/* -*- mode: c; c-basic-offset: 4; indent-tabs-mode: nil -*- */
/* kdc/kdc_util.c - Utility functions for the KDC implementation */
/*
 * Copyright 1990,1991,2007,2008,2009 by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
 * All Rights Reserved.
 *
 * Export of this software from the United States of America may
 *   require a specific license from the United States Government.
 *   It is the responsibility of any person or organization contemplating
 *   export to obtain such a license before exporting.
 *
 * WITHIN THAT CONSTRAINT, permission to use, copy, modify, and
 * distribute this software and its documentation for any purpose and
 * without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above copyright
 * notice appear in all copies and that both that copyright notice and
 * this permission notice appear in supporting documentation, and that
 * the name of M.I.T. not be used in advertising or publicity pertaining
 * to distribution of the software without specific, written prior
 * permission.  Furthermore if you modify this software you must label
 * your software as modified software and not distribute it in such a
 * fashion that it might be confused with the original M.I.T. software.
 * M.I.T. makes no representations about the suitability of
 * this software for any purpose.  It is provided "as is" without express
 * or implied warranty.
 */
/*
 * Copyright (c) 2006-2008, Novell, Inc.
 * All rights reserved.
 *
 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are met:
 *
 *   * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice,
 *       this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
 *   * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
 *       notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
 *       documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
 *   * The copyright holder's name is not used to endorse or promote products
 *       derived from this software without specific prior written permission.
 *
 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS"
 * AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE
 * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
 * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF
 * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS
 * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN
 * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE
 * POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
 */

#include "k5-int.h"
#include "kdc_util.h"
#include "extern.h"
#include <stdio.h>
#include <ctype.h>
#include <syslog.h>
#include "adm.h"
#include "adm_proto.h"
#include "net-server.h"
#include <limits.h>

#ifdef KRBCONF_VAGUE_ERRORS
const int vague_errors = 1;
#else
const int vague_errors = 0;
#endif

/*
 * concatenate first two authdata arrays, returning an allocated replacement.
 * The replacement should be freed with krb5_free_authdata().
 */
krb5_error_code
concat_authorization_data(krb5_authdata **first, krb5_authdata **second,
                          krb5_authdata ***output)
{
    register int i, j;
    register krb5_authdata **ptr, **retdata;

    /* count up the entries */
    i = 0;
    if (first)
        for (ptr = first; *ptr; ptr++)
            i++;
    if (second)
        for (ptr = second; *ptr; ptr++)
            i++;

    retdata = (krb5_authdata **)malloc((i+1)*sizeof(*retdata));
    if (!retdata)
        return ENOMEM;
    retdata[i] = 0;                     /* null-terminated array */
    for (i = 0, j = 0, ptr = first; j < 2 ; ptr = second, j++)
        while (ptr && *ptr) {
            /* now walk & copy */
            retdata[i] = (krb5_authdata *)malloc(sizeof(*retdata[i]));
            if (!retdata[i]) {
                krb5_free_authdata(kdc_context, retdata);
                return ENOMEM;
            }
            *retdata[i] = **ptr;
            if (!(retdata[i]->contents =
                  (krb5_octet *)malloc(retdata[i]->length))) {
                free(retdata[i]);
                retdata[i] = 0;
                krb5_free_authdata(kdc_context, retdata);
                return ENOMEM;
            }
            memcpy(retdata[i]->contents, (*ptr)->contents, retdata[i]->length);

            ptr++;
            i++;
        }
    *output = retdata;
    return 0;
}

krb5_boolean
realm_compare(krb5_const_principal princ1, krb5_const_principal princ2)
{
    return krb5_realm_compare(kdc_context, princ1, princ2);
}

krb5_boolean
is_local_principal(krb5_const_principal princ1)
{
    return krb5_realm_compare(kdc_context, princ1, tgs_server);
}

/*
 * Returns TRUE if the kerberos principal is the name of a Kerberos ticket
 * service.
 */
krb5_boolean
krb5_is_tgs_principal(krb5_const_principal principal)
{
    if ((krb5_princ_size(kdc_context, principal) > 0) &&
        data_eq_string (*krb5_princ_component(kdc_context, principal, 0),
                        KRB5_TGS_NAME))
        return TRUE;
    return FALSE;
}

/* Returns TRUE if principal is the name of a cross-realm TGS. */
krb5_boolean
is_cross_tgs_principal(krb5_const_principal principal)
{
    return (krb5_princ_size(kdc_context, principal) >= 2 &&
            data_eq_string(*krb5_princ_component(kdc_context, principal, 0),
                           KRB5_TGS_NAME) &&
            !data_eq(*krb5_princ_component(kdc_context, principal, 1),
                     *krb5_princ_realm(kdc_context, principal)));
}

/*
 * given authentication data (provides seed for checksum), verify checksum
 * for source data.
 */
static krb5_error_code
comp_cksum(krb5_context kcontext, krb5_data *source, krb5_ticket *ticket,
           krb5_checksum *his_cksum)
{
    krb5_error_code       retval;
    krb5_boolean          valid;

    if (!krb5_c_valid_cksumtype(his_cksum->checksum_type))
        return KRB5KDC_ERR_SUMTYPE_NOSUPP;

    /* must be collision proof */
    if (!krb5_c_is_coll_proof_cksum(his_cksum->checksum_type))
        return KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_INAPP_CKSUM;

    /* verify checksum */
    if ((retval = krb5_c_verify_checksum(kcontext, ticket->enc_part2->session,
                                         KRB5_KEYUSAGE_TGS_REQ_AUTH_CKSUM,
                                         source, his_cksum, &valid)))
        return(retval);

    if (!valid)
        return(KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY);

    return(0);
}

krb5_pa_data *
find_pa_data(krb5_pa_data **padata, krb5_preauthtype pa_type)
{
    return krb5int_find_pa_data(kdc_context, padata, pa_type);
}

krb5_error_code
kdc_process_tgs_req(krb5_kdc_req *request, const krb5_fulladdr *from,
                    krb5_data *pkt, krb5_ticket **ticket,
                    krb5_db_entry **krbtgt_ptr,
                    krb5_keyblock **tgskey,
                    krb5_keyblock **subkey,
                    krb5_pa_data **pa_tgs_req)
{
    krb5_pa_data        * tmppa;
    krb5_ap_req         * apreq;
    krb5_error_code       retval;
    krb5_authdata **authdata = NULL;
    krb5_data             scratch1;
    krb5_data           * scratch = NULL;
    krb5_boolean          foreign_server = FALSE;
    krb5_auth_context     auth_context = NULL;
    krb5_authenticator  * authenticator = NULL;
    krb5_checksum       * his_cksum = NULL;
    krb5_kvno             kvno = 0;
    krb5_db_entry       * krbtgt = NULL;

    *krbtgt_ptr = NULL;
    *tgskey = NULL;

    tmppa = find_pa_data(request->padata, KRB5_PADATA_AP_REQ);
    if (!tmppa)
        return KRB5KDC_ERR_PADATA_TYPE_NOSUPP;

    scratch1.length = tmppa->length;
    scratch1.data = (char *)tmppa->contents;
    if ((retval = decode_krb5_ap_req(&scratch1, &apreq)))
        return retval;

    if (isflagset(apreq->ap_options, AP_OPTS_USE_SESSION_KEY) ||
        isflagset(apreq->ap_options, AP_OPTS_MUTUAL_REQUIRED)) {
        krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_INFO, _("TGS_REQ: SESSION KEY or MUTUAL"));
        retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
        goto cleanup;
    }

    /* If the "server" principal in the ticket is not something
       in the local realm, then we must refuse to service the request
       if the client claims to be from the local realm.

       If we don't do this, then some other realm's nasty KDC can
       claim to be authenticating a client from our realm, and we'll
       give out tickets concurring with it!

       we set a flag here for checking below.
    */
    foreign_server = !is_local_principal(apreq->ticket->server);

    if ((retval = krb5_auth_con_init(kdc_context, &auth_context)))
        goto cleanup;

    /* Don't use a replay cache. */
    if ((retval = krb5_auth_con_setflags(kdc_context, auth_context, 0)))
        goto cleanup;

    if ((retval = krb5_auth_con_setaddrs(kdc_context, auth_context, NULL,
                                         from->address)) )
        goto cleanup_auth_context;

    if ((retval = kdc_get_server_key(apreq->ticket, 0, foreign_server,
                                     &krbtgt, tgskey, &kvno)))
        goto cleanup_auth_context;
    /*
     * We do not use the KDB keytab because other parts of the TGS need the TGT key.
     */
    retval = krb5_auth_con_setuseruserkey(kdc_context, auth_context, *tgskey);
    if (retval)
        goto cleanup_auth_context;

    if ((retval = krb5_rd_req_decoded_anyflag(kdc_context, &auth_context, apreq,
                                              apreq->ticket->server,
                                              kdc_active_realm->realm_keytab,
                                              NULL, ticket)))
        goto cleanup_auth_context;

    /* "invalid flag" tickets can must be used to validate */
    if (isflagset((*ticket)->enc_part2->flags, TKT_FLG_INVALID)
        && !isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_VALIDATE)) {
        retval = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_INVALID;
        goto cleanup_auth_context;
    }

    if ((retval = krb5_auth_con_getrecvsubkey(kdc_context,
                                              auth_context, subkey)))
        goto cleanup_auth_context;

    if ((retval = krb5_auth_con_getauthenticator(kdc_context, auth_context,
                                                 &authenticator)))
        goto cleanup_auth_context;

    retval = krb5_find_authdata(kdc_context,
                                (*ticket)->enc_part2->authorization_data,
                                authenticator->authorization_data,
                                KRB5_AUTHDATA_FX_ARMOR, &authdata);
    if (retval != 0)
        goto cleanup_authenticator;
    if (authdata&& authdata[0]) {
        krb5_set_error_message(kdc_context, KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY,
                               "ticket valid only as FAST armor");
        retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
        krb5_free_authdata(kdc_context, authdata);
        goto cleanup_authenticator;
    }
    krb5_free_authdata(kdc_context, authdata);


    /* Check for a checksum */
    if (!(his_cksum = authenticator->checksum)) {
        retval = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_INAPP_CKSUM;
        goto cleanup_authenticator;
    }

    /* make sure the client is of proper lineage (see above) */
    if (foreign_server &&
        !find_pa_data(request->padata, KRB5_PADATA_FOR_USER)) {
        if (is_local_principal((*ticket)->enc_part2->client)) {
            /* someone in a foreign realm claiming to be local */
            krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_INFO, _("PROCESS_TGS: failed lineage check"));
            retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
            goto cleanup_authenticator;
        }
    }

    /*
     * Check application checksum vs. tgs request
     *
     * We try checksumming the req-body two different ways: first we
     * try reaching into the raw asn.1 stream (if available), and
     * checksum that directly; if that fails, then we try encoding
     * using our local asn.1 library.
     */
    if (pkt && (fetch_asn1_field((unsigned char *) pkt->data,
                                 1, 4, &scratch1) >= 0)) {
        if (comp_cksum(kdc_context, &scratch1, *ticket, his_cksum)) {
            if (!(retval = encode_krb5_kdc_req_body(request, &scratch)))
                retval = comp_cksum(kdc_context, scratch, *ticket, his_cksum);
            krb5_free_data(kdc_context, scratch);
            if (retval)
                goto cleanup_authenticator;
        }
    }

    *pa_tgs_req = tmppa;
    *krbtgt_ptr = krbtgt;
    krbtgt = NULL;

cleanup_authenticator:
    krb5_free_authenticator(kdc_context, authenticator);

cleanup_auth_context:
    krb5_auth_con_free(kdc_context, auth_context);

cleanup:
    if (retval != 0) {
        krb5_free_keyblock(kdc_context, *tgskey);
        *tgskey = NULL;
    }
    krb5_free_ap_req(kdc_context, apreq);
    krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, krbtgt);
    return retval;
}

/* XXX This function should no longer be necessary.
 * The KDC should take the keytab associated with the realm and pass that to
 * the krb5_rd_req_decode(). --proven
 *
 * It's actually still used by do_tgs_req() for u2u auth, and not too
 * much else. -- tlyu
 */
krb5_error_code
kdc_get_server_key(krb5_ticket *ticket, unsigned int flags,
                   krb5_boolean match_enctype, krb5_db_entry **server_ptr,
                   krb5_keyblock **key, krb5_kvno *kvno)
{
    krb5_error_code       retval;
    krb5_boolean          similar;
    krb5_key_data       * server_key;
    krb5_db_entry       * server = NULL;

    *server_ptr = NULL;

    retval = krb5_db_get_principal(kdc_context, ticket->server, flags,
                                   &server);
    if (retval == KRB5_KDB_NOENTRY) {
        char *sname;
        if (!krb5_unparse_name(kdc_context, ticket->server, &sname)) {
            limit_string(sname);
            krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_ERR,
                             _("TGS_REQ: UNKNOWN SERVER: server='%s'"), sname);
            free(sname);
        }
        return KRB5KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
    } else if (retval)
        return retval;
    if (server->attributes & KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_SVR ||
        server->attributes & KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_ALL_TIX) {
        retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
        goto errout;
    }

    retval = krb5_dbe_find_enctype(kdc_context, server,
                                   match_enctype ? ticket->enc_part.enctype : -1,
                                   -1, (krb5_int32)ticket->enc_part.kvno,
                                   &server_key);
    if (retval)
        goto errout;
    if (!server_key) {
        retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
        goto errout;
    }
    if ((*key = (krb5_keyblock *)malloc(sizeof **key))) {
        retval = krb5_dbe_decrypt_key_data(kdc_context, NULL, server_key,
                                           *key, NULL);
    } else
        retval = ENOMEM;
    retval = krb5_c_enctype_compare(kdc_context, ticket->enc_part.enctype,
                                    (*key)->enctype, &similar);
    if (retval)
        goto errout;
    if (!similar) {
        retval = KRB5_KDB_NO_PERMITTED_KEY;
        goto errout;
    }
    (*key)->enctype = ticket->enc_part.enctype;
    *kvno = server_key->key_data_kvno;
    *server_ptr = server;
    server = NULL;
errout:
    krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, server);
    return retval;
}

/* This probably wants to be updated if you support last_req stuff */

static krb5_last_req_entry nolrentry = { KV5M_LAST_REQ_ENTRY, KRB5_LRQ_NONE, 0 };
static krb5_last_req_entry *nolrarray[] = { &nolrentry, 0 };

krb5_error_code
fetch_last_req_info(krb5_db_entry *dbentry, krb5_last_req_entry ***lrentry)
{
    *lrentry = nolrarray;
    return 0;
}


/* XXX!  This is a temporary place-holder */

krb5_error_code
check_hot_list(krb5_ticket *ticket)
{
    return 0;
}


#define MAX_REALM_LN 500


/*
 * subrealm - determine if r2 is a subrealm of r1
 *
 *            SUBREALM takes two realms, r1 and r2, and
 *            determines if r2 is a subrealm of r1.
 *            r2 is a subrealm of r1 if (r1 is a prefix
 *            of r2 AND r1 and r2 begin with a /) or if
 *            (r1 is a suffix of r2 and neither r1 nor r2
 *            begin with a /).
 *
 * RETURNS:   If r2 is a subrealm, and r1 is a prefix, the number
 *            of characters in the suffix of r2 is returned as a
 *            negative number.
 *
 *            If r2 is a subrealm, and r1 is a suffix, the number
 *            of characters in the prefix of r2 is returned as a
 *            positive number.
 *
 *            If r2 is not a subrealm, SUBREALM returns 0.
 */
static  int
subrealm(char *r1, char *r2)
{
    size_t l1,l2;
    l1 = strlen(r1);
    l2 = strlen(r2);
    if(l2 <= l1) return(0);
    if((*r1 == '/') && (*r2 == '/') && (strncmp(r1,r2,l1) == 0)) return(l1-l2);
    if((*r1 != '/') && (*r2 != '/') && (strncmp(r1,r2+l2-l1,l1) == 0))
        return(l2-l1);
    return(0);
}

/*
 * add_to_transited  Adds the name of the realm which issued the
 *                   ticket granting ticket on which the new ticket to
 *                   be issued is based (note that this is the same as
 *                   the realm of the server listed in the ticket
 *                   granting ticket.
 *
 * ASSUMPTIONS:  This procedure assumes that the transited field from
 *               the existing ticket granting ticket already appears
 *               in compressed form.  It will add the new realm while
 *               maintaining that form.   As long as each successive
 *               realm is added using this (or a similar) routine, the
 *               transited field will be in compressed form.  The
 *               basis step is an empty transited field which is, by
 *               its nature, in its most compressed form.
 *
 * ARGUMENTS: krb5_data *tgt_trans  Transited field from TGT
 *            krb5_data *new_trans  The transited field for the new ticket
 *            krb5_principal tgs    Name of ticket granting server
 *                                  This includes the realm of the KDC
 *                                  that issued the ticket granting
 *                                  ticket.  This is the realm that is
 *                                  to be added to the transited field.
 *            krb5_principal client Name of the client
 *            krb5_principal server The name of the requested server.
 *                                  This may be the an intermediate
 *                                  ticket granting server.
 *
 *            The last two argument are needed since they are
 *            implicitly part of the transited field of the new ticket
 *            even though they are not explicitly listed.
 *
 * RETURNS:   krb5_error_code - Success, or out of memory
 *
 * MODIFIES:  new_trans:  ->length will contain the length of the new
 *                        transited field.
 *
 *                        If ->data was not null when this procedure
 *                        is called, the memory referenced by ->data
 *                        will be deallocated.
 *
 *                        Memory will be allocated for the new transited field
 *                        ->data will be updated to point to the newly
 *                        allocated memory.
 *
 * BUGS:  The space allocated for the new transited field is the
 *        maximum that might be needed given the old transited field,
 *        and the realm to be added.  This length is calculated
 *        assuming that no compression of the new realm is possible.
 *        This has no adverse consequences other than the allocation
 *        of more space than required.
 *
 *        This procedure will not yet use the null subfield notation,
 *        and it will get confused if it sees it.
 *
 *        This procedure does not check for quoted commas in realm
 *        names.
 */

static char *
data2string (krb5_data *d)
{
    char *s;
    s = malloc(d->length + 1);
    if (s) {
        memcpy(s, d->data, d->length);
        s[d->length] = 0;
    }
    return s;
}

krb5_error_code
add_to_transited(krb5_data *tgt_trans, krb5_data *new_trans,
                 krb5_principal tgs, krb5_principal client,
                 krb5_principal server)
{
    krb5_error_code retval;
    char        *realm;
    char        *trans;
    char        *otrans, *otrans_ptr;
    size_t       bufsize;

    /* The following are for stepping through the transited field     */

    char        prev[MAX_REALM_LN];
    char        next[MAX_REALM_LN];
    char        current[MAX_REALM_LN];
    char        exp[MAX_REALM_LN];      /* Expanded current realm name     */

    int         i;
    int         clst, nlst;    /* count of last character in current and next */
    int         pl, pl1;       /* prefix length                               */
    int         added;         /* TRUE = new realm has been added             */

    realm = data2string(krb5_princ_realm(kdc_context, tgs));
    if (realm == NULL)
        return(ENOMEM);

    otrans = data2string(tgt_trans);
    if (otrans == NULL) {
        free(realm);
        return(ENOMEM);
    }
    /* Keep track of start so we can free */
    otrans_ptr = otrans;

    /* +1 for null,
       +1 for extra comma which may be added between
       +1 for potential space when leading slash in realm */
    bufsize = strlen(realm) + strlen(otrans) + 3;
    if (bufsize > MAX_REALM_LN)
        bufsize = MAX_REALM_LN;
    if (!(trans = (char *) malloc(bufsize))) {
        retval = ENOMEM;
        goto fail;
    }

    if (new_trans->data)  free(new_trans->data);
    new_trans->data = trans;
    new_trans->length = 0;

    trans[0] = '\0';

    /* For the purpose of appending, the realm preceding the first */
    /* realm in the transited field is considered the null realm   */

    prev[0] = '\0';

    /* read field into current */
    for (i = 0; *otrans != '\0';) {
        if (*otrans == '\\') {
            if (*(++otrans) == '\0')
                break;
            else
                continue;
        }
        if (*otrans == ',') {
            otrans++;
            break;
        }
        current[i++] = *otrans++;
        if (i >= MAX_REALM_LN) {
            retval = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_ILL_CR_TKT;
            goto fail;
        }
    }
    current[i] = '\0';

    added = (krb5_princ_realm(kdc_context, client)->length == strlen(realm) &&
             !strncmp(krb5_princ_realm(kdc_context, client)->data, realm, strlen(realm))) ||
        (krb5_princ_realm(kdc_context, server)->length == strlen(realm) &&
         !strncmp(krb5_princ_realm(kdc_context, server)->data, realm, strlen(realm)));

    while (current[0]) {

        /* figure out expanded form of current name */

        clst = strlen(current) - 1;
        if (current[0] == ' ') {
            strncpy(exp, current+1, sizeof(exp) - 1);
            exp[sizeof(exp) - 1] = '\0';
        }
        else if ((current[0] == '/') && (prev[0] == '/')) {
            strncpy(exp, prev, sizeof(exp) - 1);
            exp[sizeof(exp) - 1] = '\0';
            if (strlen(exp) + strlen(current) + 1 >= MAX_REALM_LN) {
                retval = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_ILL_CR_TKT;
                goto fail;
            }
            strncat(exp, current, sizeof(exp) - 1 - strlen(exp));
        }
        else if (current[clst] == '.') {
            strncpy(exp, current, sizeof(exp) - 1);
            exp[sizeof(exp) - 1] = '\0';
            if (strlen(exp) + strlen(prev) + 1 >= MAX_REALM_LN) {
                retval = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_ILL_CR_TKT;
                goto fail;
            }
            strncat(exp, prev, sizeof(exp) - 1 - strlen(exp));
        }
        else {
            strncpy(exp, current, sizeof(exp) - 1);
            exp[sizeof(exp) - 1] = '\0';
        }

        /* read field into next */
        for (i = 0; *otrans != '\0';) {
            if (*otrans == '\\') {
                if (*(++otrans) == '\0')
                    break;
                else
                    continue;
            }
            if (*otrans == ',') {
                otrans++;
                break;
            }
            next[i++] = *otrans++;
            if (i >= MAX_REALM_LN) {
                retval = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_ILL_CR_TKT;
                goto fail;
            }
        }
        next[i] = '\0';
        nlst = i - 1;

        if (!strcmp(exp, realm))  added = TRUE;

        /* If we still have to insert the new realm */

        if (!added) {

            /* Is the next field compressed?  If not, and if the new */
            /* realm is a subrealm of the current realm, compress    */
            /* the new realm, and insert immediately following the   */
            /* current one.  Note that we can not do this if the next*/
            /* field is already compressed since it would mess up    */
            /* what has already been done.  In most cases, this is   */
            /* not a problem because the realm to be added will be a */
            /* subrealm of the next field too, and we will catch     */
            /* it in a future iteration.                             */

            /* Note that the second test here is an unsigned comparison,
               so the first half (or a cast) is also required.  */
            assert(nlst < 0 || nlst < (int)sizeof(next));
            if ((nlst < 0 || next[nlst] != '.') &&
                (next[0] != '/') &&
                (pl = subrealm(exp, realm))) {
                added = TRUE;
                current[sizeof(current) - 1] = '\0';
                if (strlen(current) + (pl>0?pl:-pl) + 2 >= MAX_REALM_LN) {
                    retval = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_ILL_CR_TKT;
                    goto fail;
                }
                strncat(current, ",", sizeof(current) - 1 - strlen(current));
                if (pl > 0) {
                    strncat(current, realm, (unsigned) pl);
                }
                else {
                    strncat(current, realm+strlen(realm)+pl, (unsigned) (-pl));
                }
            }

            /* Whether or not the next field is compressed, if the    */
            /* realm to be added is a superrealm of the current realm,*/
            /* then the current realm can be compressed.  First the   */
            /* realm to be added must be compressed relative to the   */
            /* previous realm (if possible), and then the current     */
            /* realm compressed relative to the new realm.  Note that */
            /* if the realm to be added is also a superrealm of the   */
            /* previous realm, it would have been added earlier, and  */
            /* we would not reach this step this time around.         */

            else if ((pl = subrealm(realm, exp))) {
                added      = TRUE;
                current[0] = '\0';
                if ((pl1 = subrealm(prev,realm))) {
                    if (strlen(current) + (pl1>0?pl1:-pl1) + 1 >= MAX_REALM_LN) {
                        retval = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_ILL_CR_TKT;
                        goto fail;
                    }
                    if (pl1 > 0) {
                        strncat(current, realm, (unsigned) pl1);
                    }
                    else {
                        strncat(current, realm+strlen(realm)+pl1, (unsigned) (-pl1));
                    }
                }
                else { /* If not a subrealm */
                    if ((realm[0] == '/') && prev[0]) {
                        if (strlen(current) + 2 >= MAX_REALM_LN) {
                            retval = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_ILL_CR_TKT;
                            goto fail;
                        }
                        strncat(current, " ", sizeof(current) - 1 - strlen(current));
                        current[sizeof(current) - 1] = '\0';
                    }
                    if (strlen(current) + strlen(realm) + 1 >= MAX_REALM_LN) {
                        retval = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_ILL_CR_TKT;
                        goto fail;
                    }
                    strncat(current, realm, sizeof(current) - 1 - strlen(current));
                    current[sizeof(current) - 1] = '\0';
                }
                if (strlen(current) + (pl>0?pl:-pl) + 2 >= MAX_REALM_LN) {
                    retval = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_ILL_CR_TKT;
                    goto fail;
                }
                strncat(current,",", sizeof(current) - 1 - strlen(current));
                current[sizeof(current) - 1] = '\0';
                if (pl > 0) {
                    strncat(current, exp, (unsigned) pl);
                }
                else {
                    strncat(current, exp+strlen(exp)+pl, (unsigned)(-pl));
                }
            }
        }

        if (new_trans->length != 0) {
            if (strlcat(trans, ",", bufsize) >= bufsize) {
                retval = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_ILL_CR_TKT;
                goto fail;
            }
        }
        if (strlcat(trans, current, bufsize) >= bufsize) {
            retval = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_ILL_CR_TKT;
            goto fail;
        }
        new_trans->length = strlen(trans);

        strncpy(prev, exp, sizeof(prev) - 1);
        prev[sizeof(prev) - 1] = '\0';
        strncpy(current, next, sizeof(current) - 1);
        current[sizeof(current) - 1] = '\0';
    }

    if (!added) {
        if (new_trans->length != 0) {
            if (strlcat(trans, ",", bufsize) >= bufsize) {
                retval = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_ILL_CR_TKT;
                goto fail;
            }
        }
        if((realm[0] == '/') && trans[0]) {
            if (strlcat(trans, " ", bufsize) >= bufsize) {
                retval = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_ILL_CR_TKT;
                goto fail;
            }
        }
        if (strlcat(trans, realm, bufsize) >= bufsize) {
            retval = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_ILL_CR_TKT;
            goto fail;
        }
        new_trans->length = strlen(trans);
    }

    retval = 0;
fail:
    free(realm);
    free(otrans_ptr);
    return (retval);
}

/* Convert an API error code to a protocol error code. */
static int
errcode_to_protocol(krb5_error_code code)
{
    int protcode;

    protcode = code - ERROR_TABLE_BASE_krb5;
    return (protcode >= 0 && protcode <= 128) ? protcode : KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
}

/* Return -1 if the AS or TGS request is disallowed due to KDC policy on
 * anonymous tickets. */
static int
check_anon(krb5_context context, krb5_principal client, krb5_principal server)
{
    /* If restrict_anon is set, reject requests from anonymous to principals
     * other than the local TGT. */
    if (restrict_anon &&
        krb5_principal_compare_any_realm(context, client,
                                         krb5_anonymous_principal()) &&
        !krb5_principal_compare(context, server, tgs_server))
        return -1;
    return 0;
}

/*
 * Routines that validate a AS request; checks a lot of things.  :-)
 *
 * Returns a Kerberos protocol error number, which is _not_ the same
 * as a com_err error number!
 */
#define AS_INVALID_OPTIONS (KDC_OPT_FORWARDED | KDC_OPT_PROXY |         \
                            KDC_OPT_VALIDATE | KDC_OPT_RENEW |          \
                            KDC_OPT_ENC_TKT_IN_SKEY | KDC_OPT_CNAME_IN_ADDL_TKT)
int
validate_as_request(register krb5_kdc_req *request, krb5_db_entry client,
                    krb5_db_entry server, krb5_timestamp kdc_time,
                    const char **status, krb5_pa_data ***e_data)
{
    int errcode;
    krb5_error_code ret;

    /*
     * If an option is set that is only allowed in TGS requests, complain.
     */
    if (request->kdc_options & AS_INVALID_OPTIONS) {
        *status = "INVALID AS OPTIONS";
        return KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
    }

    /* The client must not be expired */
    if (client.expiration && client.expiration < kdc_time) {
        *status = "CLIENT EXPIRED";
        if (vague_errors)
            return(KRB_ERR_GENERIC);
        else
            return(KDC_ERR_NAME_EXP);
    }

    /* The client's password must not be expired, unless the server is
       a KRB5_KDC_PWCHANGE_SERVICE. */
    if (client.pw_expiration && client.pw_expiration < kdc_time &&
        !isflagset(server.attributes, KRB5_KDB_PWCHANGE_SERVICE)) {
        *status = "CLIENT KEY EXPIRED";
        if (vague_errors)
            return(KRB_ERR_GENERIC);
        else
            return(KDC_ERR_KEY_EXP);
    }

    /* The server must not be expired */
    if (server.expiration && server.expiration < kdc_time) {
        *status = "SERVICE EXPIRED";
        return(KDC_ERR_SERVICE_EXP);
    }

    /*
     * If the client requires password changing, then only allow the
     * pwchange service.
     */
    if (isflagset(client.attributes, KRB5_KDB_REQUIRES_PWCHANGE) &&
        !isflagset(server.attributes, KRB5_KDB_PWCHANGE_SERVICE)) {
        *status = "REQUIRED PWCHANGE";
        return(KDC_ERR_KEY_EXP);
    }

    /* Client and server must allow postdating tickets */
    if ((isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_ALLOW_POSTDATE) ||
         isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_POSTDATED)) &&
        (isflagset(client.attributes, KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_POSTDATED) ||
         isflagset(server.attributes, KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_POSTDATED))) {
        *status = "POSTDATE NOT ALLOWED";
        return(KDC_ERR_CANNOT_POSTDATE);
    }

    /*
     * A Windows KDC will return KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED instead of
     * KDC_ERR_POLICY in the following case:
     *
     *   - KDC_OPT_FORWARDABLE is set in KDCOptions but local
     *     policy has KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_FORWARDABLE set for the
     *     client, and;
     *   - KRB5_KDB_REQUIRES_PRE_AUTH is set for the client but
     *     preauthentication data is absent in the request.
     *
     * Hence, this check most be done after the check for preauth
     * data, and is now performed by validate_forwardable() (the
     * contents of which were previously below).
     */

    /* Client and server must allow renewable tickets */
    if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_RENEWABLE) &&
        (isflagset(client.attributes, KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_RENEWABLE) ||
         isflagset(server.attributes, KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_RENEWABLE))) {
        *status = "RENEWABLE NOT ALLOWED";
        return(KDC_ERR_POLICY);
    }

    /* Client and server must allow proxiable tickets */
    if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_PROXIABLE) &&
        (isflagset(client.attributes, KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_PROXIABLE) ||
         isflagset(server.attributes, KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_PROXIABLE))) {
        *status = "PROXIABLE NOT ALLOWED";
        return(KDC_ERR_POLICY);
    }

    /* Check to see if client is locked out */
    if (isflagset(client.attributes, KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_ALL_TIX)) {
        *status = "CLIENT LOCKED OUT";
        return(KDC_ERR_CLIENT_REVOKED);
    }

    /* Check to see if server is locked out */
    if (isflagset(server.attributes, KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_ALL_TIX)) {
        *status = "SERVICE LOCKED OUT";
        return(KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN);
    }

    /* Check to see if server is allowed to be a service */
    if (isflagset(server.attributes, KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_SVR)) {
        *status = "SERVICE NOT ALLOWED";
        return(KDC_ERR_MUST_USE_USER2USER);
    }

    if (check_anon(kdc_context, request->client, request->server) != 0) {
        *status = "ANONYMOUS NOT ALLOWED";
        return(KDC_ERR_POLICY);
    }

    /* Perform KDB module policy checks. */
    ret = krb5_db_check_policy_as(kdc_context, request, &client, &server,
                                  kdc_time, status, e_data);
    if (ret && ret != KRB5_PLUGIN_OP_NOTSUPP)
        return errcode_to_protocol(ret);

    /* Check against local policy. */
    errcode = against_local_policy_as(request, client, server,
                                      kdc_time, status, e_data);
    if (errcode)
        return errcode;

    return 0;
}

int
validate_forwardable(krb5_kdc_req *request, krb5_db_entry client,
                     krb5_db_entry server, krb5_timestamp kdc_time,
                     const char **status)
{
    *status = NULL;
    if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_FORWARDABLE) &&
        (isflagset(client.attributes, KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_FORWARDABLE) ||
         isflagset(server.attributes, KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_FORWARDABLE))) {
        *status = "FORWARDABLE NOT ALLOWED";
        return(KDC_ERR_POLICY);
    } else
        return 0;
}

#define ASN1_ID_CLASS   (0xc0)
#define ASN1_ID_TYPE    (0x20)
#define ASN1_ID_TAG     (0x1f)
#define ASN1_CLASS_UNIV (0)
#define ASN1_CLASS_APP  (1)
#define ASN1_CLASS_CTX  (2)
#define ASN1_CLASS_PRIV (3)
#define asn1_id_constructed(x)  (x & ASN1_ID_TYPE)
#define asn1_id_primitive(x)    (!asn1_id_constructed(x))
#define asn1_id_class(x)        ((x & ASN1_ID_CLASS) >> 6)
#define asn1_id_tag(x)          (x & ASN1_ID_TAG)

/*
 * asn1length - return encoded length of value.
 *
 * passed a pointer into the asn.1 stream, which is updated
 * to point right after the length bits.
 *
 * returns -1 on failure.
 */
static int
asn1length(unsigned char **astream)
{
    int length;         /* resulting length */
    int sublen;         /* sublengths */
    int blen;           /* bytes of length */
    unsigned char *p;   /* substring searching */

    if (**astream & 0x80) {
        blen = **astream & 0x7f;
        if (blen > 3) {
            return(-1);
        }
        for (++*astream, length = 0; blen; ++*astream, blen--) {
            length = (length << 8) | **astream;
        }
        if (length == 0) {
            /* indefinite length, figure out by hand */
            p = *astream;
            p++;
            while (1) {
                /* compute value length. */
                if ((sublen = asn1length(&p)) < 0) {
                    return(-1);
                }
                p += sublen;
                /* check for termination */
                if ((!*p++) && (!*p)) {
                    p++;
                    break;
                }
            }
            length = p - *astream;
        }
    } else {
        length = **astream;
        ++*astream;
    }
    return(length);
}

/*
 * fetch_asn1_field - return raw asn.1 stream of subfield.
 *
 * this routine is passed a context-dependent tag number and "level" and returns
 * the size and length of the corresponding level subfield.
 *
 * levels and are numbered starting from 1.
 *
 * returns 0 on success, -1 otherwise.
 */
int
fetch_asn1_field(unsigned char *astream, unsigned int level,
                 unsigned int field, krb5_data *data)
{
    unsigned char *estream;     /* end of stream */
    int classes;                /* # classes seen so far this level */
    unsigned int levels = 0;            /* levels seen so far */
    int lastlevel = 1000;       /* last level seen */
    int length;                 /* various lengths */
    int tag;                    /* tag number */
    unsigned char savelen;      /* saved length of our field */

    classes = -1;
    /* we assume that the first identifier/length will tell us
       how long the entire stream is. */
    astream++;
    estream = astream;
    if ((length = asn1length(&astream)) < 0) {
        return(-1);
    }
    estream += length;
    /* search down the stream, checking identifiers.  we process identifiers
       until we hit the "level" we want, and then process that level for our
       subfield, always making sure we don't go off the end of the stream.  */
    while (astream < estream) {
        if (!asn1_id_constructed(*astream)) {
            return(-1);
        }
        if (asn1_id_class(*astream) == ASN1_CLASS_CTX) {
            if ((tag = (int)asn1_id_tag(*astream)) <= lastlevel) {
                levels++;
                classes = -1;
            }
            lastlevel = tag;
            if (levels == level) {
                /* in our context-dependent class, is this the one we're looking for ? */
                if (tag == (int)field) {
                    /* return length and data */
                    astream++;
                    savelen = *astream;
                    if ((data->length = asn1length(&astream)) < 0) {
                        return(-1);
                    }
                    /* if the field length is indefinite, we will have to subtract two
                       (terminating octets) from the length returned since we don't want
                       to pass any info from the "wrapper" back.  asn1length will always return
                       the *total* length of the field, not just what's contained in it */
                    if ((savelen & 0xff) == 0x80) {
                        data->length -=2 ;
                    }
                    data->data = (char *)astream;
                    return(0);
                } else if (tag <= classes) {
                    /* we've seen this class before, something must be wrong */
                    return(-1);
                } else {
                    classes = tag;
                }
            }
        }
        /* if we're not on our level yet, process this value.  otherwise skip over it */
        astream++;
        if ((length = asn1length(&astream)) < 0) {
            return(-1);
        }
        if (levels == level) {
            astream += length;
        }
    }
    return(-1);
}

/*
 * Routines that validate a TGS request; checks a lot of things.  :-)
 *
 * Returns a Kerberos protocol error number, which is _not_ the same
 * as a com_err error number!
 */
#define TGS_OPTIONS_HANDLED (KDC_OPT_FORWARDABLE | KDC_OPT_FORWARDED |  \
                             KDC_OPT_PROXIABLE | KDC_OPT_PROXY |        \
                             KDC_OPT_ALLOW_POSTDATE | KDC_OPT_POSTDATED | \
                             KDC_OPT_RENEWABLE | KDC_OPT_RENEWABLE_OK | \
                             KDC_OPT_ENC_TKT_IN_SKEY | KDC_OPT_RENEW |  \
                             KDC_OPT_VALIDATE | KDC_OPT_CANONICALIZE | KDC_OPT_CNAME_IN_ADDL_TKT)
#define NO_TGT_OPTION (KDC_OPT_FORWARDED | KDC_OPT_PROXY | KDC_OPT_RENEW | \
                       KDC_OPT_VALIDATE)

int
validate_tgs_request(register krb5_kdc_req *request, krb5_db_entry server,
                     krb5_ticket *ticket, krb5_timestamp kdc_time,
                     const char **status, krb5_pa_data ***e_data)
{
    int errcode;
    int st_idx = 0;
    krb5_error_code ret;

    /*
     * If an illegal option is set, ignore it.
     */
    request->kdc_options &= TGS_OPTIONS_HANDLED;

    /* Check to see if server has expired */
    if (server.expiration && server.expiration < kdc_time) {
        *status = "SERVICE EXPIRED";
        return(KDC_ERR_SERVICE_EXP);
    }

    /*
     * Verify that the server principal in authdat->ticket is correct
     * (either the ticket granting service or the service that was
     * originally requested)
     */
    if (request->kdc_options & NO_TGT_OPTION) {
        if (!krb5_principal_compare(kdc_context, ticket->server, request->server)) {
            *status = "SERVER DIDN'T MATCH TICKET FOR RENEW/FORWARD/ETC";
            return(KDC_ERR_SERVER_NOMATCH);
        }
    } else {
        /*
         * OK, we need to validate the krbtgt service in the ticket.
         *
         * The krbtgt service is of the form:
         *              krbtgt/realm-A@realm-B
         *
         * Realm A is the "server realm"; the realm of the
         * server of the requested ticket must match this realm.
         * Of course, it should be a realm serviced by this KDC.
         *
         * Realm B is the "client realm"; this is what should be
         * added to the transited field.  (which is done elsewhere)
         */

        /* Make sure there are two components... */
        if (krb5_princ_size(kdc_context, ticket->server) != 2) {
            *status = "BAD TGS SERVER LENGTH";
            return KRB_AP_ERR_NOT_US;
        }
        /* ...that the first component is krbtgt... */
        if (!krb5_is_tgs_principal(ticket->server)) {
            *status = "BAD TGS SERVER NAME";
            return KRB_AP_ERR_NOT_US;
        }
        /* ...and that the second component matches the server realm... */
        if ((krb5_princ_size(kdc_context, ticket->server) <= 1) ||
            !data_eq(*krb5_princ_component(kdc_context, ticket->server, 1),
                     *krb5_princ_realm(kdc_context, request->server))) {
            *status = "BAD TGS SERVER INSTANCE";
            return KRB_AP_ERR_NOT_US;
        }
        /* XXX add check that second component must match locally
         * supported realm?
         */

        /* Server must allow TGS based issuances */
        if (isflagset(server.attributes, KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_TGT_BASED)) {
            *status = "TGT BASED NOT ALLOWED";
            return(KDC_ERR_POLICY);
        }
    }

    /* TGS must be forwardable to get forwarded or forwardable ticket */
    if ((isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_FORWARDED) ||
         isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_FORWARDABLE)) &&
        !isflagset(ticket->enc_part2->flags, TKT_FLG_FORWARDABLE)) {
        *status = "TGT NOT FORWARDABLE";

        return KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
    }

    /* TGS must be proxiable to get proxiable ticket */
    if ((isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_PROXY) ||
         isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_PROXIABLE)) &&
        !isflagset(ticket->enc_part2->flags, TKT_FLG_PROXIABLE)) {
        *status = "TGT NOT PROXIABLE";
        return KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
    }

    /* TGS must allow postdating to get postdated ticket */
    if ((isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_ALLOW_POSTDATE) ||
         isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_POSTDATED)) &&
        !isflagset(ticket->enc_part2->flags, TKT_FLG_MAY_POSTDATE)) {
        *status = "TGT NOT POSTDATABLE";
        return KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
    }

    /* can only validate invalid tix */
    if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_VALIDATE) &&
        !isflagset(ticket->enc_part2->flags, TKT_FLG_INVALID)) {
        *status = "VALIDATE VALID TICKET";
        return KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
    }

    /* can only renew renewable tix */
    if ((isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_RENEW) ||
         isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_RENEWABLE)) &&
        !isflagset(ticket->enc_part2->flags, TKT_FLG_RENEWABLE)) {
        *status = "TICKET NOT RENEWABLE";
        return KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
    }

    /* can not proxy ticket granting tickets */
    if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_PROXY) &&
        (!request->server->data ||
         !data_eq_string(request->server->data[0], KRB5_TGS_NAME))) {
        *status = "CAN'T PROXY TGT";
        return KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
    }

    /* Server must allow forwardable tickets */
    if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_FORWARDABLE) &&
        isflagset(server.attributes, KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_FORWARDABLE)) {
        *status = "NON-FORWARDABLE TICKET";
        return(KDC_ERR_POLICY);
    }

    /* Server must allow renewable tickets */
    if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_RENEWABLE) &&
        isflagset(server.attributes, KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_RENEWABLE)) {
        *status = "NON-RENEWABLE TICKET";
        return(KDC_ERR_POLICY);
    }

    /* Server must allow proxiable tickets */
    if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_PROXIABLE) &&
        isflagset(server.attributes, KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_PROXIABLE)) {
        *status = "NON-PROXIABLE TICKET";
        return(KDC_ERR_POLICY);
    }

    /* Server must allow postdated tickets */
    if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_ALLOW_POSTDATE) &&
        isflagset(server.attributes, KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_POSTDATED)) {
        *status = "NON-POSTDATABLE TICKET";
        return(KDC_ERR_CANNOT_POSTDATE);
    }

    /* Server must allow DUP SKEY requests */
    if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_ENC_TKT_IN_SKEY) &&
        isflagset(server.attributes, KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_DUP_SKEY)) {
        *status = "DUP_SKEY DISALLOWED";
        return(KDC_ERR_POLICY);
    }

    /* Server must not be locked out */
    if (isflagset(server.attributes, KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_ALL_TIX)) {
        *status = "SERVER LOCKED OUT";
        return(KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN);
    }

    /* Server must be allowed to be a service */
    if (isflagset(server.attributes, KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_SVR)) {
        *status = "SERVER NOT ALLOWED";
        return(KDC_ERR_MUST_USE_USER2USER);
    }

    /* Check the hot list */
    if (check_hot_list(ticket)) {
        *status = "HOT_LIST";
        return(KRB_AP_ERR_REPEAT);
    }

    /* Check the start time vs. the KDC time */
    if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_VALIDATE)) {
        if (ticket->enc_part2->times.starttime > kdc_time) {
            *status = "NOT_YET_VALID";
            return(KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_NYV);
        }
    }

    /*
     * Check the renew_till time.  The endtime was already
     * been checked in the initial authentication check.
     */
    if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_RENEW) &&
        (ticket->enc_part2->times.renew_till < kdc_time)) {
        *status = "TKT_EXPIRED";
        return(KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_EXPIRED);
    }

    /*
     * Checks for ENC_TKT_IN_SKEY:
     *
     * (1) Make sure the second ticket exists
     * (2) Make sure it is a ticket granting ticket
     */
    if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_ENC_TKT_IN_SKEY)) {
        if (!request->second_ticket ||
            !request->second_ticket[st_idx]) {
            *status = "NO_2ND_TKT";
            return(KDC_ERR_BADOPTION);
        }
        if (!krb5_principal_compare(kdc_context, request->second_ticket[st_idx]->server,
                                    tgs_server)) {
            *status = "2ND_TKT_NOT_TGS";
            return(KDC_ERR_POLICY);
        }
        st_idx++;
    }
    if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_CNAME_IN_ADDL_TKT)) {
        if (!request->second_ticket ||
            !request->second_ticket[st_idx]) {
            *status = "NO_2ND_TKT";
            return(KDC_ERR_BADOPTION);
        }
        st_idx++;
    }

    /* Check for hardware preauthentication */
    if (isflagset(server.attributes, KRB5_KDB_REQUIRES_HW_AUTH) &&
        !isflagset(ticket->enc_part2->flags,TKT_FLG_HW_AUTH)) {
        *status = "NO HW PREAUTH";
        return KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
    }

    /* Check for any kind of preauthentication */
    if (isflagset(server.attributes, KRB5_KDB_REQUIRES_PRE_AUTH) &&
        !isflagset(ticket->enc_part2->flags, TKT_FLG_PRE_AUTH)) {
        *status = "NO PREAUTH";
        return KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
    }

    if (check_anon(kdc_context, ticket->enc_part2->client,
                   request->server) != 0) {
        *status = "ANONYMOUS NOT ALLOWED";
        return(KDC_ERR_POLICY);
    }

    /* Perform KDB module policy checks. */
    ret = krb5_db_check_policy_tgs(kdc_context, request, &server,
                                   ticket, status, e_data);
    if (ret && ret != KRB5_PLUGIN_OP_NOTSUPP)
        return errcode_to_protocol(ret);

    /* Check local policy. */
    errcode = against_local_policy_tgs(request, server, ticket,
                                       status, e_data);
    if (errcode)
        return errcode;


    return 0;
}

/*
 * This function returns 1 if the dbentry has a key for a specified
 * keytype, and 0 if not.
 */
int
dbentry_has_key_for_enctype(krb5_context context, krb5_db_entry *client,
                            krb5_enctype enctype)
{
    krb5_error_code     retval;
    krb5_key_data       *datap;

    retval = krb5_dbe_find_enctype(context, client, enctype,
                                   -1, 0, &datap);
    if (retval)
        return 0;
    else
        return 1;
}

/*
 * This function returns 1 if the entity referenced by this
 * structure can support the a particular encryption system, and 0 if
 * not.
 *
 * XXX eventually this information should be looked up in the
 * database.  Since it isn't, we use some hueristics and attribute
 * options bits for now.
 */
int
dbentry_supports_enctype(krb5_context context, krb5_db_entry *client,
                         krb5_enctype enctype)
{
    /*
     * If it's DES_CBC_MD5, there's a bit in the attribute mask which
     * checks to see if we support it.  For now, treat it as always
     * clear.
     *
     * In theory everything's supposed to support DES_CBC_MD5, but
     * that's not the reality....
     */
    if (enctype == ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_MD5)
        return 0;

    /*
     * XXX we assume everything can understand DES_CBC_CRC
     */
    if (enctype == ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_CRC)
        return 1;

    /*
     * If we have a key for the encryption system, we assume it's
     * supported.
     */
    return dbentry_has_key_for_enctype(context, client, enctype);
}

/*
 * This function returns the keytype which should be selected for the
 * session key.  It is based on the ordered list which the user
 * requested, and what the KDC and the application server can support.
 */
krb5_enctype
select_session_keytype(krb5_context context, krb5_db_entry *server,
                       int nktypes, krb5_enctype *ktype)
{
    int         i;

    for (i = 0; i < nktypes; i++) {
        if (!krb5_c_valid_enctype(ktype[i]))
            continue;

        if (!krb5_is_permitted_enctype(context, ktype[i]))
            continue;

        if (dbentry_supports_enctype(context, server, ktype[i]))
            return ktype[i];
    }
    return 0;
}

/*
 * This function returns salt information for a particular client_key
 */
krb5_error_code
get_salt_from_key(krb5_context context, krb5_principal client,
                  krb5_key_data *client_key, krb5_data *salt)
{
    krb5_error_code             retval;
    krb5_data *                 realm;

    salt->data = 0;
    salt->length = SALT_TYPE_NO_LENGTH;

    if (client_key->key_data_ver == 1)
        return 0;

    switch (client_key->key_data_type[1]) {
    case KRB5_KDB_SALTTYPE_NORMAL:
        /*
         * The client could infer the salt from the principal, but
         * might use the wrong principal name if this is an alias.  So
         * it's more reliable to send an explicit salt.
         */
        if ((retval = krb5_principal2salt(context, client, salt)))
            return retval;
        break;
    case KRB5_KDB_SALTTYPE_V4:
        /* send an empty (V4) salt */
        salt->data = 0;
        salt->length = 0;
        break;
    case KRB5_KDB_SALTTYPE_NOREALM:
        if ((retval = krb5_principal2salt_norealm(context, client, salt)))
            return retval;
        break;
    case KRB5_KDB_SALTTYPE_AFS3:
        /* send the same salt as with onlyrealm - but with no type info,
           we just hope they figure it out on the other end. */
        /* fall through to onlyrealm: */
    case KRB5_KDB_SALTTYPE_ONLYREALM:
        realm = krb5_princ_realm(context, client);
        salt->length = realm->length;
        if ((salt->data = malloc(realm->length)) == NULL)
            return ENOMEM;
        memcpy(salt->data, realm->data, realm->length);
        break;
    case KRB5_KDB_SALTTYPE_SPECIAL:
        salt->length = client_key->key_data_length[1];
        if ((salt->data = malloc(salt->length)) == NULL)
            return ENOMEM;
        memcpy(salt->data, client_key->key_data_contents[1], salt->length);
        break;
    }
    return 0;
}

/*
 * Limit strings to a "reasonable" length to prevent crowding out of
 * other useful information in the log entry
 */
#define NAME_LENGTH_LIMIT 128

void limit_string(char *name)
{
    int     i;

    if (!name)
        return;

    if (strlen(name) < NAME_LENGTH_LIMIT)
        return;

    i = NAME_LENGTH_LIMIT-4;
    name[i++] = '.';
    name[i++] = '.';
    name[i++] = '.';
    name[i] = '\0';
    return;
}

/*
 * L10_2 = log10(2**x), rounded up; log10(2) ~= 0.301.
 */
#define L10_2(x) ((int)(((x * 301) + 999) / 1000))

/*
 * Max length of sprintf("%ld") for an int of type T; includes leading
 * minus sign and terminating NUL.
 */
#define D_LEN(t) (L10_2(sizeof(t) * CHAR_BIT) + 2)

void
ktypes2str(char *s, size_t len, int nktypes, krb5_enctype *ktype)
{
    int i;
    char stmp[D_LEN(krb5_enctype) + 1];
    char *p;

    if (nktypes < 0
        || len < (sizeof(" etypes {...}") + D_LEN(int))) {
        *s = '\0';
        return;
    }

    snprintf(s, len, "%d etypes {", nktypes);
    for (i = 0; i < nktypes; i++) {
        snprintf(stmp, sizeof(stmp), "%s%ld", i ? " " : "", (long)ktype[i]);
        if (strlen(s) + strlen(stmp) + sizeof("}") > len)
            break;
        strlcat(s, stmp, len);
    }
    if (i < nktypes) {
        /*
         * We broke out of the loop. Try to truncate the list.
         */
        p = s + strlen(s);
        while (p - s + sizeof("...}") > len) {
            while (p > s && *p != ' ' && *p != '{')
                *p-- = '\0';
            if (p > s && *p == ' ') {
                *p-- = '\0';
                continue;
            }
        }
        strlcat(s, "...", len);
    }
    strlcat(s, "}", len);
    return;
}

void
rep_etypes2str(char *s, size_t len, krb5_kdc_rep *rep)
{
    char stmp[sizeof("ses=") + D_LEN(krb5_enctype)];

    if (len < (3 * D_LEN(krb5_enctype)
               + sizeof("etypes {rep= tkt= ses=}"))) {
        *s = '\0';
        return;
    }

    snprintf(s, len, "etypes {rep=%ld", (long)rep->enc_part.enctype);

    if (rep->ticket != NULL) {
        snprintf(stmp, sizeof(stmp),
                 " tkt=%ld", (long)rep->ticket->enc_part.enctype);
        strlcat(s, stmp, len);
    }

    if (rep->ticket != NULL
        && rep->ticket->enc_part2 != NULL
        && rep->ticket->enc_part2->session != NULL) {
        snprintf(stmp, sizeof(stmp), " ses=%ld",
                 (long)rep->ticket->enc_part2->session->enctype);
        strlcat(s, stmp, len);
    }
    strlcat(s, "}", len);
    return;
}

static krb5_error_code
verify_for_user_checksum(krb5_context context,
                         krb5_keyblock *key,
                         krb5_pa_for_user *req)
{
    krb5_error_code             code;
    int                         i;
    krb5_int32                  name_type;
    char                        *p;
    krb5_data                   data;
    krb5_boolean                valid = FALSE;

    if (!krb5_c_is_keyed_cksum(req->cksum.checksum_type)) {
        return KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_INAPP_CKSUM;
    }

    /*
     * Checksum is over name type and string components of
     * client principal name and auth_package.
     */
    data.length = 4;
    for (i = 0; i < krb5_princ_size(context, req->user); i++) {
        data.length += krb5_princ_component(context, req->user, i)->length;
    }
    data.length += krb5_princ_realm(context, req->user)->length;
    data.length += req->auth_package.length;

    p = data.data = malloc(data.length);
    if (data.data == NULL) {
        return ENOMEM;
    }

    name_type = krb5_princ_type(context, req->user);
    p[0] = (name_type >> 0 ) & 0xFF;
    p[1] = (name_type >> 8 ) & 0xFF;
    p[2] = (name_type >> 16) & 0xFF;
    p[3] = (name_type >> 24) & 0xFF;
    p += 4;

    for (i = 0; i < krb5_princ_size(context, req->user); i++) {
        memcpy(p, krb5_princ_component(context, req->user, i)->data,
               krb5_princ_component(context, req->user, i)->length);
        p += krb5_princ_component(context, req->user, i)->length;
    }

    memcpy(p, krb5_princ_realm(context, req->user)->data,
           krb5_princ_realm(context, req->user)->length);
    p += krb5_princ_realm(context, req->user)->length;

    memcpy(p, req->auth_package.data, req->auth_package.length);
    p += req->auth_package.length;

    code = krb5_c_verify_checksum(context,
                                  key,
                                  KRB5_KEYUSAGE_APP_DATA_CKSUM,
                                  &data,
                                  &req->cksum,
                                  &valid);

    if (code == 0 && valid == FALSE)
        code = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED;

    free(data.data);

    return code;
}

/*
 * Legacy protocol transition (Windows 2003 and above)
 */
static krb5_error_code
kdc_process_for_user(krb5_context context,
                     krb5_pa_data *pa_data,
                     krb5_keyblock *tgs_session,
                     krb5_pa_s4u_x509_user **s4u_x509_user,
                     const char **status)
{
    krb5_error_code             code;
    krb5_pa_for_user            *for_user;
    krb5_data                   req_data;

    req_data.length = pa_data->length;
    req_data.data = (char *)pa_data->contents;

    code = decode_krb5_pa_for_user(&req_data, &for_user);
    if (code)
        return code;

    code = verify_for_user_checksum(context, tgs_session, for_user);
    if (code) {
        *status = "INVALID_S4U2SELF_CHECKSUM";
        krb5_free_pa_for_user(kdc_context, for_user);
        return code;
    }

    *s4u_x509_user = calloc(1, sizeof(krb5_pa_s4u_x509_user));
    if (*s4u_x509_user == NULL) {
        krb5_free_pa_for_user(kdc_context, for_user);
        return ENOMEM;
    }

    (*s4u_x509_user)->user_id.user = for_user->user;
    for_user->user = NULL;
    krb5_free_pa_for_user(context, for_user);

    return 0;
}

static krb5_error_code
verify_s4u_x509_user_checksum(krb5_context context,
                              krb5_keyblock *key,
                              krb5_data *req_data,
                              krb5_int32 kdc_req_nonce,
                              krb5_pa_s4u_x509_user *req)
{
    krb5_error_code             code;
    krb5_data                   scratch;
    krb5_boolean                valid = FALSE;

    if (enctype_requires_etype_info_2(key->enctype) &&
        !krb5_c_is_keyed_cksum(req->cksum.checksum_type))
        return KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_INAPP_CKSUM;

    if (req->user_id.nonce != kdc_req_nonce)
        return KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED;

    /*
     * Verify checksum over the encoded userid. If that fails,
     * re-encode, and verify that. This is similar to the
     * behaviour in kdc_process_tgs_req().
     */
    if (fetch_asn1_field((unsigned char *)req_data->data, 1, 0, &scratch) < 0)
        return ASN1_PARSE_ERROR;

    code = krb5_c_verify_checksum(context,
                                  key,
                                  KRB5_KEYUSAGE_PA_S4U_X509_USER_REQUEST,
                                  &scratch,
                                  &req->cksum,
                                  &valid);
    if (code != 0)
        return code;

    if (valid == FALSE) {
        krb5_data *data;

        code = encode_krb5_s4u_userid(&req->user_id, &data);
        if (code != 0)
            return code;

        code = krb5_c_verify_checksum(context,
                                      key,
                                      KRB5_KEYUSAGE_PA_S4U_X509_USER_REQUEST,
                                      data,
                                      &req->cksum,
                                      &valid);

        krb5_free_data(context, data);

        if (code != 0)
            return code;
    }

    return valid ? 0 : KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED;
}

/*
 * New protocol transition request (Windows 2008 and above)
 */
static krb5_error_code
kdc_process_s4u_x509_user(krb5_context context,
                          krb5_kdc_req *request,
                          krb5_pa_data *pa_data,
                          krb5_keyblock *tgs_subkey,
                          krb5_keyblock *tgs_session,
                          krb5_pa_s4u_x509_user **s4u_x509_user,
                          const char **status)
{
    krb5_error_code             code;
    krb5_data                   req_data;

    req_data.length = pa_data->length;
    req_data.data = (char *)pa_data->contents;

    code = decode_krb5_pa_s4u_x509_user(&req_data, s4u_x509_user);
    if (code)
        return code;

    code = verify_s4u_x509_user_checksum(context,
                                         tgs_subkey ? tgs_subkey :
                                         tgs_session,
                                         &req_data,
                                         request->nonce, *s4u_x509_user);

    if (code) {
        *status = "INVALID_S4U2SELF_CHECKSUM";
        krb5_free_pa_s4u_x509_user(context, *s4u_x509_user);
        *s4u_x509_user = NULL;
        return code;
    }

    if (krb5_princ_size(context, (*s4u_x509_user)->user_id.user) == 0 ||
        (*s4u_x509_user)->user_id.subject_cert.length != 0) {
        *status = "INVALID_S4U2SELF_REQUEST";
        krb5_free_pa_s4u_x509_user(context, *s4u_x509_user);
        *s4u_x509_user = NULL;
        return KRB5KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
    }

    return 0;
}

krb5_error_code
kdc_make_s4u2self_rep(krb5_context context,
                      krb5_keyblock *tgs_subkey,
                      krb5_keyblock *tgs_session,
                      krb5_pa_s4u_x509_user *req_s4u_user,
                      krb5_kdc_rep *reply,
                      krb5_enc_kdc_rep_part *reply_encpart)
{
    krb5_error_code             code;
    krb5_data                   *data = NULL;
    krb5_pa_s4u_x509_user       rep_s4u_user;
    krb5_pa_data                padata;
    krb5_enctype                enctype;
    krb5_keyusage               usage;

    memset(&rep_s4u_user, 0, sizeof(rep_s4u_user));

    rep_s4u_user.user_id.nonce   = req_s4u_user->user_id.nonce;
    rep_s4u_user.user_id.user    = req_s4u_user->user_id.user;
    rep_s4u_user.user_id.options =
        req_s4u_user->user_id.options & KRB5_S4U_OPTS_USE_REPLY_KEY_USAGE;

    code = encode_krb5_s4u_userid(&rep_s4u_user.user_id, &data);
    if (code != 0)
        goto cleanup;

    if (req_s4u_user->user_id.options & KRB5_S4U_OPTS_USE_REPLY_KEY_USAGE)
        usage = KRB5_KEYUSAGE_PA_S4U_X509_USER_REPLY;
    else
        usage = KRB5_KEYUSAGE_PA_S4U_X509_USER_REQUEST;

    code = krb5_c_make_checksum(context, req_s4u_user->cksum.checksum_type,
                                tgs_subkey != NULL ? tgs_subkey : tgs_session,
                                usage, data,
                                &rep_s4u_user.cksum);
    if (code != 0)
        goto cleanup;

    krb5_free_data(context, data);
    data = NULL;

    code = encode_krb5_pa_s4u_x509_user(&rep_s4u_user, &data);
    if (code != 0)
        goto cleanup;

    padata.magic = KV5M_PA_DATA;
    padata.pa_type = KRB5_PADATA_S4U_X509_USER;
    padata.length = data->length;
    padata.contents = (krb5_octet *)data->data;

    code = add_pa_data_element(context, &padata, &reply->padata, FALSE);
    if (code != 0)
        goto cleanup;

    free(data);
    data = NULL;

    if (tgs_subkey != NULL)
        enctype = tgs_subkey->enctype;
    else
        enctype = tgs_session->enctype;

    /*
     * Owing to a bug in Windows, unkeyed checksums were used for older
     * enctypes, including rc4-hmac. A forthcoming workaround for this
     * includes the checksum bytes in the encrypted padata.
     */
    if ((req_s4u_user->user_id.options & KRB5_S4U_OPTS_USE_REPLY_KEY_USAGE) &&
        enctype_requires_etype_info_2(enctype) == FALSE) {
        padata.length = req_s4u_user->cksum.length +
            rep_s4u_user.cksum.length;
        padata.contents = malloc(padata.length);
        if (padata.contents == NULL) {
            code = ENOMEM;
            goto cleanup;
        }

        memcpy(padata.contents,
               req_s4u_user->cksum.contents,
               req_s4u_user->cksum.length);
        memcpy(&padata.contents[req_s4u_user->cksum.length],
               rep_s4u_user.cksum.contents,
               rep_s4u_user.cksum.length);

        code = add_pa_data_element(context,&padata,
                                   &reply_encpart->enc_padata, FALSE);
        if (code != 0)
            goto cleanup;
    }

cleanup:
    if (rep_s4u_user.cksum.contents != NULL)
        krb5_free_checksum_contents(context, &rep_s4u_user.cksum);
    krb5_free_data(context, data);

    return code;
}

/*
 * Protocol transition (S4U2Self)
 */
krb5_error_code
kdc_process_s4u2self_req(krb5_context context,
                         krb5_kdc_req *request,
                         krb5_const_principal client_princ,
                         const krb5_db_entry *server,
                         krb5_keyblock *tgs_subkey,
                         krb5_keyblock *tgs_session,
                         krb5_timestamp kdc_time,
                         krb5_pa_s4u_x509_user **s4u_x509_user,
                         krb5_db_entry **princ_ptr,
                         const char **status)
{
    krb5_error_code             code;
    krb5_pa_data                *pa_data;
    int                         flags;
    krb5_db_entry               *princ;

    *princ_ptr = NULL;

    pa_data = find_pa_data(request->padata, KRB5_PADATA_S4U_X509_USER);
    if (pa_data != NULL) {
        code = kdc_process_s4u_x509_user(context,
                                         request,
                                         pa_data,
                                         tgs_subkey,
                                         tgs_session,
                                         s4u_x509_user,
                                         status);
        if (code != 0)
            return code;
    } else {
        pa_data = find_pa_data(request->padata, KRB5_PADATA_FOR_USER);
        if (pa_data != NULL) {
            code = kdc_process_for_user(context,
                                        pa_data,
                                        tgs_session,
                                        s4u_x509_user,
                                        status);
            if (code != 0)
                return code;
        } else
            return 0;
    }

    /*
     * We need to compare the client name in the TGT with the requested
     * server name. Supporting server name aliases without assuming a
     * global name service makes this difficult to do.
     *
     * The comparison below handles the following cases (note that the
     * term "principal name" below excludes the realm).
     *
     * (1) The requested service is a host-based service with two name
     *     components, in which case we assume the principal name to
     *     contain sufficient qualifying information. The realm is
     *     ignored for the purpose of comparison.
     *
     * (2) The requested service name is an enterprise principal name:
     *     the service principal name is compared with the unparsed
     *     form of the client name (including its realm).
     *
     * (3) The requested service is some other name type: an exact
     *     match is required.
     *
     * An alternative would be to look up the server once again with
     * FLAG_CANONICALIZE | FLAG_CLIENT_REFERRALS_ONLY set, do an exact
     * match between the returned name and client_princ. However, this
     * assumes that the client set FLAG_CANONICALIZE when requesting
     * the TGT and that we have a global name service.
     */
    flags = 0;
    switch (krb5_princ_type(context, request->server)) {
    case KRB5_NT_SRV_HST:                   /* (1) */
        if (krb5_princ_size(context, request->server) == 2)
            flags |= KRB5_PRINCIPAL_COMPARE_IGNORE_REALM;
        break;
    case KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL:      /* (2) */
        flags |= KRB5_PRINCIPAL_COMPARE_ENTERPRISE;
        break;
    default:                                /* (3) */
        break;
    }

    if (!krb5_principal_compare_flags(context,
                                      request->server,
                                      client_princ,
                                      flags)) {
        *status = "INVALID_S4U2SELF_REQUEST";
        return KRB5KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN; /* match Windows error code */
    }

    /*
     * Protocol transition is mutually exclusive with renew/forward/etc
     * as well as user-to-user and constrained delegation. This check
     * is also made in validate_as_request().
     *
     * We can assert from this check that the header ticket was a TGT, as
     * that is validated previously in validate_tgs_request().
     */
    if (request->kdc_options & AS_INVALID_OPTIONS) {
        *status = "INVALID AS OPTIONS";
        return KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
    }

    /*
     * Do not attempt to lookup principals in foreign realms.
     */
    if (is_local_principal((*s4u_x509_user)->user_id.user)) {
        krb5_db_entry no_server;
        krb5_pa_data **e_data = NULL;

        code = krb5_db_get_principal(context, (*s4u_x509_user)->user_id.user,
                                     KRB5_KDB_FLAG_INCLUDE_PAC, &princ);
        if (code == KRB5_KDB_NOENTRY) {
            *status = "UNKNOWN_S4U2SELF_PRINCIPAL";
            return KRB5KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
        } else if (code) {
            *status = "LOOKING_UP_S4U2SELF_PRINCIPAL";
            return code; /* caller can free for_user */
        }

        memset(&no_server, 0, sizeof(no_server));

        code = validate_as_request(request, *princ,
                                   no_server, kdc_time, status, &e_data);
        if (code) {
            krb5_db_free_principal(context, princ);
            krb5_free_pa_data(context, e_data);
            return code;
        }

        *princ_ptr = princ;
    }

    return 0;
}

static krb5_error_code
check_allowed_to_delegate_to(krb5_context context, krb5_const_principal client,
                             const krb5_db_entry *server,
                             krb5_const_principal proxy)
{
    /* Can't get a TGT (otherwise it would be unconstrained delegation) */
    if (krb5_is_tgs_principal(proxy))
        return KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;

    /* Must be in same realm */
    if (!krb5_realm_compare(context, server->princ, proxy))
        return KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;

    return krb5_db_check_allowed_to_delegate(context, client, server, proxy);
}

krb5_error_code
kdc_process_s4u2proxy_req(krb5_context context,
                          krb5_kdc_req *request,
                          const krb5_enc_tkt_part *t2enc,
                          const krb5_db_entry *server,
                          krb5_const_principal server_princ,
                          krb5_const_principal proxy_princ,
                          const char **status)
{
    krb5_error_code errcode;

    /*
     * Constrained delegation is mutually exclusive with renew/forward/etc.
     * We can assert from this check that the header ticket was a TGT, as
     * that is validated previously in validate_tgs_request().
     */
    if (request->kdc_options & (NO_TGT_OPTION | KDC_OPT_ENC_TKT_IN_SKEY)) {
        return KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
    }

    /* Ensure that evidence ticket server matches TGT client */
    if (!krb5_principal_compare(kdc_context,
                                server->princ, /* after canon */
                                server_princ)) {
        return KRB5KDC_ERR_SERVER_NOMATCH;
    }

    if (!isflagset(t2enc->flags, TKT_FLG_FORWARDABLE)) {
        *status = "EVIDENCE_TKT_NOT_FORWARDABLE";
        return KRB5_TKT_NOT_FORWARDABLE;
    }

    /* Backend policy check */
    errcode = check_allowed_to_delegate_to(kdc_context,
                                           t2enc->client,
                                           server,
                                           proxy_princ);
    if (errcode) {
        *status = "NOT_ALLOWED_TO_DELEGATE";
        return errcode;
    }

    return 0;
}

krb5_error_code
kdc_check_transited_list(krb5_context context,
                         const krb5_data *trans,
                         const krb5_data *realm1,
                         const krb5_data *realm2)
{
    krb5_error_code             code;

    /* Check using krb5.conf */
    code = krb5_check_transited_list(kdc_context, trans, realm1, realm2);
    if (code)
        return code;

    /* Check against the KDB module. */
    code = krb5_db_check_transited_realms(context, trans, realm1, realm2);
    if (code == KRB5_PLUGIN_OP_NOTSUPP)
        code = 0;
    return code;
}

krb5_error_code
validate_transit_path(krb5_context context,
                      krb5_const_principal client,
                      krb5_db_entry *server,
                      krb5_db_entry *krbtgt)
{
    /* Incoming */
    if (isflagset(server->attributes, KRB5_KDB_XREALM_NON_TRANSITIVE)) {
        return KRB5KDC_ERR_PATH_NOT_ACCEPTED;
    }

    /* Outgoing */
    if (isflagset(krbtgt->attributes, KRB5_KDB_XREALM_NON_TRANSITIVE) &&
        (!krb5_principal_compare(context, server->princ, krbtgt->princ) ||
         !krb5_realm_compare(context, client, krbtgt->princ))) {
        return KRB5KDC_ERR_PATH_NOT_ACCEPTED;
    }

    return 0;
}


/* Main logging routines for ticket requests.

   There are a few simple cases -- unparseable requests mainly --
   where messages are logged otherwise, but once a ticket request can
   be decoded in some basic way, these routines are used for logging
   the details.  */

/* "status" is null to indicate success.  */
/* Someday, pass local address/port as well.  */
/* Currently no info about name canonicalization is logged.  */
void
log_as_req(const krb5_fulladdr *from,
           krb5_kdc_req *request, krb5_kdc_rep *reply,
           krb5_db_entry *client, const char *cname,
           krb5_db_entry *server, const char *sname,
           krb5_timestamp authtime,
           const char *status, krb5_error_code errcode, const char *emsg)
{
    const char *fromstring = 0;
    char fromstringbuf[70];
    char ktypestr[128];
    const char *cname2 = cname ? cname : "<unknown client>";
    const char *sname2 = sname ? sname : "<unknown server>";

    fromstring = inet_ntop(ADDRTYPE2FAMILY (from->address->addrtype),
                           from->address->contents,
                           fromstringbuf, sizeof(fromstringbuf));
    if (!fromstring)
        fromstring = "<unknown>";
    ktypes2str(ktypestr, sizeof(ktypestr),
               request->nktypes, request->ktype);

    if (status == NULL) {
        /* success */
        char rep_etypestr[128];
        rep_etypes2str(rep_etypestr, sizeof(rep_etypestr), reply);
        krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_INFO, _("AS_REQ (%s) %s: ISSUE: authtime %d, %s, "
                                     "%s for %s"),
                         ktypestr, fromstring, authtime,
                         rep_etypestr, cname2, sname2);
    } else {
        /* fail */
        krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_INFO, _("AS_REQ (%s) %s: %s: %s for %s%s%s"),
                         ktypestr, fromstring, status,
                         cname2, sname2, emsg ? ", " : "", emsg ? emsg : "");
    }
    krb5_db_audit_as_req(kdc_context, request, client, server, authtime,
                         errcode);
#if 0
    /* Sun (OpenSolaris) version would probably something like this.
       The client and server names passed can be null, unlike in the
       logging routines used above.  Note that a struct in_addr is
       used, but the real address could be an IPv6 address.  */
    audit_krb5kdc_as_req(some in_addr *, (in_port_t)from->port, 0,
                         cname, sname, errcode);
#endif
}

/* Here "status" must be non-null.  Error code
   KRB5KDC_ERR_SERVER_NOMATCH is handled specially.

   Currently no info about name canonicalization is logged.  */
void
log_tgs_req(const krb5_fulladdr *from,
            krb5_kdc_req *request, krb5_kdc_rep *reply,
            const char *cname, const char *sname, const char *altcname,
            krb5_timestamp authtime,
            unsigned int c_flags, const char *s4u_name,
            const char *status, krb5_error_code errcode, const char *emsg)
{
    char ktypestr[128];
    const char *fromstring = 0;
    char fromstringbuf[70];
    char rep_etypestr[128];

    fromstring = inet_ntop(ADDRTYPE2FAMILY(from->address->addrtype),
                           from->address->contents,
                           fromstringbuf, sizeof(fromstringbuf));
    if (!fromstring)
        fromstring = "<unknown>";
    ktypes2str(ktypestr, sizeof(ktypestr), request->nktypes, request->ktype);
    if (!errcode)
        rep_etypes2str(rep_etypestr, sizeof(rep_etypestr), reply);
    else
        rep_etypestr[0] = 0;

    /* Differences: server-nomatch message logs 2nd ticket's client
       name (useful), and doesn't log ktypestr (probably not
       important).  */
    if (errcode != KRB5KDC_ERR_SERVER_NOMATCH) {
        krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_INFO, _("TGS_REQ (%s) %s: %s: authtime %d, %s%s "
                                     "%s for %s%s%s"),
                         ktypestr, fromstring, status, authtime, rep_etypestr,
                         !errcode ? "," : "",
                         cname ? cname : "<unknown client>",
                         sname ? sname : "<unknown server>",
                         errcode ? ", " : "", errcode ? emsg : "");
        if (s4u_name) {
            assert(isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_PROTOCOL_TRANSITION) ||
                   isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CONSTRAINED_DELEGATION));
            if (isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_PROTOCOL_TRANSITION))
                krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_INFO,
                                 _("... PROTOCOL-TRANSITION s4u-client=%s"),
                                 s4u_name);
            else if (isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CONSTRAINED_DELEGATION))
                krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_INFO,
                                 _("... CONSTRAINED-DELEGATION s4u-client=%s"),
                                 s4u_name);
        }
    } else
        krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_INFO, _("TGS_REQ %s: %s: authtime %d, %s for %s, "
                                     "2nd tkt client %s"),
                         fromstring, status, authtime,
                         cname ? cname : "<unknown client>",
                         sname ? sname : "<unknown server>",
                         altcname ? altcname : "<unknown>");

    /* OpenSolaris: audit_krb5kdc_tgs_req(...)  or
       audit_krb5kdc_tgs_req_2ndtktmm(...) */
}

void
log_tgs_alt_tgt(krb5_principal p)
{
    char *sname;
    if (krb5_unparse_name(kdc_context, p, &sname)) {
        krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_INFO,
                         _("TGS_REQ: issuing alternate <un-unparseable> TGT"));
    } else {
        limit_string(sname);
        krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_INFO, _("TGS_REQ: issuing TGT %s"), sname);
        free(sname);
    }
    /* OpenSolaris: audit_krb5kdc_tgs_req_alt_tgt(...) */
}

krb5_boolean
enctype_requires_etype_info_2(krb5_enctype enctype)
{
    switch(enctype) {
    case ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_CRC:
    case ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_MD4:
    case ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_MD5:
    case ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_SHA1:
    case ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_RAW:
    case ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC:
    case ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC_EXP :
        return 0;
    default:
        return krb5_c_valid_enctype(enctype);
    }
}

/* XXX where are the generic helper routines for this? */
krb5_error_code
add_pa_data_element(krb5_context context,
                    krb5_pa_data *padata,
                    krb5_pa_data ***inout_padata,
                    krb5_boolean copy)
{
    int                         i;
    krb5_pa_data                **p;

    if (*inout_padata != NULL) {
        for (i = 0; (*inout_padata)[i] != NULL; i++)
            ;
    } else
        i = 0;

    p = realloc(*inout_padata, (i + 2) * sizeof(krb5_pa_data *));
    if (p == NULL)
        return ENOMEM;

    *inout_padata = p;

    p[i] = (krb5_pa_data *)malloc(sizeof(krb5_pa_data));
    if (p[i] == NULL)
        return ENOMEM;
    *(p[i]) = *padata;

    p[i + 1] = NULL;

    if (copy) {
        p[i]->contents = (krb5_octet *)malloc(padata->length);
        if (p[i]->contents == NULL) {
            free(p[i]);
            p[i] = NULL;
            return ENOMEM;
        }

        memcpy(p[i]->contents, padata->contents, padata->length);
    }

    return 0;
}

void
kdc_get_ticket_endtime(krb5_context context,
                       krb5_timestamp starttime,
                       krb5_timestamp endtime,
                       krb5_timestamp till,
                       krb5_db_entry *client,
                       krb5_db_entry *server,
                       krb5_timestamp *out_endtime)
{
    krb5_timestamp until, life;

    if (till == 0)
        till = kdc_infinity;

    until = min(till, endtime);

    life = until - starttime;

    if (client != NULL && client->max_life != 0)
        life = min(life, client->max_life);
    if (server->max_life != 0)
        life = min(life, server->max_life);
    if (max_life_for_realm != 0)
        life = min(life, max_life_for_realm);

    *out_endtime = starttime + life;
}

/**
 * Handle protected negotiation of FAST using enc_padata
 * - If ENCPADATA_REQ_ENC_PA_REP is present, then:
 * - Return ENCPADATA_REQ_ENC_PA_REP with checksum of AS-REQ from client
 * - Include PADATA_FX_FAST in the enc_padata to indicate FAST
 * @pre @c out_enc_padata has space for at least two more padata
 * @param index in/out index into @c out_enc_padata for next item
 */
krb5_error_code
kdc_handle_protected_negotiation(krb5_data *req_pkt, krb5_kdc_req *request,
                                 const krb5_keyblock *reply_key,
                                 krb5_pa_data ***out_enc_padata)
{
    krb5_error_code retval = 0;
    krb5_checksum checksum;
    krb5_data *out = NULL;
    krb5_pa_data pa, *pa_in;
    pa_in = krb5int_find_pa_data(kdc_context, request->padata,
                                 KRB5_ENCPADATA_REQ_ENC_PA_REP);
    if (pa_in == NULL)
        return 0;
    pa.magic = KV5M_PA_DATA;
    pa.pa_type = KRB5_ENCPADATA_REQ_ENC_PA_REP;
    memset(&checksum, 0, sizeof(checksum));
    retval = krb5_c_make_checksum(kdc_context,0, reply_key,
                                  KRB5_KEYUSAGE_AS_REQ, req_pkt, &checksum);
    if (retval != 0)
        goto cleanup;
    retval = encode_krb5_checksum(&checksum, &out);
    if (retval != 0)
        goto cleanup;
    pa.contents = (krb5_octet *) out->data;
    pa.length = out->length;
    retval = add_pa_data_element(kdc_context, &pa, out_enc_padata, FALSE);
    if (retval)
        goto cleanup;
    out->data = NULL;
    pa.magic = KV5M_PA_DATA;
    pa.pa_type = KRB5_PADATA_FX_FAST;
    pa.length = 0;
    pa.contents = NULL;
    retval = add_pa_data_element(kdc_context, &pa, out_enc_padata, FALSE);
cleanup:
    if (checksum.contents)
        krb5_free_checksum_contents(kdc_context, &checksum);
    if (out != NULL)
        krb5_free_data(kdc_context, out);
    return retval;
}


krb5_error_code
krb5int_get_domain_realm_mapping(krb5_context context,
                                 const char *host, char ***realmsp)
{
    char **retrealms;
    char *realm, *cp, *temp_realm;
    krb5_error_code retval;
    char temp_host[MAX_DNS_NAMELEN+1];

    /* do sanity check and lower-case */
    retval = krb5int_clean_hostname(context, host, temp_host, sizeof temp_host);
    if (retval)
        return retval;
    /*
      Search for the best match for the host or domain.
      Example: Given a host a.b.c.d, try to match on:
      1) a.b.c.d  2) .b.c.d.   3) b.c.d  4)  .c.d  5) c.d  6) .d   7) d
    */

    cp = temp_host;
    realm = (char *)NULL;
    temp_realm = 0;
    while (cp ) {
        retval = profile_get_string(context->profile, KRB5_CONF_DOMAIN_REALM, cp,
                                    0, (char *)NULL, &temp_realm);
        if (retval)
            return retval;
        if (temp_realm != (char *)NULL)
            break;        /* Match found */

        /* Setup for another test */
        if (*cp == '.') {
            cp++;
        } else {
            cp = strchr(cp, '.');
        }
    }
    if (temp_realm != (char*)NULL) {
        realm = strdup(temp_realm);
        profile_release_string(temp_realm);
        if (!realm) {
            return ENOMEM;
        }
    }
    retrealms = (char **)calloc(2, sizeof(*retrealms));
    if (!retrealms) {
        if (realm != (char *)NULL)
            free(realm);
        return ENOMEM;
    }

    retrealms[0] = realm;
    retrealms[1] = 0;

    *realmsp = retrealms;
    return 0;
}

krb5_error_code
make_toolong_error (void *handle, krb5_data **out)
{
    krb5_error errpkt;
    krb5_error_code retval;
    krb5_data *scratch;

    retval = krb5_us_timeofday(kdc_context, &errpkt.stime, &errpkt.susec);
    if (retval)
        return retval;
    errpkt.error = KRB_ERR_FIELD_TOOLONG;
    errpkt.server = tgs_server;
    errpkt.client = NULL;
    errpkt.cusec = 0;
    errpkt.ctime = 0;
    errpkt.text.length = 0;
    errpkt.text.data = 0;
    errpkt.e_data.length = 0;
    errpkt.e_data.data = 0;
    scratch = malloc(sizeof(*scratch));
    if (scratch == NULL)
        return ENOMEM;
    retval = krb5_mk_error(kdc_context, &errpkt, scratch);
    if (retval) {
        free(scratch);
        return retval;
    }

    *out = scratch;
    return 0;
}

krb5_context get_context(void *handle)
{
    return kdc_context;
}

void reset_for_hangup()
{
    int k;

    for (k = 0; k < kdc_numrealms; k++)
        krb5_db_refresh_config(kdc_realmlist[k]->realm_context);
}
