to transportation, logistics, electric-power, and water distribution networks.
Intended audience: The target audience consists of students studying engineering systems, information and decision systems, and operations research.
Overview: Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs) are being increasingly deployed in electricity, water, transportation, and other networks. Several crucial functionalities in these critical infrastructures require network monitoring and closed-loop control. These functionalities depend on the synergy of physical and computational components. In most cases, CPS also interact with the human decision makers. Recent incidents have demonstrated that malicious entities can disrupt or gain control of CPS by exploiting cyber insecurities or physical faults, or their combination. Such incidents can cause correlated failures, resulting in significant economic losses, and even loss of human lives. Since resiliency was not considered at the design stage of existing CPS, they continue to face new security risks, in addition to the traditional reliability concerns. To improve CPS resilience, we need diagnostic tools and control algorithms that ensure survivability in the face of both attacks and faults, and also include models of the incentives of human decision makers in the design process.
This is a research oriented course. We will cover key concepts in optimization models, game theory, and network economics, and study their applications to a class of problems in resilience of infrastructure systems. Students will learn how to: (i) model the attacker-defender interactions in infrastructures and assess their vulnerabilities; (ii) develop tools to detect and respond to both local and network-level failures; and (iii) study the incentives of infrastructure operators and users for improving the aggregate levels of public good (e.g., decongestion and security).
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