\documentstyle[11pt,doublespace,titlepage]{article}
\author{David Golombek}
\title{How the Japanese Are Taking Over the World\\
{\small(or why they seem to be)}}
\date{\today}
\begin{document}
\maketitle


\begin{quote}
Japan has won the computer chip race.\\
{\small (NYT:1)}
\end{quote}


Throughout the 1980's, it seemed that articles like this filled the
entirety of every magazine and newspaper you could find.  Pundits
speculated that US world dominance was coming to an end, and that
within a few years, the US would experience a sharp economic decline.
Anthropologists republished all their books concerning Japan, suddenly
finding a market for their previously unread books.  Management gurus
studied Japanese leaders, trying to figure out how they managed to
inspire such loyalty among their workforce.  Economic analysts
pondered how Japanese industries could output so much, when Japan had
so few resources available to it.  It's no mistake that the Japanese
did so well in the world economy they re-entered after World War 2.
There are definite qualities of their culture and society that have
facilitated their countries' rapid rise.

A knowledge of where Japan has come from is vital to an understanding
of where she is now.  The modern Japanese industrial nation was resurrected
after World War 2, after having been killed during that war.  After a
brief review of Japanese history since that point, this paper will
attempt to point out several traits of Japanese culture that have
contributed to the rapid rise of Japan in the world economy.

As the US Navy and Air Force progressed through the Pacific towards
Japan at the end of World War 2, they began a series of fire-bombing
missions over Japan.  Centered on all the major industrial centers of
Japan, especially Tokyo, Osaka, Nagoya, and Kobe, these bombing raids
were responsible for both the destruction of large portions of the
Japanese industrial base, and the deaths of over five hundred thousand
civilians (besides the over two million soldiers).  
When the two infamous American nuclear bombs hit Hiroshima and
Nagasaki, it was not the amount of damage that they caused as a total,
but simply that they were single bombs of such large size that caused
the psychological impact that they did.  Nine days after the first
atomic bomb was dropped, the Emporer formally announced his decision
to end the war.  The final piece treaty was signed on September 2,
1945. 

In an attempt to avoid repeating the history of Germany after World
War 1, the United States signed a peace treaty with Japan that
included a large amount of help rebuilding.  As the world had just
found out, Germany's economy had not recovered successfully after
World War 1, leading to high levels of unemployment and inflation,
which in turn allowed Hitler to sieze control by wielding this
discontent.  This time through, the United States decided to maintain
a high level of involvement in Japan's economy and military.  In
particular, the US sent economic advisors to Japan, and provided
complete military protection for Japan while prohibiting it from
building up it's own forces.  The official document listing these
goals stated them as
\begin{quotation}
{\small The ultimate objectives of the United States in regards to
Japan, to which policies in the initial period must conform, are:\\
(a) To insure that Japan will not again become a menace to the United
States or to the peace and security of the world.\\
(b) To bring about the eventual establishment of a peaceful and
reponsible government which will respect the rights of other states
and will supoort teh objectives of the United States as reflected in
the ideals and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.  The
United States desires that this government conform as closely as may
be to principles of democratic self-government but it is not the
reponsibility of the Allied Powers to impose upon Japan any form of
government not supported by the freely expressed will of the people.}
\end{quotation}

Following the war, Japanese industrial production (Hane:341) ``stood
at scarcely 10 percent of the normal prewar level.''  In addition,
Japan's agricultural sector had dropped by almost a third, fishing was
down fourty percent from normal, and all input from territories stopped
when they were returned to other nations per the peace treaty.  The
combination of these problems, and the lack of other reliable food
supplies caused a famine in many cities that lasted for over a year
until the US started shipping in food.  

For the next four years, very little improved in Japan, as
General MacArthur, acting for the US on behalf of the Far Eastern
Commission of the Allied Powers, worked on demobilizing the Japanese
military and repatriation of those displaced by the war.  As part of
the initial peace treaty, Japan was forced to pay reparations to those
countries it invaded during the war, amounting to almost half a
billion dollars before the policy was discontinued.  These
expenditures, when added to a country already trying to repair itself,
halted recovery efforts for several years.  Finally, in 1949, the
Japanese economy received a kickstart as the Korean War began, and the
US needed to conduct operations out of Japan.  By 1951, economic
activity exceeded it's levels prior to the war, and then began to
skyrocket at a rate of 9.3 percent per year from 1953 through 1960.  

Japan worked it's economic regrowth in the same ways that most
countries work their's the first time through, it just went through
several stages at a very accelerated pace.  First, the Japanese
rebuilt their textiles industry, but quickly found themselves in
competition with the Taiwanese and others.  Thus, they moved on to
low-technology, high volume fields such as steel production, and heavy
machinery.  With the teachings of Edward Deming on the subject of
production quality management and mass-production, the Japanese were
able to enter more technologically advanced fields.  By buying old
technology from American firms, and copying more recent advances,
Japanese manufacturers of automobiles, trucks, and tractors were able to
quickly move up to speed in quality production of these items.  

The role Edward Deming played in Japan has been strongly debated by
many scholars.  His arguments for quality control and productivity
were largely ignored in the US, but when he preached in Japan,
everyone listened, and followed.  Perhaps it was that the Japanese
were willing to him because he was an outsider, perhaps because he had
fancy sounding titles, perhaps just because they hadn't heard rumors
about the ideas he spread.  In any case, Toyota and several other
major Japanese firms listened to him very well, and instituted his
ideas in their production lines.  These companies bought the newest
they could afford in machinery, then designed products that, while not
on or even near the cutting edge of technology, were highly reliable.  

Although average wage for most workers started out far below the level
of the comparable American worker, and working conditions were often
far worse than those found in the US, these savings do not explain the
price competitiveness achieved by the Japanese.  Indeed, modern
Japanese wages and working conditions now match or exceed those in the
US, yes Japan maintains a large trade surplus.  Nor can
Japanese management's forceful surpression of labor unions (despite
their official legality) account for the corporate savings.  Although
many Japanese combines banned unions on their plants,
worker/management relationships were frequently good enough to make
unions unneccessary.  Japanese workers were more willing to sacrifice
their own welfare for the good of the company (and thus frequently
their own long term good), while American workers were more concerned
about themselves (and thus neglecting the long good of the company).

One field the resurgent Japanese economy did well in was
ship-building.  Experience during the war in building giant
battleships and aircraft carriers transferred well into commercial
applications, and Japanes firms eventually captured over 50\% of the
global market.  Automobile production also soared, capturing first the
Japanese markets, then other markets worldwide.  As more and more
revenue flowed in from these low tech industries, more capital was
available to put into higher tech industries, and soon combines were able build
modern high-tech factories in which to build cameras, vcr's, and
eventually the entire semiconductor industry.

The rate at which Japanese products captured foreign markets came as a
shock to analysts around the world.  A large part of this was due to
the quality of the products being imported.  Japanese
cars and trucks proved to be a welcome relief from shoddy
workmanship from existing manufacturers.  This poor crafstmanship in
the US was largely due to the post-war boom of the American economy,
in which civilians, after having been on rations for several years,
went out and bought everything they could, no matter what the quality.
However, once the boom subsided, and competitors to American
products were introduced into the market, the US public realized that
higher quality alternatives were available, and promptly 
them along as it surged upwards.

One of the factors that allowed the Japanese to achieve this rapid
growth were the Zaikai.  These, the successors to the semi-outlawed
Zaibatsu, took over as the collection of capital.  (Yanaga:38)
\begin{quote} ``These groups are of two kinds: those organized around
former Zaibatsu and are using the old names [...] and those held
together by large banks [...]''.  
\end{quote}
These groups are somewhere between monopolies and
conglomerations, neither being tightly ruled by a single group nor
merely sharing capital and research.  Instead, several horizontally
complementary companies work together to merge capital, production
facilities, distribution routes, and venture financing.  Combined with
generous government funding curteousy of the Ministry of International
Trade and Industry (MITI), this allowed Japanese Firms to move into
new fields rapidly, putting up lots of money up front, while
competitors needed to slowly accumulate the neccessary funding to move
in.  

According to the rules setup by the Allied Powers, Japan was not
allowed to maintain any sort of a military presence.  Although this
restriction was later lifted, and Japan created a self-defence group,
Japan has never spent more than one percent of its Gross National
Product on military, as compared to the up to fifteen percent spent by
other nations.  This was possible because the United States posted a
permanent force of troops in Japan, currently: (AP:Nov 15)
\begin{quote}
about 47,000 troops in Japan, about two-thirds of them on bases on 
Okinawa, an island about 1,000 miles southwest of Tokyo.
\end{quote} 
This savings adds up over time, and has allowed the government to
finance more industry related projects, which in turn produce more
capital.  

But reasons for Japanese success go beyond these purely economic
arguments.  There are cultrural and institutional reasons that helped
lead the recovery as well.  Japan has still not fully broken out of
the class heirarchy that was formally ended during Meiji Reformations.
Large segments of the workforce are still accustomed to hard work,
long hours, and low pay, as their ancestors encountered under the
class system.  Thus, when industrial facilities needed workers, they
had a large supply at hand.  Due to the highly successfull reform of
the educational system in Japan, the workers were even well educated.  Almost
most importantly, these workers were very compliant, as they had been
in the days when their class was maintained by strict social order.
Unlike the US, where Labor Unions were abound in every factory,
Japanese were slow to organize, and when they finally did, were never
the forces to be reckoned with that American unions were.  

Many of the books published during the 80's focused on Japanese
management as the primary reason for the rapid growth of their
respective industries.  These managers were quick to move to new
technology, more efficient designs, and radical innovations.  Part of
this stems from the leeway given to these managers.  Although they
themselves are held responsible for the final outcome of their
decisions, managers have relatively free reign over their departments,
when compared to US firmst tangled in red tape.  These managers are
also willing to look for the long run, ignoring small profits in the
short term if it means larger ones in the end.  This long-sightedness
may simply be attributed to their asian heritage, with history
stretching back a few thousand years, and corporations that have been
around for significant portions of that time.  This is compared to the
US, where corporate history may stretch back up to 150 years, but
certainly no more, and frequently far less.  

There is also the greater feeling of community in Japanese culture,
that leads employees to look towards the good of the whole over
personal good.  Thus, upper management often foregoes raises, that
their wages be distributed among other workers.  Contrast this to the
US, where it is every man for himself, and he who works the hardest
should earn the greatest reward.  This is again noted in bonus
distributions -- American firms are apt to short workers on bonus,
under the theory that they are replacable, while heavily compensating
the ``Brains'' of the operation.  Japanese firms are more likely to
grant employees positions for life, and evenly distribute bonuses to
all workers.  This of course is not true for all firms of either
nation, but is most likely to be true among the large firms in each.

Possibly the reason Edward Deming was so successful in Japan also has
to do with the fact that the Japanese have traditionally paid more
attention to detail.  As mentioned in (Hane:383) 
\begin{quote}
``These traits are revealed in the way that strawberry growers cover
each individual berry with protective tissue paper and the way that
apple farmers nurture and pamper every single fruit'' 
\end{quote}
This is very unlike the American tendency towards getting the job done
quickly, and not worrying about {\it how} the job was done.  By
introducing works of high quality in the world marketplace, the
Japanese were able to generate their own markets by showing consumers
what was really available to them.

However, Japanese culture cannot be said to be without fault.  Recent
studies have indicated that stress rates among Japanese males are
rising, probably due to increasing office hours with little activity.
Also, while Japanese undergraduate schools are rated among the best in
the world, graduate schools there are still not ranked well.  Thus,
Japanese students are frequently forced to move to other countries
(predominately the United States) to complete their schooling.
Several critics of Japan claim that this weakness is merely the first
place where the lack of individuality in Japan is showing up.
Although this claim is hard to prove, it appears to have some level of
credibility.  The level of social obediance traditionally enforced in
Japan is claimed to stifle creativity.  Critics go on to claim that
Japanese firms are forced to break copyrights and world patent law to steal
technology from other companies in order to compensate for lack of
creativity on part of their own scientists.

All of the previous claims are rather extreme, and certainly beyond
what can be proved.  However, several have their bases in reality.
Although the new generation of Japanese students is exhibiting large
amounts of individuality, previous generations have been far less so.
The high population level in Japan tends to reinforce repression of
emotions, which may be detrimental to mental health, according to some
psychologists.  

Obviously, there are both advantages and disadvantages to any culture
and living style.  However, as was shown, the Japanese have managed to
pull off an economic miracle, and no serious, nation threatening
problems have been found with their culture, putting it in an enviable
position, even when compared against America, the previous holder of
said position.  Times change, situations change, and we will all see
how Japan adapts to these changes, and if she remains on top.


\newpage
\begin{center}
{\LARGE BIBLIOGRAPHY}
\end{center}
\singlespace
The Associated Press NewsFeed, Wednesday November 15, 1995 \\

Halberstam, David.  ``The Reckoning'', New York, New York: Avon Books,
1986. \\

Hane, Mikiso.  ``Modern Japan: A Historical Survey'', Boulder,
Colorado: Westview Press, Inc., 1986.\\

Livingston, Jon.  Moore, Joe.  Oldfather, Felicia.  ``Postwar Japan:
1945 to the Present''.  New York, Newy Work: Pantheon Books, 1973.\\

The New York Times, June 6, 1985\\

Reischauer, Edwin.  ``The Japanese Today: Change and Continuity''.
London, England: Belknap Press, 1988.\\

Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. ``Basic Initial
Post-Surrender Directive,'' {\it Political 
Reorientation of Japan, Report of the Government Section}\\

Yanaga, Chitoshi. ``Big Business in Japanese Politics''.  New Haven,
Conn: Yale University Press, 1968.\\

\end{document}
