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\head{February 28, 1992}

\def\ms{`the morning star'}
\def\sms{`the sense of \ms\thinspace'}

(1) The sense of \sms{} is the same as the sense of \ms{}.

We know that two signs with the same sense have the same reference.
If (1) is true, then the reference of \sms{} and the reference of
\ms{} are the same.  The reference of \ms{} is the planet Venus.  The
reference of \sms{} is a sense.  Senses are objects, but they are not
planets.  Therefore, (1) is not true.  This is not a terribly
consequential statement, except that it supports the observation that
senses are not physical objects.

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I object to Frege's notion of sense.  It seems to me that senses are
an artificial construction.  I believe in signs, since I can write one
down.  I believe in references, since they are observable all around
me.  But under Frege's theory, senses completely define a sign, making
the reference unnecessary.  But references exist.  This leads me to
believe that senses are not fundamental, but could, with effort, be
derived somehow from signs and references.

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