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{\LARGE Trials of Strength \\
and 
\medskip\medskip \\
Computer-Supported Cooperative Work:} 
\bigskip \\ 
{\Large A Look at NASA's Space Shuttle Program

\vspace*{1in}
6.036 Problem-Solving Paradigms

\vspace*{1.5in}
Juliet C. Bourne

\vspace*{.5in}
May 16, 1992}
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\section{Introduction} 

\begin{quotation}
\singlespace
``By the time the Shuttle was authorized in 1972, the urgency for
developing manned spaceflight that had characterized the Apollo era was
gone. The idea of going to Mars, which has seemed so appealing in the
euphoria of the early lunar landings, became irrelevant to a government
beset with social and racial tensions.'' (Lewis, p. viii)
\end{quotation}

In the 1960's when the attention of the public was on the ambitious
Apollo space program, NASA began planning for the next phase of the
space program. It envisioned a complete space transportation system that
would make it efficient to put people and equipment into space. This
"Space Transportation System" or STS would involve a low-orbit shuttle,
a space tug that would transport payloads from low-orbit to high-orbit,
and a space station in high-orbit from which missions to planets in the
solar system could be launched. NASA's dream of a complete space program
was met with stiff opposition from the United States Congress.
Overexposed to the ``space race'' hype of the Apollo program and
concerned with increasing racial tensions and social problems, the
American public was not interested in a new space program. Nor did they
think that their taxes should be spent on such a program. An increased
demand was made by the public for spending on social programs.

\begin{quotation}
\singlespace
\noindent ``A war-weary, inflation-scarred Congress, besieged by voluble
lobbyists and constituents clamoring on all sides for desperately need
at-home social reforms, quickly developed an almost knee-jerk negative
response to anything so costly and politically unpopular as an extensive
manned-space-flight program.'' (Grey, pp.64-65)
\end{quotation}

\noindent Thus, the Congress, reflecting public opinion, was very
reluctant to fund NASA's proposed Space Transportation System.

In order to get any funding for its space program, NASA had to endure
many trials in which it had to get support for the STS and convince the
Congress and others that the STS was worth putting money into. 

\begin{quotation}
\singlespace
\noindent ``[T]he bottom line in the late sixties turned out to be
political. The national euphoria following the July 1969 lunar landing
scarcely lasted through the summer. Although NASA had let its Phase A
study contracts on the space shuttle early in 1969, it soon became
evident to everyone that the battle for any major new space development
would be a tough one, especially after Nixon's space message of March
1970 confirmed the expected cutback in program scope.'' (Grey, p.63)
\end{quotation}

\noindent As a result of these trials, NASA's vision of the STS changed
to fit a compromise with Congress that would allow at least part of STS
to be developed. After Congress had approved funding for the greatly
stripped-down Space Transportation System, which now only consisted of
the low-orbit shuttle, the development of the shuttle began. This
development was beset by many delays and problems, caused by design and
coordination problems. The main problem was that of the main engine,
which was a greater technological challenge than had been originally
thought. (See Lewis and Grey.) The first launch of the first shuttle was
several years late and problems still plagued the Shuttle program
afterwards.

Understanding the trials and problems that surround the development of
science and technology is important if one wants to improve it. Bruno
Latour, a French sociologist, proposes several principles and methods
with which to examine science and technology while it is in the process
of development in his book {\em Science in Action}. The principles help
explain why ``technoscience'' develops the way it does.  (See Latour.)
Several of these can be applied to the example of the development of the
Space Shuttle program. However, the principles do have limitations and
cannot be taken as the complete truth about a particular situation.
Counterexamples for these same principles can be found in the
development of the Space Shuttle. Nevertheless, Latour's principles
provide a good framework for formalizing the development of some part of
science or technology. In the next section of this paper, a few of
Latour's principles will be applied to the development of the Space
Transportation System.

Once the way ``technoscience'' develops is understood, or at least
formalized, information technology can be used to help the development
of science and technology. A growing field of computer science, that of
technology for Computer-Supported Cooperative Work (CSCW), can take
advantage of this formalization of large human systems. Technology is
being developed which can help the development of other science and
technology since its purpose is to solve problems of effective
communication and collaborative design that arise in large human
systems. (See, for example, {\em CSCW '90: Proceedings of the Conference
on Computer-Supported Cooperative Work} published by the Association for
Computing Machinery.) Some of this technology would have been useful in
the development stage of the Space Shuttle, especially in the
development of the main engine which required, among other things, the
cooperative effort between groups at different locations. Had CSCW
technology been used in the Shuttle program, the numerous delays and
problems might not have occurred. Examples of how CSCW technology could
be used to improve the development of the Space Shuttle's Main Engine
will be explored in Section 3 of this paper.

\section{Trials of Strength}

The Space Transportation System proposed by NASA in the 1960's underwent
many trials of strength, involving the effort to get funding from
Congress. A major theme in Latour's book is that every development in
science and technology involves {\em trials of strength}. Any new theory
or innovation must endure many trials of strength in order to survive.
It may not survive these trials of strength, and so become unused. As a
simple example, Watson and Crick's discovery of the structure of DNA
involved many trials of strength, including the one in which they had to
convince other scientists such as Linus Pauling that the structure they
proposed was correct. If their theory had not survived these trials of
strength, it would not have be used as the structure for DNA and the
structure of DNA might still be unknown.

The full STS did not survive its trials of strength and only funding for
the Shuttle program was achieved. And in the course of development of
the Shuttle, more trials of strength arose before the first launch of
the Shuttle.  NASA's Shuttle program is still facing trials of strength
that it must survive in order to continue to exist.  And within these
trials of strength, principles from Latour help explain somewhat what is
going on and how it can be understood.

\subsection{Conflict}

One of the major hurdles that a scientist faces in the development of
any theory in science or piece of technology is that of gaining others'
support for this theory or piece of technology. Without the support of
others, a project will almost certainly fail when faced with conflicting
projects. Latour says, ``We need others to help us transform a claim
into a matter of fact. The first and easiest way to find people who will
immediately believe the statement, invest in the project, or buy the
prototype is to tailor the object in such a way that it caters to these
people's explicit interests.'' (Latour, 108) Latour then goes on to
describe different ``translations'' that take place when there are
conflicting individuals or groups. In figure 1, two of these
translations are shown. In each, the interests of a group or individual
are ``translated'' to be in apparent accord with the interests of
another individual or group. In this way, the interests into which other
interests translated gain support, since another group or individual now
shares those interests.

\begin{figure}
\center{\leavevmode{\epsfbox{trans.ps}}}
\caption{Translations of interests from Latour (Latour, p.110): The
actor A1 gains support by equating its interests with that of
organization A1; the actor A4 gains the support of the organization A3
by translating A3's interests into its own.}
\end{figure}

In the late 1960s, NASA began seeking support for its proposed Space
Transportation System. It entered into conflicts with Congress, the
American public, and other scientists in the aerospace community. As
mentioned before, the American public was more concerned with growing
social problems and were not interested in yet another manned space
program in the afterglow of the Apollo program. The Congress, reflecting
this attitude, was reluctant to allocate money for STS. Some scientists
in the aerospace community felt that more money should be spent on
unmanned space programs rather than a manned program like STS. Grey
describes the situation:

\begin{quotation}
\singlespace\noindent
``The brief glory of Apollo 11 had not changed the country's basic
concerns about Vietnam and mounting domestic problems. Liberal senators
and congressmen seeking more funds for desperately needed social
programs, space scientists who continued to stress the enormous
cost-effectiveness of unmanned missions compared to manned flights, and
even 'stay-ahead-of-the-Russians' advocates (who now realized that it
would be years before the USSR could overcome the US lead garnered by
Apollo) -- all jumped on the bandwagon to urge cuts in the space budget,
and almost unanimously (and quite properly) blasted the expenditure of
vast sums `just to go to Mars'.'' (Grey, pp.54-55)
\end{quotation}

\noindent Facing this opposition, the survival of NASA's STS project
depended on getting funding from Congress. In figure 2, NASA seeks and
gains support (funding) from a reluctant Congress for the initial
studies of the Space Transportation System.

\begin{figure}
\epsfbox{diag1.ps}
\caption{A project needs support to become a reality: NASA seeks
support, in terms of funding, for the STS from Congress through the
Office of Management and Budget.}
\end{figure}

However, trying to enroll others into supporting a project does not
always succeed. Despite such problems, projects still can move forward,
if a bit more slowly. Often, the support of only a few other individuals
or groups is necessary for a project to survive. Even strong opposition
from groups who would be expected to support a project does not always
kill that project completely. For example, when originally seeking
funding for its STS project, NASA sought the support of the Air Force.
However, the Air Force had a conflicting project in mind, namely it
wanted a space program more suited for military operations than the one
proposed by NASA: 

\begin{quotation}
\singlespace\noindent
``The Air Force position on the shuttle ... could be summed up quite
briefly: 'Who needs it?' ... NASA actively courted Air Force support,
but with little success. The Air Force was quite satisfied with its
current stable of launch vehicles -- unless, of course, NASA would be
willing to redesign the shuttle so that it would give the Air Force
better launch performance than could be obtained with expendable
rockets, perhaps?'' (Grey, p.67)
\end{quotation}

\noindent In addition, many scientists in the aerospace community felt
that money should be spent on an unmanned space program, rather than the
proposed manned STS. (See above quote from Grey.) In figure 3, NASA
seeks the Air Force's support to get funding for STS. The Air Force does
not give NASA its support and many space scientists actively oppose STS.
However, NASA still gets funding from Congress for the STS despite this
lack of support.

\begin{figure}
\center{\leavevmode{\epsfbox{diag2.ps}}}
\caption{A project can become reality without the support of others
involved in a trial of strength: NASA asks the Air Force for support
facing opposition in Congress and from scientists in the aerospace
community. The Air Force does not help NASA, but NASA still receives
funding for STS.}
\end{figure}

While the need to gain support from many others is important for the
survival of a project, it is by no means entirely necessary. Projects
can still forge ahead with a minimum of support and manage to survive.
Support for a project can be limited for a number of reasons which do
not necessarily reflect total opposition. When NASA asked for initial
funding of its STS program, the attention of the Congress was focused on
the demand for social programs and spending. But even though NASA
received little support from the Air Force or scientists in aerospace
community, NASA managed to get funding from Congress, however limited.

\subsection{Negotiations}

In one of his principles, Latour states: ``The more `science and
technology' have an esoteric content the further they extend outside.''
(Latour, pp.174-175) Scientists with very specialized projects seek
support from individuals and groups who may not have the specialized
knowledge to understand the projects. For example, NASA had to seek the
support of Congress in order to get funding for STS, even though many of
the technical aspects were beyond most of those in Congress.  An
extension of the above principle is that the further a project has to
extend outside of science and technology, the more likely it is that
negotiations over the shape and scope of the project will take place.
This happened when NASA approached Congress for STS funding.  Reluctant
to spend money on an expensive manned space program\footnote{``It became
known to the agency, in the way such things become known around
Washington (the administrator is usually given to understand by somebody
on the White House staff), that \$5.5 billion would be top dollar for
Shuttle development.'' (Lewis, p.27)}, Congress negotiated the structure
of STS and caused it to become focused on the Shuttle and its utility:

\begin{quotation}
\singlespace\noindent
``[The Shuttle's] role in a grand design for interplanetary travel was
summarily dropped, and its potential for developing space manufacturing
opportunities became an accompaniment to the main theme of its obvious
utility as a reusable space truck. ...  Although this perception of it
took some of the romance out of spaceflight, it succeeded in getting
development money out of Congress.'' (Lewis, p.27)
\end{quotation}

\begin{quotation}
\singlespace\noindent
``Under Senate pressure, NASA finally agreed that any manned-flight
program projections beyond the shuttle would be too expensive, and when
they realized that there was little chance of getting funds for both the
shuttle and the space station, they dropped the station from project
status, on the obvious grounds that there could be no space station
without a shuttle.'' (Grey, p.70)
\end{quotation}

\noindent In figure 4, NASA learns that the funding from Congress for the
development of the Shuttle will be much less than the amount needed for
the development of the fully-reusable Shuttle. 

\begin{quotation}
\singlespace\noindent
``The Shuttle's preliminary design was relatively well fixed as a fully
reusable, two-stage airplane-like system using a manned flyback booster
to carry a manned flyback orbiter. ... The new NASA administrator, James
Fletcher, who came on board in March 1971, was quick to realize that
Congress could in no way be convinced to spend the more than \$10
billion then estimated for development of the fully reusable shuttle.''
(Grey, p.71)
\end{quotation}

\noindent Thus, NASA changes the design of the Shuttle to decrease its
development cost to meet the expected funding.

\begin{figure}
\center{\leavevmode{\epsfbox{diag3.ps}}}
\caption{The more specialized a project is, the more it extends outside
of its domain and the more likely it is to be modified by those outside:
The structure of STS changes as NASA and Congress negotiate and NASA's
vision of a fully reusable shuttle does not survive, because of budget
constraints.}
\end{figure}

However, what is really being extended outside is not the science and
technology, but the need for resources and approval. Congress did not
negotiate the structure of the STS on technical grounds. Rather, it had
political reasons for changing STS: the American public wanted more
money to be spent on social programs\footnote{``Programs of high
technology in general were being challenged by the spread of a militant
humanism among young intellectuals and their campus followers, who
considered themselves the vanguard of an American cultural revolution.''
(Lewis, p. 25)}. Thus, it was not the science and technology behind the
STS that extended outside, but the need for monetary and political
approval.

\subsection{Compromises}

Another of Latour's principles states: ``The fate of facts and machines
is in later users' hands; their qualities are thus a consequence, not a
cause, of collective action.'' (Latour, 29) In a sense, the fate of the
concept of NASA's STS was determined by those such as Congress who
molded it to their own needs and ideas. Sometimes a trial of strength
ends in a compromise, where neither side is completely triumphant. In
this case, NASA had to compromise the original concept in order for any
part of STS to survive; STS was to become just a mostly reusable
shuttle:

\begin{quotation}
\singlespace\noindent
``The most appealing shuttle design ... was a winged flyback orbiter
based on the previous fully reusable concept, but now boosted into orbit
by large unmanned rockets that would be recovered and reused after
falling back into the sea. ... But to keep the orbiter small enough for
the projected cost reduction, it would necessary both to store its
propellants in a big external tank, which would be thrown away after
being emptied, and to run its engines right from the start, in parallel
with the booster rockets. This mostly reusable configuration (which
later developed into the space shuttle now flying) was dubbed TAOS --
Thrust-Assisted Orbiter System.''(Grey, p.77)
\end{quotation}

\begin{figure}
\center{\leavevmode{\epsfbox{diag8.ps}}}
\caption{The fate of facts and machines is in later users' hands: NASA's
original concept of the full STS and fully-reusable shuttle is
compromised to fit the limited funding offered by Congress.}
\end{figure}

\noindent In figure 5, the Shuttle is redesigned due to reluctance of
Congress to fund the fully-reusable design whose development cost would
be very high. 

However, the status of Congress as a ``later user'' of the STS proposal
is iffy at best, since it only dealt with the initial proposal of STS.
It might be more accurate to say that Congressional activity helped to
shape the fate of STS before it even became a reality. Thus, the fate of
facts and machines can be affected by ``collective action'' before
before being established as facts or machines. Therefore, instead of
seeing Congress as a ``later user'', Congress, as well as Congressional
activity, should be seen as an influence on the shape of STS before it
became a fact or machine. A modified version of Latour's principle might
read: ``The fate of facts and machines is in later users' hands, but the
shape of the facts and machines can be affected before they are
established as such.'' 

\subsection{The Fate of STS}

During the course of negotiations and compromises with Congress, NASA's
proposal of the Space Transportation System changed radically. ``The
system contemplated space stations in Earth and lunar orbits, orbital
transfer vehicles, and lunar and planet landers.'' (Lewis, p.viii) A key
point to this vision was the reusability of the Earth-to-orbit Shuttle,
as opposed to the one-shot rockets used in the past. However, as the
amount of funding Congress was willing to give to STS became known, NASA
began to re-structure STS, which now only consisted of the Shuttle:
``NASA faced the necessity of devising an engineering compromise that
would degrade the vehicle to one that was only partially reusable.''
(Lewis, p.28)

\begin{quotation}
\singlespace
``The transition of the Shuttle from a fully reusable, two-airplane
transport to a partly reusable, rocket-boosted airplane is essentially
the product of the budget constraints, which reflect priorities for
social welfare programs of the early 1970s.'' (Lewis, p.30)
\end{quotation}

\noindent Congress finally gave funding for this compromise: 

\begin{quotation}
\singlespace\noindent
``On January 5, 1972, President Nixon announced his decision to go ahead
with the compromise TAOS shuttle. ... Congress, in the FY 1973 budget
approval process, nailed down the lid on what NASA had agreed to: a first
orbital flight in 1979, at a total development cost of \$5.22 billion.''
(Grey, p.79)
\end{quotation}

\noindent Thus, development of the Shuttle began. It was marked by many
problems and delays, as NASA began to realize that the difficulty of
certain parts, such as the Shuttle's main engine, was far greater than
thought at first.

\section{Engine Problems and CSCW Technology}

\begin{quotation}
\singlespace
``Because NASA had not approached engine development with the expectation
that it would require the test-and-fix process that characterized
earlier rocket development, the agency seemed unprepared for the
problems that had been considered routine in the past.'' (Lewis, p.63)
\end{quotation}

The delays that the development of the Space Shuttle's main engine
(SSME) suffered were caused mainly by overconfidence on the part of NASA
and Rocketdyne (the main engine contractor) officials. An Ad Hoc
committee report on the causes of the numerous delays in the SSME
development mentioned as a contributing factor NASA's ``success-oriented
strategy.''  (Lewis, p.66) Another minor problem in the SSME development
was the testing program which was carried out from the beginning at two
separate sites.  Computer-Supported Cooperative Work (CSCW) technology
proposes methods for helping large projects like the development of the
Shuttle's main engine to run smoothly with fewer communication and
design problems. With the support of technology such as SYBIL and
ObjectLens, both examples of CSCW technology, the development of the
SSME might have fared much better by enabling engineers and officials to
work together efficiently to form the best development program for the
SSME.

\subsection{Group Decisions}

A major problem in the development of the SSME was that it was
originally a success-oriented program ``based on the assumption that
each piece of development hardware and its subsequent verification test
will succeed on the first attempt.'' (Lewis, p.66) Overconfidence on the
part of NASA and Rocketdyne officials, who expected the SSME to be a
slight advance over already successful rocket engines and who did not
realize that the SSME was a major advance, was the cause of this
success-oriented strategy. As a result, the test failures that come with
advanced rocket development caused many delays and cost overruns since
NASA and Rocketdyne were not prepared for such failures. 

\begin{figure}
\center{\leavevmode{\epsfbox{diag4.ps}}}
\caption{NASA and Rocketdyne decide to adopt a success-oriented strategy
for the development of the SSME. Unexpected test failures cause delays.}
\end{figure}

\begin{quotation}
\singlespace\noindent
``We got three major problems. One. Lack of money to begin with. Two.
Trying to do component development at the same time we're trying to do
full engine-up testing. Three. In all other programs where you had a new
component, you got it to a certain level of maturity before you put it
into the system. We didn't do that. I'm saying I don't know why.'' 
--SSME test engineer (Lewis, p.72)
\end{quotation}

\noindent Figure 6 shows how NASA and Rocketdyne's decision to follow a
success-oriented strategy led to numerous delays and shortages of parts
when unexpected failures of the SSME occurred. (See Lewis.)

The engineers at NASA and Rocketdyne realized the problems inherent in
the success-oriented strategy long before the normal fail-and-fix
strategy was finally adopted. (See Lewis.) If these engineers had been
able to voice their concerns and present arguments against the proposed
development strategy, a better strategy might have been developed,
taking into account both the budget restrictions (which was a driving
force behind the success-oriented strategy) and the major technological
advance the SSME represented (which was the reason that the
success-oriented strategy failed). Had NASA and Rocketdyne officials
talked to their engineers before going head-first into development, they
might have realized that the major technological advance that the SSME
represented and thus required a more conservative development program. A
system such as SYBIL might have been useful in allowing officials and
engineers come together and discuss the development strategy before it
was started.  SYBIL supports knowledge sharing and group decisions, and
one of the motivations behind SYBIL is described this way:

\begin{quotation}
\singlespace
``Decision making usually involves gathering and relating pieces of
knowledge relevant to evaluating alternatives along some criteria. Such
knowledge, once explicitly represented, can be shared by others in
several ways. In a group decision making, explicitly represented
knowledge allows people to augment the knowledge by bringing in
additional knowledge, supporting claims, denying claims, or
qualifications.'' (Lee, p.80)
\end{quotation}

\noindent With this system, the various problems and issues surrounding
the SSME could have been brought to light and could have changed the
development strategy used. (See figure 7.) Delays might have been
avoided, or more realistic schedules based on the development strategy
might have been used. Test failures could have been expected and used to
further the development more efficiently. All in all, the beginning of
the development, which was success-oriented, and the end, which was a
fail-and-fix strategy, could have been restructured into a unified and
more efficient development program.

\begin{figure}
\center{\leavevmode{\epsfbox{diag5.ps}}}
\caption{Engineers and officials confer using SYBIL before the
development of the SSME starts.}
\end{figure}

\subsection{Structured Conversations}

Once the SSME development was finally well into the fail-and-fix
strategy, two separate sites were engaged in main engine testing: Santa
Susana (a Rocketdyne-NASA test bed) and the National Space Technology
Laboratory (NSTL). Test failures at one site could (and did) cause
delays at the other site. For example, a test at NSTL was delayed
because of a failure at Santa Susana. NSTL engineers waited to find out
what had caused the failure. Had the failure at Santa Susana come any
later than it did, NSTL might not have postponed its test and the same
failure could have occurred. But as it happened, the failure at Santa
Susana came the day before NSTL's scheduled test. Thus, NSTL was able
to postpone the test, waiting for information about the failure. Once
Santa Susana determined the cause of the failure (a ruptured fuel line
in the ``steer horn''), ``the test crew at NSTL decided to inspect the
engines in the test stand for steer horn weaknesses.'' (Lewis, p.71) One
could easily imagine a situation in which a delay in communication
between these two sites, or even two groups working on the same stage of
development, would cause major problems. For example, a failure causing
serious damage to the engines at one site is not reported soon enough to
avoid the same failure at the other site. Also, a communication from one
site to the other which turns out to be important might be lost in the
shuffle caused by the urgency to complete testing\footnote{A grim
example which I did not explore is the apparent breakdown of
communication between engineers and their managers at Morton-Thiokol (the
contractor for the Solid Rocket Boosters) which led to the failure of
the O-rings and the explosion of the {\em Challenger}.}. Alternatively,
one can imagine how information about scheduled tests and known problems
could be shared between the two sites to coordinate the testing effort.

\begin{figure}
\center{\leavevmode{\epsfbox{diag6.ps}}}
\caption{Two separate test sites test engines: slow communication
between them, causing more delays.}
\end{figure}

What would have been useful in this situation was a better means of
communication between engineers at Santa Susana and NSTL. With a more
efficient and well-structured communication system, information and
knowledge could have been shared more freely and delays could have been
minimized.  Trying to determine the cause of some engine failure could
also be better achieved as a joint effort between the two sites, each
contributing its observations and opinions. A system such as ObjectLens,
in which ``users can represent information about people, tasks,
products, messages, and many other kinds of information in a format that
can be processed intelligently by both people and their computers,''
(Lai et al, p.332) could be used to keep track of various tests
scheduled, completed, or failed at each site. Engineers could have
access to information at both sites and could communicate efficiently
with other engineers about problems encountered, et cetera. Using such a
system, the fail-and-fix processes that went on at Santa Susana and NSTL
could have been integrated into a unified process that minimized delays
by having one centralized testing process that just happened to take
place at two separate sites.

\begin{figure}
\center{\leavevmode{\epsfbox{diag7.ps}}}
\caption{Engineers at two separate testing sites communicate and share
information via ObjectLens; delays are minimized.}
\end{figure}

\section{Conclusion}

Using tools such as those made available by CSCW technology and concepts
from sociologists such as Bruno Latour, large human systems in science
and technology can be examined and made more efficient. The initial
funding and development of the Space Transportation System (later just
the Shuttle) provides a good example of how such concepts and technology
can be applied. Trials of strength pervade the start and development of
any project; support for projects is sought so that projects can
survive. Negotiations and compromises shape the fate of projects. Once a
project is underway, tools for cooperative/collaborative work are useful
for organizing and coordinating the work of many individuals and groups.
Understanding the dynamics of large systems will allow better
technology to be developed to increase efficiency and communication
within these large systems.

\newpage
\thispagestyle{empty}
\section*{Bibliography}

\singlespace 
\hspace*{\parindent} Lai, Kum-Yew, Thomas W.  Malone, and Keh-Chiang Yu.
``ObjectLens: A `Spreadsheet' for Cooperative Work,'' ACM Transactions
on Office Information Systems, Vol. 6, No. 4, October 1988, pp. 332-353.
This paper describes the ObjectLens system which ``allows
unsophisticated computer users to create their own cooperative work
applications'' to help organize and coordinate individual as well as
group work. A system such as ObjectLens could be used in a large
development project such as the Space Shuttle Main Engine to coordinate
testing efforts at different sites.

\vspace*{0.5\baselineskip}
Latour, Bruno. {\em Science in Action}. Harvard University Press,
Cambridge, MA: 1987. In this book, Latour examines the making of facts
and machines in science and technology from a sociological viewpoint. He
proposes principles and methods with which to formalize the dynamics of
``science in action.'' Such principles are sometimes useful when trying
to understand the development of a major project such as the Space
Shuttle; however, they do not always accurately describe why things
happen the way they do in a system. For example, although Latour claims
that a project must have support in order to succeed, projects such as
the Shuttle program can survive despite much opposition.

\vspace*{0.5\baselineskip}
Grey, Jerry. {\em Enterprise}. Morrow, New York: 1979.  Grey worked at
Rocketdyne during the late 50's, on rocket-engine combustion problems of
the Redstone missile.  During the early 1950's he directed experimental
rocket research at Princeton. He describes the development of the Space
Shuttle program including its evolution from the full Space
Transportation System.

\vspace*{0.5\baselineskip}
Lee, Jintae. ``SIBYL: A Tool for Managing Group Decision Rationale,''
CSCW '90: Proceedings of the Conference on Computer-Supported
Cooperative Work. ACM: 1990. SIBYL is a system for representing,
managing, and sharing knowledge to aid group decision making. It can be
applied to the development of any large project, such as the Space
Shuttle Main Engine, in which various individuals and groups need to
come together in order to make a good decision. 

\vspace*{0.5\baselineskip}
Lewis, Richard S. {\em The Voyages of Columbia}. Columbia University
Press, New York: 1984. Lewis, a reporter, describes the trials and
tribulations of the start of the Space Shuttle program, originally the
Space Transportation System. His descriptions provide good examples to
demonstrate some of Latour's principles and possible applications of
CSCW technology.

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