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\def\u{Utilitarianism}

\title{Mill's \u{}, and a Defense of Pleasure as a Basis for
Happiness}
\author{Marc Horowitz}
\date{2 November 1995}
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John Stuart Mill's system of ethics, \u{}, consists of three major
components.  The first, welfarism\footnote{I will use the terms
presented in class, since they are sensible.  Inventing another set of
terms would only lead to confusion.}, is the view that actions are
right or wrong depending solely on the extent to which they bring
about happiness or unhappiness, respectively.  The second,
sum-maximization, is the concept that actions should be taken such
that they lead to the greatest total amount of happiness in the world.
The third is act-consequentialism, which is the theory that when
judging an act, the main principle for evaluating the goodness of the
act is to determine the effects of the act itself on the total
happiness.

Mill discusses in considerable detail about what he means by
happiness.  Simply put, happiness is pleasure and absence of pain;
unhappiness is the opposite.  All desirable things are desirable for
their inherent pleasure, or as a means to experience of pleasure.

One objection to \u{} is the notion that by supposing that there is no
higher end to life than pleasure, that we are no better than animals.

Mill answers this objection by turning it around, accusing the
objectors of claiming that humans cannot appreciate any pleasures
beyond those which animals can appreciate.  When one evaluates
pleasure, one must consider quality as well as quantity.

Of course, humans are capable of higher pleasures than pigs.  Humans
derive pleasure from the appreciation of art, music, and literature;
the discussion of history; and the study of science and philosophy.
In fact, Mill considers the quality of pleasure sometimes to be more
important than the quantity.  After all, there exist pleasures which
we would not give up, even in exchange for as much of another pleasure
as we could have, for the former pleasure is so much higher quality.
In these circumstances, quantity is of little importance.

Mill believes that no human would give up the higher facilities of
humanity, even for the ``fullest allowances of a beast's pleasures''.
Similarly, an educated person familiar with more and less
sophisticated pleasures would not be willing to give up the more
sophisticated pleasures, even in exchange for being a completely
satisfied simpleton.  Any rational person would rather be ``a human
being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied.''

This defense of the above objection is convincing to me.  I cannot
imagine any object of desire is there which is not pleasurable to the
agent at some level.  What sorts of things do the objectors consider
noble pursuits without pleasure?  The martyr, as much as he suffers or
even as he dies, knows that by doing so, he brings happiness to those
his is sacrificing himself for.  This knowledge is pleasurable, at
least inasmuch as it is not painful.  A cleric might give up all
worldly pleasures, but in exchange, he has the belief that he is
helping others in ways too numerous to list, in this world and the
next.  Perhaps the objectors consider the ascetic to be the most noble
person.  In this case, perhaps the objections have some merit, but why
would the ascetic do what he does without thinking there is some
reason for it?  There must be some pleasure in this reason, even if he
denies it, or he would not be sacrificing himself in this way.  It is
likely that some of these pleasures do not further the goals of \u{},
but they suffice for defending against the objection.

Mill goes on to describe a metric for evaluating which of two
pleasures is more preferable.  In this situation, the only valid judge
is one who is capable of experiencing both pleasures.  If there is
disagreement among qualified judges, the final decision should be that
of the majority.

I find this last idea unsatisfactory.  It is consistent with \u{}, and
I would expect Mill to argue, that moral rightness is not relative.
If two people perform the complete utilitarian calculations, they
should arrive at the same answer.  However, Mill's argument that the
choice of the higher of two pleasures is not relative (and should be
chosen by majority, even) is not sensible.  If more people prefer
chocolate to vanilla, this is not a reason to declare chocolate a
higher pleasure, and to declare those who prefer vanilla as foolish
swine.  This example is probably invalid since it clearly does not
involve different levels of faculties of judgement.  But what of a
comparison of the relative pleasures of listening to Mozart and
viewing a Monet?  I find it difficult to believe that there is one
right answer to aesthetic questions such as that of whether enjoyment
of fine music or enjoyment of fine art is a higher pleasure.

The next general component of \u{} is sum-maximization.  The
utilitarian sees as the ``end of human action'' a world where all of
mankind has an existence as full of pleasure and as empty of pain as
is achievable.

In \u{}, there is no rightness in self-sacrifice alone.  However, Mill
names as the most honorable and noble among people those who are
willing to sacrifice their own happiness for the greater good.

Even beyond self-sacrifice, Mill implies that this total is composed
of not just to the agent and his society, but ``to the whole sentient
creation''.  This would seem to include all people in the future, as
well as the people who exist at the time of an action.  This is
consistent with the rest of \u{}, as I believe that Mill would argue
that an action today which would have no effect now, but prevent a war
generations in the future, would be quite admirable.

Of course, most actions will not be this altruistic, since most people
do not have the ability to perform actions with such wide influence.
Much of the time, agents will only be able to affect themselves and
those around them. In these situations, consideration of their own
happiness, and the happiness of those immediately around them, is
sufficient, since these acts will contribute to the total happiness in
their own way.

Lastly, Mill discusses the basis for evaluating the rightness or
wrongness of an act.  When judging an act, the ultimate basis for the
rightness or wrongness of an act is its effect on the total happiness.

However, it is clearly not possible to perform the complete
utilitarian calculation before every action.  Instead, we look at
history, which is filled with stories of actions and their results.
From this history, and our own personal observation, we can establish
rules of morality based on the tendencies of actions to increase or
decrease total happiness.

Mill is careful to point out that these rules do not form the
fundamental determination of utility.  They are always susceptible to
improvement as we gain more experience.  They are also subject to
exceptions, since no general rule derived from experience will fit all
situations, and such rules will sometimes conflict.

For example, it is generally accepted that breaking a promise is bad.
It is also generally accepted that helping those in need is good.  So,
if on the way to an appointment with a friend, you find an injured
person who needs to go to the hospital, you must choose between
violating one of these premises.  At these times, one must apply the
basic principle of sum-maximization is, to resolve the conflict
between secondary rules.

Although act-consequentialism is clearly the view to which Mill
ascribes, he makes one statement which I cannot reconcile.

\begin{quote}
In the case of abstinences indeed -- of things which people forbear to
do from moral considerations, though the consequences in the
particular case might be beneficial -- it would be unworthy of an
intelligent agent not to be consciously aware that the action is of a
class which, if practiced generally, would be generally injurious, and
that this is the ground of the obligation to abstain from it.  The
amount of regard for the public interest implied in this recognition
is no greater than is demanded by every system of morals, for they all
enjoin to abstain from whatever is manifestly pernicious to society.
\end{quote}

This seems to be a traditional rule-consequentialist view.  If it can
be derived from utilitarian principles, this is not obvious, nor is it
explained at all by Mill.

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