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\head{May 8, 1992}

\part{I}

\begin{enumerate}
\prob A. $42+0=42$ \\
It is necessary that 0 be the additive inverse, for addition to work
as conventionally defined.  It is also knowable a-priori, as it does
not depend on any physical evidence.

\prob B. The exact values of very large primes.

People have used computers to determine the valyes of prime numbers
hundreds of thousands of digits long.  These numbers are necessarily
primes, but it is not evident a-priori that such a number is prime.

\prob C. I do not believe in the standard meter example.

If the scratches in the standard meter in Paris are, a-priori, one
meter long, this implies that if it were determined somehow that the
meter was a different length, then the stick would be wrong.  This is
not possible, since it is known a-priori that the scratches are one
meter apart.  But, the stick is wrong.  The meter was redefined as a
function the wavelength of one frequency of light emitted from
krypton, which is a physical quantity which must be measured, and
cannot be known a-priori.  In fact, this new definition of the meter
is different from the meterstick definition.  So much for the a-priori
meterstick.

\prob D. I am 1.68 meters tall today.

This is contingent on many things, including all events prior to the
time of measurement (what if I had lost my legs in a car accident?).
It is also a-posteriori, as it is not something which can be deduced
analytically.

\end{enumerate}

\part{V}
Kripke spends several pages describing identity statements between
names, and it seems that his arguments, if applied to the
propositional attitude problem, serve to make the problem a non-issue.
He spends a great deal of time showing that `Hesperus' and
`Phosphorus' always pick out the same reference, no matter what
universe we are referring to.  The sentence `John believes that
Phosphorus is a planet' is uttered by a speaker in our universe.  As
Kripke puts it, ``we use {\em English} with {\em our} meanings and
{\em our} references.  So, `Phosphorus' has the referent it would have
in our universe.  Now, substitute `Hesperus' in that sentence.  Since
`Phosphorus' and `Hesperus' have the referents of the speaker, not of
John, the sentences keeps the same truth value and truth conditions.
There is no difficulty.

This does not affect the propositional attitude problem, but there
does seem to be a difficulty in that there does not seem to be any way
to discuss John's language.  I'm not sure how Kripke would explain a
sentence like `John believes that the heavenly body which he calls
`Hesperus' is a planet.'  In this case, he is not referring to
Hesperus when he says `Hesperus'.  I'm not convinced Kripke can
discuss this.

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