| John Locke (1632-1704) |
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John Locke was born at Wrington, a village in Somerset, on August 29, 1632. He was the son of a country solicitor and small landowner who, when the civil war broke out, served as a captain of horse in the parliamentary army. "I no sooner perceived myself in the world than I found myself in a storm," he wrote long afterwards, during the lull in the storm which followed the king's return. But political unrest does not seem to have seriously disturbed the course of his education. He entered Westminster school in 1646, and passed to Christ Church, Oxford, as a junior student, in 1652; and he had a home there (though absent from it for long periods) for more than thirty years -- till deprived of his studentship by royal mandate in 1684. The official studies of the university were uncongenial to him; he would have preferred to have learned philosophy from Descartes instead of from Aristotle; but evidently he satisfied the authorities, for he was elected to a senior studentship in 1659, and, in the three or four years following, he took part in the tutorial work of the college. At one time he seems to have thought of the clerical profession as a possible career; but he declined an offer of preferment in 1666, and in the same year obtained a dispensation which enabled him to hold his studentship without taking orders. About the same time we hear of his interest in experimental science, and he was elected a fellow of the Royal Society in 1668. Little is known of his early medical studies. He cannot have followed the regular course, for he was unable to obtain the degree of doctor of medicine. It was not till 1674 that he graduated as bachelor of medicine. In the following January his position in Christ Church was regularized by his appointment to one of the two medical studentships of the college.
His knowledge of medicine and occasional practice of the art led, in 1666, to an acquaintance with Lord Ashley (afterwards, from 1672, Earl of Shaftesbury). The acquaintance, begun accidentally, had an immediate effect on Locke's career. Without serving his connection with Oxford, he became a member of Shaftesbury's household, and seems soon to have been looked upon as indispensable in all matters domestic and political. He saved the statesman's life by a skillful operation, arranged a suitable marriage for his heir, attended the lady in her confinement, and directed the nursing and education of her son -- afterwards famous as the author of Characteristics. He assisted Shaftesbury also in public business, commercial and political, and followed him into the government service. When Shaftesbury was made lord chancellor in 1672, Locke became his secretary for presentations to benefices, and, in the following year, was made secretary to the board of trade. In 1675 his official life came to an end for the time with the fall of his chief.
Locke's health, always delicate, suffered from the London climate. When released from the cares of office, he left England in search of health. Ten years earlier he had his first experience of foreign travel and of public employment, as secretary to Sir Walter Vane, ambassador to the Elector of Brandenburg during the first Dutch war. On his return to England, early in 1666, he declined an offer of further service in Spain, and settled again in Oxford, but was soon induced by Shaftesbury to spend a great part of his time in London. On his release from office in 1675 he sought milder air in the south of France, made leisurely journeys, and settled down for many months at Montpellier. The journal which he kept at this period is full of minute descriptions of places and customs and institutions. It contains also a record of many of the reflections that afterwards took shape in the Essay concerning Human Understanding. he returned to England in 1679, when his patron had again a short spell of office. He does not seem to have been concerned in Shaftesbury's later schemes; but suspicion naturally fell upon him, and he found it prudent to take refuge in Holland. This he did in August 1683, less than a year after the flight and death of Shaftesbury. Even in Holland for some time he was not safe from danger of arrest at the instance of the English government; he moved from town to town, lived under an assumed name, and visited his friends by stealth. His residence in Holland brought political occupations with it, among the men who were preparing the English revolution. it had at least equal value in the leisure which it gave him for literary work and in the friendships which it offered. In particular, he formed a close intimacy with Philip van Limbroch, the leader of the Remonstrant clergy, and the scholar and liberal theologian to whom Epistola de Tolerantia was dedicated. This letter was completed in 1685, though not published at the time; and, before he left for England, in February 1689, the Essay concerning Human Understanding seems to have attained its final form, and an abstract of it was published in Leclerc's Bibliotheque universelle in 1688.
The new government recognized his services to the cause of freedom by
the offer of the post of ambassador either at Berlin or at Vienna. But
Locke was no place hunter; he was solicitous also on account of his
health; his earlier experience of Germany led him to fear the "cold
air" and "warm drinking"; and the high office was declined. But he
served less important offices at home. He was made commissioner of
appeals in May 1689, and, from 1696 to 1700, he was a commissioner of
trade and plantations at a salary of L1000 a year. Although official
duties called him to town for protracted periods, he was able to fix
his residence in the country. In 1691 he was persuaded to make his
permanent home at Oates in Essex, in the house of Francis and Lady
Masham. Lady Masham was a daughter of Cudworth, the Cambridge
Platonist; Lock had manifested a growing sympathy with his type of
liberal theology; intellectual affinity increased his friendship with
the family at Oates; and he continued to live with them till his death
on October 28, 1704.
Writings
With the exception of the abstract of the Essay and other
less important contributions to the Bibliotheque universelle,
Locke had not published anything before his return to England in 1689;
and by this time he was in his fifty-seventh year. But many years of
reflection and preparation made him ready at that time to publish
books in rapid succession. In March 1689 his Epistola de
Tolerantia was published in Holland; an English translation of the
same, by William Popple, appeared later in the same year, and in a
corrected edition in 1690. The controversy which followed this work
led, on Locke's part, to the publication of a Second Letter
(1690), and then a Third Letter (1692). In February 1690 the
book entitled Two Treatises of Government was published, and in
March of the same year appeared the long expected Essay concerning
Human Understanding, on which he had been at work intermittently
since 1671. it met with immediate success, and led to a voluminous
literature of attack and reply; young fellows of colleges tried to
introduce it at the universities, and heads of houses sat in conclave
to devise means for its suppression. To one of his critics Locke
replied at length. This was Edward Stillingfleet, bishop of Worcester,
who, in his Vindication of the Doctrine of the Trinity (1696),
had attacked the new philosophy. It was the theological consequences
which were drawn from the doctrines of the Essay, not so much
by Locke himself as by Toland, in his Christianity not
Mysterious, that the bishop had chiefly in view; in philosophy for
its own sake he does not seem to have been interested. But his
criticism drew attention to one of the least satisfactory (if also one
of the most suggestive) doctrines of the Essay -- its
explanation of the idea of substance; and discredit was thrown on the
"new way of ideas" in general. In January 1697 Locke replied in A
Letter to the Bishop of Worcester. Stillingfleet answered this in
May; and Locke was ready with a second letter in August. Stillingfleet
replied in 1698, and Locke's lengthy third letter appeared in
1699. The bishop's death, later in the same year, put an end to the
controversy. The second edition of the Essay was published in
1694, the third in 1695, and the fourth in 1700. The second and fourth
editions contained important additions. An abridgement of it appeared
in 1696, by John Wynne, fellow of Jesus College, Oxford; it was
translated into Latin and into French soon after the appearance of the
fourth edition. The later editions contain many modifications due to
the author's correspondence with William Molyneux, of Trinity College,
Dublin, a devoted disciple, for whom Locke had a worm
friendship. Other correspondents and visitors to Oates during these
years were Isaac Newton and Anthony Collins, a young squire of the
neighborhood, who afterwards made his mark in the intellectual
controversies of the time.
Other interests also occupied Locke during the years following the
publication of his great work. The financial difficulties of the new
government led in 1691 to his publication of Some Considerations of
the Consequences of Lowering of Interest, and Raising the Value of
Money, and of Further Considerations on the latter
question, four years later. In 1693 he published Some Thoughts
concerning Education, a work founded on letters written to a
friend, and in 1695 appeared The Reasonableness of
Christianity, and later A Vindication of the same against
certain objections; and this was followed by a second vindication two
years afterwards. Locke's religious interest had always been strongly
marked, and, in he later years of his life, much of his tie was given
to theology. Among the writings of his which were published after his
death are commentaries on the Pauline epistles, and a Discourse on
Miracles, as well as a fragment of a Fourth Letter for
Toleration. The posthumously published writings include
further An Examination of Father Malebranche's Opinion of Seeing
all things in God, Remarks on Some of Mr Norris's Books,
and -- most important of all -- the small treatise on The Conduct
of the Understanding which had been originally designed as a
chapter of the Essay.
Plan of
the Essay
Locke's greatest philosophical contribution is his Essay,
and we have his own account of the origin of that work. In the winter
of 1670, five or six friends were conversing in his room, probably in
London. The topic was the "principles of morality and revealed
religion," but difficulties arose and no progress was made. Then, he
goes on to say, "it came into my thoughts that we took a wrong course,
and that before we set ourselves upon inquiries of that nature, it was
necessary to examine our own abilities, and see what objects our
understandings were, or were not, fitted to deal with." At the request
of his friends, Locke agreed to set down his thoughts on this question
at their next meeting, and he expected that a single sheet of paper
would suffice for the purpose. Little did he realize the magnitude of
the issue which he raised, and that it would occupy his leisure for
nearly twenty years.
Locke's interest centers on traditional philosophical topics: the
nature of the self, the world, God, and the grounds of our knowledge
of them. We reach these questions only in the fourth and last book of
the Essay. The first three books are preliminary, though they
have, and Locke saw that they had, an importance of their own. His
introductory sentence makes this plain:
Locke will not "meddle with the physical consideration of the mind";
he has no theory about its essence or its relation to the body; at the
same time, he has no doubt that, if due pains be taken, the
understanding can be studied like anything else: we can observe its
object and the ways in which it operates upon them. The Essay
is divided into four books; the first is a polemic against the
doctrine of innate principles and ideas. The second deals with ideas,
the third with words, and the fourth with knowledge.
Ideas in
General
All the objects of the understanding are described as ideas,
and ideas are spoken of as being in the mind (Intro. 2; Bk. 2:1:5;
Bk. 2:8:8). Locke's first problem, therefore, is to trace the origin
and history of ideas, and the ways in which the understanding operates
upon them, in order that he may be able to see what knowledge is and
how far it reaches. This wide use of the term "idea" is inherited from
Descartes. The contemporary term which corresponds with it most nearly
is "presentation". But presentation is, strictly, only one variety of
Locke's idea, which includes also representation and image,
perception, and concept or notion. His usage of the term thus differs
so widely from the old Platonic meaning that the danger of confusion
between them is not great. It suited the author's purpose also from
being a familiar word in ordinary discourse as well as in the language
of philosophers. Herein, however, lays danger from which he did not
escape. In common usage "idea" carries with it a suggestion of
contrast with reality; this is not supposed in Locke's use.
In the first book of the Essay, on the subject of innate ideas, Locke points to the variety of
human experience, and to the difficulty of forming general and
abstract ideas, and he ridicules the view that any such ideas can be
antecedent to experience. All the parts of our knowledge, he insists,
have the same rank and the same history regarding their origin in
experience. It is in its most extreme form that the doctrine of innate
ideas is attacked; but he cannot seen any middle ground between that
extreme doctrine and his own view that all ideas have their origin in
experience. Indeed, it is difficult to determine against whom the
argument is directed. But when we note Locke's polemical interest in
the question, and remember the significance for him of the empirical
origin of all the elements of human knowledge, we can be content to
see in it an earnest protest against the principle of authority, a
vindication of our right to examine critically all the so-called
"principles" of human knowledge.
Locke wishes to avoid any presupposition about matter, or mind, or
their relation. It is not difficult to see that the notions which he
has expelled often re-enter. But the peculiar value of his approach
consists in his attempt to keep clear of them. He begins neither with
ind nor matter, but with ideas. Their existence needs no proof:
"everyone is conscious of them in himself, and men's words and actions
will satisfy him that they are in others." His first inquiry is "how
they come into the mind"; has next business is to show that they
constitute the whole material of our knowledge. In his answer to the
former question we discover the influence of traditional philosophy,
or rather of ordinary common sense views of existence, upon his
views. All our ideas, he says, come from experience. The mind has no
innate ideas, but it has innate faculties: it perceives, remembers,
and combines the ideas that come to it from without; it also desires,
deliberates, and wills; and these mental activities are themselves the
source of a new class of ideas. Experience is therefore twofold. Our
observation may be employed either about external sensible objects, or
about the internal operations of our minds. The former is the source
of most of the ideas which we have, and, as it depends "wholly upon
our senses," is called "sensation." The latter is a source of ideas
which "every man has wholly in himself," and it might be called
"internal sense"; to it he gives the name "reflection."
Simple and
Complex Ideas
There are no innate ideas "stamped upon the mind" from birth; and
yet impressions of sense are not the only source of knowledge: "The
mind furnishes the understanding with ideas" (Bk. 2:1:5). No
distinction is implied here between "mind" and "understanding", so
that the sentence might run, "the mind furnishes itself with ideas."
As to what these ideas are, we are not left in doubt: they are "ideas
of its own operations." When the mind acts, it has an idea of its
action, that is, it is self-conscious, and, as such, is assumed to be
an original source of our knowledge. Hume and Condilac both refused to
admit reflection as an original source of ideas, and both,
accordingly, found that they had to face the problem of tracing the
growth of self-consciousness out of a succession of
sensations. According to Locke, reflection is an original, rather than
an independent, source of ideas. Without sensation mind would have
nothing to operate upon, and therefore could have no ideas of its
operations. It is "when he first has any sensation" that "a man begins
to have any ideas" (Bk. 2:1:23). The operations of the mind are not
themselves produced by sensation, but sensation is required to give
the mind material for working on.
The ideas which sensation gives "enter by the senses simple
and unmixed" (Bk. 2:2:1); they stand in need of the activity
of mind to bind them into the complex unities required for
knowledge. The complex ideas of substance, modes, and
relations are all the product of the combining and abstracting
activity of mind operating upon simple ideas, which have been
given, without any connection, by sensation or
reflection. Locke's account of knowledge thus has two
sides. On the one side, all the material of knowledge is
traced to the simple idea. On the other side, the processes
which transform this crude material into knowledge are
activities of mind which themselves cannot be reduced to
ideas. Locke's metaphors of the tabula rasa, "white
paper" (Bk. 2:2:1), and "dark room" misled his critics and
suggested to some of his followers a theory very different
from his own. The metaphors only illustrate what he had in
hand at the moment. Without experience, no characters are
written on the "tablets" of the mind; except through the
"windows" of sensation and reflection, no light enters the
understanding. No ideas are innate; and there is no source of
new simple ideas other than those two. But knowledge involves
relations, and relations are the work of the mind; it requires
complex ideas, and complex ideas are mental formations. Simple
ideas do not, of themselves, enter into relation and form
complex ideas. Locke does not, like Hobbes before him and Hume
and Condillac after him, look to some unexplained natural
attraction of idea for idea as bringing about these
formations. Indeed, his treatment of "the association of
ideas" is an afterthought, and did not appear in the earlier
editions of the Essay.
Starting from the simple ideas which we get from sensation, or
from observing mental operations as they take place, Locke has
two things to explain: the universal element, that is, the
general conceptions with which knowledge is concerned or which
it implies; and the reference to reality which it claims. With
the former problem Locke deals at great length; and the
general method of his exposition is clear enough. Complex
ideas arise from simple ideas by the processes of combination
and abstraction carried out by the mind. It would be unfair to
expect completeness from his enterprise: but it cannot be
denied that his intricate and subtle discussions left many
problems unsolved. Indeed, this is one of his great merits. He
raised questions in such a way as to provoke further
enquiry. Principles such as the causal relation, apart from
which knowledge of nature would be impossible, are quietly
taken for granted, often without any enquiry into the grounds
for assuming them. Further, the difficulty of accounting for
universals is unduly simplified by describing certain products
as simple ideas, although thought has obviously been at work
upon them.
In this connection an important inconsistency becomes apparent
in his account of the primary data of experience. It is,
indeed, impossible even to name the mere particular -- the
"this, here, and now" of sense -- without giving it a flavor
of generality. But, at the outset, Locke tries to get as near
it as possible. Simple ideas (of sensation) are exemplified by
yellow, white, heat, cold, soft, hard, and so forth
(Bk. 2:1:3). But, towards the end of the second book
(Bk. 2:21:75), a very different list is given: extension,
solidity, and mobility (from sensation); perceptivity and
motivity (from reflection); and existence, duration, and
number (from both sensation and reflection). These are said to
be "our original ideas," and the rest to be "derived" form or
to "depend" on them. It is difficult to compare the two lists,
instance by instance; but one example may be taken. According
to the first list, hard is a simple idea; according to
the second list, solidity is the original (and
therefore simple) idea, and hard will be derived from
it and depend on it. It is clear that, in making the former
list, Lock was trying to get back to the primary data of our
individual experience; whereas, in the second list, he is
rather thinking of the objective reality on which our
experience depends and which, he assumes, it reveals. But he
does not observe the difference. He seems to forget his view
that the original of all knowledge is to be found in the
particular, in something "simple and unmixed." Thus he says
without hesitation, "If any one asks me, what this solidity
is, I send him to the senses to inform him. Let him put a
flint of a football between his hands, and then endeavour to
join them, and he will know" (Bk. 2:4:4). But he will not know
without going a long way beyond the simple idea. The simple
ideas in the case are certain muscular and tactual sensations;
and he interprets these by other means (including knowledge of
external objects and his own organism) when he says that the
flint or the football is solid.
His doctrine of modes is also affected by this same
inattention of the fact that a simple idea must be really
simple. Thus he holds that "space and extension" is a simple
idea given both by sight and by touch (Bk. 2:4). One would
expect, therefore, that the original and simple idea of space
would be the particular patch seen at any moment or the
particular "feel" of the exploring limb. But we are told that
"each idea of any different distance, or space, is a simple
mode" or the idea of space (Bk. 2:8:4). Here again the simple
idea is generalized. He professes to begin with the mere
particulars of external and internal sense, and to show how
knowledge -- which is necessarily general -- is evolved from
them. But, in doing so, he assumes a general or universal
element as already given in the simple idea.
Having gone so far, he might almost have been expected to take
a further step and treat the perceptions of particular things
as modes of the simple idea substance. But this he does not
do. Substance is an idea regarding which he was in earnest
with his own fundamental theory (however, he was perplexed
about the origin of the idea of "substance in general" as well
as of the ideas of "particular sorts of substances;
Bk. 2:23:2-3). He admits that substance is a complex idea;
that is to say, it is formed by the mind's action out of
simple ideas. Now, this idea of substance marks the difference
between having sensations and perceiving things. Its
importance, therefore, is clear; but there is no clearness in
explaining it. We are told that there is a "supposed or
confused idea of substance" to which are joined, for example,
"the simple idea of a dull whitish colour, with certain
degrees of weight, hardness, ductility and fusibility," and,
as a result, "we have the idea of lead."
A difficulty might have been avoided if substance could have
been interpreted as simply the combination by the
understanding of white, hard, etc., or some similar cluster of
ideas of sensation. But it was not Locke's way thus to ignore
facts. He sees that something more is needed than these ideas
of sensation. They are only joined to "the supposed or
confused idea of substance," which is there and "always the
first and chief" (Bk. 2:12:6). He holds to it that the idea is
a complex idea and so mad by the mind; but he is entirely at a
loss to account for the materials out of which it is made. We
cannot imagine how simple ideas can subsist by themselves, and
so "we accustom ourselves to suppose some substratum wherein
they do subsist," and this we call substance. In one place, he
even vacillates between the assertions that we have no clear
idea of substance and that we have no idea of it at all "
(Bk. 1:3:19). It is "a supposition of he knows not what." This
uncertainty, as will appear presently, throws its shadow over
our whole knowledge of nature.
Primary and Secondary Qualities
The "new way of ideas" is thus hard put to it in accounting for the
universal element in knowledge; it has even greater difficulties to
face in defending the reality of knowledge. And, in the latter case,
the author does not see the difficulties so clearly. His view is that
the simple idea is the test and standard of reality. Whatever the mind
contributes to our ideas removes them further from the reality of
things; in becoming general, knowledge loses touch with things. But
not all simple ideas carry with them the same significance for
reality. Colours, smells, tastes, sounds, and the like are simple
ideas, yet nothing resembles them in the bodies themselves; but, owing
to a certain bulk, figure, and motion of their insensible parts,
bodies have "a power to produce those sensations in us." These,
therefore, as called "secondary
qualities of bodies." On the other hand, "solidity, extension,
figure, motion or rest, and number" are also held by Locke to be
simple ideas; and these are resemblances of qualities in body; "their
patterns do really exist in the bodies themselves"; accordingly, they
are "primary qualities of bodies." In
this way, by implication if not expressly, Locke severs, instead of
establishing, the connection between simple ideas and reality. The
only ideas which can make good their claim to be regarded as simple
ideas have nothing resembling them in things. Other ideas, no doubt,
are said to resemble bodily qualities (an assertion for which no proof
is given and none is possible); but these ideas have only a doubtful
claim to rank as simple ideas. Locke's prevailing tendency is to
identify reality with the simple idea, but he sometimes comes close to
the opposite view that the reference to reality is the work of
thought.
Knowledge of Mathematics, Ethics, the Self, and
God
In the fourth book of his Essay Locke applies the results
of the earlier books to determine the nature and extent of
knowledge. As ideas are the sole immediate objects of the mind,
knowledge can be nothing else than "the perception of the connexion of
and agreement, or disagreement and repugnancy, or any of our ideas."
This agreement or disagreement is said to be of four sorts: identity
or diversity; relation; co-existence or necessary connection; real
existence. Each of these kinds of knowledge raises its own questions;
but, broadly speaking, one distinction may be taken as fundamental. In
the same paragraph in which he restricts knowledge to the agreement or
disagreement of our ideas, he admits one kind of knowledge which goes
beyond the ideas themselves to the significance which they have for
real existence. When the reference does not go beyond the ideas "in
the mind," the problems that arise are of one order; when there is a
further reference to real things, another problem arises.
Locke also distinguishes between two degrees of knowledge:
intuition and demonstration. In the former case, the agreement
or disagreement is immediately perceived; in the latter, it is
perceived through the mediation of a third idea, but each step
in the demonstration is itself an intuition, the agreement or
disagreement between the two ideas compared being immediately
perceived. He believes that mathematics and ethics are
demonstrable. When ideas are together in the mind, we can
discover their relation to one another; so long as they are
not taken to represent archetypes outside the mind, there is
no obstacle to certainty of knowledge. "All relation
terminates in, and is ultimately founded on, those simple
ideas we have got from sensation or reflection"
(Bk. 2:28:18). but "general and certain truths, are only
founded in the habitudes and relations of abstract ideas"
(Bk. 4:12:7). In this way Locke vindicates the certainty of
mathematics: although instructive, the science is merely idea,
and its propositions do not hold of things outside the
mind. He thinks also that "morality is capable of
demonstration as well as mathematics." But, in spite of the
request of his friend Molyneux, he never set out his ethic
doctrine in detail. In Book II he reduced moral good and evil
to pleasure and pain which -- as reward and punishment -- come
to us from some lawgiver; thus they point to a source outside
the mind. But his ground for maintaining the demonstrative
character of morality is that moral ideas are "mixed modes,"
and therefore mental products, so that their "precise real
essence ... may be perfectly known." He ventures upon two
examples only of this demonstrative morality; and neither of
them is more than verbal or gives any information about good
or evil. Yet the doctrine is significant as showing the
influence upon Locke of another type of demonstrative thought.
Thus, knowledge of mathematics and ethics may be firmly
establish, particularly as these subjects involve relations
between ideas, and thus make no claims about matters of real
existence. When it comes to knowledge of real existence,
though, ultimately there are only two certainties: the
existence of ourselves (by intuition) and that of God (by
demonstration).
Concerning the self, Locke agrees with Descartes that the
existence of the self is implied in every state of
consciousness. Every element of our experience, every idea of
which we are conscious, is a certificate of our own existence,
as the subject of that experience:
Concerning God's existence, his proof is a cosmological-type
argument. From the certainty of our own existence that of the
existence of God immediately follows. A person knows
intuitively that he is "something that actually exists." Next
a person knows with intuitive certainty, that "bare nothing
can no more produce any real being, than it can be equal to
two right angles." it is, therefore, "an evident
demonstration", that from eternity there has been
something. And since all the powers of all beings must be
traced to this eternal Being, it follows that it is the most
powerful, as well as the most knowing, that is, God. Eternal
ind alone can produce "thinking, perceiving beings, such as we
find ourselves to be" (Bk. 4:10). Locke here assumes, without
question, the validity of the causal principle even beyond the
range of possible experience.
Sensitive Knowledge of the External
World
Below the rank of knowledge proper (intuitive and demonstrative),
Locke recognizes a third degree of knowledge, not strictly entitled to
the name. This is our sensitive apprehension of external things, or of
real objects other than ourselves and God:
Locke's argument for the objective validity of sensitive
knowledge consists of several considerations. First, he urges,
our ideas of sensation differ from those of memory and
imagination, that is from mere ideas, in being produced
in us without any action of our own, and therefore "must
necessarily be the product of things operating on the mind, in
a natural way, and producing therein those perceptions which
by the Wisdom and Will of our Maker they are ordained and
adapted to." They,
But even granting that our sensitive apprehensions of external
reality possesses the certainty which is the characteristic of
knowledge, as distinguished from mere opinion, we must observe
within how very narrow limits it is confined:
Locke finds himself compelled, therefore, to conclude that the
so-called "science" of which Bacon had talked so proudly, and
of whose achievements he had himself spoken so respectfully in
the opening pages of the Essay, is not, in the strict
sense, science at all; that, in his own words, there can be
"no science of bodies." It is vain to search for the "forms"
of the various material substances, or to seek to verify "the
corpuscularian hypothesis" as to the connection of the primary
and the secondary qualities of things. "I am apt to doubt
that, how far soever human industry may advance useful and
experimental philosophy in physical
things, scientifical will still be out of our
reach.... Certainty and demonstration are things
we must not, in these matters, pretend to" (Bk. 4:3:26).
If we cannot attain to a science of bodies, still less can we
expect "scientifical" understanding of spirits. Spiritual substance is, as we have
seen, as unknown as material substance; and Locke finds
additional reasons for limiting our knowledge in this sphere.
Judgment
The closing chapters of Book IV of the Essay are devoted to
a consideration of that kind of apprehension of reality which Locke
calls "judgment," as distinguished from "knowledge." "The faculty
which God has given man to supply the want of clear and certain
knowledge, in cases where that cannot be hand, is judgment:
whereby the mind takes its ideas to agree or disagree; or, which is
the same, any proposition to be true or false, without perceiving a
demonstrative evidence in the proofs" (Bk 4:19:1-2). So-called
"scientific" truths being generally of this kind, one would have
expected Locke to give here some account of the procedure of inductive
science, some directions for the careful and methodical study of the
facts, and cautions against the temptations to hasty and unwarranted
generalization, such as we find in Bacon's Novum Organum. But
instead of this, he contents himself with general observations on the
degrees of assent, on reason (and syllogism), on faith and reason, on
"enthusiasm," and on wrong assent, or error. The treatment of, that is
to say, is limited to general considerations regarding the function of
faith and the relations of faith and reason as guides of the human
mind.
What is especially significant here is Locke's refusal to oppose faith
and reason in the fashion of Bacon and Hobbes, and his refusal to
accept any authority which cannot vindicate itself through
reason. Even in his insistence upon the necessity of supplementing our
knowledge by faith, Locke emphasized the use of reason:
Yet reason clearly limits the field of its own insight; it is only
reasonable to believe where we cannot know and yet must act. However,
as morality and religion cannot be compassed by reason, such knowledge
must be supplemented by faith if we are to fulfill our divine
destiny. This is the point of view, not only of the closing chapters
of the Essay, but of his Resonableness of Christianity
(1695). The aim of this treatise is to recall men from the contentions
of the theological schools to the simplicity of the gospel as the rule
of human life.:
Two Treatises
of Government
In Two Treatises of Government he has two purposes in view:
to refute the doctrine of the divine and absolute right of the
Monarch, as it had been put forward by Robert
Filmer's Patriarcha, and to establish a theory which
would reconcile the liberty of the citizen with political
order. The criticism of Filmer in the first Treatise is
complete. His theory of the absolute sovereignty of Adam, and
so of kings as Adam's heirs, has lost all interest; and
Locke's argument has been only too effective: his exhaustive
reply to so absurd a thesis becomes itself wearisome. Although
there is little direct reference to Hobbes, Locke seems to
have had Hobbes in mind when he argued that the doctrine of
absolute monarchy leaves sovereign and subjects in the state
of nature towards one another. The constructive doctrines
which are elaborated in the second treatise became the basis
of social and political philosophy for generations. Labor is
the origin and justification of property; contract or consent
is the ground of government and fixes its limits. Behind both
doctrines lies the idea of the independence of the individual
person. The state of nature knows no government; but in it, as
in political society, men are subject to the moral law, which
is the law of God. Men are born free and equal in
rights. Whatever a man "mixes his labour with" is his to
use. Or, at least, this was so in the primitive condition of
human life in which there was enough for all and "the whole
earth was America." Locke sees that, when men have multiplied
and land has become scarce, rules are needed beyond those
which the moral law or law of nature supplies. But the origin
of government is traced not to this economic necessity, but to
another cause. The moral law is always valid, but it is not
always kept. In the state of nature all men equally have the
right to punish transgressors: civil society originates when,
for the better administration of the law, men agree to
delegate this function to certain officers. Thus government is
instituted by a "social contract"; its powers are limited, and
they involve reciprocal obligations; moreover, they can be
modified or rescinded by the authority which conferred
them. Locke's theory is thus no more historical than
Hobbes's. It is a rendering of the facts of constitutional
government in terms of thought, and it served its purpose as a
justification of the Revolution settlement in accordance with
the ideas of the time.
Economic
Writings
Locke's writings on economic subjects do not rank in importance
with his treatises on government. They deal with particular questions
raised by the necessities of the political situation. No attempt had
yet been made to isolate the fact of wealth and make it the subject of
a special science. The direction of industry and commerce was held to
be part of the statesman's duty; but, in the seventeenth century, it
began to be carried out with less thoroughness than before; and at the
same time new problems were opened up by the growth of the national
life. The American colonies, the enterprise of the East India Company,
the planting of Ireland, the commercial rivalry with Holland and withy
France, as well as questions regarding the rate of interest and the
currency, occupied the attention of a crowd of writers in the second
half of the century. Locke's own contributions were occasioned be the
financial problems which faced the new government after the
revolution. His reflections on the rate of interest show the growing
disfavor with which appeals for state interference were beginning to
be met. He points out the obstacles to trade that are caused when the
rate of interest is fixed by law, and he argues in favor of freedom
for what he calls, in words which suggest Adam Smith, "the natural
interest of money." Money "turns the wheels of trade"; therefore its
course should not be stopped. At the same time, he holds no general
brief against the interference of the state in matters of commerce;
nor is the language of the mercantilist foreign to him. Riches consist
in plenty of gold and silver, for these command all the conveniences
of life. Now, "in a country not furnished with mines, there are but
two ways of growing rich, either conquest or commerce." For us
commerce is the only way; and Locke condemns "the amazing politics of
some late reigns" which had "let in other competitors with us for the
sea." In the concluding portion of Some Considerations of the
Consequences of the Lowering of Interest and Raising the Value of
Money (1691), Locke laid stress on the importance of a uniform and
stable measure of values; four years later, in his Further
Considerations he defended his view against the proposals
involving a depreciation of the standard, which William Lowndes,
secretary of the treasury, had set forth in An Essay for the
amendment of the silver coins (1695).
Letters
on Religious Toleration
Locke's plea for toleration in matters of belief has become
classical. His Common-Place Book shows that his mind was clear
on the subject more than twenty years before the publication of his
first Letter. The topic, indeed, was in the air all through his
life, and affected him nearly. When he was a scholar at Westminster,
the powers of the civil magistrate in religious matters were the
subject of heated discussion between Presbyterians and independents in
the assembly of divines that held its sessions within a stone's throw
of his dormitory; and, when he entered Christ Church, John Owen, a
leader of the independents, had been recently appointed to the
deanery. There had been many arguments for toleration before this
time, but they had come from the weaker party in the state. Thus
Jeremy Taylor's Liberty of Prophesying appeared in 1646, when
the fortunes of his side had suffered a decline. For Owen the credit
has been claimed that he was the first who argued for toleration "when
his party was uppermost." He was called upon to preach before the
House of Commons on January 31, 1649, and performed the task without
making any reference to the tragic event of the previous day; but to
the published sermon he appended a remarkable discussion on
toleration. Owen did not take such high ground as Milton did, ten
years later, in his Treatise of Civil Power in Ecclesiastical
Causes -- affirming that "it is not lawful for any power on earth
to compel in matters of religion." He abounds in distinctions, and
indeed his position calls for some subtlety. He holds that the civil
magistrate has duties to the church, and that he ought to give
facilities and protection to its ministers, not merely as citizens but
as preachers of "the truth"; on the other hand he argues that civil or
corporeal penalties are inappropriate as punishments for offences
which are purely spiritual.
The position ultimately adopted by Locke is not altogether the
same as this. He was never an ardent puritan; he had as little
taste for elaborate theologies as he had for scholastic
systems of philosophy; and his earliest attempt at a theory of
toleration was connected with the view that in religion,
"articles in speculative opinions [should] be few and large,
and ceremonies in worship few and easy." The doctrines which
he held to be necessary for salvation would have seemed to
John Owen a meager and pitiful creed. And he had a narrower
view also of the functions of the state. "The business of
laws," he says,
A church, according to Locke, is "a free and voluntary society"; its
purpose is the public worship of God; the value of worship depends on
the faith that inspires it: "all the life and power of true religion
consists in the inward and full persuasion of the mind;" and these
matters are entirely outside the jurisdiction of the civil
magistrate. Locke therefore (to use later language) was a voluntary in
religion, as he was an individualist on questions of state
interference. There is an exception, however, to his doctrine of the
freedom of the individual in religious matters. The toleration
extended to all others is denied to papists and to atheists; and his
inconsistency in this respect has been often and severely
criticized. But it is clear that Locke made the exception not for
religious reasons but on grounds of state policy. He looked upon the
Roman Catholic as dangerous to the public peace because he professed
allegiance to a foreign prince; and the atheist was excluded because,
on Locke's view, the existence of the state depends upon a contract,
and the obligation of the contract, as of all moral law, depends upon
the divine will.
Theological
Writings
Locke's theological writings exhibit the characteristic qualities
which his other works have rendered familiar. The traditions of
theologians are set aside in them much as philosophical tradition was
discarded in the Essay. He will search the Scriptures for
religious doctrine just as he turned to experience for his philosophy,
and he follows a method equally straightforward. Locke does not raise
questions of Biblical criticism, such as Hobbes had already suggested
and some of his own followers put forward soon afterwards; and the
conclusions at which he arrives are in harmony with the Christian
faith, if without the fulness of current doctrine. At the same time,
his work belongs to the history of liberal theology and is intimately
connected with the deism which followed; it
treats religion like any other subject, and interprets the Bible like
any other book; and, in his view of the nature of religion, he tends
to describe it as if it consisted almost entirely in an attitude of
intellectual belief -- a tendency which became more prominent in the
course of the eighteenth century.
Educational
Writings
Locke's Thoughts concerning Education and his Conduct of
the Understanding occupy an important place in the history of
educational theory, though only a scanty reference can be made to them
here. The subject had a right to prominence in his thought. The stress
he laid n experience in the growth of mind led him to magnify, perhaps
overmuch, the power of education. He held that "the minds of children
[are] as easily turned, this way or that, as water itself." He
underrated innate differences: "we are born with faculties and powers,
capable almost of anything;" and, "as it is in the body, so it is in
the mind, practice makes it what it is." Along with this view went a
profound conviction of the importance of education, and of the breadth
of its aim. It has to fit men for life -- for the world, rather than
for the university. Instruction in knowledge does not exhaust it; it
is essentially a training of character.
IEP
Since it is the understanding that sets man above the rest of sensible
beings, and gives him all the advantage and dominion which he has over
them; it is certainly a subject, even for its nobleness, worth our
labour to inquire into. The understanding, like the eye, while it
makes us see and perceive all other things, takes no notice of itself;
and it requires art and pains to set it at a distance and make it its
own object. But whatever be the difficulties that lie in the way of
this inquiry; whatever it be that keeps us so much in the dark to
ourselves; sure I am that all the light we can let in upon our minds,
all the acquaintance we can make with our own understandings, will not
only be very pleasant, but bring us great advantage, in directing our
thoughts in the search of other things.
As for our own existence, we perceive it so plainly and so
certainly, that it neither needs nor is capable of any proof. For
nothing can be more evident to us than our own existence. I think, I
reason, I feel pleasure and pain: can any of these be more evident to
em than my own existence? If I doubt of all other things, that very
doubt makes me perceive my own existence, and will not suffer me to
doubt of that. For if I know I feel pain, it is evident I have as
certain perception of my own existence, as of the pain I feel: or if I
know I doubt, I have ascertain perception of the existence of the
thing doubting, as of that thought which I call doubt.
However, Locke fails to point out how the self can be an idea and thus
belong to the material of knowledge. An idea of the self cannot come
from sensation; and the simple ideas of reflection are all of mental
operations, and not of the subject or agent of these operations. On
the other hand, when he had occasion to discuss personal identity, he
followed his new way of idea, and made it depend on memory.
These two, viz. intuition and demonstration, are the degrees of
our knowledge; whatever comes short of one of these, with what
assurance soever embraced, is but faith or opinion, but
not knowledge, at least in all general truths. There is, indeed,
another perception of the mind, employed about the particular
existence of finite beings without us, which, going beyond bare
probability, and yet not reaching perfectly to either of the foregoing
degrees of certainty, passes under the name of knowledge. There
can be nothing more certain than that the idea we receive from an
external object is in our minds: this is intuitive knowledge. But
whether there be anything more than barely that idea in our minds;
whether we can thence certainly infer the existence of anything
without us, which corresponds to that idea, is that whereof some men
think there may be a question made; because men may have such ideas in
their minds, when no such thing exists, no such object affects their
senses. (Bk. 4:14)
Does not the very definition of knowledge, as the perception of the
agreement or disagreement of ideas with one another, preclude the
perception of the agreement of ideas with non-ideal reality?
carry with them all he conformity which is intended; or which our
state requires: for they represent to us things under those
appearances which they are fitted to produce in us: whereby we are
enabled to distinguish the sorts of particular substances, to discern
the states they are in, and so to take them for our necessities, and
apply them to our uses. (Bk. 4:4:4)
Secondly, pleasure or pain often accompanies the sensation, and is
absent from the idea as it recurs in memory or imagination; and "this
certainty is as great as our happiness or misery, beyond which we have
no concernment to know or to be" (Bk. 4:2:14). Thirdly, our several
senses assist one another's testimony, and thus enable us to predict
our sensational experience. On these grounds Locke concludes that,
the certainty of things existing in rerum natura when we have
the testimony of our senses for it is not only as great as our frame
can attain to, but as our condition needs. For, our faculties being
suited no to the full extent of being, nor to a perfect, clear,
comprehensive knowledge of things free from all doubt and scruple; but
to the preservation of us, in whom they are; and accommodated to the
use of life: they serve to our purpose well enough, if they will but
give us certain notice of those things, which are convenient or
inconvenient to us. (Bk. 4:2:14)
The certainty which Locke attributes to sensitive knowledge is thus
seen to be practical, rather than theoretical; and it is impossible to
distinguish this degree of knowledge from the belief or opinion which
results from a balance of probabilities rather than from certain
perception.
When our senses do actually convey into our understandings any idea,
we cannot but be satisfied that there doth something at that
time really exist without us, which doth affect our senses, and by
them give notice of itself to our apprehensive faculties, and actually
produce that idea which we then perceive: and we cannot so far
distrust their testimony, as to doubt that such collections of
simple ideas as we have observed by our senses to be united together,
do really exist together. But this knowledge extends as far as the
present testimony of our senses, employed about particular objects
that do then effect them, and no further. (Bk. 4:11:9)
We cannot demonstrate the necessity of the co-existence of those ideas
which constitute the modes or qualities of substances; we cannot
perceive their "necessary connexion or repugnancy." The connection
between the secondary and the primary qualities remains
inexplicable. "And therefore there are very few general propositions
to be made concerning substances, which carry with them undoubted
certainty" (Bk. 4:6:76). "Our knowledge in all these inquires reaches
very little further than our experience" (Bk. 4:3:13-14). Beyond the
strict warrant of experience, or the testimony of our senses, we may
venture upon "opinion" or "judgment" as to the co-existence of the
qualities of substances, but we cannot strictly "know". "Possibly
inquisitive and observing men may, by strength of judgment, penetrate
further, and, on probabilities taken from wary observation, and hints
well laid together, often guess right at what experience has not yet
discovered to them. But this is but guessing still; it amounts only to
opinion, and had not that certainty which is requisite to knowledge"
(Bk. 4:6:13)
If we are at a loss in respect of the powers and operations of bodies,
I think it is easy to conclude we are much more in the dark in
reference to spirits; whereof we naturally have no ideas but what we
draw from that of our own, by reflecting on the operations of our own
souls within us, as far as they come within our observation. But how
inconsiderable rank the spirits that inhabit our bodies hold amongst
those various and possibly innumerable kinds of nobler beings; and how
far short they come of the endowments and perfections of cherubim and
seraphim, and infinite sorts of spirits above us, is what by a
transient hint in another place I have offered to my reader's
consideration.
Faith is nothing but a firm assent of the mind: which, if it be
regulated, as is our duty, cannot be afforded to anything but upon
good reason; and so cannot be opposite to it. He that believes without
having any reason for believing, may be in love with his own fancies;
but neither seeks truth as he ought, nor pays the obedience due to his
maker.... (Bk. 4:27:24)
Locke is at one with the rationalist theologians of his century in
their antagonism to an "enthusiasm" which would substitute for the
insight of reason and of rational faith, the so called "revelation" of
private experience. Against such a view, he insists upon the necessity
of judging revelation by reason: "God when he makes the prophet does
not unmake the man. He leaves all his faculties in the natural state,
to enable him to judge of his inspirations, whether they be
of divine original or no.... Reason must be our last judge
and guide in everything" (Bk. 4:19:14).
The writers and wranglers in religion fill it with niceties, and dress
it up with notions, which they make necessary and fundamental parts of
it; as if there were no way into the church, but through the academy
or lyceum. The greatest part of mankind have not leisure for learning
and logic, and superfine distinctions of the schools.
What people need is not intellectual insight or theological dogma, but
practical guidance. Locke seems less confident than he was in
the Essay of the possibility of a rational science of
morals. "It should seem, by the little that has hitherto been done in
it, that it is too hard a task for unassisted reason to establish
morality, in all its parts, upon its true foundation, with a clear and
convincing light.... It is plain, in fact, that human reason
unassisted failed men in its great and proper business of morality."
is not to provide for the truth of opinions, but for the safety and
security of the commonwealth, and of every particular man's goods and
person. And so it ought to be. For truth certainly would do well
enough, if she were once left to shift for herself. She seldom has
received, and I fear never will receive, much assistance from the
power of great men, to whom she is but rarely known, and more rarely
welcome. She is not taught by laws, nor has she any need of force, to
procure her entrance into the minds of men. Errors, indeed, prevail by
the assistance of foreign and borrowed succors. But if truth makes
not her way into the understanding by her own light, she will be but
the weaker for any borrowed force violence can add to her.
Sources